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CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OE  FEEE 


CHINA, 

CAPTIVE    OR   FREE? 

A  Study  of 
Chinas  Entanglements 

BY 

Rev.  gilbert  REID,  A.M.,  D.D. 

DIRECTOR    OF   INTERNATIONAL    INSTITUTE   OF   CHINA 

Author  of  "Glances  at  China,"  "  Anti-foreign  DisturbanceB 

in   China,"    "Revolution   and   Religion,"   and  "A 

Christian's  Appreciation  of  Other  Faiths," 

and   many   books   in   Chinese 


NEW   YORK 

DODD,  MEAD  AND  COMPANY 

1921 


u/  t)  0  i£j  ,ij 


CorrRioHT,  1921 
Bv  DODD,  MEAD   AND  COMPANY,  IHO. 


PRINTED  IN  U.  S.  A. 


eOOK      MANUFACTURERS 
R  A  H  W  A  V  N  E.W    JERSEY 


i 

w 


ZD5 


PEEFACE 

"Now  it  can  be  told" — ^not  because  the  facts  have  not 

fy     been  known  or  because  any  censor  has  forbidden  their 

fj      publication,  but  because  the  temper  of  the  reading  public 

t^     has  not  yet  escaped  the  bias  of  war  and  resumed  the  calm- 

i\^    ness,  poise,  fairness  and  broad-mindedness  of  days  before 

the  war.    America  by  entering  the  war  and  through  glory 

of  achievement  has  not  suffered  militarily,  but  morally. 

Not  until  one  reaches  the  lofty  idealism  of  **  being  just 

.         to  those  to  whom  we  wish  to  be  just,  and  just  to  those  to 

^  I      whom  we  do  not  wish  to  be  just,"  will  he  read  with  patience 

'    such  a  book  as  this. 

^         The  author  primarily  is  an  advocate  of  justice  the  world 

over,  but,  to  be  intelligently  just,  there  comes  the  task  of 

accommodating  thinking  to  the  process  of  discrimination. 

In  times  of  war,  and  under  the  behests  of  war,  conscience 

;     must  be  set  to  sleep,  and  loyalty  must  shape  itself  by  cur- 

.^     rent  opinion,  loftily  proclaimed,  that  one's  own  nation  and 

^     all  her  associates  are  of  necessity  immaculate,  and  the  op- 

v^     posing  group  without  any  virtue  which  Heaven  or  man 

may  recognize.    When  peace  dawns,  and  reconstruction  is 

undertaken — undertaken  on  the  basis  of  real  re-conciliation 

— then  policies  and  systems,  customs  and  governments  must 

be  discriminated  from  peoples  and  the  individual,  and  even 

in  the  individual  one  must  learn  to  see  both  good  and  evil. 

So  far  as  peoples  are  concerned,  and  not  the  character 

of  their   dominating,    governmental    policies,    the    author 

acknowledges  that  as  a  resident  in  China  of  nearly  four 

decades,  he  is  pro-Chinese,  rather  than  pro-Japanese  or 

even  pro- American,  but,  even  so,  the  views  presented  are 

Y 


vi  PREFACE 

not  altogether  the  Chinese  view;  they  are  his  own  views. 
His  views  are  based  on  a  knowledge  of  existing  facts,  such 
as  the  average  person  does  not  generally  see,  and  the  ex- 
pression of  these  views  is  made  with  the  intent  of  being 
fair,  undetermined  by  prejudice  for  or  against  any  par- 
ticular people.  In  being  loyal  to  the  truth  and  true  to 
the  facts,  the  author  does  not  gainsay  that  other  fact,  that 
lie  is,  and  has  been,  and  will  continue  to  be,  supremely 
interested  in  the  welfare  of  the  Chinese  people  and  of 
China  as  a  nation. 

As  to  the  treatment  meted  out  to  China  by  other  nations, 
or,  more  specifically,  other  governments,  the  reader  will 
observe  that  Japan  at  certain  stages  vis-a-vis  China  is 
severely  criticized,  but  after  all  no  worse  than  the  criticism 
of  Great  Britain  and  no  worse  as  to  Great  Britain  than  the 
criticism  of  the  author's  own  government,  or  the  policy 
pursued  towards  China  by  the  Wilson  Administration  dur- 
ing the  delirium  of  war.  Other  readers  who  read  here  and 
there  a  line  will  refuse  to  face  the  facts  as  they  reveal 
favourably  the  German  temper  of  mind  on  the  eastern  out- 
skirts of  Asia,  far  removed  from  the  real  seat  of  the  awful 
conflict  in  arms.  All  that  the  author  asks  for  in  the  way 
of  indulgence  is  a  patient  study  of  the  facts.  He  acknowl- 
edges that  as  to  the  comparative  relationship  of  Allies  and 
Central  Powers  to  China  during  the  last  few  years,  and 
as  to  the  policy  pursued  and  their  general  demeanour,  he 
may  be  classed  more  as  pro-German  than  pro-Ally,  but  here 
again  the  reader  is  asked  to  study  the  facts.  At  bottom, 
the  worst  that  can  be  said  is  that  by  the  behests  of  Pres- 
ident Wilson  he  has  had,  and  still  has,  "friendship  and 
sympathy  for  the  German  people,"  and  has  refused  to 
discard  his  friendship  because  certain  governments  were 
determined  on  war. 

A  certain  amount  of  respect  may  be  accorded  the  author, 
if  it  be  known  that  for  adhering  to  his  convictions  and  out 


PREFACE  vii 

of  love  for  China  he  was  made  to  suffer  not  only  for  China, 
but  with  China,  and  underwent  some  tragic,  amusing  and 
puerile  persecution  from  the  great  diplomats  of  four  Le- 
gations, British,  French,  Japanese  and  even  American.  The 
U.  S.  Constitution,  like  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  both 
"slumbered  and  slept." 

Out  of  supreme  interest  in  the  permanency  and  well- 
being  of  China,  he  foregoes  the  personal  factor,  and  callj 
on  all  peoples  to  give  China  a  chance  and  to  help  her 
defend  her  rights. 

Let  the  reader — and  may  there  be  many  in  many  lands — 
"read,  learn,  and  inwardly  digest"  the  facts  as  here  told 
and  the  truth  at  which  the  author  has  aimed. 

Gilbert  Beid. 
February,  1921. 


CONTENTS 

I     A  Background  of  Foreign  Encroachments        1 
II     Germany's    Menace    to    China    and    Ger- 
many's Rights 16 

III  Intrusion  op  the  War  into  China  :  Britain 

AND  Japan  in  the  Lead       ....       36 

IV  Japan's  Inroads  in  China       ....       63 

V  The  Injury  to  China  through  American 

AND  Allied  Intrigue 84 

VI     A  Series  of  Aggravations  and  Perils  to 

China 121 

VII     Commercial  Eivalries  as  Affecting  China  147 
VIII     The  Blow  Struck  at  China  at  the  Peace 

Table 168 

IX     The  Future  Prospects  of  China  .       .       .  206 
X     Japan's  Future  Influence  in  China  .       .  223 
XI     The  Future  Influence  of  "Western  Na- 
tions in  China 243 

XII     Vital  Principles  versus  Spoliation     .       .  261 

'      APPENDIX 

I     The  Neutrality  of  China     ....    281 
II     A   Chinese  President's  Proclamation  on 

the  War,  and  Editorial  Comments  .       .     290 

III  The   Versailles   Treaty    Concerning   the 

Christian  Missions  of  Germany       .       .     295 

IV  The  Problem  of  German  Missions       .       .     297 

V  Conversation    of    President    Wilson    and 

U.  S.  Senators       .       .       .       .       .       .302 

VI     China's  Attitude  to  the  Anglo- Japanese 

Alliance  309 

Index 313 


CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE 


CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

CHAPTER   I 

A    BACKGROUND    OF    FOREIGN    ENCROACHMENTS 

The  contact  of  European  civilization  with  the  peoples 
of  Asia  and  Africa,  and  the  American  continents,  makes 
sad  reading  for  the  man  of  justice.  As  to  the  one  country 
of  China,  with  a  long  record  of  civilization,  statecraft, 
philosophy,  art  and  religion,  the  question  arises,  "Has 
China  been  blessed  or  cursed  by  Western  civilization?" 

The  seriousness  of  China's  international  relations  began 
in  the  early  eighties  in  the  growing  rivalry  and  conflict 
between  China  and  Japan,  with  Korea  as  a  centre.  Before 
that  time.  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia  were  the  chief 
countries  in  the  forceful  opening  of  China  to  the  trade, 
missions  and  diplomacy  of  the  rest  of  the  world,  accompa-^ 
nied  by  minor  acts  of  encroachment,  interference  and 
seizure  of  territory  under  the  legal  guise  of  treaties.  Look- 
ing at  the  sad  havoc  of  the  years,  Japan  may  well  claim  that 
she  is  no  worse  than  European  nations  in  their  treatment  of 
China.  From  China's  standpoint  all  outsiders  are  bad,  with 
no  sign  of  repentance.    I  mention  a  few  outstanding  facts. 

Great  Britain  began  her  aggressive  policy  with  the 
"Opium  War,"  ending  in  the  treaty  of  1842,  whereby  the 
island  of  Hongkong  became  an  English  crown  colony. 

Justin  McCarthy,  speaking  of  ways  to  justify  British 
action,  says: 

But  no  considerations  of  this  kind  can  now  hide  from  our  eyes 
the  fact  that  in  the  beginning  and  the  very  origin  of  the  quarrel 

1 


2  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OE  FREE! 

we  were  distinctly  in  the  wrong.  We  asserted,  or  at  least  acted 
on  the  assertion  of,  a  claim  so  unreasonable  and  even  monstrous 
that  it  never  could  have  been  made  upon  any  action  strong  enough 
to  render  its  assertion  a  matter  of  serious  responsibility.^ 

France  seconded  the  war  operations  of  the  British  and 
directed  her  efforts  henceforth  to  the  religious  task  of  being 
Protector  of  Catholic  Missions,  and  indirectly  of  Chinese 
converts.  It  is  hence  easy  to  understand  the  desire  once 
expressed  by  Prince  Kung  that  China  might  be  free  of 
* '  opium  and  missionaries. ' '  Opium  from  1842  spread  more 
and  more  throughout  China,  while  missionaries,  both  Cath- 
olic and  Protestant,  harassed  the  Chinese  Government  by 
so-called  "difficulties,"  dependent  for  settlement  on  the 
frequent  application  of  the  "gun-boat  policy." 

Concerning  the  view  that  China  presented  "a  vast  field 
of  lucrative  opportunities  for  British  merchants,"  J.  0.  P. 
Bland  writes :  * 

The  wars  of  1842  and  1858  were  deliberately  undertaken  for  the 
development  and  protection  of  that  field,  at  a  time  when  Eng- 
lishmen had  no  reason  to  anticipate  serious  rivalry  in  the  reaping 
of  its  harvests. 

Russia  during  these  years  had  encroached  from  the  north 
on  the  Amur  region  of  Manchuria,  and  from  the  northwest 
on  Chinese  Turkestan.  China  more  and  more  realized  that 
Russia  was  the  "Big  Bear." 

The  general  policy  of  the  United  States  to  China  as  to 
Japan  was  that  of  generosity,  made  conspicuous  by  Caleb 
Cushing  and  Anson  Burlingame. 

In  1883  and  1884  hostilities  arose  between  China  and 
France,  resulting  in  China's  losing  the  suzerainty  of 
Annam  and  Tongking,   which  passed  to  the   control  of 

*  "A  History  of  Our  Own  Times,"  p.  166. 

*  "  Recent  Events  and  Present  Policies  in  China,"  p.  256. 


FOREIGN  ENCROACHMENTS  3 

France  as  part  of  her  colonial  empire.  France  became  the 
menacing  factor  on  China's  southern  frontier,  as  Russia 
was  on  the  north. 

About  the  same  time — actually  in  1882 — after  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  had  induced  Korea  to  make 
with  them  commercial  treaties,  thus  impairing  China's 
suzerainty  of  Korea,  the  Chinese  Government  dispatched 
to  Korea  a  young  officer,  Yuan  Shih-kai,  with  a  small  force 
of  3,000  men,  to  maintain  China's  rights  and  prestige. 
Friction  between  Chinese  and  Japanese  ambitions  grew 
more  intense.  This  young  Chinese  was  viewed  by  Japan  as 
an  antagonist  and  became  still  more  so,  some  twenty  years 
later,  when  as  President  he  was  the  "strong  man"  of  China. 
Russia,  too,  in  the  early  eighties,  entered  upon  the  scene, 
and  was  looked  at  askance  by  Japan  even  more  than  by 
China.  Korea  was  already  the  centre  of  international 
intrigue. 

The  question  of  Korea,  whether  or  not  to  be  attached  to 
China  as  to  a  suzerain  Power,  was  an  object  of  interest  to 
Japan.  Out  of  this  question  has  sprung  Japan's  ever- 
expanding  ambition — or,  in  another  phraseology,  has  be- 
come a  progressive  nation  like  those  of  the  West.  Japan's 
"peaceful  expansion"  on  the  Asiatic  continent  goes  by  the 
decade  and  in  terms  of  war :  first,  1894,  in  war  with  China ; 
second,  1904,  in  war  with  Russia;  and  third,  1914,  in  war 
with  Germany.  By  1924  will  it  be  war  with  Britain,  or  the 
United  States,  or  a  decadent  white  race? 

It  was  1894  when  Japan  found  a  sufficiently  plausible 
reason  for  announcing  a  casus  belli  against  China.  In  the 
conflict  the  Chinese  navy,  trained  by  British  officers,  fell 
into  the  hands  of  Japan.  The  Chinese  army,  mostly  of 
the  old  style,  was  defeated,  retreating  from  Korea  and 
Manchuria.  Peking,  the  national  capital,  was  threatened. 
The  Chinese  Government  sued  for  peace.  China  was  humil- 
iated in  the  eyes  of  the  world.   Japan  of  a  sudden  rose  to  a 


4  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OB  FREE? 

commanding  position  among  the  Great  Western  Powers — 
the  only  strong  Eastern  Power  in  all  Asia. 

The  man  to  make  peace  on  the  Chinese  side  was  the  great 
Oriental  diplomat,  Li  Hung-chang,  aided  by  an  American, 
John  W.  Foster.  The  Japanese  diplomat  was  Count  Ito, 
already  known  to  Li  Hung-chang,  and  more  sure  of  success 
because  his  diplomacy  was  backed  by  military  conquest. 
All  that  China  had  to  do  was  to  submit. 

In  the  first  article  of  the  treaty  the  responsibility  was 
laid  on  China  to  "recognize  definitely  the  full  and  com- 
plete independence  and  autonomy  of  Korea, ' '  a  captivating 
phrase.  As  for  Japan,  she  made  no  declaration  to  this 
effe^. 

"Besides  an  indemnity  of  200,000,000  taels  (about  40,000,- 
000  pounds  sterling)  which  Japan  demanded  of  China, 
there  was  also  the  cession  of  the  island  of  Formosa,  of  the 
Pescadores  group,  and  of  the  peninsula  of  Liaotung  at  the 
southern  end  of  Manchuria.  This  latter  comprised  Port 
Arthur,  China's  strongest  fortification.  It  was  in  reference 
to  the  latter  cession  that  Li  Hung-chang  displayed  his 
skill  as  an  Oriental  diplomat.  Before  leaving  Peking  for 
peace  negotiations  at  Shimonoseki,  he  came  to  an  under- 
standing with  the  Russian  Minister  to  intervene  on  China's 
behalf.  Thus,  no  sooner  was  the  treaty  signed,  than  the 
Russian  Government,  backed  by  France  and  Germany, 
** recommended"  to  Japan  the  retrocession  of  Liaotung,  in 
lieu  of  a  further  indemnity  of  7,500,000  pounds  sterling. 
The  joint  advice  was  in  these  words : 

Such  territorial  acquisition  constitutes  a  menace  against  the 
capital  of  China,  renders  Korea's  independence  merely  nominal, 
and  jeopardizes  the  perpetual  peace  in  the  Far  East. 

Concerning  this  act  of  finesse,  H.  B.  Morse  writes : 

Mr.  Foster  declares  that  he  first  heard  of  the  demand  during  his 
stay  in  Peking,  April  24th  to  May  2nd,  and  that  "Li  Hung- 


FOREIGN  ENCROACHMENTS  5 

Chang  waited  anxiously  for  some  indication  from  Russia,  but 
none  was  received  by  him  till  we  reached  Tientsin  on  our  return." 
This  disposes  of  the  possibility  of  any  direct  assurance  having 
been  given;  but  none  the  less,  the  viceroy  must  have  had  a  rear 
sonable  expectation  that  the  action  would  be  taken.^ 

In  this  connection,  as  bearing  on  Japan's  future  policy 
of  expansion,  John  W.  Foster  writes : 

I  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  demand  for  territory  on  the 
mainland  of  China  was  contrary  to  the  better  judgment  of 
Marquis  Ito.  ...  In  my  conversations  with  Count  Mutsu,  I 
told  him  I  was  satisfied  Russia  would  not  pei-mit  Japan  to  occupy 
the  mainland  so  threateningly  near  to  Peking,  and  that  it  was  not 
good  policy  to  insist  upon  it.^ 

The  war,  and  then  the  peace  settlement,  of  China  and 
Japan  in  1894  and  1895,  have  had  serious,  unexpected, 
and  far-reaching  bearings,  all  linked  up  in  one  way  or 
another  with  the  political  manoeuvers  of  the  present  war. 

(1)  First  of  all,  the  way  was  open  for  Russia  to  push 
her  interests  in  Manchuria  as  China's  "true  friend,"  and 
to  find  at  last  an  outlet  to  the  sea. 

(2)  The  policy  of  China's  dependence  on  loans  from 
European  Powers  was  initiated  for  meeting  at  once  the 
indebtedness  to  Japan.  France  and  Russia  made  a  joint 
loan  of  400,000,000  francs,  and  British  and  German  bankers 
advanced  jointly  two  loans  of  16,000,000  pounds  sterling 
each.  The  British  required  of  the  Chinese  that  as  the 
maritime  customs  was  to  be  the  security,  the  Inspector 
General  of  the  customs  should  be  a  Britisher  so  long  as 
Britain  held  the  preponderance  of  foreign  trade.  This 
arrangement  now  spurs  on  the  Japanese  to  be  preponderant 

' "  The  International  Relations  of  the  Chinese  Empire,"  Vol.  HI, 
p.  47. 
•  "  Diplomatic  Memoirs,"  Vol.  II,  p.  163. 


6  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

in  China,  both  politically  and  commercially,  in  place  of 
Britain. 

(3)  More  serious  for  the  political  integrity  of  China  was 
the  policy  adopted  in  1898  of  acquiring  in  the  name  of  lease 
small  sections  of  Chinese  territory  and  some  of  China's 
most  important  harbours,  capable  of  fortification.  The 
country  responsible  for  the  first  move  was  Germany,  a  new 
factor  in  China's  international  relations.  Germany's  am- 
bitions to  have  a  place  in  the  sun,  as  it  shines  in  old  Cathay, 
succeeded  those  of  Great  Britain,  France,*  Russia,  the 
United  States,  and  Japan.  The  impelling  cause  of  Ger- 
many's action,  so  calamitous  to  China,  was  these  two  fol- 
lowing facts: — (a)  Two  Catholic  missionaries  of  German 
nationality,  and  connected  with  a  new  diocese  in  western 
Shantung  under  a  German  bishop,  were  killed  by  a  Chinese 
mob  near  the  close  of  1897.  A  fitting  penalty,  in  line  with 
the  long-established  policy  of  Force,  was  demanded.  Rep- 
aration had  in  fact  been  made  prior  to  the  ingenious  pro- 
posal— no  part  of  the  reparation — that  Germany  have  a 
port  of  her  own.  This  policy,  along  with  the  circumstances 
that  gave  rise  to  it,  I  criticized  then,  and  criticize  still  more 
strongly  today,  (b)  Still  more  important  was  the  fact  that 
Russia  had  already  begun  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  in 
Manchuria,  and  was  advancing  to  a  position  of  dominating 
influence,  if  not  territorial  acquisition,  at  Port  Arthur,  at 
the  harbour  of  Dalny,  and  in  Liaotung,  which  only  two 
years  before  had  been  retroceded  by  Japan  to  China.  Russia 
was  also  reported  as  having  been  assured  by  China  of  a 
concession  in  Shantung  of  Kiaochow  Bay  and  harbour. 
Moreover,  a  memorial  had  been  presented  to  Lord  Salisbury 
in  1896,  by  one  who  had  investigated  the  region,  that  the 
British  Government  take  steps  to  get  co^trol  of  this  un- 
developed port.^ 
Amid  such  a  clash  of  powerful  rivals,  China  preferred 
*  I  Baw  the  memorial  while  living  in  Peking  at  the  time. 


FOREIGN  ENCROACHMENTS  7 

Germany  to  both  Russia  and  Great  Britain,  who  already 
had  won  a  dominating  influence.  By  admitting  Germany, 
a  check  could  be  placed  on  Russia  and  Britain,  just  as 
Russia,  France  and  Germany  had  been  a  check  to  Japan. 
It  had  always  been  the  diplomacy  of  Li  Hung-chang  (and 
successful  it  had  proved  to  be)  to  play  one  nation  against 
another.  This  meant  equilibrium  for  China,  and  national 
security. 

The  German  Government,  conscious  that  German  inter- 
ests were  deprived  of  the  special  advantages  which  Britain, 
France,  Russia  and  even  Japan  had  acquired,  negotiated 
with  the  Chinese  Government  for  the  leasehold  of  Kiao- 
chow.  This  included  the  harbour  and  hamlet  of  Tsingtao, 
as  yet  undeveloped.  The  treaty  was  signed  March  6,  1898. 
The  lease  was  made  out  for  ninety-nine  years. 

March  27,  following  the  example  of  Germany,  a  Conven- 
tion was  signed  by  China  and  Russia,  leasing  Port  Arthur 
and  Talien-wan  (Dairen)  to  Russia  for  a  term  of  twenty- 
five  years.  Russia  thus  secured  the  strongest  fortification  on 
the  China  coast.  She  acquired  that  which  was  objected  to 
in  the  case  of  Japan  three  years  before,  but  it  is  well  to 
remember  that  Japan's  stipulation  was  for  permanent  ces- 
sion, while  that  of  Russia  was  for  a  lease  during  a  short 
period  of  years. 

April  3,  Great  Britain  insisted  on  a  Convention  with 
China,  and,  July  1,  signed  the  Convention,  leasing  Wei- 
haiwei  in  the  province  of  Shantung  to  Great  Britain  "for 
so  long  a  period  as  Port  Arthur  shall  remain  in  the  occu- 
pation of  Russia.'*  This  port,  together  with  the  island  of 
Liukungtao,  was  opposite  to  Port  Arthur,  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Gulf  of  Pehchihli,  and  opposite  to  Tsingtao,  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Shantung  peninsula.  Next  to  Port  Arthur 
it  was  China's  most  important  naval  base  and  land  fortress. 

France,  too,  had  her  demands.  May  27,  France  and 
China  signed  a  Convention  leasing  to  France  a  harbour  on 


8  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

the  sonthem  coast  of  Canton  province  (Kuang-tung), 
known  as  Kuang-chow-wan,  for  a  period  of  ninety-nine 
years. 

—  It  IS  interesting  here  to  note  that  in  this  same  year,  1898, 
though  after  the  forced  lease  of  territory  to  the  four  Euro- 
pean Powers,  there  came,  under  the  leadership  of  Emperor 
Kuang-hsii,  the  hundred  days  of  reform,  succeeded  by  the 
coup  d'etat  of  the  Empress  Dowager  and  her  reactionary 
measures.  Yuan  Shih-kai,  back  from  Korea,  was  conspic- 
uous in  bringing  on  the  coup.  This  was  an  internal  blow 
at  China's  well-being. 

(4)  Another  intrusion  on  China's  sovereign  position  was 
the  adoption  of  the  policy  of  spheres  of  interest,  sometimes 
called  spheres  of  influence.  The  latter  is  more  a  political 
term,  leading  gradually  to  China's  dismemberment.  Con- 
cerning a  sphere  of  interest,  T.  W.  Overlach  says: 

Its  essential  element  is  a  negative  one:  namely,  the  term  ex- 
presses the  principle  that  no  other  power  except  the  one  in 
whose  favour  the  "sphere  of  interest"  exists  shall  be  permitted 
to  acquire  concessions  or  to  exert  any  control  or  influence  whatso- 
ever— not  to  speak  about  military  occupation — at  the  same  time 
giving  the  privileged  power  a  monopoly  of  the  right  to  seek 
concessions.^  . 

The  root  of  this  dubious  policy  was  in  the  special  demands 
made  by  France,  after  the  hostilities  of  1883  and  1884,  with 
reference  to  Chinese  provinces  bordering  on  Annam.  The 
southwestern  province  of  Yunnan  was  especially  affected. 
After  the  China-Japan  war,  the  French  extended  their 
sphere  to  the  provinces  of  Kuang-tung  and  Kuang-hsi, 
where  was  located  the  leased  territory  of  Kwang-Chou-wan. 
Great  Britain,  however,  managed  to  secure  counter  conces- 
sions both  in  Kuang-tung  and  Yunnan,   as  a  check  on 

* "  Foreign  Financial  Control  in  China,"  p.  v. 


FOREIGN  ENCROACHMENTS  9 

France.  Most  important  of  all,  as  a  counterbalance  to 
the  French  Indo-China  empire,  Great  Britain,  July  24, 
1886,  arranged  with  China  that  Burma  should  pass  from 
the  suzerainty  of  China  to  the  complete  control  of  Great 
Britain. 

^  Recognition  of  the  Russian  sphere  of  interest  in  the  three 
provinces  of  Manchuria,  leading  up  to  the  acquired  lease 
of  the  Liaotung  peninsula  in  1898,  succeeded  that  of  France 
in  the  southern  provinces,  and  was  also  contrary  to  the 
original  desires  of  the  British  Government  as  represented 
by  Lord  Salisbury.  Russia's  insistence  on  her  right  to 
make  her  own  arrangement  with  the  Chinese  Government 
led  finally  to  Britain's  acquiescence. 

Germany's  sphere  of  interest  was  a  part  of  the  momen- 
tous transactions  pertaining  to  Kiaochow  in  1898.  Lord 
Salisbury  did  not  like  the  trend  of  events,  but  in  true  diplo- 
matic style  yielded  to  Germany 's  wishes  to  avoid  all  danger 
of  a  clash.    H.  B.  Morse  says : 

England  had  no  desire  to  see  the  "  break-up "  of  China,  of 
which  these  successive  cessions  (of  1898)  seemed  to  be  the  be^- 
ning;  and,  acting  on  her  unvaiying  policy  in  China,  her  one  wish 
was  to  maintain  the  equality  of  opportunity  which  had  existed  up 
to  that  time.^ 

Japan  also  had  her  sphere  of  interest  in  Fukien  province, 
as  a  natural  corollary  of  the  cession  in  1895  of  the  island  of 
Formosa. 

Great  Britain,  in  this  nice  political  game  of  tit  for  tat, 
brought  forward  the  claim,  to  which  she  has  held  to  the 
present  time,  that  the  whole  Yang-tsze  valley,  even  includ- 
ing the  western  province  of  Szechuan,  must  be  the  British 
sphere  of  interest.    The  British  Government,  however,  has 

^  "  The  International  Relations  of  the  Chinese  Empire,"  Vol.  Ill, 
p.  113. 


10  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

found  it  no  easy  task  to  exclude  other  nationals  from  acts 
of  exploitation  in  the  Yang-tsze  basin. 

As  between  Britain  and  Russia,  an  arrangement  was 
reached  in  April,  1899,  that  Britishers  were  not  to  seek 
railway  or  mining  concessions  north  of  the  Great  Wall,  and 
Russians  were  not  to  seek  similar  concessions  in  the 
Yang-tsze  valley. 

As  between  Britain  and  France,  each  has  had  the  habit 
of  intruding  on  the  "preserve"  of  the  other,  France  gen- 
erally making  use  of  Belgium  to  soothe  British  suscepti- 
bilities. 

As  between  Britain  and  Japan,  the  former  has  never 
wounded  the  Japanese  sense  of  honour  as  related  to  prior 
position  in  Fukien,  though  reciprocity  has  been  made  im- 
possible through  Japanese  ambitions  along  the  Yang-tsze 
river. 

As  between  Britain  and  Germany,  the  lease  of  Weihaiwei 
to  Britain  was  viewed  by  Germany  as  an  infringement  of 
the  German  "preserve."  Friction,  however,  was  avoided 
by  Britain  disclaiming  any  desire  to  obstruct.  Notice  the 
official  statement: 

The  British  Government,  in  view  of  the  approaching  occupa- 
tion of  Weihaiwei,  has  spontaneously  intimated  to  the  German 
Government  that  it  has  not  the  intention  of  injuring  or  calling 
into  question  German  rights  or  interests  in  the  province  of  Shan- 
tung, or  of  creating  any  difiBeulties  for  the  German  Government 
in  that  province.^ 

(5)  A  final  circumstance  in  the  international  relation- 
ship of  China  was  the  battle  for  commercial  concessions. 
All  nations  took  part  in  the  scramble.  Americans,  disap- 
proving of  the  other  forms  of  encroachment,  appeared  as 
active  concessionaires,  acquiring  the  concession  for  railway 

*  Rockhill,  "  Treaties  with  China,"  p.  180. 


FOREIGN  ENCROACHMENTS  11' 

between  Hankow  and  Canton.  The  Russians  were  push- 
ing the  great  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  system,  crossing 
Manchuria  from  the  Amur  to  Port  Arthur.  The  French 
began  to  build  a  line  through  Tongking  into  Yunnan.  The 
Germans  were  building  the  first  line  in  the  sacred  province 
of  the  Sages,  across  Shantung  from  Tsingtao  to  Tsinan-fu, 
the  provincial  capital. 

The  British  had  rather  the  preponderance  of  first  claim 
in  mines  and  railways.  The  Peking  Syndicate  acquired 
control  of  the  vast  coal  area  in  the  northern  provinces  of 
Shanse  and  Honan,  and  as  to  railways  J.  0.  P.  Bland 
writes : 

In  1898,  with  the  acute  development  of  the  "  spheres  of  influ- 
ence "  regime  and  the  assertion  by  Great  Britain  of  special  rights 
in  the  Yangtsze  Valley,  five  exclusively  British  railway  concessions 
in  that  region  were  extracted  from  China  under  severe  diplomatic 
pressure  by  the  British  Minister.* 

These  five  phases  of  outside  intrusion  into  Chinese  life, 
and  often  of  unjust  encroachment  and  inconsiderate  inter- 
ference, helped  to  bring  on  the  Boxer  uprising  of  1899 
and  1900. 

This  uprising,  resulting  in  the  siege  of  the  Legations, 
was  disastrous  to  China.  The  Protocol,  signed  by  all,  and 
forced  on  the  Chinese,  was  from  first  to  last  punitive.  In  the 
midst  of  much  that  was  harsh,  inconsiderate,  and,  as  seen 
today,  unfair,  there  were  two  favourable  circumstances, 
one  the  preservation  of  Chinese  autonomy  through  adher- 
ence to  the  equitable  policy  of  spheres  of  interest,  linked 
with  the  Hay  policy  of  the  open  door  in  matters  of  ordinary 
trade,  missions  and  residence,  and  the  other  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  Manchu  monarchy  with  protection  accorded  to 
the  old  Empress  Dowager,  who  was  in  many  respects  the 
most  guilty  person  in  the  whole  anti-foreign  uprising. 

* "  Recent  Events  and  Present  Policies  in  China,"  p.  270. 


12  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

When,  ten  years  after  the  China-Japan  war,  the  war 
arose  in  1904  between  Japan  and  Russia,  Japan  had  her 
second  great  opportunity  to  establish  herself  in  China,  not 
so  much  on  an  equality  with  Western  nations  as  in  a  po- 
sition ahead  of  them. 

This  war  had  also  certain  effects  on  Chinese  political 
life: — (1)  In  waging  the  war  the  Chinese  Government  was 
induced  to  give  up  its  neutrality  by  granting  a  war  zone 
in  Manchuria  for  both  belligerents.  As  for  Russia  and 
Japan,  they  both  infringed  on  China's  neutral  territory. 

(2)  Russian  rights  and  privileges  in  southern  Manchu- 
ria, including  the  retroceded  Liaotung  peninsula,  were 
ceded  by  the  Portsmouth  treaty  to  Japan.  This  established 
Japanese  influence  not  only  in  the  south,  in  Fukien,  but  in 
the  north,  in  Manchuria. 

(3)  The  arrangements  made  were  first  between  Russia 
and  Japan  and  then  between  them  and  China.  A  clause 
was  introduced  into  the  Sino-Japanese  Convention,  giving 
Japan  an  exclusive  position  in  southern  Manchuria. 

(4)  Japan  more  than  ever  acquired  a  position  in  Korea 
to  the  exclusion  of  both  China  and  Russia. 

(5)  Japan,  by  her  military  operations,  greatly  enhanced 
her  prestige  among  the  nations  of  the  world. 

Following  close  upon  Japan's  gain,  if  not  complete  vic- 
tory, in  the  war  with  Russia,  came  the  gradual  absorption 
of  Korea.  In  the  Portsmouth  treaty  of  1905  the  indepen- 
dence of  Korea  is  not  mentioned,  but  it  states  that  Japan 
"possesses  in  Korea  paramount  political,  military  and  eco- 
nomical interests. ' '  By  1906  Japan  had  a  Resident-General 
in  Seoul,  in  the  person  of  Count  Ito.  Then  followed  com- 
plete control  of  Korea's  affairs,  in  the  name  of  a  protec- 
torate, and  finally,  in  a  very  diplomatic  way,  the  absorption 
of  Korea  into  Japan's  national  life  in  1910.  This,  along 
with  the  rights  acquired  from  Russia  in  Manchuria,  gave 
a  preponderance  to  Japan  in  affairs  of  the  Far  East.    It 


FOREIGN  ENCROACHMENTS  13 

remained  for  Japan  to  make  her  power  a  menace  or  a  help 
to  China. 

A  further  move  on  the  part  of  Japan  for  establishing 
her  leadership,  and  for  having  it  recognized,  was  to  make 
Conventions  concerning  China  with  Great  Britain,  first  in 
1902,  then  in  1905,  and  then  in  1911 ;  with  Russia  in  1907 ; 
with  France  in  the  same  year ;  and  with  the  United  States 
in  1908.  These  conventions  recognized,  if  they  did  not 
guarantee,  "the  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of 
China. ' '  This  was  much  like  the  policy  in  Europe  of  strong 
Powers  neutralizing  smaller  States.  The  insult  to  China 
was  in  the  fact  that  outside  nations  proceeded,  under  Ja- 
pan 's  initiative,  to  negotiate  about  China,  without  negotiat- 
ing with  China,  or  doing  it  at  China's  request.  China  was 
ignored  in  her  own  affairs. 

These  conventions  also  stipulated  "equal  opportunities 
for  the  trade  and  industries  of  all  nations,"  a  splendid 
theory  if  meant  to  be  carried  out,  whether  in  peace  or  in 
war. 

There  has  never  been  anything  sentimental  in  the  foreign 
policy  of  Japan,  and  her  statesmen  have  from  the  first  displayed 
a  thorough  appreciation  of  the  fact  that  Treaties  and  Conven- 
tions between  the  great  Powers  may  serve  to  conceal,  but  not  to 
hinder,  the  processes  of  geographical  gravitation  and  the  ulterior 
purposes  of  statesmen.^ 

In  a  general  way,  there  were  two  groups  of  concession- 
hunters  and  financial  exploiters.  The  one  group  was 
French  and  Russian,  with  whom  Belgium  generally  asso- 
ciated. The  other  group  was  British  and  German,  with 
whom  Americans  and  Japanese  were  more  apt  to  join,  as 
the  stronger  combination.  As  early  as  1895  the  Hongkong 
and  Shanghai  Banking  Corporation  made  an  agreement 

^  J.  0.  P.  Bland,  "  Recent  Events  and  Present  Policies  in  China," 
p.  293. 


14  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

with  the  Deutsche-Asiatische  Bank  to  share  all  business 
acquired  from  the  Chinese  Government.  This  co-operation 
extended  with  only  a  slight  break  down  to  the  Great  War. 
There  were  exceptional  acts  in  this  general  grouping,  as 
when  Belgians  joined  with  British  and  Americans  in  con- 
cessionary schemes,  or  British  and  French  formed  a  Com- 
pany for  joint  exploitation. 

It  should  not  be  overlooked  that  after  the  Boxer  up- 
rising, the  Germans,  acting  on  business  principles,  rather 
than  under  orders  from  German  officialdom,  adopted  an 
attitude  to  the  Chinese  that  was  conciliatory,  friendly, 
adaptable  and  co-operative.  By  this  change  Germans  won 
great  success  in  matters  of  trade  in  China.  The  terms  of 
the  agreement  made  with  the  Germans  for  building  the 
railway  between  Tientsin  and  Nanking  (Pukou)  were  more 
generous  to  the  Chinese  than  in  all  previous  concessions, 
and  when  the  British  were  admitted  to  the  arrangement  for 
building  the  southern  half,  they  had  to  agree  to  the  same 
liberal  terms.  In  proportion  as  Germans  succeeded,  others 
became  jealous  and  plotted  ruin. 

The  last  great  event  prior  to  the  World  War  was  the 
first  revolution  which  took  place  in  1911,  bringing  about 
the  abdication  of  the  Manchu  House  in  1912.  In  this  revo- 
lution as  also  in  the  second  revolution  of  1913,  Japan  had 
the  peculiar  opportunity,  if  she  cared  to  utilize  it,  of  help- 
ing to  keep  China  weak  by  keeping  her  in  turmoil.  The 
Japanese  Government,  as  was  natural,  was  more  in  sym- 
pathy with  the  Manchu  monarchy,  while  radical  Japanese 
were  ready  to  give  aid  to  the  revolutionary  party  under 
Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen.  On  the  other  hand,  when  Yuan  Shih-kai 
became  President,  he  had  but  little  support  from  any  fac- 
tion in  Japan,  owing  to  the  old  disagreements  when  he  was 
Chinese-Resident  in  Korea,  prior  to  the  China-Japan 
Var. 
_In  the  main,  then,  through  the  last  two  decades.  Great 


FOREIGN  ENCROACHMENTS  15 

Britain's  preponderating  influence  was  passing  to  Japan. 
To  both,  Germany  was  the  great  competitor,  and  next  came 
the  United  States,  with  Russia  and  France  receding  in 
matters  of  trade,  but  still  busy  in  matters  political.  These 
rivalries  with  threatening  collisions  encircled  China.  J.  0. 
P.  Bland  says  of  Japan's  steady  advance: 

By  virtue  of  her  geographical  situation  and  her  new  military 
prestige,  Japan  could  not  only  assert  preponderant  political 
claims  at  Peking,  but  she  could  hope  to  push  her  trade  and 
industries  throughout  China  in  successful  competitioii  with  the 
European  Powers,  her  ally  included.^ 

China's  unfortunate  position  today,  and  the  new  crisis 
in  her  political  existence,  are  involved  in  the  events  of 
previous  years,  wherein  China  was  made  to  bend  to  the 
will  of  stronger  Powers.  China  may  give  thanks  to  High 
Heaven,  but  to  no  one  else.  If  she  survives,  it  will  be  by 
a  Providential  interposition,  and  not  by  the  favour  of  men. 

* "  Recent  Events  and  Present  Policies  in  China,"  p.  294. 


CHAPTER  II 

Germany's  menace  to  china  and  Germany's  rights 

In  nothing  is  it  more  difficult  to  exercise  discrimination 
of  judgment,  which  is  essential  to  being  just,  than  con- 
cerning Germany's  position  in  China.  The  first  disclosure 
of  German  designs  as  a  political  factor,  though  coming  after 
the  movements  of  Britain,  France  and  Russia,  and  even  of 
Japan,  did  not  increase  the  reputation  of  Germany.  Other 
countries  made  inroads  after  waging  a  war;  Germany 
threatened  a  war  and  then  marched  forward.  The  Chinese, 
like  the  rest  of  civilized  peoples,  can  never  forget  the  threat 
of  the  "mailed  fist."  It  was  a  bad  way  to  seek  ac- 
quaintance. 

But,  to  be  fair,  Germany's  strong  action  in  1897  and 
1898  was  no  worse  than  the  encroaching  policy  of  other 
Powers.  The  only  great  Power  that  was  free  from  high- 
handedness and  territorial  aggrandizement  was,  up  to  that 
time,  the  United  States. 

Moreover,  the  forced  lease  of  Chinese  ports  for  exclusive 
foreign  control,  and  the  insistent  demand  for  concessionary 
Tights,  as  pursued  in  1898  by  Germany,  Russia,  Great 
Britain  and  France,  were  all  on  a  par. 

The  one  to  complain  or  to  censure  was  China  alone,  and 
the  four  great  military  Powers  of  Europe  were  equally  at 
fault,  if  fault  there  was. 

It  is  well  to  remember  that  Germany's  menace  to  China 
was  not  during  the  period  of  a  World  War  or  since,,  but 
sixteen  years  before.  If  menace  there  has  been  in  these 
latter  years  it  has  not  been  to  China,  but  rather  to  the 
commercial  ambitions  of  rival  nations. 

16 


GERMANY'S  MENACE  TO  CHINA  17 

Even  in  the  year  1898,  when  the  action  of  Germany  for 
gaining  a  foothold  in  China  is  open  to  condemnation,  a 
clear-cut,  discriminatory  analysis  is  incumbent,  in  the  in- 
terests of  the  law  of  righteousness.  The  treaty  as  to  Kiao- 
chow  made  between  the  two  governments  of  Germany  and 
China  was  not  the  reprehensible  part  of  their  inter-rela- 
tions, was  in  no  wise  an  act  of  duress,  but  where  the  Ger- 
mans are  open  to  censure  was  in  the  settlement  previously 
reached  for  the  massacre  of  two  German  missionaries.  The 
treaty,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  was  subsequent  to  the  use  of  ^ 
force  and  to  what,  after  the  event,  may  be  called  a  harsh 
settlement.  At  that  time  the  general  feeling  among  for- 
eigners in  China  was  that  Germany  aided  all  jother  govern- 
ments in  insisting  that  Chinese  officials  give  proper  pro- 
tection to  missionaries.  Riots  had  arisen  in  different  parts 
of  China,  and  the  British,  French  and  American  Legations 
were  wont  to  use  pretty  strong  language  to  bring  the 
Chinese  Foreign  Office  to  terms.  Let  me  quote  from  a 
dispatch  of  Sir  Claude  McDonald,  the  British  Minister,  to 
Lord  Salisbury  under  date  of  December  1,  1897,  as  it  ap- 
pears in  the  Parliamentary  Papers :  ^ 

During  the  summer  there  were  prevalent  in  this  province 
rumours  of  the  kidnapping  of  children  of  foreigners,  which  pro- 
duced much  excitement,  and  placed  the  mission<aries  in  the  in- 
terior in  great  danger.  The  Governor,  in  spite  of  much  pressure, 
did  nothing  to  suppress  these  rumours,  and  even  by  his  attitude 
gave  them  tacit  encouragement.  After  repeatedly  calling  the 
Yamen's  attention  to  his  conduct,  I  was  at  last  obliged  to  desire 
them  to  warn  him  that  if  any  serious  incident  occurred  as  a  result 
of  his  anti-foreign  spirit,  he  would  find  himself  in  jeopardy.  This 
I  did  in  a  note  so  long  ago  as  the  27th  of  July  and  the  result 
was,  according  to  a  report  from  His  Majesty's  consul  at  Chefoo, 
that  active  measures  were  at  length  taken  to  check  the  rumours 
and  the  ferment  thereupon  subsided. 

*  See  A.  H.  Snow's  article  in  the  Nation,  September  20,  1919. 


18  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

It  is  not  possible  at  present  to  ascertain  whether  this  agitation 
has  indirectly  led  to  the  present  outrage,  but  the  Governor's  atti- 
tude has  been  such  as  to  induce  full  approval  of  the  Qerman 
demand  for  his  dismissal. 

Sir  Claude  writes  thus  of  the  dispatch  of  three  small 
German  cruisers  to  Kiaochow  Bay,  on  the  massacre  of  two 
German  Catholic  missionaries: 

If  the  German  occupation  of  Kiaochow  is  only  used  as  a 
leverage  for  obtaining  satisfactory  reparation  .  .  .  for  the  mur- 
der of  German  missionaries,  the  effect  on  the  security  of  our  own 
people  will  be  of  the  best. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  German  object  is  to  secure  Kiaochow 
as  a  naval  station  under  cover  of  their  demands  for  reparation,  it 
is  by  no  means  clear  that  their  acquisition  of  it  will  prejudice  our 
interests. 

Mr.  Snow,  from  whom  I  derive  these  valuable  citations, 
sums  up  in  this  admirable  fashion : 

The  terms  of  the  reparation  settlement  were  agreed  upon  about 
two  months  before  the  treaty  was  signed.  The  Governor  was 
degraded.  The  money  reparation  included  compensation  to  the 
relatives  of  the  murdered  priests,  damages  for  injury  to  the 
mission  buildings,  and  a  contribution  to  the  building  of  mission 
chapels  near  the  scene  of  the  murder.  The  reparation-money  was 
paid  to  the  Roman  Catholic  authorities.  Germany  obtained  for 
itself  and  all  foreign  states  an  Imperial  tablet  condemnatory  of 
the  anti-Christian  and  anti-foreign  proceedings.  The  next  year 
the  Vatican  granted  to  Germany  the  ecclesiastical  protectorate 
over  Roman  Catholics  in  Shantung;  this  religious  sphere  of  influ- 
ence being  subtracted  from  that  of  France,  which  had  theretofore 
extended  over  all  China. 

The  treaty  stated  that  the  Chinese  Government  regarded  the 
occasion  of  the  amicable  closing  of  the  reparation  settlement  as 
an  appropriate  one  for  giving  a  concrete  evidence  of  its  grateful 
recognition  of  friendship  shown  to  it  by  Germany. 


GERMANY'S  MENACE  TO  CHINA  19 

As  to  the  compacts  themselves,  which  were  diplomatically 
negotiated  between  the  Chinese  and  German  governments, 
they  deserve  careful  analysis,  if  only  that  we  may  judge 
with  a  righteous  judgment  concerning  the  bewildering 
action  taken  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  in  1919. 

According  to  past  usage,  and  even  in  the  identical  lan- 
guage of  the  Versailles  treaty,  what  Germany  had  in  Shan- 
tung was  certain  "rights."  If  she  had  any  rights,  they 
were  granted  her  by  China  and  by  China  alone.  These 
rights,  moreover,  were  determined  by  treaty  of  the  two 
governments  of  China  and  Germany,  and  by  the  action  of 
no  other  government.  For  others  to  strike  a  blow  at  this 
contract  is  an  offence  to  China  as  much  as  to  Germany. 
China  has  been  wronged  amid  the  upheaval  of  war  just 
because  Germany  has  been  wronged.  Righteousness  has 
suffered  even  more.  A  contract  has  been  ignored,  a  treaty 
has  been  cast  aside,  and  that  by  outsiders.  Rights,  both 
of  Chinese  and  Germans,  have  been  trampled  in  the  dust. 

What,  then,  were  German  rights  in  China,  particularly 
in  Shantung?  What  was  the  compact,  solemnly  sealed  and 
signed  by  the  two  governments,  in  March,  1898? 

The  contract  is  in  two  parts,  the  one  a  treaty  respecting 
the  lease  of  Kiaochow  to  Germany  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, and  the  other  a  treaty  respecting  railway  and  mining 
concessionary  rights  in  the  province  of  Shantung.  Note 
the  chief  features. 

I.   The  Territorial  Lease 

There  are  several  features  in  this  lease  arrangement 
which  deserve  special  attention. 

(1)  Friendly  relations  between  China  and  Germany 
were  asserted.    In  the  preamble  it  is  stated: 

The  Imperial  Chinese  Government  considers  it  advisable  to  give 
a  special  proof  of  their  grateful  appreciation  of  the  friendship 
shown  to  them  by  Germany. 


20  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

And  again: 

The  Imperial  German  and  the  Imperial  Chinese  Governments, 
inspired  by  the  equal  and  mutual  wish  to  strengthen  the  bonds  of 
friendship  which  unite  the  two  countries,  etc.,  etc. 

Article  I  also  says: 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China,  guided  by  the  intention  to 
strengthen  the  friendly  relations  between  China  and  Germany, 
etc.,  etc. 

» 

All  the  treaties  made  by  foreign  nations  with  China,  with 
the  notable  exception  of  the  punitive  Protocol  of  1901,  suc- 
ceeding the  Boxer  uprising,  have  given  profuse  expressions 
of  everlasting  peace,  amity  and  friendship.  Fine  phrase- 
ology and  professions  of  kindly  sentiments  characterize 
both  Occidental  and  Oriental  diplomacy.  They  are  gen- 
erally tucked  away  in  some  preamble,  which  too  often  is 
sugar  coating  to  a  bitter  pill.  Germany,  therefore,  was 
conforming  to  good  usage  in  proceeding  to  negotiate  ter- 
ritorial acquisition  in  China. 

(2)  The  German  acquisition  of  Kiaochow  territory  of 
the  Bay  and  the  islands  in  the  Bay  was  in  the  form  of  a 
lease.    Article  II  says : 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China  cedes  to  Germany  in 
lease,  provisionally  for  ninety-nine  years,  both  sides  of  entrance 
to  the  Bay  of  Kiaochow. 

The  leased  zone  was  "a  zone  of  50  kilometres  (100 
Chinese  U)  surrounding  the  Bay  of  Kiaochow  at  high 
water."  Also  "the  whole  water  area  of  the  Bay  up  to  the 
highest  watermark  at  present  known,"  and  "all  islands 
lying  seaward  from  Kiaochow  Bay,  which  may  be  of  im- 
portance for  its  defence." 


GERMANY'S  MENACE  TO  CHINA  21' 

The  land  zone,  which  was  less  than  the  zone  of  the  Bay, 
was  about  117  square  miles,  smaller  than  that  allotted  to 
either  Russia,  Great  Britain,  France  or  Japan.  In  the 
hinterland,  there  was  a  neutral  zone  of  some  2,500  square 
miles.  In  the  more  limited  area  of  the  peninsula  between 
the  east  shore  of  the  Bay  and  the  sea  lay  Tsingtao  and  the 
German  Concession  proper. 

This  was  a  new  mode  of  getting  control  of  another 
country's  land  and  harbour.  Heretofore,  the  aim  had  been 
to  possess  land  and  sea  in  perpetuity.  The  new  aim  was 
better,  but  still  bad.  The  nearest  example  was  the  leasing 
of  certain  ports  as  treaty  ports  for  the  trade  of  all  nations 
and  placed  for  the  most  part  under  foreign  administration. 

At  treaty  ports,  the  British  had  what  is  called  a  Settle- 
ment of  their  own  at  Canton,  Shanghai,  Tientsin,  and  a  few 
other  places ;  and  the  French  had  what  they  called  a  Con- 
cession in  Shanghai,  Tientsin  and  Hankow.  In  all  these 
cases  the  land  was  leased  by  the  Chinese  Government.  Ac- 
cording to  the  new  arrangement  Germany  was  to  have 
exclusive  control  of  a  port  or  leased  territory.  As  to  China, 
the  original  owner  and  the  other  contracting  party,  it  is 
to  be  assumed  that  she  was  ready  to  make  out  the  lease  to 
Germany  and  to  no  one  else. 

The  treaty  made  special  reference  to  the  reasonable  desire 
of  Germany  to  be  treated  in  the  same  way  as  other  nations. 
Thus  Article  II : 

With  the  intention  of  meeting  the  legitimate  desire  of  his 
Majesty  the  German  Emperor  that  Germany,  like  other  Powers, 
should  hold  a  place  on  the  Chinese  coast  for  the  repair  and  equip- 
ment of  her  ships,  for  the  storage  of  materials  and  provisions 
for  the  same,  and  for  other  arrangements  connected  therewith, 
etc.,  etc. 

Seeing  that  France  had  a  great  colonial  empire  on  the 
Pacific  coast,  and  Great  Britain  had  possessions  all  the  waj^ 


22  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

from  the  Atlantic  through  the  Mediterranean  Sea  and  In- 
dian Ocean  to  Hongkong  in  the  Pacific,  with  an  ever- 
expanding  grasp  of  power,  it  does  not  seem  so  reprehensible 
for  Germany  to  possess  in  a  modified  sense  one  open  port, 
that  of  Tsingtao  in  Shantung. 

(3)  The  evident  intention  of  both  parties  to  the  contract 
was  clearly  that  the  arrangement  made  was  between  Ger- 
many and  China  alone.  For  the  territory  to  pass  to  Japan 
or  to  any  other  country  was  not  to  be  thought  of.  Article 
V  says: 

Should  Germany  at  some  future  time  express  the  wish  to  return 
Kiaoehow  to  China  before  the  expiration  of  the  lease,  China 
engages  to  refund  to  Germany  the  expenditure  she  has  incurred 
at  Kiaoehow  and  to  cede  to  Germany  a  more  suitable  place. 
Germany  engages  at  no  time  to  sublet  the  territory  leased  from 
China  to  another  Power. 

It  is  to  be  supposed  that  if  any  country  was  to  secure  all 
the  improvements  gratis,  that  country  was  to  be  China,  not 
Japan,  or  any  group  of  allied  nations,  representing  them- 
selves to  the  world  as  international. 

While  the  phrasing  used  implies  that  Germany  would 
always  want  some  place  for  her  own  special  administra- 
tion, it  may  be  taken  for  granted  that  if  other  countries 
should  at  any  time  withdraw  from  their  leased  territory 
and  give  up  extra-territorial  jurisdiction,  Germany  would 
consent  to  do  the  same. 

The  use,  however,  of  the  word  "provisionally"  in  describ- 
ing the  limit  of  the  lease  to  ninety-nine  years  gives  the 
natural  implication  that  the  occupation  was  thought  of  as 
permanent.  It  is  here  that  Germany  did  a  great  wrong 
to  China,  but  Great  Britain,  Russia,  France  and  after- 
wards Japan  have  been  unable  to  pose  as  innocent,  while 
denouncing  German  culpability. 

An  English  authority,  writing  of  this  form  of  lease,  says ; 


GERMANY'S  MENACE  TO  CHINA  23 

We  must  agree  with  Despagnet,  who,  after  remarking  that  the 
restoration  of  the  temtory  at  the  specified  time  is  very  unlikely, 
says  that  these  pretended  leases  are  alienation  disguised  in  order 
to  spare  the  susceptibility  of  the  state  at  whose  cost  they  are 
made.* 

Still,  this  possible  alienation  should  not  be  stretched  so 
far  as  to  allow  at  any  time  transfer  to  a  third  party  in  vio- 
lation of  other  stipulations  to  the  contrary.  According  to 
the  terms  of  the  grant,  the  rights  acquired  by  Germany 
were  unassignable  and  non-transferable. 

(4)  Chinese  sovereignty  was  to  be  retained  in  the  leased 
territory,  though  administration  was  to  pass  to  the  Ger- 
mans.   Article  III  begins  thus : 

In  order  to  avoid  the  possibility  of  conflicts,  the  Imperial 
Chinese  Government  will  abstain  from  exercising  rights  of  sov- 
ereignty in  the  ceded  territory  during  the  term  of  the  lease,  and 
leaves  the  exercise  of  the  same  to  Germany. 

Article  I  defines  the  leased  zone  as  granted  by  the 
Chinese  Emperor,  and  adds  the  clause,  "while  reserving  to 
himself  all  rights  to  sovereignty." 

Article  III  also  contains  a  clause  that  is  slightly  equivo- 
cal.   It  reads : 

In  virtue  of  the  rights  of  sovereignty  over  the  whole  of  the 
water  area  of  the  Bay  transferred  to  Germany. 

In  this  phraseology  it  is  the  water  area  of  the  Bay,  not 
the  land  zone,  which  admits  of  transfer  of  sovereignty. 
Even  so,  it  is  the  exercise  of  sovereignty  that  must  be  meant. 
This  was  particularly  necessary  in  regard  to  harbour  regu- 
lations in  the  Bay  of  Kiaochow. 

Of  Chinese  residing  in  the  leased  area  Article  V  says : 

*  J.  Westlake,  "  International  Law,"  p.  136. 


24  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

The  Chinese  population  dwelling  in  the  ceded  territory  shall  at 
all  time  enjoy  the  protection  of  the  German  Government,  pro- 
vided that  they  behave  in  conformity  with  law  and  order. 

H.  B.  Morse  adds  an  important  footnote: 

The  Chinese  city  of  Kiaochow,  situated  inland  from  the  head 
of  the  bay,  within  the  fifty-kilometre  neutral  zone,  remained  under 
Chinese  jurisdiction;  the  German  port  and  administration  centre 
were  at  Tsingtao  at  the  mouth  of  the  bay.^ 

T.  J.  Lawrence  disapproves  of  this  division  of  sovereign 
powers.    He  says: 

In  private  law  both  lease  and  usufruct  imply  that  the  property 
continues  to  belong  to  the  grantor,  while  the  grantee  has  the  use 
and  beneficial  enjoyment  of  it  for  the  time  and  under  the  con- 
ditions fixed  in  the  grant.^ 

Then  after  referring  to  these  leased  territories  in  China, 
he  sums  np  thus: 

In  fact,  the  attempt  to  separate  property  or  sovereignty  on  the 
one  hand  from  possession  on  the  other,  by  the  use  of  phrases 
taken  from  the  law  of  lease  or  usufruct,  is  in  its  very  nature 
deceptive !  ^ 

To  show  how  far  the  Grermans,  in  acquiring  this  leased 
area,  were  willing  to  co-operate  with  the  Chinese,  it  was 
agreed  that  Tsingtao  should  become  a  free  port  of  trade, 
and  by  subsequent  agreements  with  Sir  Robert  Hart,  In- 
spector-General of  Customs,  it  was  arranged  that  the 
Chinese  customs  administration  should  be  established  at 

* "  The  International  Relations  of  the  Chinese  Empire,"  Vol.  Ill, 
p.  109. 

' "  Principles  of  International  Law,"  pp.  176,  177. 


GERMANY'S  MENACE  TO  CHINA  25 

Tsingtao  itself,  and  not  on  the  boundary  of  the  Chinese- 
administered  territory.  "The  free  depot,"  says  Mr.  Morse, 
"aided  by  the  railway,  prospered,  but  it  was  prosperity 
based  on  an  English  free-trade  policy,  and  not  on  the  policy 
adopted  elsewhere  in  German  territory. ' '  ^  This  fact  ought 
to  be  kept  in  mind,  when  one  feels  called  upon  to  exclude 
Germany  from  all  rights  in  Kiaochow  territory  as  from 
all  her  colonial  possessions. 

(5)  There  was  also  a  military  character  to  the  purposes 
and  plans  of  the  German  leased  territory.  The  preamble 
states  that  the  chief  purpose  or  wish  of  both  countries  was 
"to  strengthen  the  bonds  of  friendship,  which  united  the 
two  countries,  and  to  develop  the  economic  and  commercial 
relations  between  the  subjects  of  the  two  States,"  while 
Article  I  outlines  two  intentions  in  the  mind  of  the  Chinese 
Emperor,  the  one  "to  strengthen  the  friendly  relations 
between  China  and  Germany,"  and  the  other  "to  increase 
the  military  readiness  of  the  Chinese  Empire."  This  par- 
ticular feature  of  the  contract  has  been  overlooked  by  most 
war-critics.  Tsingtao  was  never  meant  by  either  party  as 
a  menace  to  China  (though  possibly  it  might  be  construed 
as  a  menace  to  Japan),  but  as  an  auxiliary  agency  in 
Chinese  plans  for  national  self-defence.  Hence  not  only 
German  troops  were  to  be  allowed  "free  passage"  in  the 
leased  zone,  but  Chinese  troops  were  to  be  allowed  to  be 
stationed  within  that  zone. 

Article  II  refers  to  the  new  fortifications  thus : 

Germany  engages  to  construct,  at  a  suitable  moment,  on  the 
territory  thus  ceded,  fortifications  for  the  protection  of  the  build- 
ings to  be  constructed  there  and  of  the  entrance  to  the  harbour. 

Here,  very  clearly,  the  newly-built  German  fortifications 
were  for  defensive  purposes  alone,  not  for  offensive  war- 
fare, or  as  a  naval  base  for  attacking  an  enemy. 

* "  The  International  Relations  of  the  Chinese  Empire,"  Vol.  IIL 
p.  110. 


26  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Chinese  ships  of  war  were  also  to  be  free  from  all  re- 
strictions, and  from  all  dues,  except  those  necessary  in 
harbour  arrangements. 

In  a  word,  the  new  port  became  under  German  direction 
more  of  a  commercial  town  and  a  summer  resort  than  a 
military  fortification.  By  the  expenditure  of  vast  sums  of 
money,  provided  annually  by  the  German  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment, Tsingtao  became  the  model  city  of  the  Far  East, 
administered  largely  on  the  single-tax  theory.  By  the  in- 
crease of  trade,  by  the  establishment  of  a  high-grade  gov- 
ernment hospital  and  of  technical  schools  under  joint  Ger- 
man and  Chinese  control,  and  by  the  inauguration  of  Ger- 
man missionary  operations,  carried  on,  side  by  side,  with 
those  of  American  Societies,  the  Chinese  had  reason  to 
express  a  sincere  admiration  for  the  service  being  thus  ren- 
dered by  an  alien  government  to  their  own  country. 

Let  us  take  the  opinion  of  S.  K.  Hornbeck,  once  a  teacher 
in  a  Chinese  Government  College,  and  now  professor  in 
the  University  of  "Wisconsin.    He  says : 

Before  long  a  substantial  breakwater,  granite  docks  with  com- 
plete equipment  and  a  floating  dock  capable  of  handling  vessels 
of  16,000  tons  displacement  had  been  installed.  At  Tsingtao  there 
soon  appeared  a  modem  German  city,  carefully  planned,  artisti- 
cally and  substantially  built.  Forts,  shops,  military  departments 
and  well-equipped  barracks  gave  the  character  of  a  fortified  base ; 
but  Kiaochow  was  never  given  the  military  equipment  or  aspects 
of  a  Port  Arthur  or  a  Vladivostok — as  the  comparative  ease  with 
which  it  was  recently  taken  (in  1914)  shows.* 

And  again: 

At  Tsingtao  and  its  environs  more  than  60,000  metres  of  ex- 
cellent roads  were  built.  Systematic  afforestation  was  undertaken 
both  there  and  in  the  hinterland.    Schools  of  all  sorts  were  estab- 

* "  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East,"  p.  296. 


GERMANY'S  MENACE  TO  CHINA  27 

lished,   including   a    German    High    School    with    well-equipped 
laboratories  and  library,  and  several  faculties.^ 

Putnam  Weale,  writing  ten  years  before  the  Great  War, 
says: 

As  has  already  been  stated,  this  town  of  Tsingtao,  on  which 
part  of  the  Berlin  millions  have  been  spent,  is  excellently  well 
laid  out.  The  streets  are  broad  and  admirable,  and  provided 
with  sidewalks  of  noble  dimensions.  Electricity  lights  all  the 
town,  and  a  complete  water-supply  system  has  been  installed. 
There  are  good  hotels  and  passable  shops,  a  splendid  parade 
ground  and  fine  military  roads  darting  everywhere  into  the 
country.    Tsingtao  is  an  unique  creation  in  the  Far  East.^ 

//.   The  Concessionary  Bights  in  Shantung 

Perhaps  the  more  important  of  the  arrangements  made 
between  China  and  Germany  in  1898  had  to  do  with  railway 
and  mining  concessions  in  Shantung  province.  They  were 
a  part  of  Germany's  subsequent  demand  for  a  sphere  of 
interest,  to  match  the  spheres  of  other  countries,  Great 
Britain,  Russia,  France  and  Japan. 

(1)  Germans,  in  this  new  arrangement,  received  sanc- 
tion to  build  a  railway  from  Kiaochow  (or  Tsingtao)  to 
Tsinan-fu,  the  provincial  capital,  and  from  each  of  these 
places  to  the  Shantung  boundary. 

(2)  To  carry  on  this  railway  construction,  **a  Chino- 
German  Company  shall  be  formed, "  "  and  in  this  Company 
both  German  and  Chinese  subjects  shall  be  at  liberty  to 
invest  money  if  they  so  choose,  and  appoint  directors  for 
the  management  of  the  undertaking. ' ' 

Here  was  a  project  for  joint  co-operation  and  manage- 
ment, most  commendable  at  that  time,  and  capable  of  ulti- 
mate good  to  the  Chinese. 

*  "  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East,"  p.  297. 
»  "The  Re-Shaping  of  the  Far  East,"  p.  348. 


28  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Another  Article,  No.  Ill,  adds:  "All  arrangements  in 
connection  with  the  works  specified  shall  be  determined  by 
a  future  conference  of  German  and  Chinese  representa- 
tives." The  arrangement  of  1898  was  merely  an  initial 
move.  But  the  general  principle  was  a  good  one,  that 
nothing  should  be  determined  except  by  conference  with 
the  Chinese  authorities. 

The  same  Article  adds:  "Profits  derived  from  the  work- 
ing of  these  railways  shall  be  justly  divided  pro  rata  be- 
tween the  shareholders,  without  regard  to  nationality." 

(3)  This  railway  enterprise,  thus  inaugurated  by  the 
Germans,  was  to  be  separate  from  all  political  designs. 
There  might  result  a  sphere  of  interest,  commercial  in 
character,  but  not  a  sphere  of  influence,  political  in  char- 
acter.   So  Article  III  closed  with  these  words : 

The  object  of  constructing  these  lines  is  solely  the  development 
of  commerce.  In  inaugurating  a  railway  system  in  Shantung 
Germany  entertains  no  treacherous  intention  towards  China,  and 
undertakes  not  to  unlawfully  seize  any  land  in  the  province. 

(4)  Beside  the  project  of  railway  building  there  was 
another  for  opening  mines.    Article  IV  reads  thus: 

The  Chinese  Government  will  allow  German  subjects  to  hold 
and  develop  mining  property  for  a  distance  of  30  li  (some  10 
miles)  from  each  side  of  these  railways  and  along  the  whole 
extent  of  the  lines. 

(5)  Co-operation  was  also  to  be  encouraged  in  these 
mining  operations,  thus :  * '  Chinese  capital  may  be  invested 
in  these  operations."  And  again:  "All  profits  derived 
shall  be  fairly  divided  between  Chinese  and  German  share- 
holders. ' ' 

(6)  The  improvement  of  commerce  and  of  friendly  re- 


GERMANY'S  MENACE  TO  CHINA  29 

lations  between  the  two  countries  is  stated  as  the  sole  object 
in  mind. 

(7)  Then  comes  in  a  far-reaching  stipulation,  establish- 
ing once  for  all  a  German  sphere  of  interest,  such  as  other 
countries  were  allowed  to  have,  thus: 

The  Chinese  Government  binds  itself  in  aU  cases  where  foreign 
assistance,  in  persons,  capital  or  material,  may  be  needed  for 
any  purpose  whatever  within  the  province  of  Shantung,  to  offer 
the  said  work  or  supplying  of  materials,  in  the  first  instance,  to 
German  manufacturers  and  merchants  engaged  in  undertakings 
of  the  kind  in  question.  In  case  German  manufacturers  and 
merchants  are  not  inclined  to  undertake  the  performance  of  such 
works  or  the  furnishing  of  materials,  China  shall  be  at  liberty 
to  act  as  she  pleases. 

(8)  The  concession  for  the  railway  was  actually  made  out 
in  June,  1899,  and  granted  to  a  syndicate,  to  be  called 
Shantung  Railway  Company  (Sehantung-Eisenbahn-Ge- 
sellschaft),  with  a  capital  of  54,000,000  marks,  by  the 
German  Imperial  Government,  which  in  turn  had  secured 
the  concessionary  rights  the  previous  year  through  treaty 
from  the  Chinese  Imperial  Government. 

This  participation  in  railway  schemes  in  China  by  the 
German  Government  is  similar  to  the  way  any  American 
syndicate,  seeking  for  exploitation  in  China,  must  receive 
a  charter  from  some  State  Legislature. 

(9)  According  to  this  new  arrangement  between  the 
German  Government  and  the  newly-formed  syndicate,  it  is 
specially  stipulated  that  "German  material  shall  be  used, 
as  far  as  possible,  in  the  construction  of  the  railways." 

In  1900,  the  noted  Boxer  year,  while  Yuan  Shih-kai  was 
Governor  of  the  province  of  Shantung,  a  new  agreement 
was  made  between  him,  as  representing  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, and  the  German  Company.  The  authority  for 
policing  and  protecting  was  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  the 


30  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Germans  and  placed  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  the  Chinese 
provincial  authorities.  China  bound  the  Germans  not  to 
utilize  their  railway  rights  in  Shantung  as  Russians  were 
using  theirs  in  Manchuria,  and  as  Japan  afterwards  used 
hers  in  the  same  region.    Article  16  reads  thus : 

Should  it  ever  happen  that  it  becomes  necessary  for  soldiers 
to  protect  the  railway  outside  of  the  100-li  zone,  the  Governor 
of  Shantung  shall  detail  such  soldiers,  and  foreign  soldiers  cannot 
be  used.  The  Governor  of  Shantung  having  consented  to  use  his 
utmost  endeavours  to  protect  the  railway  both  in  time  of  construc- 
tion and  operation,  he  must  see  to  it  that  the  railway  receives  no 
injury  from  bandits. 

If  in  any  way  it  had  seemed  that  China 's  sovereignty  had 
been  infringed  upon  by  the  original  concessionary  rights 
granted  to  Germans,  it  was  made  clear  in  the  new  agree- 
ment that  China  had  complete  sovereignty  and  political 
control  along  the  line  of  the  railway,  which  were  not 
claimed  by  Germany. 

Article  17  is  equally  specific: 

The  object  of  constructing  this  line  is  solely  the  development  of 
commerce,  and  it  will  not  be  permissible  to  transport  foreign 
soldiers  or  munitions  used  by  foreign  soldiers  to  any  place  outside 
of  the  100-li  zone.  If  by  any  chance  the  peaceful  relations 
existing  between  China  and  any  foreign  Power  become  broken, 
the  railway  will  still  remain  under  the  management  of  the  Com- 
pany, but  the  Company  must  still  observe  the  above  rule.  But 
if  the  oflBces  are  seized  by  an  enemy,  and  the  Company  loses  its 
control,  then  this  province  will  no  longer  assume  the  responsibility 
of  protecting  the  Une. 

The  anomalous  feature  of  the  Great  War  was  that  Japan, 
a  friend,  not  an  enemy  of  China,  proceeded  to  seize  the  of- 
fices of  the  Company  and  to  exclude  all  Chinese  provincial 
protection. 


GERMANY'S  MENACE  TO  CHINA  31 

Thfs  railway  from  Tsingtao  to  Tsinan-fu,  of  about  250 
miles  in  length,  was  completed  in  1904  at  a  cost  of  52,900,- 
000  marks.  The  railway  proved  a  paying  investment,  but 
the  mines  were  operated  at  a  loss  to  the  German  Company. 
Whatever  the  reason,  by  1911,  the  Mining  Area  Delimita- 
tion Agreement  renounced  most  of  the  mining  rights 
granted  in  the  Convention  of  1898.  In  fact  the  German 
Company  retained  for  itself  only  two  collieries  and  one 
mine.  The  Japanese,  however,  in  occupying  Shantung, 
made  no  distinction  between  mines  worked  by  Germans  and 
those  worked  by  Chinese. 

After  the  completion  of  the  Shantung  railway  there  came 
the  building,  as  a  Chinese  Government  enterprise,  of  the 
grand-trunk  line  from  Tientsin  south  to  Pukou,  opposite  to 
Nanking,  wherein  the  northern  section  to  the  southern 
border  of  Shantung  was  to  be  built  and  financed  by  a  Ger- 
man Company  and  the  southern  section  by  a  British. 

Towards  the  end  of  1913,  the  Chinese  Government 
granted  to  Germans  the  further  right  to  build  two  other 
railway  lines  running  west  and  southwest  to  connect  with 
railway  systems  already  built,  but  on  terms  more  favourable 
to  the  Chinese  than  in  the  original  agreements  of  1898-9, 
and  like  the  terms  governing  the  Tsin-Pu  line. 

Concerning  the  character  of  German  commercial  enter- 
prise, let  us  quote  from  S.  K.  Hornbeek : 

At  first  the  Germans  appeared  bent  upon  asserting  themselves 
politically  in  Shantung.  Practically  everything  in  connection 
with  the  railway  was  kept  in  German  hands.  German  guards 
were  installed  for  the  "  protection  "  of  the  railway.  A  German 
post-office  was  established.  Germany  seemed  to  be  following  a 
policy  similar  to  that  which  Russia  had  pursued  in  Manchuria. 
But  at  the  end  of  1905  they  began  to  withdraw  their  troops;  they 
handed  over  their  post-offices  to  the  Chinese;  they  made  an  agree- 
ment whereby  the  Chinese  Customs  administration  was  to  func- 
tion at  Tsingtao  much  as  elsewhere  in  China — with  the  special 


32  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

provision  that  twenty  per  cent,  of  the  duties  collected  be  con- 
tributed toward  the  expenses  of  the  local  Tsingtao  administration ; 
and  they  began  to  employ  Chinese  in  various  capacities.^ 

In  referring  to  the  latest  German  concession  of  1913,  this 
writer  adds: 

The  Germans  gave  evidence  of  having  relinquished  the  last 
vestiges  of  an  actively  aggressive  political  policy,  in  favour  of 
commercial  co-operation.^ 

He  sums  up  the  situation  in  the  following  language : 

Since  the  original  seizure  of  Kiaochow  the  Germans  had  made 
no  additional  attempt  to  extend  their  territorial  holdings  or 
special  privileges  in  China.  They  had  not  undertaken  to  extend 
their  administration  over  Shantung — or  even  over  the  Railway 
Zone.  The  Shantung  Railway  Company  had  never  attempted  to 
assume  a  political  status  and  perform  political  functions.  The 
German  Government  had  not  sought  to  stretch  the  terms  of  the 
Convention  of  1898.  There  had  been  no  creating  of  issues  and 
demanding  of  immediate  settlement  such  as  had  characterized  the 
progress  of  the  Japanese  in  Manchuria.  German  subjects  had  not 
exceeded  their  plainly  stipulated  rights;  they  had  not  invaded 
the  interior;  they  had  not  become  engaged  in  personal  and  police 
conflicts  with  the  Chinese.  There  was  in  the  later  years  of 
German  presence  in  Shantung  little  of  which  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  open-door  policy,  complaint  could  be  made.  For  ten 
years  past  the  Germans  had  done  practically  nothing  calculated  to 
complicate  the  politics  of  the  Far  East,  and,  except  commercially, 
they  disturbed  no  peace  in  the  Far  East  but  the  peace  of  mind 
of  Japanese  expansionists.  Judged  upon  the  basis  of  substantial 
accomplishment,  successful  and  just  administration  and  real  con- 
tribution to  the  economic  and  social  welfare  of  the  people  who  fell 
within  the  range  of  their  influence,  none  of  the  Powers  holding 

*  "  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East,"  p.  296. 

•  Jbid.,  p.  298. 

/ 


GERMANY'S  MENACE  TO  CHINA  33 

fjases  on  the  China  coast  can  offer  better  justification  for  its  pres- 
ence than  could  the  Germans.^ 

This  was  written  in  1916,  before  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment entered  on  war  and  began  to  put  restraint  on  the 
free,  full  and  fair  expression  of  opinions  or  the  statement 
of  facts.  My  own  observation  leads  me  to  corroborate  what 
is  here  said  by  Professor  Hornbeck.  "With  a  clearer  knowl- 
edge of  German  use  of  concessionary  rights  acquired  from 
China,  one  may  the  better  judge  of  both  the  military  and 
commercial  ambition  of  rival  nations  to  uproot  German 
influence  in  China.  He  will  be  the  just  man  who  takes 
the  facts  as  they  are  in  China,  however  favourable  to  the 
Germans,  and  bases  the  attempt  at  righteous  judgment  on 
real  truth,  untainted  by  the  passions  of  war  and  bloodshed. 

One  of  the  latest  books  on  the  Far  East,  "The  New  Map 
of  Asia"  by  Herbert  Adams  Gibbons,  makes  this  reference 
to  Germany's  inroad  into  China  in  1898.^ 

To  assert  that  the  Germans  were  alone  to  blame  or  even  the 
first  to  blame,  as  has  been  so  frequently  done  during  the  recent 
war,  is  to  deny  the  facts. 

And  again: 

The  Japanese  have  no  more  contempt  and  the  Chinese  no  more 
dislike  for  Germans  than  for  other  Europeans.  All  are  tarred 
with  the  same  brush.  All  have  set  the  same  example  to  Japan. 
All  have  acted  in  the  same  way  toward  China. 

In  concluding  this  analysis  it  may  be  well  to  note  two 
exaggerations — slight  deviations  from  truth — perpetrated 
both  on  Germans  and  Japanese  in  their  relation  with  the 
Chinese.  The  one  is  spoken  of  as  "  the  rape  of  Shantung, ' ' 
or  the  robber's  seizure.    Today  Japan  is  thus  condemned; 

•  "  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East,"  pp.  298,  299. 
» "  The  New  Map  of  Asia,"  p.  390. 


34  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OE  FREE? 

yesterday  it  was  Germany.  Of  the  two  Germany  is  looked 
upon  as  the  greater  criminal.  *' Japan,"  it  is  said,  "only 
took  stolen  goods  from  the  robber."  If  German  rights  and 
the  leased  territory  were  stolen  goods,  then  Japan  should 
hand  them  back  to  the  rightful  owner.  If  not  stolen  from 
China  in  the  first  place,  Japan  had  no  legal  right  thereto, 
for  the  contract  was  a  personal  one,  between  China  and 
Germany  alone.  In  strict  justice  there  was  no  robbery,  or 
plunder,  or  rape,  on  Germany's  part,  but  a  legal  transac- 
tion, a  treaty  agreement.  Whatever  measure  of  wrong  may 
be  detected,  the  same  measure  must  be  meted  out  to  Great 
Britain,  France  and  Russia,  and,  later  on,  to  Japan,  who 
acquired  similar  leases  of  harbours  and  territory.  Moreover, 
if  a  forced  lease  is  a  theft,  how  much  more  a  permanent 
possession,  as  Great  Britain  in  Hongkong,  France  in  Tong- 
king,  and  Japan  in  Korea,  Formosa  and  the  Pescadores. 

The  second  exaggeration  is  that  the  transaction  of  Ger- 
many leasing  a  Chinese  port  was  illegal,  because  the  treaty 
was  made  under  duress.  The  same  charge  has  been  since 
made  of  the  Sino-Japanese  Conventions  of  1915,  one  of 
which  bears  on  Shantung.  If  all  treaties  are  to  be  abro- 
gated because  of  the  charge  of  force  majeure,  where  are  we 
to  stop?  What  treaties  made  with  China  would  be  left? 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  most  eases,  the  duress  did  not  come 
when  a  treaty  was  made,  but  before.  Thus  France  secured 
an  indemnity  in  1856,  after  some  French  missionaries  had 
been  killed,  and  Great  Britain  acquired  Hongkong  by 
treaty,  after  the  Opium  War.  So  the  German  Government 
forced  things  when  in  1897  two  German  missionaries  were 
killed,  but  the  treaty  of  1898  was  of  the  same  character  as 
all  others  made  with  China,  or,  if  you  please,  forced  on 
China.  The  treaty  part  of  Germany's  action  was  similar 
to  the  treaties  made  the  same  year  by  Great  Britain,  Russia 
and  France,  and  was  subsequent  to  the  reparation  act  al- 
ready completed. 


GERMANY'S  MENACE  TO  CHINA  35 

From  a  moral  point  of  view  the  violence  done  to  China 
again  and  again  by  foreign  Powers  is  to  be  reprobated,  the 
guilt  or  innocence  of  each  is  to  be  determined  relatively,  and 
the  righteous  or  commendable  thing  for  all  to  do  is  for  all 
to  hand  back  to  China  all  that  they  have  taken  from  her, 
however  acquired. 


CHAPTER  III 

mTRDSION  INTO  CHINA  OP  THE  EUROPEAN  WAB:  BRITAIN  AND 
JAPAN  IN  THE  LEAD 

The  war  that  was  raging  in  1914  was  not  yet  a  World 
War,  it  was  only  a  European  war.  In  it,  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  were  arrayed  on  the  one  side,  and  Serbia, 
Russia,  Prance,  Great  Britain  and  Belgium  were  on  the 
other  side.  Hence  this  war  had  no  business  in  Asia.  What- 
ever the  diplomacy  which  carried  the  lighted  torch  from 
the  conflagration  of  western  Europe  far  away  into  eastern 
Asia,  it  was  a  diplomacy  deserving  our  severest  con- 
demnation. Who,  then,  was  the  guilty  party?  Shall 
China,  in  lamenting  her  present  unfortunate  situation,  for- 
get the  primal  source  of  all  these  woes  in  the  political 
manceuverings  of  the  year  1914,  August  to  December,  and 
the  daring,  drastic,  unfeeling  intrusion  on  China's  political 
integrity  by  the  two  island  empires,  Britain  and  Japan  ? 

If  it  is  hard  for  an  American  of  English  and  Scotch  stock 
to  speak  favourably  of  German  conduct,  even  as  seen  in  dis- 
tant China,  it  is  just  as  hard,  yea,  uncongenial  and  almost 
irreverent,  to  acknowledge  any  wrong,  or  error  of  judg- 
ment, or  diplomatic  waywardness,  in  those  of  one's  own 
kith  or  kin,  our  cousins  across  the  sea,  in  their  dealings, 
past  or  present,  with  the  yellow  and  brown  races  of  the 
Asiatic  continent.  But  facts  should  overrule  personal  pro- 
clivities in  matters  so  serious  as  the  destiny  of  an  ancient 
people.  Personally  I  still  hold  in  highest  esteem  the  re- 
ligious qualities,  the  mental  alertness,  the  sense  of  fair-play 
and  the  courageous  resolve  to  defend  among  men  civil  and 
religious  liberty,  which  characterize  the  Anglo-Saxon  race, 

3e 


INTRUSION  INTO  CHINA  OF  EUROPEAN  WAR      37 

but  I  cannot  close  my  eyes  to  the  diplomatic  blunder  and 
illegal  transaction  concerning  the  neutral  rights  of  China, 
in  the  closing  months  of  1914,  which  characterized  the  pol- 
icy of  the  British  Imperial  Government  and  then  the  joint 
action  of  the  Japanese  Government.  It  was  so-called  "mil- 
itary necessity"  and  arbitrary  behaviour,  with  no  concern 
for  China's  rights,  that  went  marching  on  through  the 
Shantung  peninsula,  under  the  two  flags  of  Japan  and 
England,  the  mightiest  of  the  East  and  the  West. 

What  I  here  relate  as  to  the  actual  facts  that  bear  so 
heavily  on  China's  destiny  comes  from  intimate  knowledge 
and  close  observation  of  the  varied  factors.  To  criticize 
Japan  is  expedient  and  sane;  to  say  aught  of  England  is 
both  perilous  and  imprudent.  What,  however,  are  the 
facts? 

Two  questions  must  be  answered :  first,  Should  the  Euro- 
pean War  have  been  brought  into  China  at  all?  and,  sec- 
ond. Who  was  responsible  for  bringing  the  war  into  China, 
Japan  alone,  or  Japan  and  Great  Britain  together?  Fol- 
lowing this,  a  little  study  will  be  worth  while  as  to  how 
Japan  waged  the  war  in  violation  of  international  law,  and 
how  afterwards  she  seized  all  German  concessionary  rights 
in  Shantung,  in  further  violation  of  international  law. 

I.  WJiy  bring  tJie  war  into  Eastern  Asia  and  on  to 
Chinese  soil?  If  the  war  had  been  limited  at  the  outset  to 
the  four  great  belligerents  of  continental  Europe,  Austria- 
Hungary,  Germany,  Russia  and  France,  not  only  would 
there  have  been  a  straight,  fair  fight,  but  also  no  occasion 
for  projecting  war  into  the  continents  of  the  Americas,  of 
Africa  and  of  Asia.  But  when  England  took  part  on  the 
one  side,  the  whole  British  Empire  was  involved,  and  that 
meant  commotion  in  all  the  continents  and  on  all  the  seas. 

Before  the  first  declaration  of  war,  Sir  Edward  Grey  had 
exerted  himself,  not  only  to  avoid  war,  but  to  keep  it  cir- 
cumscribed to  the  narrowest  limits,  if  war  should  actually 


95032 


38  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREEt 

arise.  He  wrote  of  "the  gravity  of  the  situation  if  the  war 
could  not  be  localized";  he  dreaded  "the  possibility  of  a 
European  conflagration. ' '  How  much  more  a  conflagration 
spreading,  as  on  the  wings  of  the  wind,  to  the  populous 
regions  of  eastern  Asia.  Surely  the  act  of  wisdom  was  to 
put  forth  effort  to  keep  Asia  quiet,  not  to  stir  up  turmoil. 

As  to  whether  China  should  be  embroiled,  she  was  the 
nation  most  concerned,  and  her  wishes  should  have  been 
first  considered.  In  accordance  with  usage,  the  Chinese 
Government  promptly  issued  a  proclamation  of  neutrality. 
Efforts  were  also  made  to  secure  the  co-operation  of  all 
foreign  residents  in  China  for  making  easy  the  Chinese  task 
of  preserving  neutrality.  I  did  my  part  at  the  request  of 
President  Yuan  Shih-kai.  China  also  sought  the  govern- 
mental action  of  Japan  and  of  the  United  States,  two  neu- 
tral nations  to  be  deeply  affected.  Formal  request  was 
made  of  Japan  to  join  in  measures  for  defending  the  neu- 
trality of  the  Far  East  and  for  mutual  well-being  along 
lines  of  peace.  Japan  was  a  neighbour,  and  might  have 
given  China 's  request  a  first  place  in  her  diplomatic  action. 
Japan  as  showing  her  trend  abstained  from  declaring 
neutrality,  as  China  had  done.  Moreover,  she  had  begun 
to  mobilize  her  forces.  Japanese  papers  stated  it  thus: 
**The  war  in  Europe  gives  wings  to  the  Tiger"  (Japan). 

The  Chinese  Government,  realizing  possible  danger  of 
conflict  on  the  territories  leased  to  Great  Britain,  France 
and  Germany,  as  also  to  Japan,  proposed  a  plan  for  neutral- 
ization, thus  making  these  territories  as  neutral  as  all  ter- 
ritory under  Chinese  control,  or  as  the  larger  treaty-ports 
under  foreign  control. 

No  obstruction  came  to  the  proposition  from  Germany. 
She  was  as  anxious  to  keep  the  war  away  from  Tsingtao 
as  China  was  to  keep  it  away  from  the  whole  of  the  China 
coast.  The  German  Minister,  finding  that  Japan  was  de- 
laying to  give  consent  to  the  plan  of  neutralization,  went 


INTRUSION  INTO  CHINA  OF  EUROPEAN  WAR      39 

so  far  as  to  negotiate  with  the  Chinese  Government  for 
transfer  to  China  of  complete  authority  over  the  German- 
leased  area  of  Kiaochow.  This  re-cession  to  China  was  even 
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  American  Government  by 
the  Chinese  Government.  Events  were  sweeping  on  with 
electric  speed,  and  this  plan,  like  the  other,  failed  of  con- 
summation. Japan's  speed  was  too  great  for  the  rest  of 
the  world. 

Should  these  negotiations  come  to  naught,  it  was  the 
wish  of  China,  that  if  war  by  any  means  should  approach 
the  China  coast,  it  should  continue  to  avoid  the  treaty-ports, 
such  as  Shanghai,  Tientsin,  or  Canton,  and  also  Chinese- 
administered  territory;  it  must  rigidly  be  restricted  to  the 
limited  areas  held  under  lease  by  the  nations  at  war.  Even 
this  yielding  on  China's  part  ought  never  to  have  been 
necessary.     Certainly  no  more  was  to  be  expected. 

The  places  likely  to  be  affected  under  these  contingencies 
were  the  British  leasehold  of  Kowloon  (opposite  to  Hong- 
kong), her  leasehold  of  Weihaiwei  on  the  north  coast  of 
the  Shantung  peninsula,  and  the  German  leasehold  of  Kiao- 
chow, with  fortifications  at  Tsingtao,  on  the  south  coast  of 
the  Shantung  peninsula. 

Much,  therefore,  depended  on  the  respective  purposes 
of  mind  of  the  two  antagonists,  England  and  Germany,  or, 
more  properly,  of  the  British  and  German  governments. 
Much  also  depended  on  the  tendency  of  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment towards  war  or  towards  peace,  towards  helping 
China  and  Yuan  Shih-kai  to  remain  neutral,  or  towards 
embroiling  China  in  the  many  complications  incident  to  war 
at  one's  own  door.  As  for  Japan,  jealous  of  Yuan  Shih-kai 
since  the  early  antagonisms  over  Korean  affairs,  and  averse 
to  China's  experiment  in  a  democratic  government,  she  was 
more  likely  to  make  it  hard  for  China  than  easy.  When 
China  formally  requested  that  Japan  use  her  influence  to 
render  China  immune  from  warlike  activities,  the  reply 


40  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

was  that  the  time  was  not  ripe  to  consider  the  proposal  and 
that  Japanese  action  awaited  the  war  measures  of  Great 
Britain. 

As  for  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  everything  depended 
on  the  war  schemes  of  the  home  governments  and  on  the 
larger  issues  of  military  strategy.  In  a  word,  China 's  fate 
rested  not  with  the  thoughts  of  peoples  but  with  imperial- 
istic governments,  engaged  in  the  great  but  perilous  game 
of  war.  The  entrance  of  Japan  into  the  war  was  not  pop- 
ular with  the  Japanese  people ;  and  as  for  the  majority  of 
British  residents  in  China,  there  was  sympathy  felt  for 
China  and  dread  of  coming  trouble,  if  Japan  should  enter 
the  fray.  It  was  not  until  the  British  Government  took 
action,  that  the  British  resident  in  the  Far  East  began  to 
discipline  himself  into  enjoying  the  prospect  of  Japan  as 
an  Ally  waging  war  on  Chinese  soil. 

As  for  the  German  Government,  it  sent  on  August  12 
(1914)  the  following  telegram  to  its  ambassador  in  Tokio: 

East  Asiatic  squadron  instructed  to  avoid  hostile  acts  against 
England  in  case  Japan  remains  neutral.  Please  inform  Japanese 
Government.^ 

The  Japanese  Government  gave  no  reply,  as  it  had  given 
no  favourable  response  to  the  proposals  of  China. 

The  German  Government,  while  anxious  that  Tsingtao 
should  not  be  attacked,  did  the  fair  thing  by  making  no 
attack  or  threat  of  attack,  on  either  British  or  French 
leased  territories  or  on  their  colonial  possessions.  Russian 
Vladivostok  also  remained  immune. 

But  what  was  the  cry  from  Japan  and  accepted  as  truth 
the  world  round?  Namely  this:  "Tsingtao  is  a  naval 
base."  But  what  were  the  facts?  This:  the  German  Pa- 
cific squadron,  having  left  the  China  and  Japan  seas  in 

*  German  White  Book,  Appendix  40. 


INTRUSION  INTO  CHINA  OF  EUROPEAN  WAR      41 

the  summer  months,  sailed  towards  the  southern  Pacific 
waters,  not  back  to  the  China  coast;  all  that  remained  be- 
hind in  Tsingtao  was  what  an  Englishman  has  described 
as  * '  only  obsolete  craft. ' '  Only  one  ship,  the  Embden,  came 
into  Tsingtao  harbour  with  dispatches  from  Admiral  von 
Spee,  of  the  German  Pacific  Squadron,  but  by  August  4, 
along  with  four  colliers,  "apparently  proceeded  to  cruise 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Vladivostok,  where  she  captured  a 
Russian  auxiliary  cruiser  and  one  or  two  merchant  ships, 
before  going  south  to  make  history  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal. ' '  ^ 
This  author  outlines  five  possible  objects  which  the  German 
Admiral  may  have  had  in  mind  in  this  peculiar  naval 
strategy.  Among  these  there  is  no  mention  of  any  purpose 
to  wage  war  in  either  the  China  or  Japan  Sea.  He  con- 
cludes that  the  object  "likely  to  yield  a  richer  harvest" 
than  any  other  scheme  was  ' '  to  harass  our  trade  with  South 
America."  For  Britain  or  even  Japan  to  make  the  attack 
in  that  part  of  the  broad  Pacific  was  legitimate.  In  equal 
proportion  it  was  both  wrong  and  needless  to  make  attack 
on  the  China  coast. 

Another  Englishman,  W.  L.  Wyllie,  writes :  ^  "  The  Ger- 
man squadron  was  in  the  Carolines  at  the  opening  of  war," 
and  '  *  curiously  enough,  made  no  attempt  to  return  to  their 
base  at  Tsingtao."  "During  August  and  the  first  half  of 
September,  Count  Von  Spee's  ships  steamed  about  in  the 
South  Pacific."  October  30,  the  squadron  was  about  fifty 
miles  west  of  Valparaiso.  November  1st  there  came  the 
battle  with  Admiral  Craddock's  ships,  the  Good  Hope  and 
the  Monmouth,  in  which  the  latter  were  sunk,  the  British 
defenders  dying  an  heroic  death.  December  8th,  there  oc- 
curred the  second  naval  battle,  off  the  Falkland  Islands, 
in  which  Admiral  Sturdee's  squadron  was  victorious,  and 

*  Commander  Spencer-Cooper,  "  Battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands," 
p.  11. 

» "  Sea  Fights  of  the  Great  War,"  pp.  83,  84. 


42  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

the  German  ships  were  sunk,  the  German  defenders  dying 
an  heroic  death.  Thus  before  1914  had  come  to  an  end,  the 
assumed  threat  of  Tsingtao  as  a  naval  base  had  vanished. 

The  German  purpose,  different  from  the  English,  was  to 
restrict  the  war  to  Europe.  If  any  fighting  should  take 
place,  far  away  from  the  centre  of  military  action,  let  it  be 
on  the  high  seas  and  not  in  a  neutral  country  like  China. 
A  battle  between  British  and  German  fleets  on  any  ocean 
would  have  been  legitimate,  bringing  no  harm  to  others. 
For  either  fleet  to  take  possession  of  the  island  colonies  of 
the  other  country  was  also  a  fair  game  in  war.  But  there 
was  dynamite  in  the  proposal  that  an  attack  be  made  on 
Tsingtao,  still  remaining  under  Chinese  sovereignty,  and 
situated  on  the  China  coast. 

To  infringe  on  the  neutral  rights  of  Belgium  may  have 
been  construed  by  the  German  Staff  as  a  "military  ne- 
cessity, ' '  but  for  Germany  or  Great  Britain  or  any  one  else 
there  was  no  "military  necessity"  to  thrust  the  European 
War  into  the  Far  East,  on  to  Chinese  soil,  for  attack  on 
either  British  Weihaiwei  or  German  Tsingtao.  For  a  few 
thousand  isolated  Germans,  4,500  in  all,  to  be  subjugated 
by  any  kind  of  enemy  force,  whatever  the  flag,  could  have 
no  bearing  on  the  ultimate  issue  of  the  war,  either  for  or 
against  Germany.  "Foreign  leased  territories  in  China," 
says  Thomas  F.  Millard,  * '  were  only  pawns  in  the  war,  and 
could  have  been  eliminated  without  affecting  in  the  slight- 
est degree  the  essential  strategical  zones  of  operations. ' '  ^ 

If  the  combined  naval  forces  of  Russia,  France  and  Great 
Britain,  Germany's  immediate  antagonists,  were  insuffi- 
cient to  vanquish  Tsingtao,  it  would  have  been  better  if 
they  had  preserved  the  peace  of  the  Far  East  by  keeping 
war  nearer  home  and  by  using  peaceful  means  in  relation 
to  the  Far  East.  Being  unnecessary,  uncalled-for,  a  mere 
incident  in  a  mighty  struggle,  such  belligerent  activities 

'  "  Oux  Eastern  Question,"  p.  89. 


INTRUSION  INTO  CHINA  OF  EUROPEAN  WAR      4? 

should  have  been  discountenanced,  all  the  more  that 
China's  national  entity  and  well-being  might  be  impaired 
or  imperilled.  This  was  the  view  I  took  at  the  time,  think- 
ing of  China 's  interests.  What  has  happened  since  has  con- 
firmed me  in  this  view.  To  bring  the  war  from  Europe  to 
Asia  has  been  a  calamity  to  China,  though  so  worked  as  to 
be  a  gain  to  Japan.  Marquis  Okuma  was  no  doubt  right 
in  thinking  that  the  new  circumstances  afforded  Japan  "the 
one  opportunity  of  10,000  years."  As  for  China,  they 
brought  the  one  catastrophe  of  10,000  years.  As  between 
Great  Britain  and  Germany,  the  blow  which  Germany  re- 
ceived in  the  loss  of  Tsingtao  and  the  glory  which  Great 
Britain  received  have  been  too  insignificant  to  deserve  a 
passing  thought.  Britons  there  are  who  now  see  that  the 
elimination  of  Germany  and  the  expansion  of  Japan  is  no 
more  good  to  them  than  to  China. 

II.  We  now  come  to  another  question,  one  more  of  fact 
than  of  opinion:  Which  country  brought  the  war  into 
China,  Japan  alone  or  Japan  in  conjunction  with  Great 
Britain? 

Most  writers  and  speakers  have  been  accustomed  to  refer 
to  Japan  as  the  guilty  interloper.  Few  Americans  or  Brit- 
ishers, especially  those  living  in  the  Far  East,  have  so  much 
regard  and  admiration  for  Japan  as  to  exonerate  her 
through  a  division  of  culpability.  An  easier  way  of  ren- 
dering judgment  is  to  assume  one's  own  innocence  and 
cast  all  blame  on  one  individual  or  on  one  nation.  So  far 
as  this  is  done,  Japan  is  unfairly  treated,  and  the  cause  of 
justice  dishonored. 

Putnam  Weale^  states  the  matter  thus,  in  one  of  his 
books : 

Japan,  after  some  rapid  negotiations  with  her  British  Ally, 
had  filed  an  ultimatum  on  Germany. 

*  "  Fight  for  the  Republic  of  China,"  pp.  71,  84. 


44  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Again,  more  explicitly: 

There  was  also  the  feeling  abroad  [in  Japan]  that  England 
by  calling  upon  her  Ally  to  carry  out  the  essential  provisions  of 
her  Alliance  had  shown  that  she  had  the  better  part  of  a  bar- 
gain, and  that  she  was  exploiting  an  old  advantage  in  a  way 
which  could  not  fail  to  react  adversely  on  Japan's  future  world's 
relationships. 

Dr.  Arthur  J.  Brown,^  relying  for  information  on  many 
sources,  sums  up  thus: 

Great  Britain  early  gave  Japan  a  fine  opportunity  in  connec- 
tion with  the  German  fortified  post  at  Tsingtao  in  the  province  of 
Shantung,  China,  which  had  been  made  one  of  the  most  formidable 
fortifications  in  the  world.  Of  course  the  British  could  not  afford 
to  leave  the  Germans  in  possession  of  a  naval  base  from  which 
the  immense  commerce  of  the  Allies  in  the  Far  East  could  be 
successfully  raided  and,  as  the  British  had  their  hands  full  in 
Europe,  it  was  natural  that  they  should  expect  their  more  con- 
veniently situated  ally,  Japan,  to  attend  to  this  matter  for  them. 

The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  one  of  many  unholy  al- 
liances, was  at  the  bottom  of  the  unfriendly  intrusion. 
But  in  Dr.  Brown's  statement  two  slight  errors  are  found. 
One,  the  formidability  of  the  fortification  is  stated  with 
exaggeration ;  and  the  other,  Tsingtao  was  not  used  as  naval 
base  for  raiding  purposes,  as  is  made  clear  above.  The 
main  idea  that  Britain  was  the  agent  to  present  Japan  with 
a  new  opportunity  of  achievement  is  correct.  How  great 
was  the  opportunity  was  probably  not  realized  by  the  over- 
burdened British  Government.  Britons  might  have  hesi- 
tated to  call  in  such  an  ally,  had  they  known  where  such 
opportunity  might  lead. 

Thomas  F.  Millard,  who  is  known  to  be  anti-Japan  more 
than  anti-England,  in  two  books,  **Our  Eastern  Question," 

» "  The  Mastery  of  the  Far  East,"  p.  416. 


INTRUSION  INTO  CHINA  OF  EUROPEAN  WAR      45 

published  in  1916,  and  * '  Democracy  and  the  Eastern  Ques- 
tion," published  in  1919,  holds  to  the  view  that  "Japan 
herself  took  the  initiative  contrary  to  the  real  desire  of  her 
ally,  and  by  force  of  circumstances  compelled  Great  Britain 
to  acquiesce  with,  and  officially  to  sanction,  this  diplomatic 
fiction."  He  also  says  the  belief  held  in  America,  that 
"Japan  entered  the  war  because  she  was  required  to  do  so 
by  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance,"  is  not  a  "correct"  one. 
There  seems  to  be  circumstantial  evidence  to  uphold  this 
view.  But  official  utterances  speak  otherwise.  Too  much 
sympathy  for  Germany  existed  among  educated  men  in 
Japan,  and  particularly  in  the  Army,  to  lead  the  Japanese 
Government  to  make  the  first  move  towards  expanding  the 
area  of  war  or  towards  antagonizing  Germany. 

Major  T.  E.  Compton,  an  English  officer,  writing  in 
November,  1918,  says: 

Whatever  preoccupations  the  appearance  of  the  Teuton  in 
China  may  have  caused  her,  Japan,  after  her  recovery  of  Port 
Arthur  in  1905,  had  no  quarrel  with  Germany,  from  which 
country  her  schools  of  medicine  and  science  and,  above  all,  her 
army  had  obtained  great  benefits. 

The  fact  which  induced  Japan  to  enter  the  war  was  the 
opportunity  for  territorial  expansion. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  Great  Britain  once  entered  the 
war,  it  became  her  policy  to  call  in  the  resources  of  all  her 
possessions  for  both  offensive  and  defensive  war.  As  Great 
Britain  was  in  the  Far  East,  war,  ipso  facto,  came  there 
also.  She  seemed  ready  to  go  to  the  ends  of  the  earth  and 
there  capture  German  possessions,  both  great  and  small. 
From  London  the  lines  went  out  to  all  the  world. 

At  the  very  time  Japan  entered  the  war,  a  correspondent 
in  the  London  Times  (Aug.  24)  urged  British  merchants 
"to  take  advantage  of  every  opportunity  which  may  pre- 
sent itself  for  diverting  German  commerce  to  our  advan- 


'46  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

tage. ' '  If  Japan  had  an  ulterior  end  in  projecting  the  war 
into  China,  the  British  had  the  same,  except  that  perhaps 
the  Japanese  end  was  political  and  tTie  British  commercial. 
Subsequent  events  make  clear  the  motive  of  both. 

Now  as  to  the  origin  of  the  war  in  the  Far  East,  Baron 
Kato,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  at  that  time  in  Marquis 
Okuma's  cabinet,  said,  in  a  speech  in  the  Diet  on  Septem- 
ber 4: 

Early  in  August  the  British  Government  asked  the  Imperial 
Government  for  assistance  under  the  terms  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance. 

Then,  after  recounting  the  terms  of  this  Alliance,  he 
continued : 

Therefore,  inasmuch  as  we  were  asked  by  our  Ally  for  assist- 
ance ...  we  could  not  but  comply  to  the  request  to  do  our  part. 

And  again : 

The  Japanese  Government  therefore  resolved  to  comply  with 
the  British  request,  and  if  necessary  to  open  hostilities  against 
Germany. 

A  statement  previously  issued  by  the  Japanese  author- 
ities for  publication  in  the  press  used  these  words:  "The 
Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  having  been  in 
communication  with  each  other,  etc.,  etc." 

The  British  Government  has  never  denied  the  statement 
of  fact,  or  charge,  if  you  so  desire  to  call  it,  that  the  British 
Government  asked  for  the  assistance  of  Japan.  The  actual 
documents  of  the  negotiations  have  not  been  made  public, 
but  the  results  are  so  obvious  that  they  reveal  the  "inner 
consciousness"  of  the  two  governments.  In  a  true  technical 
sense,  Japan  was  the  only  Ally  which  Great  Britain  had. 


INTRUSION  INTO  CHINA  OF  EUROPEAN  WAR      47 

The  relations  of  Great  Britain  to  France  and  Russia  were 
only  of  an  entente  cordials. 

The  London  Times  on  August  18,  some  two  weeks  be- 
fore Baron  Kato  made  his  speech  in  Tokio,  used  these 
words : 

It  should  be  said  at  once  that  the  Japanese  intervention  has 
not  taken  place  without  full  consultation  with  Great  Britain. 

Later  on,  under  date  of  September  25th,  the  London 
Times  used  stronger  language : 

We  appealed  to  our  Ally  in  the  terms  of  the  Treaty,  and  she 
has  answered  that  appeal  with  the  loyalty  we  have  learned  to 
expect  of  her.  .  .  .  Japan  had  no  desire  to  intervene  in  the 
war.  She  has  done  so,  the  Emperor  and  his  Ministers  tell  us, 
because  she  could  not  break  her  promises. 

According  to  Jefferson  Jones ^  (a  nom  de  plume),  who 
was  familiar  with  the  facts  as  they  took  place  in  Tokio,  the 
Japanese  Government  on  August  2d  expressed  to  the  Brit- 
ish a  willingness  to  put  in  force  the  Anglo-Japanese  Al- 
liance, and  by  August  7  the  British  Ambassador  in  Tokio 
"handed  to  the  Foreign  Office  at  Tokio  a  request  that  Japan 
join  in  the  European  war." 

The  American  diplomat,  W.  W.  Rockhill,  in  an  address 
which  he  delivered  in  New  York,  November  12,  the  last 
speech  before  his  death,  gave  utterance  to  this  careful 
statement : 

The  action  of  Japan  was  taken  after  consultation  with  the 
ally,  Great  Britain,  and,  inferentially,  with  the  approval  of 
France  and  Russia. 

Mr.  K.  K.  Kawakami,^  who  is  in  a  position  to  know,  de- 
scribes how  the  war  plan  of  Japan  was  set  in  motion  by  the 

»  "The  Fall  of  Tsingtau,"  pp.  18,  20. 

'  "  Japan  and  the  European  War,"  in  Atlantic  Monthly,  November, 
1914. 


48  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

British  Government,  even  prior  to  Britain's  declaration  of 
war  against  Germany.    These  are  his  words : 

The  assertion  that  Japan  thrust  herself  upon  the  war  ■without 
England's  invitation  is  as  sinister  as  it  is  unwarranted.  Japan 
did  not  join  hands  with  England  without  England's  request. 
When  it  became  evident  that  England  must  come  to  the  rescue 
of  France  and  Belgium,  the  press  of  Japan,  without  exception, 
hoped  that  Japan  would  not  be  called  upon  to  aid  her  western 
ally.    But  the  western  ally  did  call  upon  Japan. 

On  August  3,  that  is,  the  day  before  England  declared  war  on 
Germany,  the  British  Ambassador  to  Japan  hurried  back  to  Tokio 
from  his  summer  villa  and  immediately  requested  an  interview 
with  Baron  Kato,  Foreign  Minister.  At  this  conference  the 
British  Ambassador  informed  Baron  Kato  that  his  government 
was  compelled  to  open  hostilities  against  Germany  and  that  it 
desired  to  ascertain  whether  Japan  would  aid  England  in  the 
event  of  British  interests  in  the  Far  East  being  jeopardized  by 
German  activities. 

Baron  Kato  answered  that  the  question  put  to  him  was  such  a 
serious  one  that  he  could  not  answer  it  on  his  own  account. 

On  the  evening  of  the  same  day  Count  Okuma  convened  a 
meeting  of  all  the  Cabinet  members.  Bearing  the  resolution  of 
this  meeting.  Baron  Kato,  on  August  4,  called  upon  the  British 
Ambassador  and  told  the  latter  that  Japan  would  not  shirk  the 
responsibilities  which  the  alliance  with  England  put  upon  her 
shoulders. 

At  this  time  Japan  did  not  expect  to  be  called  upon  to  aid 
England  for  at  least  a  few  months.  But  on  August  7  the  British 
Ambassador  suddenly  asked  for  an  interview  with  Baron  Kato 
and  told  the  Foreign  Minister  that  the  situation  had  developed 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  oblige  England  to  ask  for  Japan's  assist- 
ance without  delay.  On  the  evening  of  that  day  Premier  Okuma 
requested  the  "  Elder  Statesmen  "  and  his  colleagues  to  assemble 
at  his  mansion.  The  conference  lasted  until  two  o'clock  the  next 
morning.  Before  it  adjourned  the  policy  of  Japan  was  definitely 
formulated. 

What  caused  Downing  Street  to  invite  Japan's  co-operation  so 


INTRUSION  INTO  CHINA  OP  EUROPEAN  WAR      49 

soon  is  not  clearly  known  to  the  outside  world.  But  the  Japanese 
press  is  in  all  probability  right  when  it  says  that  Japan  and 
England  were  obliged  to  act  promptly  in  order  to  frustrate  the 
German  scheme  to  transfer  Kiaochow  to  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment before  Germany  was  compelled  to  surrender  it  at  the  point 
of  the  sword.  Had  Germany  succeeded  in  carrying  out  this  scheme 
she  would  still  have  enjoyed,  in  virtue  of  Article  Five  of  the 
Kiaochow  Convention  of  1898,  the  privilege  of  securing  in  some 
future  time  "  a  more  suitable  territory "  in  China.  This  was 
exactly  the  condition  which  the  Allies  did  not  want  to  see  estab- 
lished in  China.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  Germany  were  forced  to 
abandon  Kiaochow  by  the  arbitrament  of  the  sword,  China  would 
no  longer  be  under  obligation  to  "cede  to  Germany  a  more 
suitable  place." 

These  words  show  plainly  that  the  war  measures  to  be 
carried  out  in  China  originated  with  the  British  Govern- 
ment. It  is  also  disclosed  that  Japan  and  the  European 
Allies  at  the  early  days  of  the  war  had  formed  the  great 
plan  to  forestall  Germany  in  her  desire  to  ever  have  in 
China  a  port  of  her  own,  as  others  had.  Already  the  great 
purpose  was  made  clear  that  Germany  must  not  only  be 
destroyed  militarily,  but  eliminated,  even  from  China. 

It  may  be  taken  for  granted  that  the  British  Government 
— not  the  British  people,  or  the  British  resident  in  China — 
while  approving  and  even  desiring  the  military  assistance 
of  Japan  in  the  initial  stages,  was  not  bound  to  approve  of 
all  that  Japan  did,  to  the  very  end  of  the  war.  But  an 
alliance  is  oftentimes  a  burden  to  either  ally  as  well  as  a 
prolific  source  of  evil  to  others.  Hence,  if  we  desire  to 
overlook  the  personal  factor,  we  may  lay  the  blame  for  these 
unfortunate  transactions  in  China  to  so  impersonal  a  factor 
as  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance,  just  as  we  may  blame  the 
horrors  and  evils  of  the  whole  war,  not  on  Germany  or 
Russia  or  Britain,  but  on  war  or  ''special  alliances." 

The  ultimatum  which  was  sent  to  the  German  Imperial 


50  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Government  August  15  was  not  sent  by  Great  Britain,  a 
belligerent,  but  by  Japan,  officially  still  a  neutral,  but  of 
course  an  ally  of  a  belligerent.  The  document  was  diplo- 
matically perfect.  Japan  bound  herself  by  no  unnecessary 
limitations  and  proclaimed  the  most  laudable  of  motives. 
Notice  the  phraseology : 

1.  **To  take  measures  to  remove  the  causes  of  all  dis- 
turbances of  the  peace  of  the  Far  East." 

2.  "To  secure  a  firm  and  enduring  peace  in  eastern 
Asia." 

3.  "To  safeguard  the  general  interests  as  contemplated 
by  the  agreement  of  alliance  between  Japan  and  Great 
Britain." 

One  not  trained  in  the  school  of  militarism  or  even  in  the 
school  of  diplomacy  might  suppose  that  the  best  measure 
for  effecting  peace  would  be  a  peaceful,  rather  than  a  war- 
like measure,  and  for  removing  any  cause  of  disturbance  all 
that  might  be  needed  would  be  to  avoid  creating  a  disturb- 
ance through  one 's  own  actions.  For  such  peaceful  designs, 
Japan  could  have  solicited  the  aid  of  so  great  a  neutral  as 
the  United  States,  and  especially  of  China,  the  country  most 
affected.  By  mentioning  "the  Far  East,"  and  "Eastern 
Asia"  Japan  was  given  a  wide  sweep  of  activity,  but  the 
main  concern  was  the  little  spot  on  the  Shantung  peninsula 
known  as  Tsingtao.  As  stated  above,  this  spot  could  have 
been  neutralized  or  re-ceded  to  China.  As  it  was,  there  was 
no  disturbing  element,  for  the  German  squadron  had  left 
not  only  Tsingtao  but  "Eastern  Asia,"  and  the  military 
operations  of  the  Germans  were  for  defensive  purposes 
alone  in  the  eventuality  of  attack  by  some  outside  enemy. 
It  was  the  entrance  of  Japan  into  war,  on  Chinese  soil  and 
in  Chinese  waters,  not  the  presence  of  a  few  Germans  in 
Tsingtao,  that  brought  about  *  *  disturbances  of  the  peace  of 
the  Far  East,"  which  have  not  yet  ended  with  the  signing 
of  the  Versailles  treaty  of  peace.    Peace  in  all  China  was 


INTRUSION  INTO  CHINA  OF  EUROPEAN  WAR     51 

upset  by  Japan's  "measures"  of  war.  The  only  "general 
interests"  safeguarded  were  those  of  Japan.  Not  only  did 
Germany  lose  the  "equal  opportunities  of  all,"  but  Great 
Britain,  viewed  relatively,  lost  much  at  the  hands  of  this 
her  Ally.  As  for  the  "interests"  of  China  they  have  been 
totally  neglected. 
The  ultimatum  made  to  Germany  had  two  demands : 

First — To  withdraw  immediately  from  Japanese  and  Chinese 
waters  German  men-of-war  and  armed  vessels  of  all  kinds,  and 
to  disarm  at  once  those  which  cannot  be  so  withdrawn. 

Second — To  deliver  on  a  date  not  later  than  September  15  to 
the  Imperial  Japanese  authorities,  without  condition  or  compensa- 
tion, the  entire  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow,  with  a  view  to  the 
eventual  restoration  of  the  same  to  China. 

The  Japanese,  surely,  are  humourists,  without  the  appear- 
ance of  humour.  This  might  be  called  comedy,  were  it  not 
for  the  tragic  events  which  followed. 

An  ultimatum,  presented  at  so  early  a  date  to  a  Teuton, 
was  the  surest  way  to  bring  about  armed  resistance.  If  the 
real  desire  of  the  Japanese,  and  with  them  of  the  British, 
was  preservation  of  peace,  they  could  have  tried  negotia- 
tion, not  an  ultimatum ;  and  negotiation  would  have  fared 
better  if  left  in  Chinese  hands,  with  Japanese  rendering 
hearty  approbation.  If  the  object  was  to  bring  about  hos- 
tilities, rather  than  to  "remove  the  causes  of  all  disturb- 
ances," Japan,  seconded  by  Great  Britain,  adopted  the 
wisest  course. 

Left  in  Chinese  hands,  the  first  element  presented  in  the 
ultimatum  could  have  been  quickly  satisfied.  The  German 
men-of-war  had  already  left  the  confines  of  "Chinese  and 
Japanese  waters,"  and  the  only  way  for  Japanese  men-of- 
war  to  find  them  was  to  hurry  after  them  in  mid-Pacific 
and  take  up  a  few  German  islands  on  the  way.    The  other 


52  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OE  FREE? 

"armed  vessels"  left  at  Tsingtao  might  have  been  interned 
at  the  request  of  China  to  Germany. 

Left  also  in  Chinese  hands,  the  second  element  of  the 
ultimatum  could  easily  have  been  complied  with,  except 
that  the  restoration  of  Kiaochow  to  China  would  have  been 
immediate  and  not  ** eventual." 

Again  we  say,  how  much  better  it  would  have  been  for 
China,  for  the  peace  of  Eastern  Asia,  for  the  prevalence  of 
right,  free  from  all  sorts  of  complications  and  hindrances, 
if  Great  Britain  and  Japan  had  jointly  planned  to  put  out, 
rather  than  to  kindle,  the  fires  of  both  war  and  revolution. 

It  may  be  here  noted  that  the  promise  of  "eventual  res- 
toration" of  Kiaochow  to  China  was  made  to  Germany 
alone,  and  also  on  condition  of  immediate  surrender  of  the 
same  to  Japan.  The  words  used  freed  Japan  from  obligation 
to  make  transfer  to  China,  if  the  territory  should  be  ac- 
quired in  some  other  way  than  by  compliance  with  an 
ultimatum. 

It  has  been  reported  that  prior  to  the  ultimatum,  in  con- 
sultation with  the  Foreign  Office  in  London,  consent  was 
given  to  this  proposal  of  Japan,  if  she  "confine  her  war 
operations  to  the  China  Sea,"  and  "eventually  turn  over 
Kiaochow  to  China. "  ^  It  is  also  stated  that  the  day  before 
the  ultimatum  expired,  the  Japanese  Minister  in  Peking 
"tried  to  reassure  China  by  stating  verbally"  that  if 
"Japan  was  compelled  to  occupy  Kiaochow,  that  territory 
would  be  returned  to  China  after  the  war. ' '  ^ 

This  matter  of  "eventual  restoration"  to  China  has  con- 
flicting interpretation  from  Japanese  statesmen.  "While 
Premier  Okuma,  August  20,  declared  that  Japan  "harbours 
no  design  for  territorial  aggrandizement  and  entertains 
no  desire  to  promote  any  other  selfish  end, ' '  and,  August  24, 
telegraphed  the  New  York  Independent  that  Japan  had  "no 

*  Jefferson  Jones,  "  The  Fate  of  Tsingtau,"  pp.  23,  24. 

*  Thomas  F.  Millard,  "  Our  Eastern  Question,"  p.  90. 


INTRUSION  INTO  CHINA  OF  EUROPEAN  WAR      53* 

desire  to  secure  more  territory"  (making  no  mention  of 
Tsingtao),  Baron  Kato,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  said 
in  the  Diet,  early  in  December,  that  **  Japan  had  never  com- 
mitted herself  to  any  foreign  Power"  "in  the  matter  of 
final  disposition  of  Kiaoehow. "  ^  It  is  clear  now,  that  it 
would  have  been  easier  for  China  to  get  back  Kiaoehow 
with  no  conditions  fixed  thereto,  if  this  roundabout  and 
warlike  method  of  Japan  had  been  discarded.  Intervention 
has  seldom  proved  a  blessing  to  China,  in  her  long  ex- 
periences with  outside  nations. 

About  the  time  the  ultimatum  was  made  known,  the 
Press  Bureau  in  England  gave  out  this  announcement: 

It  is  understood  that  the  action  of  Japan  will  not  extend  to 
the  Pacific  Ocean,  beyond  the  China  Seas,  except  in  so  far  as  it 
may  be  necessary  to  protect  Japanese  shipping  lines  in  the 
Pacific,  nor  beyond  Asiatic  waters  westward  of  the  China  Seas, 
nor  to  any  foreig:n  territory,  except  territory  in  German  occupa- 
tion on  the  continent  of  Eastern  Asia.^ 

How  far  the  Japanese  conformed  to  this  understanding 
as  to  operations  on  the  high  seas,  need  not  here  be  consid- 
ered. There  was  really  more  reason  for  the  two  Allies  to 
unite  in  capturing  enemy-ships  or  enemy-colonies,  than  for 
them  to  attack  the  territory  of  China  temporarily  leased  to 
Germany.  The  latter  operations  brought  more  harm  to 
neutral  rights  and  to  the  law  of  nations  than  the  former 
could  possibly  have  done. 

The  fall  of  Tsingtao,  as  compared  with  battles  in  other 
areas  of  the  war,  needs  only  brief  notice.  What  happened 
by  way  of  supplement — the  victory  of  Japanese  diplomatic 
finesse — will  require  years  of  investigation  by  students  of 
history,  political  science,  and  ethics,  the  world  over. 

When  the  time-limit  of  Japan's  ultimatum  to  Germany 

*  Thomas  F.  Millard,  "  Democracy  and  the  Eastern  Question,"  p.  82. 

*  London  Times,  August  18,  1914. 


54  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREEf 

expired,  August  23,  the  Japanese  were  fully  prepared  to 
win  a  victory,  even  if  the  4,500  Germans  should  be  exter- 
minated in  an  awful  holocaust,  as  seemed  likely  under  re- 
ported orders  from  the  German  Kaiser  ' '  to  defend  the  place 
to  the  last  man." 

The  great  Japanese  navy  had  its  ships,  both  large  and 
small,  arranged  in  a  semi-circle  outside  the  Bay  of  Kiao- 
chow.  The  Japanese  army,  under  command  of  Lieut.-Gen- 
eral  Kamio,  had  three  divisions  aboard  transports,  ready  to 
land  with  great  guns,  smaller  arms,  and  ammunition,  with 
a  fully  equipped  commissariat  and  hospital  service.  Later 
on  the  Japanese  were  aided  by  some  1,200  men  under  com- 
mand of  Major-General  Barnardiston,  who  came  from  the 
British  garrison  at  Tientsin.  The  fortifications  on  the  hills, 
litis,  Bismarck,  and  Moltke,  to  the  rear  of  Tsingtao  city, 
were  got  ready  for  the  siege.  The  supply  of  guns  and  am- 
munition was  only  enough  for  a  short  siege.  The  main 
thing  the  Germans  had  to  rely  upon  was  their  courage. 
They  were  practically  isolated  from  the  leaders  of  the 
campaign  in  Europe.  Tsingtao  might  have  held  out  against 
an  Anglo-Franco-Russo  combination,  but  not  against  the 
army  and  navy  of  Japan,  conducting  the  assault  as  they 
did. 

III.  We  here  approach  the  third  question  of  our  present 
discussion,  as  to  how  Japan,  with  at  least  no  objection  by 
the  British,  violated  the  neutral  rights  of  China,  as 
guaranteed  by  the  law  of  nations,  in  making  attack  on 
Tsingtao. 

Japanese  transports  by  September  2  entered  the  port 
of  Lungkow,  on  the  northern  coast  of  the  peninsula,  west 
of  the  treaty-port  of  Chefoo  and  the  British-leased  territory 
of  Weihaiwei.  Lungkow  was  not  a  treaty-port,  open  to 
trade,  neither  was  it  leased  to  any  foreign  government.  It 
was  purely  a  "native"  port,  for  the  exclusive  use  of  the 
Chinese.     It  was  a  thoroughly  neutral  port,  into  which 


INTRUSION  INTO  CHINA  OF  EUROPEAN  WAR      55 

belligerents  had  less  right  of  entrance  than  even  into  the 
treaty-ports. 

The  Japanese  transports  proceeded  to  land  their  soldiers, 
guns  and  military  outfit  for  transport  across  the  neutral 
Shantung  peninsula,  150  miles,  to  attack  Tsingtao  from  the 
land  side — and  to  do  other  things  which  they  could  do  only 
as  contrary  to  the  law  of  nations. 

Bodies  of  Japanese  troops,  says  Thomas  F.  Millard,^  made 
detours,  occupying  important  cities  and  towns  in  the  province 
wide  of  a  direct  line  of  march.  Wherever  they  went,  the  Japanese 
assumed  control  of  the  country,  means  of  communication,  posts 
and  telegraphs;  and  subjected  the  Chinese  population  to  many 
hardships,  deprivations  and  indignities,  which  were  obserx'ed  and 
reported  by  American  and  British  missionaries  in  that  region. 

Supposing  that  the  Japanese  navy,  attacking  from  the 
sea,  was  unable  to  overthrow  a  small  body  of  Germans,  the 
Japanese  army,  helped  by  the  navy,  ought  to  have  been 
able  to  accomplish  it,  making  the  attack  within  the  area 
leased  to  Germany,  or  within  the  much  larger  "neutral 
zone,"  so-called,  stretching  37  miles  from  the  shores  of  the 
wide  Bay  of  Kiaochow.  There  was  no  necessity  to  wage 
war  outside  these  limits,  on  the  neutral  soil  of  China. 

The  British  overlooked  Japanese  wrongdoing  in  that  no 
protest  was  made,  suitable  to  an  old  Ally,  but  at  the  same 
time  they  appeared  well  to  the  world  and  magnified  their 
friendship  for  China,  by  landing  their  own  little  military 
force  within  the  narrow  limits  of  the  German  protectorate. 
They  came  in  late,  towards  the  end  of  September,  but,  as 
the  London  Times  said,  ''the  distance  which  separated 
Laoshan  Bay  from  Tsingtao  was  so  much  shorter,  and  pre- 
sented so  much  less  of  difficulty  than  the  Japanese  had  to 
encounter  in  their  preliminary  advances,  that  the  British 

* "  Our  Eastern  Question,"  p.  107. 


56  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

really  arrived  on  the  scene  just  as  the  Japanese  were  fin- 
ishing their  first  engagement  in  force, ' ' 

The  London  Times,  while  exalting  the  sagacity  of  Great 
Britain  in  landing  her  force  inside  the  German-leased  ter- 
ritory, comments :  ' '  thus  avoiding  the  breach  of  neutrality 
alleged  by  the  Chinese  against  the  Japanese."  This  word, 
"alleged,"  is  more  a  slap  at  Chinese  stupidity  than  a  re- 
buke to  Japanese  illegality.  But  we  must  remember  that 
Eastern  Asia  is  not  Central 'Europe.  Good  and  evil,  for 
four  years  and  more,  have  been  divided  according  to  lines 
of  longitude  and  latitude. 

The  Chinese  Government,  being  unable  to  resist  the  en- 
croachments of  Japan,  took  a  different  position  to  that  of 
Belgium  when  she  refused  to  allow  German  troops  to  be 
transported  across  Belgian  territory.  China  accepted  the 
advice  of  Dr.  Ariga,  Japanese  advisor  to  President  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  and  proposed  a  war  zone,  favourable  to  Japan's 
plans,  but  unfavourable  to  the  German  defence  of  Tsingtao. 
Japan  evaded  and  then  rejected  the  proposal.  The  fol- 
lowing, however,  is  the  Note  presented  by  the  Chinese  For- 
eign OfBce  to  the  Foreign  Legations  on  September  4 : 

The  Government  of  China  declared  its  neutrality  toward  the 
present  European  war  and  is  faithfully  maintaining  it.  Accord- 
ing to  reports  from  the  Chinese  local  authorities  in  the  province 
of  Shantung,  the  Germans  have  commenced  war  operations  at 
Kiaochow  Bay  and  their  sphere  of  influence  there,  and  the  allied 
forces  of  Japan  and  Britain  have  also  started  war  operations 
at  Lungkow,  Kiaochow,  Laichow,  and  in  their  neighbouring  dis- 
tricts. Germany,  Japan  and  England  are  all  in  friendly  relations 
with  China,  and  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  unfortunately  these 
Powers  have  taken  such  unexpected  courses  in  China's  territory; 
therefore  the  Chinese  Government  has  decided  to  propose  special 
limitations  as  regards  the  extent  of  the  present  war  operations 
as  China  limited  the  scope  of  war  operations  at  Liaotung  penin- 
sula at  the  time  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  in  1904.    The  Chinese 


INTRUSION  INTO  CHINA  OF  EUROPEAN  WAR     57 

Government  will  not  accept  responsibility  for  the  passing  of 
troops  or  any  war  operations  at  Lungkow,  Laichow,  Kiaochow, 
and  their  adjacent  districts,  but  in  the  other  districts  in  China  the 
Government  will  strictly  enforce  neutrality  as  declared.^ 

After  many  obstructions  from  the  "elements,"  but  not 
from  the  Chinese  or  Germans,  the  Japanese  at  last,  on  Sep- 
tember 11th,  came  in  contact  with  a  German  detachment — 
of  10  men.  From  that  time  on,  to  the  end  of  October,  there 
were  many  skirmishes,  forcing  back  the  German  defenders 
to  the  limits  of  their  forts.  From  the  middle  of  September, 
Tsingtao  was  in  a  state  of  siege,  the  only  communication 
with  the  outside  world  being  by  wireless.  The  white  peo- 
ples of  the  United  Kingdom,  of  the  French  Republic,  and 
of  the  Holy  Russian  Empire,  mostly  Christians,  were  be- 
ginning to  exult  that  at  last  their  brothers  of  the  same  race 
and  religion,  friends  in  the  social  and  business  life  of  the 
Far  East,  were  to  be  caught  like  "rats  in  a  trap."  The 
Japanese  maintained  self-restraint.  They  were  embarked 
on  a  bigger  expedition  than  the  pigmy  game  of  personal 
hate.  The  whole  spectacle  left  a  peculiar  impress  on  the 
Chinese  mind.  Here  for  the  first  time  white  men  fought 
white  men,  and  called  for  the  help  of  their  little  yellow 
brothers,  on  the  soil  of  China's  millions. 

Real  fighting  began  October  31,  anniversary  of  the 
accession  to  the  throne  of  the  Mikado.  Guns  of  all  sizes, 
from  the  Japanese  and  British  land  forces,  and  from  their 
cruisers  outside  the  harbour,  as  well  as  from  the  German 
forts,  began  to  fire  back  and  forth,  making  the  sound  as  it 
echoed  and  re-echoed  among  the  Shantung  hills  fiercer  and 
more  overwhelming  to  the  imagination  than  was  the  deadly 
reality.  The  Japanese  had  maps  of  the  whole  country, 
around  and  inside  the  besieged  town.  By  use  of  telephone 
from  land  to  sea,  the  gunners  learned  the  exact  spot  where 

*  Jefferson  Jones,  "  The  Fall  of  Tsingtau,"  p.  46. 


5g  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

the  shells  fell.  By  day  or  by  night  the  investing  forces 
closed  in  upon  the  Germans.  One  redoubt  after  another 
was  taken.  One  battery  after  another  was  silenced.  By 
November  6,  "twenty-five  yards  from  the  front  wall  that 
skirted  the  Tsingtau  fortresses  for  three  miles  from  the  Bay 
of  Kiaochow  on  the  right,  to  the  Yellow  Sea  on  the  left,  was 
entrenched  the  front  line  of  the  Japanese  and  British  ex- 
peditionary forces.  Behind  this  line  of  underground 
fighters  was  another  line,  a  third,  and  then  the  large,  mas- 
sive twenty-eight-centimetre  siege  guns  of  the  Japanese."^ 
They  had  142  guns  on  the  firing  line. 

In  the  final  rush  up  the  sides  of  litis  Fort  there  were 
"17,000  men  against  3,800."  The  Germans,  who  had  held 
on  bravely  and  untiringly,  had  fired  their  last  shells ;  their 
ammunition  was  exhausted.  The  Kaiser  had  sent  word  that 
they  might  surrender,  and  so  at  7.05  on  the  morning  of 
November  7,  the  white  flag  was  hoisted  at  the  residence 
of  Governor-General  Meyer- Waldeck,  and  3,800  Germans 
became  prisoners  of  war  in  Japan.  The  bushido  spirit  had 
won;  Great  Britain  stood  by  and  watched  the  growing 
power  of  Japan. 

Of  the  siege,  Mr.  Jefferson  Jones  writes: 

From  an  Oriental  standpoint  the  siege  of  Tsingtau  will  always 
stand  out  as  remarkably  free  from  hatred.  During  the  opera- 
tions, Japanese  oflBcers  sent  many  messages  into  the  Tsingtau 
garrison,  wishing  their  German  friends  and  former  tutors  luck 
and  safety  during  the  siege.  The  Japanese  officers  seemed  always 
courteous.  They  placed  courtesy  foremost,  instead  of  indulging 
in  recrimination  such  as  usually  goes  on  between  the  German  and 
British  officers  and  troops.  General  Kamio  and  his  officers  did 
not  desire  to  humiliate  the  defeated  German  officers.  The  mes- 
sages that  were  interchanged  during  the  siege  and  afterwards 
were  couched  in  the  most  courteous  language,  nor  did  Govemor- 

'  Jefferson  Jones,  "  The  Fall  of  Tsingtau,"  p.  87. 


INTRUSION  INTO  CHINA  OF  EUROPEAN  WAR      59 

General  Waldeek  and  his  staff  officers  lose  their  swords  after  the 
final  surrender.^ 

What  concerns  the  moralist  is  the  astounding  fact  that 
in  attacking  German  Tsingtao,  the  British  condoned  the 
Japanese  infringement  of  the  Hague  Convention  in  insist- 
ing on  transport  of  troops  and  arms  across  the  neutral  soil 
of  the  Shantung  peninsula. 

Though  the  Chinese  had  been  advised  by  the  Japanese 
advisor  to  give  a  form  of  legality  to  Japan's  war  operations 
by  establishing  a  war  zone,  it  was  only  a  matter  of  a  few 
days  when  Japanese  soldiers  were  marched  outside  the  pre- 
scribed area,  and  infringed  again  on  the  Hague  Convention 
by  marching  250  miles  along  the  Shantung  Railway  to 
Tsinan-fu,  the  provincial  capital.  Japan  not  once  but  twice 
reduced  the  Hague  Convention  to  a  "scrap  of  paper,"  and 
Britain,  though  an  Ally,  entered  no  protest  and  passed  no 
criticism.^ 

No  sooner  had  the  Japanese  force  succeeded  in  marching 
through  quagmires  from  Lungkow  to  the  rear  of  the  Ger- 
man defences,  near  the  middle  of  September,  than  a  detach- 
ment was  sent  westward  to  Weihsien,  an  important  centre 
on  the  Shantung  Railway.  **A11  of  northern  China  rose  in 
revolt  against  the  Japanese  action.  The  Japanese  troops 
took  command  of  the  Shantung  Railroad,  shooting  down 
native  employees  who  seemingly  rebelled  at  the  invasion. 
The  troops  pushed  on  to  Tsinan-fu,  leaving  small  garrisons 
in  every  Chinese  town  to  keep  'Japan's  peace,'  and  in  a 
few  days  western  Shantung  was  practically  in  the  control 
of  Japan."  ^ 

The  Japanese  did  it  all  in  quick  time,  the  only  ones  to 
obstruct  their  march  being  Chinese.  And  one  might  ask  the 

»  "The  Fall  of  Tsingtau,"  p.  118. 

*  See  Appendix  I. 

•  Jefferson  Jones,  "  The  Fall  of  Tsingtau,"  p.  48. 


60  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

question:  Ought  the  Chinese  to  be  treated  as  an  'enemy,' 
while  trying  to  remain  neutral?  From  the  standpoint  of 
law  and  equity,  which  nation  in  the  Far  East  went  more 
astray,  Germany  or  Britain  and  Japan?  And  did  China 
suffer,  and  continue  to  suffer,  for  her  own  misdeeds,  or  for 
the  misdeeds  of  outsiders  ? 

By  October  3,  and  before  the  forts  of  Tsingtao  were 
silenced,  a  Japanese  military  force  took  over  the  whole  of 
the  Shantung  Railway,  outside  of  German-leased  territory, 
or  the  war  zone  granted  by  China.  Besides  planning  the 
conquest  of  the  German-leased  territory  of  Kiaochow,  Ja- 
pan had  a  deep-laid  plan,  to  make  conquest  of  all  German 
rights  in  Shantung,  in  the  form  of  railway  and  mining 
concessions  granted  in  treaty  by  the  Chinese  Government. 
All  this  was  within  the  bounds  of  China,  The  Japanese 
seemingly  did  not  surmise  that  it  would  ever  occur  to  diplo- 
matic minds  to  discountenance  and  repudiate  the  right  of 
conquest ;  so  they  went  boldly  forward,  fully  confident  that 
Might  in  the  end  would  win  the  day. 

When  the  Japanese  entered  Tsinan-fu,  capital  of  Shan- 
tung province,  they  proceeded  to  occupy  it  with  a  military 
guard.  They  also  planned  the  bigger  scheme  to  occupy  the 
German-built  railway  from  Tsinan-fu  to  Tientsin,  but  now 
the  British,  having  schemes  of  their  own,  strongly  objected. 
Japan  was  thus  left  to  Shantung  as  a  sphere  of  conquest, 
illegal  but  none  the  less  actual,  and  afterwards  to  be  con- 
doned by  statesmen  believing  in  self-determination.^ 

Where  before,  in  the  laws  governing  the  waging  of  war, 
as  to  the  obligations  of  belligerents  and  the  rights  of  neu- 
trals, has  it  been  taught  that  one  nation  in  war  with  another 
nation  can  go  into  a  third  and  neutral  nation  and  forcibly 

^  Prof.  John  Dewey  in  "The  New  Republic,"  March  3,  1920,  writes: 
"  Japanese  troops  overran  the  province  before  they  made  any  serious 
attempt  to  capture  Tsingtao.  It  is  only  a  slight  exaggeration  to  say 
that  they  took  the  'Chinese'  Tsinan  before  they  took  the  German 
Tsingtao." 


INTRUSION  INTO  CHINA  OP  EUROPEAN  WAR     61 

take  possession  of  all  enemy  property?  If  this  be  new  in- 
ternational law,  suggested  by  Japan  and  adopted  by  Europe 
and  America,  then  investments  in  a  foreign  land  become  a 
risky  venture.  Should  Japan  some  time  be  at  war  with  the 
United  States,  then  Japanese  soldiers  may  seize  in  China 
some  Standard  Oil  concession  or  some  of  the  railway  con- 
cessions granted  to  American  bankers.  With  equal  right  in 
the  late  war,  British  marines  might  have  landed  in  New 
York,  when  America  was  neutral,  and  have  taken  over  all 
German  Companies  from  New  York  to  Philadelphia. 
Thomas  F.  Millard  touches  on  the  same  proposition : 

Japan's  seizure  of  the  entire  Tsinan-Tsingtau  Railway  was  not 
a  necessary  military  measure,  as  was  pretended,  but  was  a  po- 
litical move.  The  seeming  acquiescence  of  Great  Britain  with 
that  move  gives  it  additional  importance.  Does  Great  Britain 
regard  the  Canton-Kowloon  Railway  (extending  from  British- 
leased  territory  opposite  Hongkong)  as  also  constituting,  in 
Japan's  phraseology,  "  an  indivisible  part "  of  Great  Britain's 
Kowloon  leasehold  ?  These  considerations  make  this  question  very 
significant  to  China ;  and  also  significant  to  all  foreign  investments 
existing  in  China  now,  and  those  which  may  hope  to  get  a  legiti- 
mate foothold  in  China  hereafter.^ 

What  concerned  China  was  her  responsibility  in  permit- 
ting or  in  forbidding  any  attempt  of  a  belligerent  to  in- 
fringe on  her  sovereignty  or  neutrality.  Strong  states  not 
only  forbid,  but  actually  take  steps  to  resist,  all  violation 
of  their  rights.  "If  a  state  has  neutrality  laws,  it  is  under 
obligation  to  enforce  these  laws. ' '  So,  on  the  other  hand,  if  a 
neutral  not  only  permits,  but  condones  any  violation  of  her 
neutrality,  she  ceases  to  be  neutral,  and  becomes  a  belliger- 
ent. "A  neutral  state,"  says  Hall  in  his  "International 
Law,"  "which  overlooks  such  violations  of  its  neutrality  as 
it  can  rightly  be  expected  to  prevent,  or  which  neglects  to 

*  "  Our  Eastern  Question,"  p.  113. 


62  CHINA.  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

demand  reparation  in  the  appropriate  cases,  becomes  itself 
an  active  offender."  Considering  all  the  circumstances, 
however,  China's  failure  to  resist  must  be  judged  with  a 
degree  of  palliation  and  not  with  condemnation.  If  any 
nation  might  have  complained  of  China's  remissness,  it  was 
Germany,  and  not  Great  Britain  or  Japan. 


CHAPTER  IV 

japan's   inroads   in    CfflNA 

The  starting-point  in  the  weakening  of  China  by  outside 
attack  was  in  1914,  when  Britain  and  Japan  spurned  the 
wishes  of  China  and  brought  the  firebrand  of  war  all  the 
way  from  Europe  to  the  shores  of  Shantung,  where  Con- 
fucius and  Mencius  had  instilled  wise  teachings  as  to 
human  relationship.  In  fact,  the  diplomatic  move  and  the 
military  hard-heartedness  was  contrary  both  to  Confucian- 
ism and  to  Christianity.  The  year  1914  was  thus  a  bad  year 
for  China,  as  for  European  civilization. 

But  the  year  1915  was  even  worse  for  China.  This  was 
the  year  when  Japan  made  gigantic  strides  in  the  military 
domination  of  her  nearest  neighbour,  and  threatened  as 
never  before  attempted  by  any  Power,  East  or  West,  the 
very  existence  of  the  Chinese  state.  This  was  the  period  of 
the  "Twenty-one  Demands."  The  manoeuverings  thereon 
were  so  intricate,  that  without  a  special  effort  an  unjust 
judgment  will  be  rendered  and  misrepresentation  will  gain 
currency.  Out  of  a  natural  indignation  at  Japan's  high- 
handedness there  is  danger  of  going  too  far  in  condemning 
Japan.  At  least  it  is  incumbent,  as  in  other  judgments,  to 
distinguish  the  policy  of  the  Japanese  Government  and  that 
of  the  mass  of  the  Japanese  people. 

We  must  tread  warily,  if  we  are  to  avoid  a  stumble,  either 
in  holding  to  principles  or  in  passing  judgment  on  both 
Chinese  and  Japanese. 

In  1914  a  little  band  of  Germans  had  been  overpowered 
by  the  Japanese  army  and  navy,  aided  by  a  small  British 
force.    It  remained  for  Japan  alone  in  1915  to  overpower 

!63 


64  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

China  by  skill  of  diplomacy,  by  force  of  arms,  or  by  a  threat 
and  an  ultimatum.  China,  being  weak  militarily  as  com- 
pared with  Japan,  had  been  forced  to  yield,  as  had  the  few 
Germans  stranded  on  the  shores  of  Shantung.  The  Ger- 
man surrender  was  no  disgrace.  The  Chinese  surrender 
was  humiliating.  Japan  won  by  Might,  not  by  Right.  She 
did  as  all  belligerents  were  doing — sought  victory,  and  then 
the  spoils  of  war,  by  superior  military  strength.  The  only 
difference  was  that  Japan's  chance  came  early.  The 
chances  for  her  Allies  came  late,  after  over  four  years  of 
slaughter,  anguish  and  struggle.  Japan,  arriving  early  on 
the  field  of  glory,  had  no  need  to  wait  for  a  Peace  Con- 
ference ;  she  pre-empted  the  ground,  forestalled  events,  out- 
ran all  runners,  by  reaching  a  settlement  with  China — a 
victorious  belligerent  dictating  to  a  neutral  about  a  van- 
quished belligerent.  Japan  trusted  to  fait  accompli.  * '  Pos- 
session is  nine-tenths  of  the  law."  Militarism  was  plainly 
in  evidence  on  the  hills  around  Tsingtao.  It  was  not  in 
evidence  in  negotiations  of  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  Gov- 
ernments, but,  none  the  less,  it  backed  up  the  negotiations, 
it  commandeered  success,  it  was  the  power  behind  the 
throne. 

The  face  of  a  Japanese  diplomat  is  impassive,  but  his 
diplomacy  is  very  active.  As  was  once  said  of  the  Russians, 
so  it  may  be  said  of  the  Japanese:  "They  can  wait  a 
hundred  years."  At  the  end  of  1914,  the  Japanese  saw  no 
need  to  wait  longer;  their  day  had  come;  they  had  the 
chance  to  carry  out  great  plans,  far-reaching  plans,  not 
merely  to  take  the  place  of  Germans  in  a  part  of  China,  but 
to  become  the  great  predominating  power  in  all  China. 
Japan's  ambition  was  the  hegemony  of  the  Far  East,  and 
then  in  due  time  to  have  it  recognized — signed  and  sealed — 
by  all  the  great  Powers. 

November  16,  1914,  3,800  Germans  surrendered  to 
Japan.     January  18,   1915,  only  two  months  later,  the 


JAPAN'S  INROADS  IN  CHINA  65 

Japanese  Minister  in  Peking,  Mr,  Hioki,  made  a  presenta- 
tion to  President  Yuan  Shih-kai  of  an  official  document 
commonly  spoken  of  as  the  Twenty-one  Demands.  The  char- 
acter of  each  point  in  the  document  and  the  way  it  was 
presented  seemed  almost  a  duplicate  of  demands  once  made 
on  the  Emperor  of  Korea  prior  to  the  absorption  of  that 
country  by  Japan.  It  was  a  startling  venture  in  the  realm 
of  territorial  expansion.  As  Putnam  Weale  says,  it  was 
"a  list  designed  to  satisfy  every  present  and  future  need 
of  Japanese  policy  and  to  reduce  China  to  a  state  of 
vassalage."^ 

Properly  any  such  official  document  should  have  been 
presented,  if  presented  at  all,  to  the  diplomatic  department 
of  the  Government,  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  It  was 
an  impropriety,  and  almost  an  insult,  for  the  Japanese 
Minister  to  ask  for  an  audience  with  the  President  of  the 
Chinese  Republic,  and  then  to  go  beyond  ceremonial  usages 
and  hand  to  him  such  a  menacing  and  dictatorial  document. 

The  Japanese,  never  having  any  great  liking  for  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  were  no  doubt  delighted  to  have  the  chance  to 
present  him  as  President — "the  strong  man  of  China" — 
an  offensive  document  whose  demands  he  was  powerless 
to  resist. 

Moreover,  the  Japanese  Minister  insisted  on  complete 
secrecy.  Any  disclosure  would  prove  disastrous  to  China 
as  a  nation  and  to  Yuan  Shih-kai  personally. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  the  present  nothing 
stands  out  in  Japanese  politics  more  deserving  of  severest 
condemnation  than  the  presentation  and  attempt  at  exe- 
cution of  these  Twenty-one  Demands.  As  they  gradually 
became  known,  the  British  and  French,  as  well  as  Amer- 
icans and  Chinese,  joined  in  one  great  uproar  of  denun- 
ciation. The  British  were  beginning  to  doubt  their  wisdom 
in  inviting  Japan  to  eliminate  "the  German  menace"; 

»  "  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China,"  p.  87. 


66  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

they  already  saw  a  Japanese  menace,  and  did  not  hesitate 
to  warn  against  it. 

The  Twenty-one  Demands  as  actually  made  known  to 
the  President  of  China  were  in  five  groups.  The  first,  quite 
logically,  bore  on  the  confirmation  of  Japan's  possession 
of  German  rights  in  Shantung.  The  second  enlarged  and 
prolonged  the  Japanese  hold  on  rights  acquired  in  Southern 
Manchuria  in  the  war  with  Russia  ten  years  before,  and 
linked  on  with  this  certain  demands  concerning  Inner 
Eastern  Mongolia.  The  third  related  to  increased  control 
in  the  Hanyehping  Company,  China's  greatest  industrial 
enterprise,  and  in  the  development  of  mines,  in  the  geo- 
graphical centre  of  China  Proper,  thus  projecting  into 
the  British  sphere  of  interest.  The  fourth,  a  very  brief 
one,  but  apparently  magnanimous  on  Japan's  part,  was 
the  obligation  resting  on  China  to  lease  no  more  harbours  or 
islands  on  the  China  coast  to  a  third  Power.  The  fifth 
group,  most  vital  of  all,  related  to  railway  concessions  in 
the  Yangtsze  Valley,  to  Japan's  priority  in  Fukien  prov- 
ince, recognized  for  some  time  as  Japanese  sphere  of  in- 
terest, and,  more  than  all,  to  an  astounding  influence  and 
authority  on  the  part  of  Japan  in  the  internal  and  political 
affairs  of  all  China,  deeply  affecting  China's  sovereignty 
for  all  future  time. 

Looking  backward,  it  is  clear  that  Group  I,  which  bore 
Upon  cession  to  Japan  of  all  German  rights  in  Shantung, 
to  be  agreed  to  by  China,  automatically  arose  from  Japan's 
method  of  attacking  Tsingtao,  and  this  in  turn  arose  from 
the  appeal  to  Japan  by  the  British  Government  to  enter 
the  war  against  Germany  in  the  Far  East.  Nothing  more 
needed  negotiation. 

Looking  forward,  the  Demands  made  as  to  the  province  of 
Shantung  afforded  Japan  the  rare  opportunity,  not  to  be 
neglected,  of  fixing  once  for  all  Japan's  predominance  not 
only  in  Shantung,  but  in  Southern  Manchuria,  in  Inner 


JAPAN'S  INROADS  IN  CHINA  67 

Mongolia,  in  the  province  of  Fukien,  in  the  British  sphere 
of  interest,  and,  in  a  political  way,  in  the  whole  of  China. 

The  Japanese  Government,  trusting  that  secrecy  could  be 
kept — "clothed  in  impenetrable  mystery,"  as  Putnam 
Weale  writes — assured  foreign  governments,  who  pressed 
for  information,  that  there  "had  never  been  twenty-one 
demands,  as  the  Chinese  alleged,  but  only  fourteen,  the 
seven  items  of  Group  V  being  desiderata  which  it  was  in 
the  interests  of  China  to  endorse  but  which  Japan  had  no 
intention  of  forcing  upon  her. ' '  ^ 

Dr.  Sidney  L.  Gulick  says:  "I  have  it  on  pretty  high 
authority  that  Group  V  was  put  up  for  purposes  of  trad- 
ing. Japan  arranged  that  Yuan  Shih-kai  could  say  to 
China  that  he  had  forced  Japan  to  back  down  on  the  most 
important  demands  and  thus  'save  his  face'  for  having 
yielded  the  rest. ' '  ^ 

This  mode  of  reasoning  rests  on  a  foundation  of  moving 
sand.  If  the  mention  of  Group  V  was  a  bargaining  pro- 
cess, why  insist  at  the  end  that  the  points  were  to  be 
deferred  for  future  consultation?  And  why  in  1918  was 
the  attempt  again  made  to  carry  them  out  through  a  number 
of  secret  agreements  with  the  militaristic  faction  con- 
trolling the  Peking  Government? 

The  full  text  of  the  Demands  was  not  revealed  by  Japan 
to  the  Governments  of  Japan's  Allies  or  the  United  States 
till  rumours  had  become  so  loud,  as  well  as  manifold, 
that  all  denial  was  threatening  to  the  moral  standing  of 
Japan.  It  was  a  month  before  even  the  limited,  and  less 
objectionable,  list  was  made  known  officially,  while  the 
complete  list  was  delayed  still  longer,  until  in  fact  the 
Twenty-one  Demands  were  modified  in  a  revised  list,  pre- 
sented to  China,  April  26  (1915).  In  all  probability  the 
revision  of  the  original  list  was  due  as  much  to  foreign 

*  Putnam  Weale,  "  The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China,"  p.  100. 
»  Arthur  J.  Brown,  "  The  Mastery  of  the  Far  East,"  p.  425. 


68  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

criticism  and  world-wide  outcry  as  to  the  argumentative 
powers  of  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  and  President  Yuan 
Shih-kai. 

The  reader  should  bear  in  mind  that  after  many  con- 
ferences concerning  the  original  Twenty-one  Demands 
Japan  presented,  April  26,  a  revised  list,  less  drastic  than 
the  previous  one,  of  twenty-four  Articles,  but  arranged  in 
three  Groups  instead  of  five;  that,  on  May  1,  the  Chinese 
Foreign  Office  presented  to  the  Japanese  Minister  a  memo- 
randum discussing  the  general  matters  at  issue,  and  en- 
closing China's  proposed  list  of  thirteen  Articles  in  three 
Groups;  that,  on  May  7,  Japan  presented  an  ultimatum, 
demanding  acceptance  of  Japan's  revised  list  and  calling 
for  a  favourable  reply  within  48  hours,  or  ''the  Imperial 
Government  will  take  steps  they  may  deem  necessary"; 
that,  on  May  9,  China  complied,  presenting,  however,  an 
able  "Official  Statement"  in  defence  of  China's  position, 
and  that,  on  May  25,  treaties  were  made,  or  exchange  of 
notes  passed,  between  Mr.  Hioki,  the  Japanese  representa- 
tive, and  Mr.  Lou  Tseng-tsiang,  the  Chinese  representative, 
settling  once  for  all,  as  it  was  supposed,  the  right  of  Japan 
to  dictate  in  Chinese  affairs,  and  the  duty  of  China  to 
comply  on  pain  of  war  and  complete  subjugation. 

Thus  Japan  handed  out  an  ultimatum  first  to  Germany, 
a  belligerent,  and  then  to  China,  a  neutral  and  neighbour. 
All  along  China  has  been  treated  less  as  a  neutral  or  even  as 
an  ally  or  associate  than  as  an  enemy.  "Japan,"  says 
Thomas  F.  Millard,  "employed  bludgeoning  tactics  all 
through  the  negotiations.  She  reinforced  her  military 
forces  in  Shantung  and  Manchuria  and  made  strategical 
dispositions  unmistakably  directed  against  China, ' '  All  this 
gave  force  and  significance  to  the  ultimatum.  Had  it  not 
been  that  the  "strong  man,"  Yuan  Shih-kai,  was  President, 
the  forces  of  internal  revolt  or  the  forces  of  external  war 
could  never  have  been  held  in  cheek.     There  was  force 


JAPAN'S  INROADS  IN  CHINA  69 

majeure,  plenty  of  it,  in  negotiation  and  in  the  settlement, 
as  in  many  a  treaty  before,  but  through  kind  words  from 
Britons  and  Americans  the  hope  sprang  in  the  Chinese 
breast  that  in  some  way  and  at  some  time  High  Heaven 
would  rescue  China  from  the  grip  of  an  outside  nation, 
"Yuan  chose  the  wiser  cause,"  says  Mr.  Millard,  with 
whom  all  familiar  with  the  circumstances  must  agree.  ' '  He 
conceded  what  he  must,  and  saved  such  exceptions  as  he 
could,  hoping  that  China's  case  would  get  a  hearing  before 
civilization  later. ' '  ^ 

Thus  in  1915  Japan  acquired  certain  rights  in  China  by 
means  of  a  treaty  with  China;  legality  enshrouded  mili- 
tarism; China  had  consented.  To  understand  just  how 
much  Japan  gained,  and  how  much  China  was  forced  to 
lose,  these  investigations  may  be  made  along  two  lines,  one 
the  direct  result  of  the  war  as  seen  in  acquisition  of  previous 
German  rights  in  Shantung,  and  the  other  the  indirect 
result  as  seen  in  acquisition  of  rights  in  other  sections  of 
China,  along  with  the  promise  of  more  blessings  still  in 
store. 

I.    Japan's  direct  gain  through  rights  in  Shantung. 

(1)  The  new  Chino- Japanese  Treaty,  Article  1,  reads: 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  to  give  full  assent  to  all  mat- 
ters upon  which  the  Japanese  Government  may  hereafter  agree 
with  the  German  Government  relating  to  the  disposition  of  all 
rights,  interests  and  concessions  which  Germany  by  virtue  of 
treaties  or  otherwise  possesses  in  relation  to  the  province  of 
Shantung. 

The  significance  of  this  agreement  as  bearing  on  the 
wisdom  of  China's  own  entrance  into  the  war  has  been 
generally  overlooked.  All  the  rights  which  China  originally 
ceded  by  treaty  to  Germany  in  1898  are  to  be  disposed  of 
by  mutual   consultation  of  Germany  and  Japan.     And 

*  "  Our  Eastern  Question,"  p.  154. 


J 


70  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

China  is  to  agree  to  it.  Was  it  wise  for  China  later  on  to 
antagonize  either  Germany  or  Japan  by  going  to  war  with 
the  one  and  by  conflicting  with  the  other  at  the  Peace  Con- 
ference in  Paris?  Would  it  not  have  been  wiser  to  keep 
on  friendly  terms  with  both  than  to  rely  on  the  assuring 
phraseology  of  America,  Britain  and  France,  that  China 
would  be  befriended,  if  she  entered  the  war,  and  would  be 
allowed  a  seat,  however  lowly,  at  the  Peace  Table? 

In  conversations  which  I  personally  had  with  the  German 
Minister,  Admiral  von  Hintze,  before  either  China  or  the 
United  States  declared  war,  I  know  that  Germany  was 
ready  to  urge  on  Japan  the  presence  of  a  Chinese  repre- 
sentative at  the  proposed  conference  of  Germany  and 
Japan.  In  the  Official  Statement  presented  by  China,  May 
7,  1915,  it  is  said : 

The  suggestion  relating  to  participation  in  conference  between 
Japan  and  Germany  was  made  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Shantung, 
the  object  of  future  negotiations  between  Japan  and  Germany,  is 
a  Chinese  province,  and  therefore  China  is  the  Power  most  con- 
cerned in  the  future  of  that  territory. 

It  certainly  seemed  very  probable  that  more  advantage 
would  have  accrued  to  China  by  following  such  a  line  of 
action  than  by  the  policy  she  was  led  to  pursue  from  1917 
until  the  signing  of  the  Versailles  Treaty,  June  28,  1919 — 
an  occasion  on  which  China,  alas,  was  forbidden  even  to 
*'sign  with  reservations." 

(2)  The  disposition  of  the  German-leased  territory  of 
Kiaochow  was  settled  by  exchange  of  notes.  This  terri- 
tory is  to  be  "left  to  the  free  disposal  of  Japan,"  thus 
recognizing,  as  the  Versailles  Treaty  has  also  recognized, 
Japan's  supremacy  over  both  Germany  and  China  in  ref- 
erence to  this  territory.  However,  Japan  by  her  sovereign 
grace  "will  restore  the  said  leased  territory  to  China." 


JAPAN'S  INROADS  IN  CHINA  71 

Free  salvation  again,  but — but — '  *  under  the  following  con- 
ditions." And  what  are  they?  Four  in  all,  but  two  are 
noteworthy : 

*'A  Concession  under  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  Japan 
to  be  established  at  a  place  designated  by  the  Japanese 
Government"; 

"If  the  Foreign  Powers  desire  it,  an  International  Con- 
cession may  be  established." 

What  is  left  as  a  residuum  is  to  go  to  China,  but  under 
the  stipulation  that  Tsingtao  "be  opened  as  a  Commercial 
Port,"  as  it  had  been  in  fact  by  agreement  with  Ger- 
many. 

This  arrangement  would  make  the  once  free-port  of 
Tsingtao  under  German  jurisdiction  a  second  Shanghai,  in 
which  there  exists  a  French  Concession,  an  International 
Settlement,  and  the  Chinese  native  city  and  suburbs. 

Showing  the  pressure  that  Japan  constantly  brought  on 
China  by  dangling  the  promise  of  the  restoration  of  Kiao- 
chow,  it  is  stated  that  when  Japan  presented  the  revised 
Demands,  April  26,  "the  Japanese  Minister  stated  that  the 
Japanese  Government  would  restore  the  leased  territory  of 
Kiaochow  to  China  at  an  opportune  time  in  the  future  and 
under  proper  conditions";  and  then  it  is  added — "if  the 
Chinese  Government  would  agree  to  the  new  list  of  Twenty- 
four  Demands  without  modification."  A  pretty  big  if,  a 
preliminary  ultimatum. 

Was  it  at  all  likely  that  China  by  being  embroiled  in  the 
war  would  be  able  to  alter  the  Chino-Japanese  agreement 
of  1915?  The  restoration  of  Kiaochow,  if  it  ever  takes 
place,  is  to  be  on  the  conditions  defined  in  1915  and  by 
Japan's  "free  disposal."  Japan,  to  strengthen  her  posi- 
tion from  1915  to  1919,  purchased  much  land  in  the  de- 
sirable portion  of  Tsingtao  and  around,  to  be  set  apart  as 
a  Japanese  Concession.  Whether  an  International  Settle- 
ment is  formed  or  not,  Japan  has  acquired  through  a  grow- 


J 


72  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

ing  population  at  Tsingtao  and  through  delay  a  predom- 
inant influence  in  all  administration. 

(3)  Another  Article  reads: 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  as  regards  the  railway  to 
he  huilt  by  China  herself  from  Chefoo  or  Lungkow  to  connect 
with  the  Kiaochow-Tsinan-fu  Railway,  if  Germany  abandons  the 
privilege  of  financing  the  Chefoo-Weihsien  line,  China  will  ap- 
proach Japanese  capitalists  to  negotiate  for  a  loan. 

The  Versailles  Treaty  of  Peace  has  not  improved  on  this 
arrangement.  "China  herself"  is  to  build  the  railway, 
according  to  the  terms  agreed  upon  by  China  and  Japan. 
If  she  has  money  of  her  own,  as  she  ought  to  have  under 
proper  management,  there  will  be  no  necessity  for  Jap- 
anese or  German  financing.  What  others  object  to  is  that 
they  do  not  have  an  equal  chance. 

(4)  One  more  stipulation  is  the  following: 

Within  the  province  of  Shantung  or  along  its  coast  no  territory 
or  island  will  be  leased  or  ceded  to  any  foreign  Power  under  any 
pretext. 

It  is  generally  supposed  that  this  stipulation  was  meant 
to  check  the  designs  of  Germany,  to  whom  according  to  the 
Treaty  of  1898  was  to  be  given  by  China  "a  more  suitable 
place,"  "should  Germany  at  some  future  time  express  the 
wish  to  return  Kiaochow  Bay  to  China." 

It  is  to  be  acknowledged  that  the  principle  here  laid  down 
is  a  good  one,  and  that  Japan  deserves  credit  for  bringing 
it  forward — ^namely,  that  the  habit  of  seizing  Chinese  ports 
and  territory  comes  to  an  end.  May,  1915.  Japan,  too, 
according  to  this,  is  never  to  occupy  territory,  at  least  in 
the  province  of  Shantung. 

r"  Thus,  in  the  above  four  stipulations,  what  Japan  had 
gained  by  right  of  conquest  in  1914,  in  Shantung,  she  has 


JAPAN'S  INROADS  IN  CHINA  73 

confirmed  by  treaty  in  1915,  except  that  a  few  points  were 
to  be  amicably  settled  through  negotiation  after  the  ter- 
mination of  war.    The  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  no  better, 
for  it,  too,  gave  its  sanction  to  the  principle  of  conquest,    i 
without  the  definite  agreement  of  future  negotiation. 

The  Chinese  in  the  negotiations  preceding  the  ultimatum 
of  May  7  did  not  specially  complain  of  what  Japan  insisted 
on  concerning  Shantung.  In  fact  in  China's  Memorandum 
of  May  1st,  it  is  stated : 

As  regards  matters  relating  to  Shantung,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
taent  has  agreed  to  a  majority  of  the  demands. 

Thus  so  far  as  Shantung  is  concerned,  it  is  hard  to  under- 
stand why  more  stress  was  laid  at  the  Peace  Conference  on 
Shantung  affairs  than  on  other  matters  to  which  China 
strongly  objected  in  the  1915  negotiations.  If  China  ex- 
pected to  have  altered  or  abrogated  the  agreements  of  1915, 
she  should  have  placed  on  record  her  protest  and  not  de- 
clared that  she  ' '  agreed. ' '  Still  less  could  China  complain 
at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  that  the  Treaty  of  1915,  so 
far  as  Shantung  was  concerned,  was  made  under  duress. 
Duress  was  applied  to  other  matters. 

There  were,  however,  two  particulars  in  the  Shantung 
settlement  of  1915  which  China  brought  forward  and 
which  Japan  as  a  good  neighbour  might  have  agreed  to. 
One,  as  given  out  in  China's  "Official  Statement,"  reads: 

Another  supplementary  proposal  suggesting  the  assumption  by 
Japan  of  responsibility  for  indemnification  of  the  losses  arising 
out  of  the  military  operations  by  Japan  in  and  about  the  leased 
territory  of  Kiaochow  was  necessitated  by  the  fact  that  China  was 
neutral  vis-d-vis  the  war  between  Japan  and  Germany. 

This  was  simple  justice.  As  Germany  is  called  on  to 
indemnify  the  losses  in  Belgium,  much  more  should  Japan 


74  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

indemnify  the  losses  of  China.    Why  so  clear  a  duty  slipped 
from  notice  at  the  Peace  Conference  at  Paris  can  only  be 
explained  by  the  skilful  manceuvering   of  the  Japanese 
delegates. 
Another  reasonable  request  reads: 

That  the  military  railway,  the  telegraph  lines,  etc.,  which  were 
installed  by  Japan  to  facilitate  her  military  operations  should  be 
removed  forthwith;  that  the  Japanese  troops  now  stationed  out- 
side of  the  leased  territory  should  be  first  withdrawn,  and  those 
within  the  territory  should  be  recalled  at  the  time  when  Kiaochow 
is  returned  to  China. 

Knowing  of  the  inroads  made  by  Japan  in  Manchuria 
after  the  war  with  Russia  through  a  military  railway  and 
refusal  to  withdraw  troops  and  police,  it  was  China's  duty 
to  avert  such  evils  in  Shantung.  Japan 's  persistent  refusal 
to  comply  with  such  a  reasonable  request  can  only  increase 
Chinese  suspicion  of  Japanese  designs. 

The  Agreements  of  1915  were  thus  bad,  not  so  much  in 
what  they  affirmed  as  in  what  they  omitted  to  affirm. 
p'  The  peril  to  China  was  also  not  so  much  in  the  actual 
'  specifications  of  the  Treaty  bearing  on  Shantung  as  in  the 
j  substitution  of  Japan  for  Germany,  thus  excluding  a  strong 
balancing  power  and  transferring  it  all  to  the  increased 
(predominance  of  Japan.    S.  K.  Hornbeek  has  written : 

With  the  Manchurian  railways  penetrating  the  heart  of  Man- 
churia and  the  Shantung  Railway  extending  to  the  heart  of 
Shantung — and  with  the  right  to  extend  the  latter  line  to  join  the 
Peking- Hankow  line — Japan  is  in  a  position,  should  she  so 
choose,  at  any  moment  to  grind  Peking  between  the  millstones  of 
her  military  machine.  So  far  as  strategy  is  concerned,  Japan  has 
North  China  commercially,  militarily  and  politically  at  her 
mercy.  ^ 

* "  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East,"  p.  346. 


b 


JAPAN'S  INROADS  IN  CHINA  75 

II,     Japan's  indirect  gains  in  other  parts  of  China. 

(1)  Japan's  demands  in  Manchuria  are  agreed  to  in  the 
following  particulars : 

(a)  The  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  (or  Dairen)  is 
extended  to  99  years. 

(6)  "The  terms  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  and 
the  Antung-Mukden  Railway"  also  extend  to  99  years. 
The  Chinese  Memorandum  acknowledges  that  it  must 
*  *  abandon  its  own  cherished  hopes  to  regain  control  of  these 
places  and  properties  at  the  expiration  of  their  respective 
original  terms  of  lease." 

(c)  "Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria  may,  by 
negotiation,  lease  land  necessary  for  erecting  suitable  build- 
ings for  trade  and  manufacture  or  for  prosecuting  agricul- 
tural enterprises."  They  also  "shall  be  free  to  reside  and 
travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  to  engage  in  business  and 
manufacture  of  any  kind  whatsoever."  Thus,  merchants, 
manufacturers  and  farmers,  if  they  are  Japanese,  may  live 
anywhere  in  South  Manchuria,  as  in  China's  treaty- 
ports. 

(d)  "In  the  event  of  Japanese  and  Chinese  desiring 
jointly  to  undertake  agricultural  enterprises  and  industries 
incidental  thereto,  the  Chinese  Government  may  give  its 
permission."    Such  co-operation  is  unobjectionable. 

(e)  Japanese  subjects  "shall  also  submit  to  the  police 
laws  and  ordinances  and  taxation  of  China."  The  treaty 
on  this  point  is  a  slight  improvement  on  the  revised  list  of 
the  Japanese,  in  that  the  latter  stipulated  that  the  laws  and 
ordinances  must  be  "approved  by  the  Japanese  Consul," 
while  the  former  adds  merely  that  ' '  the  Chinese  authorities 
will  notify  the  Japanese  Consul." 

(/)  A  rule  is  laid  down,  to  which  no  exception  can  be 
made,  as  to  Mixed  Court  procedure  in  litigation  between 
Chinese  and  Japanese,  similar  to  that  at  treaty-ports.  Then 
the  clause  is  added ; 


76  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

When,  in  future,  the  judicial  system  in  the  said  region  is  com- 
pletely reformed,  all  civil  and  criminal  cases  concerning  Japanese 
subjects  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  entirely  by  Chinese  law 
courts. 


This  feature  while  not  appearing  in  the  original  copy  of 
the  Demands,  appears  both  in  the  revised  list  and  in  the 
final  agreement. 

(g)  A  revision  is  made  in  the  terms  of  the  Kirin-Chang- 
chun  Railway  Loan  Agreement,  giving  Japan  the  conces- 
sion, and  to  this  China  had  already  assented. 

(h)  It  is  agreed  that  in  building  railways  "if  foreign 
capital  is  required,  China  may  negotiate  for  a  loan  with 
Japanese  capitalists  first."  This  merely  establishes  South 
Manchuria  as  a  Japanese  sphere  of  interest,  just  as  British, 
French  and  Germans  had  secured  in  other  parts  of  China. 

(i)  New  commercial  ports  are  opened  in  Manchuria, 
wherein  all  foreigners  may  carry  on  trade. 

(j)  Japan  is  allowed  certain  mining  areas,  heretofore 
not  worked.  In  this  way  South  Manchuria  more  than  ever 
becomes  Japan's  special  and  exclusive  sphere  of  interest, 
similar  to  the  position  of  other  countries  in  other  parts  of 
China. 

(k)  "Hereafter,  if  foreign  advisors  or  instructors  on 
political,  financial,  military  or  police  matters  are  to  be  em- 
ployed in  South  Manchuria,  Japanese  may  be  employed 
first."  This  is  like  the  original  form  of  the  Demands,  ex- 
cept that  "may  be  employed"  is  the  improved  form  of  the 
phrase,  "the  Japanese  Government  shall  be  consulted." 
To  this  the  Chinese  commissioner  presented  no  objection. 

(2)  Japan's  demands  in  Inner  Eastern  Mongolia  are 
agreed  to  in  only  a  few  particulars,  namely,  (a)  opening 
of  commercial  ports,  (b)  applying  for  loans  to  Japanese 
capitalists  first,  and  (c)  employing  Japanese  advisors  and 
instructors  first.     These  are  similar  to  the  revised  list, 


JAPAN'S  INROADS  IN  CHINA  77 

while  the  original  list  aimed  at  much  more,  giving  to  the 
Japanese  nearly  the  same  position  in  Mongolia  as  in 
Manchuria. 

In  reference  to  Japan's  position  in  South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Mongolia,  the  Treaty  says  that  it  is  concluded 
"with  a  view  to  developing  their  economic  relations,"  while 
the  original  Demands  state  that  ''the  Chinese  Government 
has  always  acknowledged  the  special  position  enjoyed  by  Ja- 
pan." In  either  ease  China  was  set  to  lose  in  her  sovereign 
position  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia  far  more  than  in_ 
Shantung. 

^(3)  Japan  secures  greater  control  of  the  Hanyehping 
Company,  consisting  of  iron  and  coal  mines  and  a  great 
steel  foundry.  Greater  co-operation  of  capitalists  from 
both  countries  is  to  be  allowed.  '  *  The  Chinese  Government 
further  agrees  not  to  confiscate  the  said  Company,  nor, 
without  the  consent  of  the  Japanese  capitalists,  to  convert 
it  into  a  State  enterprise,  nor  cause  it  to  borrow  and  use 
foreign  capital  other  than  Japanese." 

The  mines  and  works  of  this  great  industrial  Company 
are  in  the  very  centre  of  China,  within  the  British  sphere 
of  interest. 

The  original  Demands  extended  Japan's  influence  in  the 
Yangtsze  Valley  by  insisting  that  * '  all  mines  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood  of  those  owned  by  the  Hanyehping  Company  shall  ^ 
not  be  permitted,  without  the  consent  of  the  said  Company, 
to  be  worked  by  other  persons  outside  of  the  said 
Company." 

Naturally  the  opposition  by  Britons  to  the  Twenty-one 
Demands  was  directed  more  to  Group  III,  which  related  to 
this  Company,  than  to  the  settlement  of  either  the  Shan- 
tung or  the  Manchurian  and  Mongolian  questions.  The 
Chinese  Minister  also  could  not  agree  to  the  insertion  of  the 
original  form,  as  it  ''seriously  affected  the  principle  of 
equal  commercial  opportunity. ' '   Few  foreigners  or  Chinese 


78  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

I    at  that  time  of  discussion  had  much  to  say  about  the  Jap- 
\    anese  acquisition  of  German  rights  and  concessions  in  Shan- 
^  \  tung,  which,  therefore,  was  not  particularly  a  work  of  force 
\  majeure. 

As  Great  Britain  was  and  is  a  formal  Ally  of  Japan, 
Japan  yielded  to  British  criticism  about  the  Hanyehping 
Company,  and  simply  omitted,  but  did  not  abandon,  the 
objectionable  part  of  the  original  Demands. 

(4)  Japan  secures  an  agreement  from  China  through 
exchange  of  notes  to  the  effect  "that  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment hereby  declares  that  it  has  given  no  permission  to 
foreign  nations  to  construct,  on  the  coast  of  Fukien  prov- 
ince, dockyards,  coaling  stations  for  military  use,  naval 
bases,  or  to  set  up  other  military  establishments,  nor  does  it 
entertain  an  intention  of  borrowing  foreign  capital  for  the 
purpose  of  setting  up  the  above-mentioned  establish- 
ments. ' ' 

This  recognized  Japanese  priority  in  Fukien  province, 
where  for  many  years  Japan  had  claimed  a  sphere  of  in- 
terest. The  new  wording  gave  recognition  to  Japan's  po- 
litical influence,  by  warning  off  all  other  foreigners. 

In  the  original  form  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands,  the  ref- 
erence to  Fukien  is  contained  in  the  objectionable  Group  V 
as  Article  6. 

It  was  understood  at  the  time  that  Japan  desired  such 
an  agreement,  out  of  fear  that  the  United  States  was 
designing  some  scheme  of  intrusion  into  the  Fukien 
province. 

Thus  Japan,  in  as  early  an  hour  as  possible,  by  means  of 
the  Treaties  of  1915,  protected  and  expanded  her  interests 
not  only  against  Germany  but  against  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  and  even  against  China  herself. 
^  (5)  China  also  agrees  in  the  final  arrangement  to  the 
modified  form  of  Group  IV,  that  she  will  "give  a  pro- 
nouncement by  herself  in  accordance  with  the  following 


JAPAN'S  INROADS  IN  CHINA  79 

principle:  *No  bay,  harbour  or  island  along  the  coast  of 
China  may  be  ceded  or  leased  to  any  Power.'  " 

This  is  an  expansion  of  a  very  desirable  article  in  the 
Shantung  arrangement.  If  all  the  countries,  Japan  in- 
cluded, would  now  agree  to  give  up  all  harbours  or  territory 
already  held  on  lease,  China's  national  integrity  and  the 
peace  of  the  Far  East  would  be  greatly  solidified. 

(6)  In  the  reply  of  the  Chinese  Government,  May  8, 
to  the  ultimatum  of  Japan,  it  is  agreed  that  "five  articles 
of  Group  V"  are  "postponed  for  later  negotiation." 
These  five  "refer  to  (a)  the  employment  of  advisors, 
(b)  the  establishment  of  schools  and  hospitals,  (c)  the 
railway  concessions  in  South  China,  (d)  the  supply  of  arms 
and  ammunition  and  the  establishment  of  arsenals,  and 
(e)  right  of  missionary  propaganda."  "It  is  this  fact  [of 
postponement]  which  remains  the  sword  of  Damocles  hang- 
ing over  China's  head,  and  until  this  sword  has  been  flung 
back  into  the  waters  of  the  Yellow  Sea  the  Far  Eastern 
situation  will  remain  perilous"  (Putnam  Weale). 

Several  of  the  items  to  be  postponed  came  up  for  "nego- 
tiation" and  also  for  settlement  in  1918  before  the  an- 
nouncement of  armistice.  What  Japan  thus  acquired,  in 
Shantung,  in  Manchuria,  in  Mongolia,  in  the  Yangtsze  Val- 
ley, in  Fukien,  in  all  China  (potentially),  was  startling. 

This  much  can  be  said,  however,  of  Japanese  attitude  to "" 
China  that  there  was  more  readiness  to  negotiate  than  in 
most  treaties  concluded  under  coercion.  -4 

Moreover,  while  the  original  form  of  the  Twenty-one 
Demands  deserves  the  severest  censure,  the  ultimate  agree- 
ment is  less  objectionable.  What  China  agrees  to  after 
receipt  of  the  ultimatum  is  in  the  main  what  she  had  agreed 
to  in  conference  prior  to  the  ultimatum.  The  subsequent 
complaint,  made  known  at  the  Peace  Conference  in  Paris, 
that  the  Agreements  of  1915  should  be  abrogated  by  the 
League  of  Nations  because  they  were  signed  under  duress, 


80  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

is  worthy  of  no  consideration,  in  face  of  the  far  greater  act 
of  duress,  with  exclusion  of  all  negotiation,  as  revealed  in 
the  Versailles  Treaty  with  Germany  as  well  as  in  most 
treaties  with  China.  In  the  " Official  Statement"  which 
China  made  May  8,  it  may  be  seen  that  according  to 
China's  own  acknowledgment  she  had  consented  to  prac- 
tically all  that  the  ultimatum  required,  and  that  therefore 
coercion,  if  it  existed  at  all,  was  insignificant : 

Of  the  twenty-one  original  demands  there  were  six,  as  previ- 
ously mentioned,  to  which  China  could  not  agree. 

And  these  six  were  not  included  in  the  "Revised  List," 
concerning  which — and  not  the  ** Twenty-one  Demands" — 
Japan  had  issued  her  ultimatum. 

Still  less  could  the  Shantung  settlement  be  made  a  matter 
of  objections,  except  so  far  as  it  omitted  certain  points  which 
China  desired  to  have  inserted. 

The  restoration  of  Kiaochow  to  China  seems  to  have  been 
the  chief  factor  in  the  Chinese  claim  as  made  to  the  Su- 
preme Council  in  Paris,  but,  May  7,  1915,  the  Japanese 
Government  declared:  "If  the  Chinese  Government  accept 
all  the  articles  as  demanded  in  the  ultimatum  the  offer 
of  the  Japanese  Government  to  restore  Kiaochow  to  China, 
made  on  the  26th  of  April,  will  still  hold  good."  In  fact, 
the  Versailles  Treaty  accorded  more  to  Japan,  and  took 
more  away  from  China,  than  the  settlement  of  1915  as  made 
between  China  and  Japan  direct. 

'^    If  China  has  complaint  to  make,  it  should  be  against  the 
entrance  of  war  into  China  in  1914,  from  which  has  issued 
]  a  variety  of  evils,  annoyances  and  misfortunes. 

A  minor  complaint  might  be  this:  why  did  not  Japan 
content  herself  with  reaching  a  settlement  on  the  one  ques- 
tion of  disposal  of  former  German  rights  in  Shantung? 
Why  did  she  compel  China  to  drag  in  other  matters,  con- 


JAPAN'S  INROADS  IN  CHINA  81 

nected  perhaps  with  the  former  war  with  Russia,  but  not 
with  the  war  with  Germany?  And  why,  too,  did  the 
Chinese  delegates  at  Paris  lay  stress  on  only  the  matters 
relating  to  Shantung,  and  not  to  the  major  part  of  the 
1915  Agreement? 

S.  K.  Hornbeek  ^  presents  the  reader  with  a  philosophical 
conundrum : 

The  ultimatum  demanded  little  of  importance  to  which  China 
had  not  already  agreed.  Was  it  then  really  nothing  but  a  stuffed 
club,  a  mere  bluff,  its  presentation  a  "  grand-stand  play  "  ?  Was 
the  threat  of  war  made  simply  to  save  the  face  of  the  Chinese 
Government  before  the  Chinese  people,  to  enhance  the  prestige 
of  the  Japanese  Government  with  the  Japanese  people,  to  place 
before  the  world  a  picture  of  Japan  provoked  by  Chinese  ob- 
structionist tactics  to  the  point  of  raising  the  sword  and  then, 
rather  than  break  the  peace,  magnanimously  foregoing  the  easy 
glory  of  an  easier  conquest  and  the  full  fruits  of  an  assured  and 
early  military  success?  Or  was  Japan  really  asking  for  a  little 
more  in  addition  to  the  very  much  which  China  had  already  con- 
ceded, actually  ready  to  go  to  war  rather  than  be  denied? 

My  own  opinion  is  that  Japan  presented  the  original  ; 
Twenty-one  Demands  with  the  probability  of  having  them    , 
accepted,  but  when  by  official  conference  and  public  agi- 
tation   complete    acceptance    seemed    improbable,    Japan 
issued  an  ultimatum  as  to  what  China  had  already  agreed,        %/:.■ 
knowing  that  refusal  on  China's  part  was  unlikely,  and 
that   compliance   under   circumstances    of   an   ultimatum 
would  imply  a  yielding  to  Japan's  superior  Might,  with  a 
world-wide  recognition  of  Japan's  predominance. 

Still,  Japan  has  suffered  through  the  prevalent  miscon- 
ception that  Japan  forced  on  China  the  Twenty-one 
Demands. 

Looking  at  the  whole  transaction,  illustrative  of  Force 

*  "  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East,"  p.  327. 


82  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

and  characteristic  of  War,  the  Chinese,  and  the  whole 
world,  may  well  complain  that  as  a  result  of  excluding 
Germany  from  China  and  substituting  Japan,  a  way  is 
found  in  the  garb  of  legality,  and  by  the  sacredness  of  trea- 
ties, to  establish  irrevocably  the  supremacy  of  Japan  in  all 
Eastern  Asia. 

No  sooner  had  China  and  Japan  come  to  an  agreement, 
which  was  all  to  Japan's  gain  and  China's  loss,  than  the 
United  States  Government,  through  the  Secretary  of  State, 
William  Jennings  Bryan,  sent  an  identic  note  to  Japan 
and  China  as  follows : 

In  view  of  the  circumstances  of  the  negotiations  which  have 
taken  place  and  which  are  now  pending  between  the  Government 
of  China  and  the  Government  of  Japan  and  of  the  agreements 
which  have  been  reached  as  a  result  thereof,  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  has  the  honour  to  notify  the  Government  of  the 
Chinese  Republic  [of  Imperial  Japan]  that  it  cannot  recognize 
any  agreement  or  undertaking  which  has  been  entered  into  or 
which  may  be  entered  into  between  the  Governments  of  China 
and  Japan  impairing  the  treaty  rights  of  the  United  States  and 
its  citizens  in  China,  the  political  or  territorial  integrity  of  the 
Republic  of  China,  or  the  international  policy  relative  to  China 
commonly  known  as  the  Open  Door  policy. 

It  is  evident  that  an  official  utterance  of  this  kind  would 
inspire  in  the  Chinese  confidence  of  American  help,  and 
in  the  Japanese  resentment  at  American  intrusion.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  confidence  of  the  Chinese  was  futile,  for 
if  the  American  Government,  in  the  face  of  past  treaties, 
did  nothing  to  prevent  the  Japanese  annexation  of  Korea, 
how  could  she  be  expected  to  help  China  in  a  matter  so 
indefinite  as  these  agreements  of  Japan  and  China,  during 
the  administration  of  that  strong  man,  President  Yuar 
Shih-kai?  On  the  other  hand,  the  resentment  of  the  Jap- 
anese foreboded  no  good ;  to  stir  it  up  was  an  act  of  folly. 


JAPAN'S  INROADS  IN  CHINA  83 

Unless  America  had  something  definite  to  complain  about, 
rather  than  utter  general  insinuations,  it  would  have  been 
better  to  remain  silent  and  observe  the  customary  proprie- 
ties. Reading  the  words  of  the  Note  one  might  suppose 
something  substantial  was  about  to  take  place,  when  in 
reality  there  was  a  combination  of  illusion  and  offensive- 
ness.  The  Chinese,  or  even  the  "Open  Door,"  received 
no  help,  while  the  Japanese  were  offended.  Unless  the 
United  States  Government  intended  to  rescue  China  from 
a  harmful  situation  there  was  no  reason  for  such  a  formal 
utterance. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  INJURY  TO  CfflNA  THROUGH  AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED 
INTRIGUE 

Viewing  events  in  China  in  historical  order,  we  now  come 
to  the  next  scene  in  the  great  drama,  to  the  events  oi  1917. 
The  narration,  for  an  American,  is  most  humiliating.  For 
the  first  time  in  history,  the  American  Government  tied 
itself  up  with  intrigue,  chicanery,  secret  diplomacy  and 
selfish  agreements.  Eather,  it  was  that  part  of  the  Amer- 
ican Government  called  the  Executive  branch,  that  is,  the 
"Wilson  Administration.  The  intricacies  of  intrigue  make  it 
hard  to  separate  the  responsibility  of  one  government  from 
that  of  others.  In  bringing  China  into  the  meshes,  perils 
and  enthrallment  of  the  World  War,  how  far  was  the 
United  States  accountable,  how  far  the  Entente  Allies,  and 
how  far  Japan  ?  And  as  to  the  United  States,  how  far  was 
President  Wilson  the  accountable  party,  how  far  Secretary 
of  State  Lansing,  and  how  far  the  American  Minister  at 
Peking,  Dr.  Paul  S.  Reinsch  ? 

In  any  case,  it  was  most  disastrous  to  China  that  outside 
advice,  appeal,  threat,  pressure,  by  means  of  diplomatic 
intrigue  under  the  semblance  of  friendly  solicitude,  induced 
China  to  forsake  the  safe  path  of  peace  and  neutrality  and 
enter  the  whirlpool  of  a  World  War  and  of  world  chaos. 

It  was  unfortunate  for  America's  fair  name  that  her 
agents  should  counsel  China  to  forsake  peace  for  war, 
democracy  for  autocracy,  liberty  for  enslavement  and  quiet- 
ness for  confusion,  discord  and  upheaval. 

There  were  two  centres  of  intrigue,  the  one  in  Peking 
tinder  American  instigation,  and  more  and  more  eneour- 

84 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE  85 

aged  by  the  European  Allies  and  by  Japan;  the  other  in 
Tokio,  where  the  European  Allies  connived  with  Japan  in 
secret  compact  not  only  against  Germany,  but  against 
China  and  the  United  States. 

I.  First,  then,  the  intrigue  in  Peking  to  embroil  China 
in  the  Great  War. 

There  were  three  steps  for  China  in  diplomatic  procedure : 
first,  to  send  Germany  a  letter  of  reproof  and  of  threat, 
February  9, 1917 ;  second,  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with 
Germany,  March  14;  and,  third,  to  declare  war  against 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  (without  Parliamentary 
action),  August  14. 

The  war  issue  did  not  specially  engross  the  attention  of 
China  until  February  4  (1917),  and  then  through  action 
of  the  American  Government  and  by  definite  request  of 
President  Wilson. 

Heretofore  advocates  of  war  and  of  peace,  except  out- 
and-out  pacifists,  have  generally  theorized  thus:  Never 
go  to  war  except  as  a  last  alternative.  But  President, 
Wilson  announced  a  new  dictum  to  all  neutral  nations  for 
assuring  a  real  world  war:  Whether  with  or  without  just 
cause,  every  neutral  nation  is  advised  to  do  what  the  United 
States  does — first,  be  neutral ;  second,  break  off  diplomatic 
relations  with  Germany;  and,  third,  declare  war  on  Ger- 
many. On  this  new  theory,  there  will  be  no  neutral  nations, 
no  neutral  rights,  and  no  laws  on  neutrality  or  freedom  of 
the  seas.  This  new  doctrine,  more  chaotic  than  idealistic, 
was  subsequently  introduced  into  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  as  invented  at  Paris  for  maintaining 
peace  and  also  for  assuring  a  world  war,  if  war  is  ever  to 
come  again.  So  far,  then,  President  Wilson  was  solely  re- 
sponsible for  getting  China  on  the  war-path. 

Prior  to  President  Wilson's  innocent  suggestion  of  Feb- 
ruary, 1917,  China  had  managed  to  remain  at  peace,  on 


86  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

equally  friendly  terms  with  all  nations.  During  the  in- 
cumbency of  President  Yuan  Shih-kai,  there  had  been  two 
or  three  slight,  tentative  overtures — properly  mere  queries 
— on  the  part  of  President  Yuan  to  his  old  friend,  Sir  John 
Jordan,  the  British  Minister,  as  to  the  advisability  of  the 
Chinese  entering  the  war.  There  is  no  question  as  to  the 
friendship  of  this  Britisher  for  the  Chinese  President,  or 
as  to  his  sincere  concern  for  China's  development  and 
progress.  Thomas  F.  Millard,^  from  his  varied  sources  of 
information,  states  that  the  British  Minister  did  not  look 
upon  these  suggestions  with  favour,  probably  on  account  of 
Japan's  opposition,  but  that  the  French  and  Russian  Le- 
gations gave  some  encouragement.  However,  there  was  no 
unity  of  purpose  in  Peking  and  Tokio  among  these  diplo- 
matic representatives.  As  to  the  American  Minister,  rep- 
resenting a  neutral  country,  Mr.  Millard  asserts:  "I  am 
informed  that  the  American  Minister  expressed  his  private 
opinion  to  Yuan  Shih-kai  that  such  a  move  probably  would 
save  China."  This  was  some  time  towards  the  end  of  1915, 
■when  the  United  States  was  not  yet  a  belligerent.  It  was 
strange  advice  to  come  from  a  neutral  and  an  advocate  of 
universal  peace. 

A  somewhat  different  account  of  President  Yuan's  atti- 
tude to  the  war  is  given  by  Mr.  Kawakami.  I  quote  his 
words :  2 

What  Yuan  really  had  in  mind  in  declaring  himself  in  favour 
of  the  Entente  Powers  was  the  attainment  of  his  ambition  to 
become  an  emperor.  .  .  .  The  resourceful  Yuan,  unwilling  to 
give  up  his  imperial  designs,  secretly  conferred  with  England 
proposing  that  he  would  declare  war  upon  Germany  and  drive 
German  interests  from  China,  if  the  Entente  Powers  would,  in 
return,  support  his  scheme  to  enthrone  himself.    England,  eager 

*  "  Democracy  and  the  Eastern  Question,"  pp.  95-100. 
»  "  Japan  and  World  Peace,"  p.  129. 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE  87 

to  exterminate  German  influence  in  China,  was  favourably  dis- 
posed towards  this  proposal. 

This  was  the  impression  which  I  also  received  as  to  polit- 
ical manoeuvres  going  on  in  Peking.  I  was  told  that  when 
President  Yuan  actually  launched  his  imperial  scheme 
towards  the  end  of  1915,  he  had  a  secret  understanding 
with  the  British  Minister  that  British  recognition  would  be 
accorded,  if  the  scheme  was  successful,  and  if  the  new  Im- 
perial Government  declared  war  on  Germany.  When  the 
scheme  failed.  President  Yuan,  as  I  was  informed,  asked 
Sir  John  Jordan  to  come  and  consult  with  him,  but  the 
request  was  not  granted,  and  President  Yuan,  mortified 
over  his  failure,  was  taken  ill  and  died.  Needless  to  say, 
this  nice  little  intrigue  for  bringing  China  into  the  war 
also  came  to  naught. 

Mr.  Kawakami  is  probably  correct  in  saying  that  Japan 
did  not  join  England  in  perfecting  this  scheme ;  but  I  re- 
gard it  that  the  opposition  was  not  so  much  due  to 
Japan's  being  "unalterably  opposed  to  the  crowning  of 
Yuan  Shih-kai,"  as  being  opposed  to  the  man,  and  also 
to  China's  war  purposes,  unless  Japan's  ambitions  were 
satisfied. 

In  a  general  way,  if  China's  entry  into  the  war  should 
have  effect  on  the  spread  of  righteousness,  truth,  love  and 
liberty  throughout  the  world,  or  even  on  the  military  opera- 
tions of  the  war  in  Europe  as  distinct  from  commercial 
rivalries  and  jealousies,  then  it  was  a  duty  of  the  United 
States  to  put  forth  every  effort  to  persuade  China  to  be- 
come one  of  the  belligerents  on  the  side  of  the  majority, 
and  probably  also  on  the  side  of  the  victors.  Moreover,  if 
China  could  only  get  her  wrongs  righted,  that  is,  wrongs 
done  by  Japan,  through  being  present  at  the  future  Peace 
Table,  and  if  she  could  be  present  there  only  by  going  to 
war  with  Germany,  then  it  was  wise,  though  not  imper^- 


88  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

tive,  to  yield  to  outside  persuasion  under  the  leadership  of 
the  United  States.  Should  the  presence  of  Chinese  dele- 
gates at  the  Peace  Conference  be  without  effect,  then 
it  would  have  been  better  for  her  to  have  remained 
neutral,  at  peace  within  her  own  borders  and  with  all 
peoples. 

Furthermore,  if  China  wanted  a  casus  belli,  she  had  a 
better  one  against  Japan  than  against  Germany.  The 
China  Sea  and  the  Japan  Sea  were  more  vital  to  China 
than  the  North  Sea  or  the  English  Channel.  To  get  ahead 
of  Japan  by  warring  on  Germany:  to  force  compensation 
from  Japan  by  joining  the  Allies,  of  whom  Japan  was  one, 
partook  too  much  of  the  old  diplomacy  of  intrigue  and 
chicanery  rather  than  the  new  diplomacy,  widely  pro- 
claimed, of  "open  covenants"  and  straightforward 
dealing. 

At  that  particular  time,  also,  China  had  greater  grievance 
against  France  than  against  Germany,  owing  to  French 
high-handed  occupation  of  Lao-shi-kai,  adjoining  the 
French  Concession  in  Tientsin. 

The  President  of  China,  successor  to  Yuan  Shih-kai,  was 
Li  Yuan-hung.  He  assumed  office  June  6,  1916.  He  had 
been  military  leader  of  the  first  revolution  which  overthrew 
the  Manchu  Monarchy,  of  which  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  been 
the  last  Premier.  Yuan  was  monarchical  in  his  sympa- 
thies; Li  was  devoted  to  the  democratic  idea.  Yuan  left 
the  country  broken  by  discord  and  strife;  Li  set  out  to 
unite  the  country,  to  stop  fighting  and  to  establish  a  bona 
fide  Republic.  All  factions,  all  sections  of  the  country, 
were  brought  together  under  the  centralizing,  or  rather 
harmonizing  influence  of  President  Li.  Every  one  trusted 
him.  He  only  needed  a  fair  chance  and  sufficient  time  to 
show  to  the  world  that  Democracy  was  suited  to  the 
Chinese.  If  the  country  could  be  kept  at  peace,  if  war 
could  be  put  at  arm's  length,  he  was  sure  of  success.    His 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE  89 

Premier  was  General  Tuan  Chi-jui,  last  Secretary  of  State 
under  Emperor-President  Yuan,  who,  like  President  Li,  was 
opposed  to  all  monarchical  schemes. 

The  Parliament,  which  had  been  dissolved  by  President 
Yuan,  was  re-called  by  the  new  President.  This  Parliament 
early  began  the  discussion  of  a  permanent  Constitution,  and 
by  the  spring  of  1917  had  almost  completed  its  task. 
Clashes  had  arisen  between  the  different  branches  of  au- 
thority, but  none  so  serious  as  to  forebode  defeat  to  liberal 
institutions  or  renewed  strife  in  the  land.  The  outlook  for 
democracy,  peace  and  national  prosperity  was  bright. 

Thus  it  was  until  February  4,  1917,  when  the  American 
Minister  in  Peking,  Paul  S.  Reinsch,  made  known  to  Pres- 
ident Li  the  request  of  President  Wilson,  that  China,  as 
well  as  all  other  neutral  nations,  should  imitate  the  example 
of  the  United  States  by  severing  diplomatic  relations  with 
Germany.  Thus  it  was  that  the  leader  of  neutral  nations 
became  a  leader  in  belligerency.  I  had  previously  conveyed 
to  President  Wilson  the  desire  of  President  Li  to  follow 
the  lead  of  the  United  States  in  bringing  together  all  neu- 
tral nations  in  a  common  effort  to  effect  peace.  Now  the 
Chinese  President  was  forced  by  another  and  diametrically 
opposite  proposition,  looking  to  active  participation  in 
war. 

If  this  proposal  or  request  had  been  communicated  to 
China  merely  in  the  usual  official  way  without  pressure,  no 
harm  would  have  been  done  to  China  and  no  confusion 
would  have  arisen.  China,  in  all  probability,  would  have 
remained  neutral  and  at  peace.  Moreover,  no  further  ad- 
vantage would  have  accrued  to  Japan  at  China's  expense. 
Samuel  G.  Blythe,  who  was  in  Peking  those  critical  days, 
has  described  the  character  of  the  campaign  and  propa- 
ganda, which  was  carried  on  with  prudent  secretiveness,  to 
embroil  China  in  war  against  Germany  in  the  probable 
^eventuality  that  war  would  arise  between  Germany  and 


90  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

the  United  States.  He  speaks  of  this  political  crusade  as 
a  "Flying  Wedge."  ^ 

(1)  First,  then,  the  initial  step  of  sending  a  threatening 
letter — a  kind  of  ultimatum — to  Germany.  The  great  mass 
of  Chinese  officials,  merchants,  students,  farmers,  labourers, 
had  no  desire  to  take  sides  in  the  calamitous  struggle  going 
on  in  Europe.  They  resented  what  Japan  and  Great  Britain 
had  already  done  on  Chinese  soil  in  the  years  1914  and 
1915 ;  they  knew  no  reason  why  they  should  join  such  com- 
pany as  against  Germans  and  Austrians.  They  did  not  wish 
to  become  entangled  in  affairs  in  Europe, 

"When  a  really  friendly  nation  like  the  United  States, 
one  that  had  professed  to  follow  the  same  path  of  neutrality 
and  impartiality,  came  forward  to  counsel  association  in  the 
task  of  upholding  law  and  righteousness,  Chinese  officials 
who  were  thus  approached  felt  bound  to  consider  the  new 
suggestion  from  a  sister  Republic.  America  had  not  yet 
declared  war  or  joined  the  Allies.  But  never  mind ;  diplo- 
macy is  far-reaching. 

As  already  stated,  President  Wilson  was  solely  respon- 
sible for  instructing  on  February  4,  1917,  all  his  agents  in 
neutral  countries  to  advise  them  to  sever  relations  with 
Germany.  How  it  was  carried  out  in  Peking  was  left  to 
the  responsibility  of  the  American  Minister,  Dr.  Paul  S. 
Reinsch,  sometimes  acting  with,  and  sometimes  without,  the 
instructions  of  Secretary  of  State  Lansing.  To  show 
America's  abundant  power  and  to  hasten  compliance  on 
China's  part,  Dr.  Reinsch  secured  an  entourage  of  capable 
experts,  skilled  in  manipulating  Chinese  political  thought. 
He  himself  was  **at  the  apex  of  the  wedge,"  to  use  Mr. 
Blythe's  phrase.  Next  in  point  of  capacity  was  Dr.  John 
C.  Ferguson,  counsellor  of  the  Chinese  Red  Cross  Society, 
and  so  in  semi-official  relations  with  the  Chinese  Govern- 

» Saturday  Evening  Post,  April  28,  1917,  "  The  First  Time  in  Five 
thousand  Years." 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE  91 

ment.  Next  came  Roy  S.  Anderson,  son  of  a  Methodist 
missionary  and  familiar  with  the  intricacies  of  Chinese 
officialdom.  Along  with  these  two  Americans  there  were 
brought  into  the  secret  two  Australians.  One  was  Dr. 
George  E.  Morrison,  a  paid  political  advisor  of  President 
Li  Yuan-hung  to  look  after  the  special  interests  of  China. 
The  other  was  W.  H.  Donald,  editor  of  the  American  mag- 
azine, the  Far  Eastern  Review,  and  for  some  time  Peking 
correspondent  of  the  New  York  Herald.  Then  came  an- 
other duet,  "writing  men,"  Charles  Stevenson  Smith,  rep- 
resenting the  Associated  Press,  and  Samuel  G.  Blythe,  rep- 
resenting the  Saturday  Evening  Post.  With  all  these  were 
associated  four  young  Chinese,  Dr.  Chen  Chin-tao,  a  Yale 
graduate  and  then  Minister  of  Finance ;  Admiral  Tsai  Ting- 
kan,  also  educated  in  America,  and  naval  A.  D.  C.  to  the 
President;  C.  C.  Wu,  son  of  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang,  educated 
both  in  America  and  in  England,  and  associated  with  his 
father  in  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs;  and  Eugene 
Chen,  an  English  University  man,  a  master  of  style,  and 
at  the  time  editor  of  the  Peking  Gazette. 

The  President  was  first  approached  by  Admiral  Tsai 
and  Dr.  Morrison,  both  drawing  salaries  from  Chinese  rev- 
enues. "That  genial  dignitary  told  them  he  was  opposed 
to  the  matter  in  its  entirety  and  in  all  its  parts."  (I  quote 
from  Mr.  Blythe 's  disclosure.) 

Who  next?  Naturally  the  Premier,  General  Tuan  Chi- 
jui,  but  he  "was  opposed."  "Most  of  the  older  generals" 
were  also  opposed.  "The  Young  China  party  must  be 
appealed  to."  Arguments  were  ready  to  hand,  forceful 
arguments,  when  only  one  side  is  heard.    Here  they  are : 

(1)  "China  will  secure  in  her  own  right  a  place  in 
the  Peace  Conference."  This  was  probably  the  great  out- 
standing reason  for  China's  acceptance  of  the  American 
proposal.  The  Chinese  looked  upon  the  coming  Peace  Con- 
ference as  the  open  sesame. 


92  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

(2)  "It  is  the  one  great  chance  for  Young  China  to 
sweep  away  this  archaic,  inefficient  governing  class  and 
come  into  Young  China 's  own. ' '  This  thought,  full  of  sug- 
gestion, captivated  Young  China — more  than  it  did  the  old 
mandarins. 

(3)  China  would  be  "in  a  position  to  repudiate  the 
German  and  Austrian  share  of  the  Boxer  indemnity. ' '  This 
was  just  what  the  Chinese  liked:  getting  rid  of  a  debt 
through  legal  processes.  Of  course,  the  possibility  implied 
that  China  must  declare  war;  nothing  less  could  win  the 
stakes.  The  mere  thought  of  shuffling  off  a  treaty  obligation 
and  financial  indebtedness  was  most  alluring. 

These  were  reasons  for  breaking  off  relations  or  even  for 
going  to  war,  but  at  the  time,  considering  all  the  complex 
factors,  the  play  was  to  persuade  China  to  do  something 
less,  that  is,  to  threaten  Germany.  If  possible,  China  was 
to  be  blindfolded,  so  that  the  future  might  be  involved  un- 
escapably  in  the  present. 

Let  me  again  quote  from  Mr.  Blythe,  who  wa.s  on  the 
inside  of  this  renowned  American  exploit  and  this  unfortu- 
nate Chinese  venture: 

For  hours  and  hours,  day  and  night,  Peking  resounded  with 
speeches  to  timid  Chinese  made  by  these  urgent  Americans  and  the 
two  invaluable  Australians,  urging,  forcing,  begging,  cajoling 
and  showing  the  Chinese  who  were  needful  to  toe  the  mark.  There 
was  no  rest.  There  was  no  soft-pedal  business.  It  was  a  big, 
hard,  two-fisted  campaign,  and  he  who  dallied  was  a  dastard; 
and  he  who  doubted  was  roundly  damned ! 

Two  other  arguments  began  to  be  used:  (1)  that  China 
associate  herself  with  the  United  States — an  informal  alli- 
ance of  two  Republics,  and  (2)  that  China  with  the  help 
of  her  sister  Republic  would  then  be  able  to  checkmate  the 
ambitious  designs  of  Japan. 

As  to  the  former  point,  "a  long  course  of  argument  wasj 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE  93 

necessary  to  make  it  plain  that  the  Americans  were  not 
asking  China  to  join  the  Allies,  but  were  asking  China  to 
join  America  and  the  other  neutrals,  which  was  an  entirely 
different  matter."  Mr.  Millard  says  that  ** among  for- 
eigners in  China,  except  Japanese,  there  was  almost  una- 
nimity of  opinion  that  China's  opportunity  to  escape  for- 
eign domination  and  a  further  restriction  of  her  autonomy 
and  territory  lay  in  getting  under  the  wing  of  America." 
So  far  as  the  Chinese  listened  to  any  words  of  mi*ne,  I 
warned  them  that  all  this  fine  talk  was  illusive  and  that 
once  started  on  the  slippery  down-hill  path,  it  would  not 
be  long  before  China  would,  willy  nilly,  take  orders  from 
all  the  Allies,  and  that  Japan  would  not  be  found  in  that 
dread  day  the  smallest  and  most  gentle. 

As  to  the  second  point,  the  Chinese  were  ready  enough 
to  put  a  check  on  Japan,  but  they  were  apprehensive.  And 
there  "was  more  than  apprehension."  There  was  "actual 
fear" — "fear  of  what  the  Japanese  might  do."  From  my 
side  (and  I  edited  the  only  paper  in  English  which  sup- 
ported the  Chinese  President  in  his  policy  of  neutrality), 
I  warned  the  Chinese  against  anything  like  sharp  practice 
in  resisting  the  Japanese.  "What  you  do,"  I  said  again 
and  again,  "let  it  be  done  aboveboard.  Don't  aspire  to  be 
tricky." 

Mr.  Blythe  again: 

There  was  no  let-up  to  the  campaign.  Dr.  Eeinsch  was  inde- 
fatigible.  He  had  repeated  audiences  with  the  President  and  with 
the  Premier.  He  worked  night  and  day,  and  he  captained  the 
squad  that  was  working  with  him.  .    .    . 

At  this  juncture  Dr.  Reinsch  rose  and  declared  himself  in  a 
vigorous  and  American  manner.  He  told  the  Chinese  exactly 
what  was  proposed  to  them;  what  the  benefits  to  China  would  be. 
And  he  also  told  them  that  their  attempt  at  a  compromise  would 
not  suffice.  They  must  go  the  distance  or  not  start.  Also,  the 
Flying  Wedge  enunciated  the  same  sentiments — not  in  the  diplo- 


94  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

hiatie  language  employed  by  Dr.  Reinsch,  mayhap,  but  in  words 
that  were  to  the  point.  No  compromise!  That  was  the  watch- 
word. All  or  nothing!  To  be  sure,  we  didn't  expect  a  definite 
break  in  diplomatic  relations;  but  we  demanded  just  that,  none 
the  less.  What  we  wanted  was  an  adequate  declaration  that  would 
align  China  with  the  United  States,  and  were  content  to  leave  the 
question  of  breaking  off  diplomatic  relations  to  a  later  date. 
The  Chinese  did  not  know  this,  and  they  were  much  perturbed 
Chinese.  They  argued  shrewdly  that  they  had  no  grievance  with 
Germany;  that  there  had  been  no  situation  anterior;  and  that  to 
do  this  thing  would  be  like  walking  up  and  assaulting  an  old  and 
unoffending  friend. 

Thus  the  American  Minister  in  Peking  and  his  coterie 
of  friends  were  aspiring  to  high  diplomacy  of  a  typical 
kind,  so  familiar  in  past  ages;  they  were  playing  politics, 
and  the  Chinese  were  the  tools.  There  can  be  no  doubt  of 
Dr.  Reinsch 's  friendly  intentions  in  China's  interests,  but 
one  may  well  doubt  the  wisdom  or  utility  of  his  diplomatic 
venture. 

The  result  was  the  first  step,  namely,  a  mere  formal 
dispatch  from  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  to  the  German 
Minister,  protesting  against  Germany's  method  of  waging 
war  and  advising  in  solemn  terms  a  speedy  reversal  of 
policy.  In  phraseology  and  moral  ideas  China  was,  indeed, 
aligned  with  the  United  States.  As  to  the  authorship  of 
the  document,  supposedly  prepared  by  Mr.  C.  C.  Wu,  act- 
ing for  his  father  who  was  laid  aside  by  illness  and  was 
being  medically  treated  by  a  German  physician,  Samuel 
G.  Blythe  says : 

The  form  of  the  Notes  was  to  be  decided.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  say  when  or  where  or  by  whom  the  Note  to  Germany  and  the 
Note  to  the  United  States,  presented  by  China,  were  written. 
All  that  is  necessary  is  to  say  that  before  these  Notes  were  agreed 
upon  by  the  Cabinet  and  given  to  the  German  Minister  and  to 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE  95 

the  American  Minister,  they  were  entirely  satisfactory  both  in 
manner  and  in  matter  to  all  intimately  concerned. 

The  dispatch  to  the  German  Minister,  dated  February  9, 
five  days  after  the  receipt  by  the  Chinese  Government  of 
the  American  Minister's  dispatch,  contains  this  magnifi- 
cently conceived  sentence: 

The  new  measures  of  submarine  warfare  inau^rated  by  Ger- 
many, imperilling  the  lives  and  property  of  Chinese  citizens  to 
even  a  gi-eater  extent  than  the  measures  previously  taken  which 
have  already  cost  China  so  many  lives,  constitute  a  violation  of  the 
principles  of  international  law  at  present  in  force,  and  an  inter- 
ference with  legitimate  commercial  intercourse  between  neutral 
states  and  between  neutral  states  and  belligerent  powers;  if  we 
submit  to  this  method  of  warfare  it  will  be  equivalent  to  an 
admission  on  our  part  that  this  arbitraiy  and  unjustifiable  course 
of  action  is  in  accordance  with  international  law. 

Beside  the  rebuke  and  protest,  the  Note  contained  this 
warning — it  might  almost  be  called  an  ultimatum — con- 
ceived by  a  brilliant  brain: 

In  case,  contrary  to  its  expectations,  its  protest  be  ineffectual, 
the  Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  will  be  constrained,  to  its 
profound  regret,  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  at  present  existing 
between  the  two  countries.  It  is  necessary  to  add  that  the  atti- 
tude of  the  Chinese  Government  has  been  dictated  purely  by  the 
desire  to  further  the  cause  of  the  world's  peace  and  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  sanctity  of  international  law. 

The  Chinese  were  delighted  with  their  literary  effort  and 
diplomatic  ingenuity.  In  fact  the  version  in  English  far 
surpassed  the  version  in  Chinese.  Eugene  Chen,  editor  of 
the  Peking  Gazette,  exulted  that  the  two  Republics  were 
taking  together  such  a  lofty  moral  position.    He  wrote; 


96  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

The  decision  arrived  at  is  in  every  sense  a  victory  of  the 
younger  intellectual  forces  over  the  older  mandarinate,  whose 
traditions  of  laissez  faire  and  spineless  diplomacy  have  hitherto 
cost  China  so  much. 

Miss  La  Motte  *  gives  expression  to  a  somewhat  prevalent 
view: 

Again  I  marvelled  at  the  lofty  tone  of  this  note,  and  wondered 
how  this  moral  strength  had  been  so  suddenly  acquired.  Thought 
I  to  myself,  can  this  be  poor  old  browbeaten  China — humbled 
and  prostrate  before  the  Powers  of  Europe,  unable  to  protest 
when  her  territory  is  snatched  away  from  her, — now  suddenly 
giving  voice  to  these  exalted  ideas'?  Does  it  not  seem  rather 
ludicrous  that  she  should  suddenly  proclaim  herself  the  upholder 
of  international  law?  Like  Moses  of  old,  she  is  now  stretching 
forth  her  arms;  but  who  are  they  who  uphold  those  arms?  These 
solemn  notes  are  given  forth  to  the  world,  and  the  world  is  asked 
to  believe  sincerely,  as  China  herself  states,  that  they  were  "  dic- 
tated purely  by  the  desire  to  further  the  cause  of  the  world's 
peace  and  by  the  maintenance  of  the  sanctity  of  international 
law."    Let  us  believe  it,  if  we  can. 

For  the  moment  the  Chinese  were  captivated  by  an  hal- 
lucination. 

There  are  those  who  now  blame  the  American  Minister 
for  giving  assurance  of  help  to  the  Chinese  Government 
and  which  the  President  failed  at  the  Peace  Conference  to 
have  realized.  He  would,  indeed,  be  to  blame,  if  he  was  not 
authorized  by  the  President.  Others  blamed  the  President 
for  not  guaranteeing  to  China  all  that  she  had  been  led  to 
believe  was  to  be  hers.  But  here  it  is  to  be  supposed  that  he 
authorized  assurances  to  China.  Discrimination  here  is 
most  important.  To  be  sure,  the  President  was  the  one  re- 
sponsible for  requesting  China  along  with  other  neutral 
nations  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany,  as  an- 

»  "  Peking  Dust,"  p.  142. 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE  97 

PoajQced  in  his  Message  to  Congress,  but  he  was  not  to  blame 
jfor  all  of  China's  subsequent  entanglements  for  the  very 
reason  that  what  he  definitely  authorized  was  the  official 
presentation  of  his  personal  request.  What  occurred  in 
Peking  in  the  way  of  assurance*  of  American  help  must  be 
traced  to  the  difficulties  of  executing  the  President's  re- 
quest and  to  the  policy  pursued  in  reference  to  what  is 
called  both  the  first  and  second  steps  of  the  Peking  Gov- 
ernment. 

What  the  President  has  understood  as  to  his  own  inten- 
tions in  early  1917  has  been  made  clear  in  the  conversation, 
August  19,  1919,  between  the  President  and  the  Senatorial 
Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs.    I  quote: 

Senator  Johnson — Did  China  enter  the  war  upon  our  advice, 
the  advice  of  the  United  States? 

The  President — I  cannot  tell,  sir.  We  advised  her  to  enter  and 
she  soon  after  did.  Whether  she  had  sought  our  advice,  and 
whether  that  was  the  persuasive  advice  or  not,  I  do  not  know. 

As  will  be  seen  in  the  subsequent  discussion  of  China's 
taking  the  third  step,  that  of  declaring  war,  the  chief  factor 
or  ''persuasive  voice"  was  Japan,  while  Great  Britain  and 
France  came  next  in  point  of  persuasiveness,  and  the 
United  States  was  a  passive  third.  It  was  in  the  initial 
stages  of  persuading  China  to  threaten  and  warn  Germany 
and  then  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  that  the  American 
Government  was  the  active  factor  and  "persuasive  voice." 
What  the  President  recognizes  to  be  his  responsibility  in 
those  initial  stages  is  further  disclosed  in  this  peculiar 
"official  inquiry": 

Senator  Johnson — Do  you  recall,  Mr.  President,  that  preceding 
that  advice  we  had  asked  China,  as  one  of  the  neutral  nations,  to 
sever  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany? 

Mr.  President — I  do  not  recall,  Senator.  I  am  sure  Mr. 
^Lansing  can  tell,  though,  from  the  records  of  the  department. 


98  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Senator  Johnson — Do  you  know,  Mr.  President,  whether  or  not 
our  Government  stated  to  China  that  if  China  would  enter  the 
war  we  would  protect  her  interests  at  the  Peace  Conference  t 

The  President — ^We  made  no  promises. 


It  is  quite  likely  that  no  promise  in  this  identical  form 
was  given.  It  is  equally  probable  that  the  President  him- 
self was  not  kept  posted  as  to  the  real  form  of  assurances 
which  lured  the  Chinese  Government  on  to  coming  danger. 

As  to  the  arguments  advanced  by  Americans  in  Peking 
for  embroiling  China  in  the  war  the  Allied  Ministers  in 
Peking  passed  no  criticism  so  long  as  the  end  was  attained. 
They  were  conscious  that  the  best  way  to  get  China  started 
on  the  war-path  was  to  leave  the  counselling  to  America 
alone,  and  that  the  two  arguments  of  aligning  China  with 
the  sister  republic  and  of  putting  a  check  to  Japan's  de- 
signs were  more  impelling  than  any  argument  of  their 
own. 

Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  was  both  jealous  and  indignant 
at  American  intrusion  and  at  the  kind  of  argument  used. 
Her  ingenuity  was  equal  to  the  occasion.  Hitherto  she  had 
opposed  all  plans  for  bringing  China  into  the  war,  now  she 
suddenly  wheeled  around,  rushed  in  ahead  of  the  American 
propagandists,  and  ever  since  has  held  the  position  of  pre- 
dominance, superior  not  only  to  American  influence  in 
China,  but  to  that  of  the  British  and  French.  She  was 
more  insistent  than  any  American  or  European  that  China 
must  delay  no  longer  to  sever  relations  with  Germany,  not 
because  she  hated  Germany,  but  because  she  could  give  good 
proof  that  what  Americans  and  Europeans  could  not  do, 
she  was  able  to  do. 

(2)  We  thus  come  to  the  second  step,  that  of  severing 
diplomatic  relations  with  Germany.  The  campaign  against 
China  for  effecting  this  object  was  triangular.  The  Chinese 
who  argued  for  action  grew  in  numbers  and  were  of  three 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE  99 

groups  according  to  the  leadership  to  which  they  attached 
themselves.  One  group  advanced  the  argument  that  China 
should  align  herself  with  the  United  States ;  this  was  mostly 
the  Young  China  party.  The  second  group  argued  that 
China  should  align  herself  with  the  Allies,  meaning  Euro- 
pean Allies,  as  against  the  Central  Powers  and  Turkey; 
this  was  under  the  leadership  of  returned  students  from 
those  countries  and  of  those  who  had  held  offices  at  the 
European  capitals.  The  third  group  did  not  so  much 
argue,  as  they  secretly  plotted,  to  bring  China  and  Japan 
into  closer  relations  under  Japan's  military  direction;  this 
was  composed  of  the  pro-Japan  party,  which  grew  stronger 
as  the  war  continued  and  as  China's  entanglements  in- 
creased. 

The  Premier,  General  Tuan  Chi-jui,  fell  under  the  in- 
fluence of  the  third  group  and  of  Japan.  In  a  conversation 
which  I  had  with  him  at  the  time,  he  said,  "We  are  bound 
to  take  the  second  step.  We  are  helpless.  We  are  pressed 
to  act, ' '  meaning  the  pressure  of  Japan,  which  worked  with 
no  ostentation  or  open  propaganda. 

Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  his 
young  son,  C.  C.  Wu,  joined  the  American  group;  they, 
very  reasonably,  thought  it  best  that  China  should  have  a 
place  at  the  Peace  Table. 

Mr.  Lou  Tseng-tsiang,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  when 
Japan  presented  the  Twenty-one  Demands,  and  once  Min- 
ister to  France,  Mr,  Liang  Chi-chiao,  the  noted  reformer 
and  active  participant  in  the  revolution  against  Yuan  Shih- 
kai's  monarchical  movement,  and  Mr.  Tsai  Yun-pei,  noted 
educationist,  who  had  just  returned  from  a  visit  to  Europe, 
were  three  of  the  strongest  agents  of  the  pro-Ally  party. 
Really  it  was  a  pro-French  party. 

Tsao  Yu-lin,  who  had  been  educated  in  Japan,  and  was 
Minister  in  the  Chinese  Government,  Lu  Tsung-yu,  for- 
merly Minister  to  Japan,  and  Chang  Tsung-hsiang,  Min- 


100  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

ister  to  Japan  during  these  critical  times,  were  of  the  pro- 
Japan  party. 

Agitation  flourished  as  never  before.  Money  in  abun- 
dance was  forthcoming  to  make  sure  all  doubtful  ones.  The 
Allied  Legations  of  Europe,  Japan  and  the  United  States, 
all  from  different  angles,  pressed  the  Chinese  to  make  what 
was  called  a  "masculine  decision."  President  Li  Yuan- 
hung  was  chief  of  the  party  of  strict  neutrality.  He  wished 
to  see  China  on  friendly  terms  with  all  nations.  More  than 
all,  he  abhorred  intrigues,  secrecy,  trickery  and  bribery. 
His  one  desire  was  to  see  China  a  real  Republic,  and  that 
he  and  all  officials  abide  by  the  law  and  Constitution.  At 
the  same  time  he  refused  to  force  his  own  will  on  the  Gov- 
ernment. As  the  situation  became  more  intense,  and  his 
own  views  clashed  with  those  of  the  Premier  and  the  Cab- 
inet and  the  whole  group  of  agitators,  he  consented  to  refer 
the  matter  of  severance  of  relations  with  Germany  to  the 
two  Houses  of  Parliament,  and  to  submit  his  own  judg- 
ment to  the  decision  of  the  people's  representatives. 

The  Lower  House,  March  10,  voted  330  to  87  in  favour 
of  the  Cabinet 's  recommendation.  The  Upper  House  voted 
the  next  day,  158  to  37. 

By  a  strange  coincidence  the  reply  of  the  German  Gov- 
ernment to  the  Chinese  dispatch  of  February  9  was  made 
on  the  same  day.  It  had  no  effect  in  altering  the  general 
result  of  the  campaign  of  enlightenment.  The  German  Min- 
ister and  his  staff  received  their  passports,  March  14.  Many 
Chinese  officials  really  regretted  the  departure  of  Admiral 
von  Hintze,  who  had  commended  himself  and  his  govern- 
ment by  his  geniality  as  well  as  by  his  thoughtfulness  for 
China's  best  interests.  It  was  not  till  March  25  that  he  and 
his  suite  left  Peking,  some  of  the  Chinese  having  taken  the 
unusual  position  that  he  might  live  on  quietly  at  some  sea- 
side resort  till  the  war  came  to  an  end ;  this,  they  thought, 
would  not  be  far  away. 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE    '     101 

(3)  The  third  step,  most  serious  of  all,  but  one  in  which 
the  United  States  was  less  implicated,  was  to  get  China  to 
declare  war.  Here  confusion,  already  great,  became  worse 
confounded.  For  five  months  China's  turmoil  increased 
from  day  to  day  and  from  one  plot  into  another.  China 
became  a  land  of  upheaval  and  strife,  of  the  passions  of 
war  and  of  autocratic  domination. 

The  Premier  and  his  coterie  argued  that  the  third  step 
was  logical  and  even  necessary.  The  President  favoured  a 
declaration  of  war  even  less  than  he  had  favoured  the  break 
in  diplomatic  relations.  Members  of  Parliament,  who  saw 
that  all  the  nice  things  which  the  Allies  had  suggested  as 
quite  possible,  and  which  the  Premier  had  represented  as 
** assurances,"  were  mere  fancies  of  an  excited  brain,  be- 
came antagonistic  to  the  Premier  and  his  proposals  of  war. 
The  Young  China  party,  while  ready  for  war,  all  the  more 
that  the  United  States  had  declared  war  in  April,  was  not  so 
ready  to  allow  leadership  and  added  power  to  the  Premier 
and  his  military  associates.  The  war  issue  had  brought 
schism  between  the  President  and  the  Premier,  and  now 
was  bringing  schism  between  Parliament  and  the  Premier, 
between  democracy  and  militarism.  There  was  a  growing 
feeling  that  China  had  done  enough  in  connection  with 
the  European  War,  and  that  more  should  not  be  expected 
unless  some  decided  advantages  were  to  appear. 

As  to  the  change  going  on  in  the  arguments  used,  I  quote 
from  the  Washington  correspondent  of  the  New  York 
Tribune  for  April  12,  1917 : 

It  is  understood  that  the  principal  question  confronting  the 
Peking  Government  at  this  moment  is  not  whether  China  should 
enter  the  war,  as  this  virtually  has  been  decided,  but  whether 
China  should  continue  to  align  herself  with  the  United  States  and 
follow  this  country's  lead,  or  should  join  the  Entente  Alliance 
under  the  leadership  and  direction  of  Japan,  If  a  decision  fol- 
lowing the  latter  course  is  made  it  is  believed  here  that  Japan 


102  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

•will  obtain  control  of  China's  army  and  military  resources,  and 
establish  a  semi-protectorate  over  China  that  would  make  it  dif- 
ficult for  either  China  or  the  other  Powers  to  induce  Japan  to  sur- 
render after  the  war. 


The  Premier  towards  the  end  of  April  called  a  confer- 
ence of  all  the  Military  Governors,  who  decided  to  follow 
the  lead  of  their  military  chief.  The  military  element  was 
now  in  the  saddle.  On  May  1,  the  Cabinet  unanimously 
decided  in  favour  of  a  declaration  of  war.  The  President, 
still  opposed  to  these  war  schemes,  consented  in  the  con- 
stitutional way  to  refer  the  matter  to  Parliament.  A  dis- 
patch was  sent  to  Parliament  by  the  President,  on  May  7. 
By  May  10,  Parliament  met  to  discuss  and  decide.  A  howl- 
ing mob,  hired  by  the  militarists,  gathered  outside  Parlia- 
ment building,  to  force  compliance  to  the  patriotic  demand 
for  war.  Naturally  Parliament  refused  to  act  under  such 
methods  of  coercion.  Moreover,  all  of  the  Cabinet  Min- 
isters except  one  resigned.  The  Military  Governors  sup- 
porting the  Premier  memorialized  the  President  to  dissolve 
Parliament.  Being  rebuffed,  they  retired  to  Tientsin.  The 
Premier,  General  Tuan  Chi-jui,  was  dismissed  from  ofSce 
by  mandate  of  the  President,  and  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang  be- 
came acting  Premier.  The  militarists  formed  a  "Provi- 
sional Government"  of  their  own  in  Tientsin.  Different 
provinces  or  their  Military  Governors  declared  independ- 
ence. The  cry  was,  "On  to  Peking!"  The  President 
was  firm,  and  issued  a  proclamation  to  warn  these  of- 
ficers of  the  government  who  were  plotting  revolt.  General 
Chang  Hsun,  the  most  reactionary  of  all,  but  holding  ideas 
of  his  own,  was  invited  to  mediate.  He  arrived  in  Tientsin 
June  7.  An  ultimatum  from  the  mediator  came  to  the 
President  to  dissolve  Parliament.  The  mediator,  moreover, 
had  troops,  as  had  the  Premier  and  Military  Governors. 
The  President  yielded  and  prepared  a  mandate  for  Dr.  Wu 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE  103 

Ting-fang  to  countersign.  This  veteran  statesman  showed 
a  lofty  courage:  "You  may  take  off  my  head,  but  I  will 
sign  no  such  mandate."  He  was  allowed  to  retire.  An- 
other man  was  chosen,  who  signed,  and  the  mandate  went 
forth.  Parliament  disappeared,  and  the  militarists  were 
in  the  saddle.  In  fact,  the  Republic  was  no  more;  this  was 
the  result  of  a  crusade  for  war.  Men  who  wanted  war  with 
Germany  were  having  war  with  themselves.  Civil  strife 
had  begun.  Meanwhile,  in  all  this  confusion  and  lawless- 
ness, General  Chang  Hsun  came  with  his  soldiers  to  Pe- 
king, compelled  more  mandates  to  be  issued,  declared  the 
restoration  of  the  Monarchy,  and  then  by  a  quick  reversal 
was  in  a  few  days  defeated  by  the  troops  of  the  ex-premier, 
General  Tuan  Chi-jui. 

Most  of  the  Parliamentarians  retired  to  Shanghai  and 
then  to  Canton,  where  they  established  a  "Constitutional 
Government."  President  Li  Yuan-hung,  chagrined  at  his 
failure,  resigned,  and  the  Vice-President,  General  Feng 
Kuo-chang,  came  to  Peking  as  acting  President.  General 
Tuan  Chi-jui,  who  had  once  more  shown  his  loyalty  to  the 
Republic,  again  became  Premier,  but  without  sanction  of 
a  Parliament.  The  militarists  were  in  complete  possession. 
The  war  issue  could  again  come  to  the  front  with  chance  of 
favourable  consideration. 

So  long  as  the  act  of  inducing  China  to  enter  the  war 
was  looked  upon  as  a  great  achievement  for  a  worthy  cause, 
credit  was  given  to  Dr.  Reinsch ;  but  no  sooner  did  the  act 
begin  to  appear  unwise  than  America's  responsibility  began 
to  be  denied.  Thus  W.  Reginald  Wheeler^  writes,  in  a 
foot-note  however: 

The  personal  influence  of  the  American  Minister  and  his  asso- 
ciates at  Peking,  throughout  all  the  negotiations  leading  up  finally 
to  a  declaration  of  war,  was  one  of  the  strongest  factors  in  induc- 
ing China  to  join  the  Allies. 

* "  China  and  the  World  War,"  p.  79. 


104  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Whatever  the  purpose  of  the  American  Minister,  the 
policy  of  the  American  Government,  and  of  Americans 
familiar  with  Chinese  conditions,  was,  if  not  hostile  to  the 
inoculation  of  China  with  the  war-fever,  at  least  of  a  neg- 
ative and  somewhat  inoperative  character.  It  is  not  quite 
the  truth  to  say  that  China  entered  the  war  at  America's 
invitation. 

During  the  months  of  turmoil  and  civil  strife,  the  Amer- 
ican Minister,  as  if  to  make  amends  for  past  zeal,  was  in- 
structed to  send,  on  June  5,  the  following  dispatch  to  the 
Chinese  Government : 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  learns  with  the  most  pro- 
found regret  of  the  dissension  in  China  and  desires  to  express  the 
most  sincere  desire  that  tranquillity  and  political  co-ordination 
may  be  forthwith  re-established. 

The  entry  of  China  into  war  with  Germany — or  the  continuance 
of  the  status  quo  of  her  relations  with  that  Government — are  mat- 
ters of  secondary  consideration. 

The  principal  necessity  for  China  is  to  resume  and  continue  her 
political  entity,  to  proceed  along  the  road  of  national  development 
on  which  she  has  made  such  marked  progress. 

With  the  form  of  Government  in  China  or  the  personnel  which 
administers  the  Government,  the  United  States  has  an  interest 
only  in  so  far  as  its  friendship  impels  it  to  be  of  service  to  China. 
But  in  the  maintenance  by  China  of  one  central,  united  and  alone 
responsible  Government,  the  United  States  is  deeply  interested  and 
now  expresses  the  very  sincere  hope  that  China,  in  her  own  inter- 
est, and  in  that  of  the  world,  will  immediately  set  aside  her 
factional  political  disputes,  and  that  all  parties  and  persons  will 
work  for  the  re-establishment  of  a  co-ordinate  Government  and 
the  assumption  of  that  place  among  the  Powers  of  the  world  to 
which  China  is  so  justly  entitled,  but  the  full  attainment  of  which 
is  impossible  in  the  midst  of  internal  discord. 

This  was  another  of  America's  admirably  phrased  mes- 
sages to  China.    To  one  not  trained  in  the  manoeuvrings 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE         105 

of  diplomacy  it  would  seem  that  real  interest  in  China 
might  have  been  better  effected  by  keeping  the  war  issue 
entirely  away  from  China's  political  life.  If  it  had  never 
been  broached  by  the  American  Government  or  pushed  by 
the  persuasive  reasonings  of  Americans  the  European 
Allies  would  have  had  no  lever  to  move  China  to  enter 
the  war  and  no  raison  d'etre  to  intrigue  with  Japan  to 
consent  to  the  general  scheme.  Without  the  war  issue,  Par- 
liament would  hardly  have  been  dissolved,  and  civil  strife 
have  had  no  chance  to  begin. 

Shortly  before  the  United  States  sent  this  Note,  an  Eng- 
lish correspondent  of  the  North  China  Herald,  David 
Fraser,  on  May  17,  expressed  his  doubts  as  to  the  wisdom 
of  seeking  Japan's  co-operation.    He  wrote  thus: 

It  was  one  thing  to  admit  Germany  to  a  special  position  in 
Shantung  because  her  military  power  could  never  have  been  ex- 
erted in  the  Far  East.  It  is  quite  another  thing  to  see  Japan 
become  so  privileged,  ambitious  as  she  is  of  predominance  in 
China. 

The  action  of  the  United  States  Government  in  issuing 
a  warning  to  China  probably  resulted  in  more  harm  than 
good.  (1)  The  Note  was  futile  in  restoring  peace  to  China. 
(2)  The  action  of  the  American  Government  soon  changed 
to  its  original  form,  of  advising  China  to  follow  the  United 
States  and  enter  the  war,  thereby  nullifying  the  force  of 
the  warning.  (3)  Japan  was  offended  at  American  in- 
trusion into  Chinese  affairs,  without  consulting  the  Powers 
most  concerned.  Thus,  then,  as  all  through  the  subsequent 
events  of  war  and  peace,  China,  the  United  States,  the 
Entente  Allies  and  Japan,  all  of  whom  were  associated  in 
the  overthrow  of  Germany,  were  jealous  and  suspicious  of 
each  other,  now  giving  more  power  to  Japan  and  then 
trying  to  withdraw  it. 


106  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

When  General  Tuan  Chi-jui  again  became  Premiei',  JvAyf 
15,  and  General  Feng  Kuo-ehang  formally  became  Pres- 
ident, August  1,  little  argument  was  needed  to  bring  to  a 
successful  end  the  long  campaign  of  inducing  China  to 
take  part  in  the  Great  War.  The  Cabinet  and  the  Pres- 
ident declared  war  against  both  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary,  August  14.  No  parliamentary  sanction  was  pos- 
sible. China's  entrance  into  the  war  was  an  autocratic 
move,  not  a  democratic  one,  and  yet  China,  too,  professed 
to  believe  that  she  was  fighting  to  make  the  world  * '  safe  for 
democracy. ' ' 

China  declared  war  more  at  the  behest  of  Japan  than 
from  the  irresistible  pressure  of  public  sentiment.  There 
were  stronger  reasons  against  the  fatal  action  than  for  it. 
Arguments  on  both  sides  turned  Peking  into  a  Debating 
Society,  but  they  were  never  the  propelling  force.  Japan 
held  the  reins. 

Some  of  China's  leaders  who  were  opposed  to  a  declara- 
tion of  war  were  ex-President  Li  Yuan-hung,  military 
leader  of  the  first  revolution ;  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen,  great  revo- 
lutionist and  first  Provisional  President ;  Tang  Shao-yi,  first 
Premier;  and  Kang  Yiu-wei,  the  noted  reformer  of  1898, 
and  one  who  still  held  fast  his  original  views  for  twenty 
years.  Most  of  the  Chambers  of  Commerce,  fearful  of  the 
growing  power  of  the  military  autocrats,  and  of  the  spread 
of  internal  strife,  counselled  neutrality  so  far  as  was  then 
possible. 

The  chief  argument  in  support  of  a  declaration  of  war 
was  the  financial  one.  On  the  one  hand  China  would  be 
free  from  paying  the  enemy  countries  monies  due  them, 
altogether  amounting  to  $170,000,000,  and  on  the  other 
could  receive  from  abroad  a  big  loan,  estimated  at  $200,- 
000,000  to  be  floated  if  not  in  London,  Paris  or  New  York, 
at  least  in  Japan.  Japan's  proffered  aid  in  reality  was 
already  assured. 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE         107 

Another  reason  was  that  having  put  their  hand  to  the 
plough,  the  Chinese  should  not  look  back.  There  could  be  no 
assurance  of  having  Allied  promises  fulfilled,  if  China 
stopped  halfway.  With  an  actual  declaration  of  war,  one 
blessing  after  another  would  follow. 

Dr.  George  E.  Morrison,  the  President's  diplomatic  ad- 
visor, thought  out  two  other  reasons,  which  carried  weight 
with  the  intellectuals,  though  not  with  the  mass  of  the 
people.    They  were : 

By  terminating  her  treaties  with  Germany  China  would  be  able 
to  make  new  and  more  advantageous  treaties  after  the  war,  and 
possibly  have  a  general  revision  of  treaties. 

In  the  Customs  there  are  118  Germans  employed,  41  in  the 
indoor  and  77  in  the  outdoor.  By  their  removal  vacancies  would 
be  made  which  could  be  filled  by  Chinese  students,  of  whom  24 
per  year  are  turned  out  by  the  Customs  College  and  are  waiting 
employment. 

Another  reason,  which  had  had  more  weight  at  the  open- 
ing of  the  crusade  by  the  American  Minister  than  after 
the  political  upheaval,  was  that  through  representation  at 
the  coming  Peace  Conference  all  China's  international 
problems  could  be  solved  and  past  wrongs  could  be  righted. 
This  was  the  dream-land  in  which  not  a  few  continued  to 
live  until  the  day  the  Versailles  Treaty  was  signed. 

The  arguments  opposed  to  the  declaration  of  war  may 
be  summarized  as  follows: 

1.  As  the  war  issue  had  led  China  into  confusion,  it  was 
wiser  to  put  it  to  one  side. 

2.  China's  internal  difficulties  were  too  many  and  too 
serious  to  allow  scope  for  action  on  outside  and  far  distant 
questions.  Better  for  China  to  reorganize  than  to  enter 
the  European  War. 

3.  As  complications  had  already  arisen,  more  must  be 
expected,  if  China  joined  one  side  or  the  other. 


108  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

4.  So  long  as  the  people  saw  no  reason  for  the  war,  and 
there  was  no  Parliament  to  sanction,  the  declaration  of  war 
had  better  be  postponed. 

5.  Promises  of  outside  help  must  be  taken  as  illusory. 
China  had  better  start  out  to  help  herself. 

6.  If  China  declared  war,  she  would  be  compelled  to  take 
orders  from  others,  and  to  that  degree  lose  her  power  of 
independent  action.  A  strong  nation  like  the  United  States 
might  avoid  subjection  to  the  will  of  others,  but  not  a  weak 
nation  like  China. 

7.  Many  who  had  favoured  war  as  an  abstract  proposi- 
tion, were  opposed  to  the  way  the  war  was  declared  and  to 
the  type  of  government  consummating  the  act.  In  a  word, 
it  was  not  the  Chinese  nation,  but  the  Peking  Government 
that  was  to  make  the  decision. 

8.  To  use  a  figure  of  speech,  China  was  asked  to  spring 
into  the  fire  with  no  weapons  to  put  the  fire  out.  Or  to  use 
another  figure,  China  was  asked  to  float  out  to  the  whirl- 
pool, from  which  she  would  then  be  admonished  to  escape 
and  come  to  the  shore. 

The  views  of  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen  were  made  known  in  an 
open  letter  to  Premier  Lloyd  George  as  early  as  March  7. 
They  were  ridiculed  by  the  Allied  press  (not  by  the  Jap- 
anese) ,  but  at  this  later  date  may  be  regarded  as  good  fore- 
sight.   I  quote  in  part: 

...  I  have  been  approached  by  prominent  English  to  con- 
sider the  question  of  China  joining  the  Allies,  After  careful 
study  I  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  be  disastrous  to  both 
countries  should  China  break  her  neutrality.  For  China  is  yet  an 
infant  Republic  and  as  a  nation  she  may  be  likened  to  a  sick  man 
just  entering  the  hospital  of  constitutionalism.  Unable  to  look 
after  herself  at  this  stage,  she  needs  careful  nursing  and  support. 
Therefore  China  cannot  be  regarded  as  an  organized  country.  She 
is  held  intact  only  by  custom  and  sentiment  of  a  peace-loving 


AMEEICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE         109 

people.    But  at  once,  should  there  arise  discord,  general  anarchy 
would  result.  .   .    . 

.  .  .  Should  China  enter  the  war,  it  would  prove  dangerous 
to  her  national  life  and  injurious  to  the  prestige  of  England  in 
the  Far  East.  The  mere  desire  to  get  China  to  join  the  Allies  is 
to  Chinese  minds  a  confession  of  the  Allies'  inability  to  cope 
with  Germany.  Just  now  comes  Premier  Tuan's  report  to  the 
President  that  the  Entente  Powers  are  coercing  China  to  join  the 
Allies.  Already  the  question  has  raised  bitter  dissensions  among 
our  statesmen.  Discord  now  may  evoke  anarchism  which  will 
arouse  the  two  strong  but  perilous  elements  in  China,  anti-foreign 
fanatics  and  Mohammedans. 

The  dissensions  which  arose  after  Dr.  Sun  penned  these 
words,  and  which  have  continued  to  the  present,  show  the 
foreign  thinker  and  schemer  that  it  may  be  prudent  as  to 
things  Chinese  to  give  heed  to  the  warnings  of  the  Chinese, 
who  place  first  the  interests  of  their  own  country. 

I  may  here  recount  part  of  a  conversation  with  President 
Feng  Kuo-chang,  August  13,  the  day  before  he  issued  the 
declaration  of  war. 

I  said  to  him:  "There  is  no  objection  to  China's  declar- 
ing war  on  Germany,  if  that  is  all.  It  will  be  a  declaration, 
but  nothing  will  be  done.  Germany  has  no  troops  or  ships 
to  send  here,  and  you  are  not  likely  to  send  any  to  fight 
Germany.  What  I  fear  is  that  you  will  have  to  join  the 
Allies,  of  whom  Japan  is  chief,  and  henceforth  you  will 
have  to  obey  them.    This  wiU  be  your  disaster." 

"I  am  opposed  to  joining  either  side,"  the  President 
said,  and  then  added:  "China  will  fight  Germany  inde- 
pendently. China  is  opposed  to  violations  of  international 
law,  and  therefore  joins  with  the  United  States  in  opposing 
such  violations.    We  will  take  orders  from  no  one." 

"Very  good,"  I  replied,  "I  hope  so.    Wait  and  see." 

This  idea  of  making  war  without  joining  the  Allied  na- 
tions, including  Japan,  was  where  President  Feng  differed 


110  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

from  the  more  zealous  agitators.  Possibly  he  had  derived 
the  idea  from  President  Wilson.  Before  leaving  Nanking 
for  Peking,  late  in  July,  to  enter  the  Presidential  Palace, 
he  made  a  speech  containing  these  words : 

Originally  I  was  absolutely  opposed  to  the  declaration  of  war. 
But  after  my  attempts  to  oppose  it  proved  futile,  I  have  had  to 
follow  the  general  trend  of  public  opinion.  Although  I  now  have 
no  objection  to  the  declaration  of  war  upon  Germany,  yet  I  am 
still  opposed  to  the  idea  of  my  country  entering  into  alliance 
with  the  Entente  Powers.  If  our  entry  into  the  war  on  the  side 
of  the  Entente  Powers  becomes  a  matter  of  imperative  necessity, 
we  may  do  so  on  certain  conditions,  without  which  I  deem  it  were 
better  for  us  to  keep  out  of  it.  For  it  must  be  understood  that  in 
the  case  of  declaring  war  upon  Germany  independently,  we  can  do 
so  at  our  own  perfect  will,  but  if  we  go  to  war  on  the  side  of 
the  Entente,  we  should  not  be  as  free  as  we  should  like  to  be. 

Here,  then,  we  are  able  first  to  detect  the  varying  course 
Chinese  thought  had  taken  from  those  early  days  in  Feb- 
ruary. The  scheme  of  China  aligning  herself  with  the 
United  States  had  vanished,  the  subsequent  scheme  of  join- 
ing the  Entente  Allies  was  not  accepted  by  all  the  Chinese, 
and  was  advocated  by  Japan  only  on  the  understanding 
that  she  was  to  act  for  the  Entente  in  Far  Eastern  affairs, 
and  might  ultimately  become  the  sole  Ally  of  China. 

As  illustrating  the  attempt  to  get  China  to  do  what  the 
new  President  was  anxious  not  to  do,  I  cite  an  instance  on 
August  6,  when  the  seven  Ministers  for  France,  Portugal, 
Russia,  Japan,  Belgium,  Great  Britain,  and  the  United 
States  had  audience  with  the  new  President.  The  capable 
French  Minister,  M.  Conty,  was  spokesman  for  the  group. 
He  not  only  extended  congratulations  as  befitted  a  cere- 
monial call,  but  seized  the  opportunity  to  express  apprecia- 
tion that  China  was  going  to  declare  war  on  Germany.  He 
added  the  hope  that  the  bonds  between  China  and  these 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE         111 

Allied  nations  would  be  cemented  by  a  closer  association  in 
the  great  struggle.  These  words  did  not  harmonize  with 
the  American  Note  of  warning,  issued  shortly  before. 
Neither  did  they  harmonize  with  President  Feng's  explicit 
desire  that  China  go  to  war  in  an  independent  capacity.^ 
Thomas  F.  Millard  ^  writes  thus  of  the  purposes  of  Japan : 

When  it  was  evident  that  the  united  urging  of  the  American, 
British  and  French  Grovernments,  and  the  influence  of  individual 
foreigners,  would  bring  China  into  the  war,  Japanese  diplomacy 
made  a  characteristic  manoeuvre.  The  Chinese  Government  was 
advised  by  Japan  to  declare  war  as  one  of  the  Allies,  and  not  as 
a  separate  nation.  This  was  a  scheme  to  detach  China  from  the 
United  States,  which  power  never  had  formally  joined  the  Allies, 
and  attach  her  to  the  Allies,  thereby  making  her  a  part  of  and 
subject  to  the  private  agreements  made  among  the  nations  com- 
posing the  original  alliance. 

The  climax  of  the  tragic  and  momentous  moulding  of 
China's  destiny  received  a  touch  of  pleasant  humour  from 
the  hand  of  the  Minister  for  Austria-Hungary,  Baron  von 
Rosthorn,  who  had  remained  in  Peking  till  the  middle  of 
August,  1917.  This  diplomat  had  originally  been  in  the 
Chinese  Customs  Service,  was  a  Chinese  sinologue,  and  was 
a  protagonist  of  Chinese  rights.  His  term  of  service  in 
the  Legation  was  longer  than  that  of  all  the  seven  Ministers 
combined  who  formed  the  opposing  group. 

On  the  day  war  was  declared  by  the  Peking  Government, 
he  sent  to  the  Chinese  Minister  this  most  unusual  Note : 

Peking,  August  14,  1917. 
YouB  Excellency, 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  note  of 
today  of  the  following  tenour: 

(Text  of  Chinese  Note) 

*  See  Appendix  II. 

*  "  Democracy  and  the  Eastern  Question,"  p.  131. 


112  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

In  reply  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  Your  Excellency  that  I 
have  taken  cognizance  of  your  note  and  am  awaiting  instructions 
from  my  Government. 

I  cannot  here  enter  into  the  arguments  contained  in  the  declara- 
tion of  war,  but  feel  bound  to  state  that  I  must  consider  this 
declaration  as  unconstitutional  and  illegal,  seeing  that  according 
to  so  high  an  authority  as  the  former  President  Li  Yuan-Hung 
Such  a  declaration  requires  the  approbation  of  both  houses  of 
Parliament. 

Etc.,  etc. 

II.  The  Intrigue  going  on  in  ToMo  to  embroil  China  in 
the  war. 

To  make  clear  the  peculiar  windings  of  diplomacy  in 
inducing  China  to  take  the  three  steps  that  bound  China  to 
one  group  of  warring  nations,  a  study  must  be  made  of 
the  greater  and  wider  intrigue  going  on  in  Tokio,  in  which 
the  Governments  of  Japan,  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy, 
and  at  first  Russia,  all  had  a  part. 

As  soon  as  the  Entente  Allies  detected  that  the  United 
States  was  seeking  in  early  February  to  take  the  lead  in 
Oriental  polities  by  inducing  China  to  align  herself  with 
the  sister  Republic  in  all  war  measures,  the  Ambassadors  in 
Tokio  for  Russia,  Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy  secretly 
negotiated  with  Japan  as  to  Japan's  connections  with 
China's  war  measures.  The  one  intrigue  conflicted  with 
the  other.  The  American  Legation  in  Peking  was  pointing 
out  how  China  could  get  ahead  of  Japan  in  reference  to 
German  and  other  rights  which  Japan  had  planned  to  ap- 
propriate. At  the  same  time  the  four  European  Embassies 
were  pointing  out  to  Japan  how  she  could  appropriate  all 
German  rights  not  only  in  Shantung  but  in  the  German 
colonies  north  of  the  equator.  Europe  agreed  with  the 
United  States,  a  future  associate  in  the  war,  in  the  one 
matter  of  arraying  China  against  Germany.  But  Japan 
had  previously  resisted  the  European  advice  that  China 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE  113 

should  enter  the  war.  To  resist  American  advice  in  the 
same  direction  was  less  feasible,  for  China  would  probably 
accept  the  advice.  Japan,  therefore,  would  do  well  to  ac- 
cede to  the  combined  advice  of  Europe  and  America,  if  so 
be  that  her  gains  would  be  greater.  To  induce  Japan  to 
allow  China,  first  to  break  with  Germany  and  then  to  de- 
clare war,  all  that  was  necessary  was  to  give  Japan  a 
reasonable  quid  pro  quo.  This  was  to  guarantee  to  Japan, 
whatever  China  or  the  United  States  might  wish,  all  the 
German  rights  in  Shantung  and  the  South  Seas  north  of 
the  equator.  In  making  this  guarantee,  which  proved  of 
highest  value  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  Japan,  too, 
was  requested  to  give  a  quid  pro  quo,  namely,  to  assist  in 
bringing  about  the  repatriation  of  all  Germans,  and  the 
requisition  of  German  commercial  houses  in  China.  In  fact 
it  seems  clear  that  the  British  and  French  were  more  anx- 
ious to  consummate  these  last  designs  than  to  lead  China 
into  the  war.  China 's  entrance  into  war  was  the  means  for 
facilitating  and  legalizing  the  total  elimination  of  Germans 
from  China  and  the  destruction  of  German  trade. 

Thus  while  China  supposed,  at  American  suggestion,  that 
her  entrance  into  war  would  afford  her  the  chance  of  ter- 
minating treaties  with  Germany  and  possibly  of  nullifying 
the  agreements  with  Japan  of  1915,  and  so  of  restoring  all 
German  rights  to  China,  the  European  Allies  were  conniv- 
ing with  Japan,  unknown  to  China  or  to  the  United  States, 
that  what  China  hoped  to  get  would  all  pass  to  Japan.  If 
these  facts  had  been  known  to  the  Peking  Government,  the 
arguments  of  all  groups  of  outside  agitators  would  have 
lost  most  of  their  persuasiveness.  As  to  the  United  States, 
even  as  late  as  August  11  and  19,  1919,  both  President 
Wilson  and  the  Secretary  of  State  asserted  that  they  had 
been  kept  in  ignorance  of  these  wonderful  compacts  of  our 
associates  in  war. 

One  informing  document  is  a  dispatch  of  Viseoimt 


114  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Motono,  February  19    (1917),  to  the  French  and  Russian 
Ambassadors.    It  is  as  follows: 

...  In  view  of  recent  developments  in  the  general  situation 
and  in  view  of  the  particular  arrangements  concerning  peace 
conditions  such  as  arrangements  relative  to  the  disposition  of  the 
Bosporus,  Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles,  being  already 
under  discussion  by  the  Powers  interested,  the  Imperial  Japanese 
Government  believes  that  the  moment  has  come  for  It  also  to 
express  Its  desire  relative  to  certain  conditions  of  peace  essential 
to  Japan  and  to  submit  them  for  the  consideration  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  French  Republic. 

The  French  Government  is  thoroughly  informed  of  all  the  ef- 
forts the  Japanese  Government  has  made  in  a  general  manner  to 
accomplish  its  task  with  the  present  war,  and  particularly  to 
guarantee  for  the  future  the  peace  of  Oriental  Asia  and  the 
security  of  the  Japanese  Empire,  for  which  it  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  take  from  Germany  its  bases  of  political,  military  and 
economic  activity  in  the  Far  East. 

Under  these  conditions  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  pro- 
poses to  demand  from  Germany  at  the  time  of  the  peace  negotia- 
tions the  surrender  of  the  territorial  rights  and  special  interests 
Germany  possessed  before  the  war  in  Shantung  and  the  islands 
situated  north  of  the  equator  in  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

The  Imperial  Japanese  Government  confidently  hopes  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  French  Republic,  realizing  the  legitimacy  of  these 
demands,  wUl  give  assurance  that,  her  case  being  proved,  Japan 
may  count  upon  their  full  support  on  this  question.  .   .   .^ 

The  reply  of  the  French  Ambassador  at  Tokio,  under 
date  of  March  2,  1917,  reads  thus : 

The  Government  of  the  French  Republic  is  disposed  to  give 
the  Japanese  Government  its  accord  in  regulating  at  the  time  of 
the  Peace  Negotiations  questions  vital  to  Japan  concerning  Shan- 
tung and  the  German  Islands  on  the  Pacific  north  of  the  equator. 

*  Charles  A.  Selden,  New  York  Times,  April  12,  1919. 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE         ll5 

It  also  agrees  to  support  the  demands  of  the  Imperial  Japanese 
Government  for  the  surrender  of  the  rights  Germany  possessed 
before  the  war  in  this  Chinese  province  and  these  islands. 

M.  Briand  demands  on  the  other  hand  that  Japan  give  its  sup- 
port to  obtain  from  China  the  breaking  of  its  diplomatic  relations 
with  Germany,  and  that  it  give  this  act  desirable  significance. 
The  consequences  in  China  should  be  the  following: 

First,  handing  passports  to  the  German  diplomatic  agents  and 
consuls ; 

Second,  the  obligation  of  all  under  German  jurisdiction  to 
leave  Chinese  territory; 

Third,  the  internment  of  German  ships  in  Chinese  ports  and 
the  ultimate  requisition  of  these  ships  in  order  to  place  them  at 
the  disposition  of  the  Allies,  following  the  example  of  Italy  and 
Portugal ; 

Fourth,  requisition  of  German  commercial  houses,  established 
in  China;  forfeiting  the  rights  of  the  Germans  in  the  Concessions 
she  possesses  in  certain  parts  of  China.^ 

The  fact  that  these  secret  Agreements  were  not  disclosed 
to  the  Peking  Government  bespeaks  no  real  friendliness  to 
China.  The  fact  that  they  were  not  disclosed  to  the  Wash- 
ington Government,  at  the  very  time  America's  help  was 
being  sought  by  the  Entente  Allies,  and  at  the  time  Amer- 
ican arguments  were  deluding  the  Chinese,  bespeaks  no 
real  friendliness  to  the  United  States.  This  was  hardly 
playing  the  game.  According  to  the  statement  of  Secre- 
tary Lansing,  August  11,  1919,  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee of  Foreign  Relations,^  neither  Mr,  Arthur  Balfour, 
nor  M.  Viviani,  nor  Viscount  Ishii,  on  coming  to  the  United 
States  in  1917  on  special  missions,  confidential  and  far- 
reaching,  disclosed  to  any  one  in  the  American  Government 
the  arrangements  arrived  at  in  Tokio  the  early  part  of  the 
same  year.    Senator  Borah,  at  the  same  Committee  meeting, 

^  Charles  A.  Selden,  New  York  Times  Paris  correspondent,  April  21, 
1919. 

'  New  York  Sim,  August  12,  1919. 


116  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

read  the  following  from  the  records  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons March  4, 1918 : 

Mr.  King  asked  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  whether 
there  have  been  communicated  to  President  Wilson  copies  of  all 
treaties,  whether  secret  or  public,  and  memoranda  of  all  other 
agreements  or  undertakings  to  which  this  country  has  become  a 
party  since  August  4,  1914;  and  if  not,  whether  copies  of  all 
such  documents  will  be  handed  to  the  American  Ambassador  in 
London  ? 

Balfour — The  honourable  Member  may  rest  assured  that  Presi- 
dent Wilson  is  kept  fully  informed  by  the  Allies. 

At  least  the  Secretary  of  State  was  kept  ignorant  of  these 
arrangements  made  by  the  Allies  in  Tokio,  for  when  Sen- 
ator Borah  asked  Mr.  Lansing,  "Notwithstanding  the  state- 
ment of  Ishii  and  the  statement  of  Balfour,  it  is  a  matter  of 
fact  that  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States  had 
no  knowledge  of  these  treaties  until  after  the  signing  of 
the  armistice,  is  it  not?"  Mr.  Lansing  replied:  ''That  is 
true."  It  is  even  more  likely  that  President  Wilson  was 
left  in  ignorance. 

More  serious  was  the  omission  of  informing  China.  She 
was  the  one  country  vitally  affected.  Germany  had  no 
rights  in  Shantung  except  as  granted  by  China,  the  sover- 
eign State.  For  American  agents  to  urge  on  China  the 
severance  of  relations  with  Germany  in  order  that  China 
might  strengthen  her  position  in  Shantung  as  against  both 
Germany  and  Japan,  at  the  very  time  that  the  Allies  were 
trying  to  eliminate  China  from  having  possession  of  Ger- 
man rights  that  Japan  might  be  the  gainer,  was  hardly 
playing  fair  with  China,  a  past  friend  and  a  potential  ally. 
The  rights  which  Germany  had  had  in  Shantung  prior  to 
the  war  were  all  embraced  within  the  bounds  of  China,  not 
of  Japan.  China,  not  Japan,  had  sole  responsibility  for  the 
disposal  of  German  rights,  German  property,  German  title- 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE         117 

deeds  and  German  investments  within  the  confines  of 
China.  Japan  had  the  same  responsibility  within  her  own 
confines. 

It  was  a  sorry  spectacle  this  trickery  and  chicanery  being 
perpetrated  on  China.  And,  how  blind  was  American 
statecraft  and  how  inconsistent  American  idealism  to  pro- 
claim on  one  side  of  the  globe  righteousness,  democracy, 
open  covenants  and  the  emancipation  of  the  oppressed,  and 
to  share  in  intrigue,  secrecy,  selfishness  and  deception  on 
the  other  side  of  the  globe. 

In  a  general  way,  the  United  States  was  trying  to  help 
China  as  against  Japan,  while  Great  Britain,  France  and 
Italy  were  seemingly  helping  Japan  as  against  China.  The 
American  attitude  to  Japan,  as  represented  by  the  doings  of 
the  American  Legation  in  Peking,  was  not  hid  from  the 
statesmen  of  Japan :  but  the  attitude  of  the  three  European 
Allies  towards  China,  as  revealed  by  their  scheming  in 
Tokio,  was  the  very  opposite  of  what  the  Ministers  in  Pe- 
king for  Britain,  France  and  Italy  loudly  proclaimed  to 
the  Chinese.  As  we  now  read  the  facts,  these  six  countries 
not  only  were  forming  plots  to  overwhelm  Germany,  but 
were  at  loggerheads  with  each  other  on  the  very  eve  of 
combining  against  Germany.  Above  all,  this  medley  of 
war  scheming  was  taking  place  during  the  months  of  Feb- 
ruary and  March  before  either  the  United  States  Congress 
or  the  Chinese  Parliament  was  asked  to  declare  a  state  of 
war  with  Germany.  The  intrigue  was  a  motley  mixture  of 
semi-neutrality  and  defiant  belligerency.  Secrecy  envel- 
oped all.  Strange  associations  for  President  Wilson  and 
the  American  people,  who  from  the  founders'  day  have 
stood  for  straightforward  dealing  with  all  peoples  of  men, 
Oriental  as  well  as  Occidental. 

Dr.  Arthur  J.  Brown,^  referring  to  Japan's  change  of 
mind  in  reference  to  China  under  influences  so  adroit  and 

* "  The  Mastery  of  the  Far  East,"  p.  436. 


118  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

unholy,  comments  thus:  "Verily,  dubious  are  the  ways  of 
secret  diplomacy."  And  he  quotes  from  Dr.  Frank  J. 
Goodnow  of  March  14,  1917 : 

China  would  never  have  broken  off  relations  but  for  urgings  of 
Japan,  which  has  sinister  designs  against  the  integrity  of  China. 
And  unfortunately  she  will  be  able  to  carry  out  her  scheme.  One 
obvious  motive  is  the  opportunity  it  wUl  afford  Japan  to  gain 
control  of  China's  army  and  navy,  a  step  that  will  put  her  abso- 
lutely at  the  Mikado's  mercy. 

The  Englishman  of  the  Far  East  has  as  a  rule  a  high 
sense  of  honour,  a  reputation  for  probity,  straightforward 
dealing  and  playing  fair,  but  the  diplomatic  tactics  pur- 
sued in  Tokio  by  the  four  European  Allies  were  of  the 
Old  World  type,  made  feverish  by  contact  with  a  sly  kind 
of  Oriental  diplomacy.  There  was  in  those  days,  on  en- 
trance into  war  of  both  the  United  States  and  China,  a  lot 
of  humbug,  and  some  buncombe,  a  fair  amount  of  self- 
complacency  and  an  immense  amount  of  secrecy,  inconsist- 
encies galore,  and  selfish  national  ambition  beyond  measure. 

A  few  days  after  the  Chinese  President  issued  the  decla- 
ration of  war,  all  the  eight  Ministers  of  the  new  group 
(arrayed  against  Grermany)  sent  to  the  Foreign  Office  in 
Peking,  in  almost  similar  phraseology,  notes  of  congratula- 
tion and  profound  assurances  of  renewed  friendship.  I 
append  the  one  from  the  United  States  as  being  the  one 
nation  whose  word  was  more  likely  to  be  fulfilled. 

.  .  .  My  Government  is  happily  desirous  of  taking  this  op- 
portunity to  make  it  definitely  known  that  in  friendship,  co- 
operation and  support  my  Government  will  do  what  it  can  to 
enable  China  to  enjoy  the  position  and  special  regard  that  are 
due  to  a  great  country. 

The  reception  of  such  Notes  had  only  one  effect,  to  in- 
spire in  the  Chinese  breast  hope  and  joy  and  to  remove  all 
fears  of  future  trouble. 


AMERICAN  AND  ALLIED  INTRIGUE         119 

My  views  on  the  situation  have  been  clarified  by  sub- 
sequent events,  but  what  I  thought  at  the  time  is  shown 
in  an  editorial  which  I  wrote,  somewhat  sceptically,  I  con- 
fess, August  21 : 

It  is  a  pity  that  the  Chinese  Government  and  the  various  Allied 
Legations  have  not  given  more  publicity  to  the  replies  sent  to  the 
Chinese  Government  by  the  Allied  Ministers  (including  the 
American)  in  congratulation  of  having  another  ally  against 
Germany. 

China  in  entering  the  war  at  the  behests  of  friendly  advisors 
from  near  and  far  was  just  a  little  tremulous  as  she  neared  the 
fateful  hour,  but  now  she  is  assured,  yea,  seven  times  reassured, 
that  she  will  now  have  more  gains  than  her  fondest  fancies  had 
painted  for  her. 

We  have  had  the  impression,  and  we  told  President  Feng 
so,  that  the  outlook  for  China  had  never  been  so  hopeless.  We 
must  reverse  this  extravagant  statement,  until  facts  prove  that 
our  revised  view  is  wrong. 

Ministers  Plenipotentiary  of  eight  countries  assure  China 
(yes,  assure  her)  that  she  is  now  to  receive  their  united  "  friend- 
ship, solidarity  and  assistance."  Japan  goes  still  further.  She 
says,  "  That  at  this  moment  the  friendship  of  these  two  countries 
has  been  much  enhanced  and  their  relations  have  grown  still 
closer."  This  is  comforting.  Moreover,  all  the  eight  Ministers 
point  China  forward  and  upward,  for  she  is  now  to  enjoy  the 
position  "  due  to  a  great  Power." 

At  one  bound,  by  a  simple  Declaration  of  War,  China  attains 
to  all  this  glory,  distinction  and  assured  friendship  of  other 
Powers.  She  has  become  with  less  trouble  than  Japan  one  of  the 
family  of  nations. 

On  our  part  we  have  no  doubt  but  that  the  ex-Ministers  for 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  would  be  pleased  to  write  the 
same  Notes  with  the  same  assurances,  if  so  be  the  Notes  were  not 
returned. 

Several  years  ago  Japan  took  the  lead  in  making  an  arrange- 
ment with  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia,  for  guaranteeing 


120  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

equal  opportunity  in  China  to  all  nations,  and  the  sovereign 
independence  of  China. 

Today  she  takes  the  lead — for  leader  she  is — in  bringing  not 
only  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia,  but  the  United  States, 
Belgium,  Italy  and  Portugal,  to  the  policy  of  solidarity  and 
assistance. 

Premier  Tuan  Chi-jui  deserves  all  the  honour  he  can  get  for 
effecting  this  tangible  result. 

For  half  a  year  we  have  written  upwards  of  120  squibs  against 
the  abandonment  of  neutrality  and  peace.  We  now  see  how 
foolish  we  have  been;  China  gets  into  no  trouble  at  all,  but  has 
abundant  assurances  of  blessing  that  are  never  to  end. 


CHAPTER  VI 

A    SERIES    OP    AGGRAVATIONS    AND    PERILS    TO    CHINA' 

When  the  Peking  Government,  with  no  sanction  of  Parlia- 
ment, declared  war  on  the  two  Central  Powers,  August  14, 

1917,  the  mass  of  the  Chinese  took  the  result  with  their 
customary  spirit  of  fatalism.  What  matter  if  the  outcome 
be  good  or  bad  ?  What  would  happen  was  inevitable ;  why 
complain?  Already  China  had  been  carried  along  for  six 
months  by  complex  and  hidden  forces,  as  in  a  current,  and 
the  future  no  man  could  see.  That  complications,  en- 
tanglements, annoyances,  and  all  sorts  of  troubles,  with 
possible  catastrophes,  would  arise,  seemed  to  be  a  certainty. 
War  seldom  brings  blessing  to  the  weak ;  and  China  surely 
was  weak.    Dr.  Arthur  J.  Brown,  writing  at  the  close  of 

1918,  says: ^ 

Time  alone  will  show  whether  China  embroiled  herself  in  the 
world  war  to  her  benefit  or  to  her  hurt.  We  suspect  that,  in  spite 
of  the  virtuous  and  well-meant  declarations  of  the  various  Powers 
regarding  "  the  rights  of  weaker  nations,"  poor,  helpless  China 
will  get  only  what  the  representatives  of  stronger  governments 
deem  expedient  and  that  Japan  will  have  a  good  deal  to  say  as 
to  what  that  shall  be. 

Coincidentally  the  United  States  and  China  should  fare 
well,  for  the  former  declared  war  on  Good  Friday  and  the 
latter  on  the  day  the  Holy  Pontiff  made  his  appeal  for 
peace. 

Most  of  the  Japanese  papers,  more  familiar  than  others 

*  "  The  Mastery  of  the  Far  East,"  p.  436. 

121 


1^2  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

with  the  part  played  by  the  Japanese  Government,  wrote  in 
commendatory  language  of  China's  decision.  One  paper, 
however,  the  Osaki  Asahi,  wrote  in  a  different  strain,  a  few 
days  prior  to  the  decision,  thus : 

China's  participation  in  the  war  has  now  become  a  matter  of 
time.  No  one  has  doubted  that  it  will  come.  Now  after  Vice- 
President  Feng  Kuo-ehang's  arrival  in  Peking,  the  decision  has 
been  arrived  at.  Whether  it  is  necessary  for  her  to  take  that 
step  or  not  is  not  the  question  now.  An  independent  nation  to 
be  forced  by  others  to  do  anything,  to  talk  about  humanity  which 
is  not  in  her  mind  and  to  declare  war  which  is  not  necessary,  is 
indeed  a  regrettable  thing  from  the  point  of  view  of  national 
existence  of  that  nation.  To  be  sure,  even  Japan  is  not  free 
from  doing  things  which  are  not  altogether  necessary  but  because 
forced  by  others.  Some  persons  are  inclined  to  regard  Japan's 
declaration  of  war  against  Germany  merely  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance.  We  supported  the  war 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Oriental  problem,  independently 
of  all  else.  As  for  the  question  of  China's  participation  in  the 
war,  judged  from  the  history  and  effect  of  it,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  it  is  advantageous  to  China  or  not. 

As  I  viewed  the  probabilities  at  the  time,  I  was  more  than 
doubtful,  I  was  pessimistic  as  to  the  outcome  for  China.  In 
a  conversation  with  President  Feng  on  the  eve  of  declaring 
war,  I  said : 

' '  I  have  seen  China  in  many  difficulties ;  I  passed  through 
the  Boxer  uprising;  but  I  have  never  been  so  hopeless  as 
to  China's  future  as  I  am  now." 

"And  I,  too,"  he  replied,  "have  no  hope." 

China,  even  more  than  vigorous  and  prosperous  America, 
would  have  done  well  to  heed  these  words  of  Washington's 
Farewell  Address :  ' '  Harmony  and  liberal  intercourse  with 
all  nations  are  recommended  by  policy,  humanity  and  in- 
terest.    But  even  our  commercial  policy  should  hold  an 


A  SERIES  OF  AGGRAVATIONS  123 

equal  and  impartial  hand,  neither  seeking  nor  granting  ex- 
elusive  favours  or  preferences." 

The  question  was  never  presented  to  China  to  enter  the 
war  on  the  side  of  the  Central  Powers;  therein  these  two 
(Powers  showed  themselves  true  friends  of  China.  The 
question  urged  on  China  by  eight  Legations — I  will  not  say 
Governments — was  to  join  the  United  States,  or  the  Entente 
Allies,  or  Japan,  or  all  of  them,  against  the  Central  Powers, 
until  the  latter  should  be  vanquished  not  only  on  the  field 
of  battle,  but  in  the  marts  of  trade  and  even  within  the 
sacred  domain  of  missions,  science  and  education.  For  one 
to  argue  otherwise  was  to  lay  himself  open  to  being  called 
pro-German,  and  few  cared  to  take  the  risk.  I  was  among 
the  number  to  follow  my  own  conscience,  and  I  had  the  joy 
of  suffering  for  it.  If  China  had  persisted  in  remaining 
neutral,  she  would  have  had  good  company,  Spain,  Hol- 
land, Denmark,  Norway,  Sweden  and  Switzerland,  and  two 
of  the  A.  B.  C.  Republics  of  South  America — Argentine  and 
Chile.  If  China  had  merely  severed  diplomatic  relations 
with  Germany^  as  President  Wilson  requested,  China's  sole 
associates  of  any  importance  would  have  been  Peru  and 
Ecuador.  To  go  further,  and  declare  war,  China  was  in 
the  company  of  Brazil,  Guatemala,  Siam  and  Greece,  and 
still  more  of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  France, 
Italy,  Belgium,  Portugal,  the  Czarist  Russia  (still  retaining 
a  Minister  in  Peking)  and  Japan.  It  certainly  seemed  as 
if  China  in  going  with  the  crowd  was  on  the  winning  side, 
both  by  superiority  of  military  power,  by  combination  of 
financial  resources,  and  by  a  widespread  profession  of  lofty 
aims,  righteous  ideals  and  untarnished  justice.  When  all 
these  eight  foreign  Ministers  solemnly  assured  China  that 
she  could  rely  on  their  help  and  solidarity  for  placing  her 
high  among  the  great  nations  of  the  world,  it  was  simple 
folly  for  a  private  individual  like  myself  to  sing  in  a 
minor  key. 


124  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FEEE?  ' 

Hardly,  however,  had  China  made  her  choice  as  to  the 
side  of  righteousness  and  the  policy  of  prudence  and  secur- 
ity than  one  by  one  a  series  of  complications,  annoyances 
or  troubles  befell  her,  held  sway  through  the  Paris  Peace 
Conference,  and  has  not  yet  come  to  an  end.  These  troubles 
which  have  come  to  China  have  come  from  China's  associ- 
ates in  war,  not  from  enemies  in  war.  Some  of  the  more 
glaring  misfortunes  and  annoyances  I  will  now  briefly 
mention. 

I.   British  demands  as  to  Tibet. 

While  China  was  all  stirred  by  the  hot  discussion  on  the 
war  question,  the  British  Government,  having  kept  silent 
for  several  years,  with  no  fixed  agreement  in  her  possession, 
suddenly  presented  to  China,  in  the  month  of  March,  1917, 
Twelve  Demands  concerning  Tibet.  Previous  negotiations 
in  1913  had  failed  to  secure  unanimity  of  action.  In  the 
whirl  of  events  in  1917,  China  was  again  urged  to  be 
reasonable.  Japan,  in  1915,  presented  to  China,  under 
President  Yuan  Shih-kai,  Twenty-one  Demands;  Great 
Britain,  in  1917,  presented  to  China,  under  President  Li 
Yuan-hung,  Twelve  Demands.  Two  Allies,  mistrustful  of 
each  other  alike,  were  playing  havoc  with  China.  The 
Demands,  as  made  public  by  the  Japanese  press,  and  trans- 
lated into  Chinese  newspapers,  are  as  follows: 

1.  Great  Britain  shall  have  the  right  to  construct  railways 
between  India  and  Tibet. 

2.  The  Chinese  Government  shall  contract  loans  from  the 
British  Government  for  the  improvement  of  the  administration  of 
Tibet. 

3.  The  treaty  obligations  between  Tibet  and  Great  Britain 
shall  be  considered  valid  as  heretofore. 

4.  British  experts  shall  be  engaged  for  the  industrial  enter- 
prises of  Tibet. 

5.  China  shall  secure  the  redemption  of  loans  contracted  from 
the  British  people  by  Tibetans. 


A  SERIES  OF  AGGRAVATIONS  125 

6.  Neither  China  nor  Great  Britain  shall  send  troops  to  Tibet 
without  reason. 

7.  The  Chinese  Government  shall  not  appoint  or  dismiss  of- 
ficials in  Tibet  on  its  own  responsibility.     (Italics  ours.) 

8.  The  British  Government  shall  be  allowed  to  establish  tele- 
graph lines  in  Lhassa,  Chianghu,  Chamutao,  etc. 

9.  British  postal  service  shall  be  introduced  in  Lhassa  and 
other  places. 

10.  China  shall  not  interfere  with  the  actions  of  the  British 
Government  in  Tibet.     (Italics  ours.) 

11.  No  privileges  or  interests  in  Tibet  shall  be  granted  to  other 
nations. 

12.  All  mines  in  Tibet  shall  be  jointly  worked  by  the  British 
and  Chinese  Governments. 

Surely  Great  Britain  is  not  the  one  to  east  the  first  stone 
at  Japan.  And  between  these  two  Allies — upper  and  nether 
millstones — China  is  being  ground. 

Miss  La  Motte,^  writing  of  these  same  Demands,  says : 

Remember,  over  here  it  is  not  customary  to  think  of  or  speak 
of  anything  but  "  Japanese  aggression."  Japan,  you  see,  offers 
the  only  stumbling-block  to  the  complete  domination  of  the  Orient 
by  Europe.  But  for  Japan — China  might  possibly  become  another 
India. 

These  Demands,  as  well  as  final  Agreement,  were  kept  in 
abeyance  till  after  the  Great  War.  But  the  Chinese  in 
official  circles  knew  well  enough  that  sooner  or  later  they 
must  come  to  an  agreement  by  agreeing  vnth  Great  Britain. 
The  matter  was  again  broached  in  1919,  and  the  Chinese  are 
being  pressed  to  sign  an  official  document.  Since  the  arm- 
istice, Great  Britain  has  been  busy  safeguarding  her  po- 
sition in  Hongkong,  the  Straits  Settlements,  Burma  and 
India,  and  in  widening  her  influence  and  beneficent  sway 
in  Afghanistan,  Mesopotamia,  Persia,  the  Caucasus,  and 

»"  Peking  Dust,"  p.  223. 


126  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

far-away  Tibet,  all  strategic  points  in  the  Asiatic  portion 
of  world-wide  empire. 

And  China,  like  Persia,  like  Egypt,  will  have  to  submit, 
unless — unless — she  yields  to  the  other  dominating  force, 
Japan. 

Mr.  C.  C.  Wu,  in  a  memorandum,  issued  in  the  same 
year,  1917,^  wrote: 

China  wants  nothing  more  than  the  re-establishment  of  Chinese 
suzerainty  over  Tibet,  with  recognition  of  the  autonomy  of  the 
territoiy  immediately  under  the  control  of  the  Lhassa  Govern- 
ment, she  is  agreeable  to  the  British  idea  of  forming  an  effective 
buffer  territory  in  so  far  as  it  is  consistent  with  equity  and  jus- 
tice; she  is  anxious  that  her  trade  interest  should  be  looked  after 
by  her  trade  agents  as  do  the  British,  a  point  which  is  agreeable 
even  to  the  Tibetans,  though  apparently  not  to  the  British;  in 
other  words,  she  expects  that  Great  Britain  would  at  least  make 
with  her  an  arrangement  regarding  Tibet  which  should  not  be 
more  disadvantageous  to  her  than  that  made  with  Russia  respect- 
ing Outer  Mongolia. 

II.   The  LoMsing-Ishii  Agreement. 

No  sooner  had  the  United  States  declared  war  than  the 
Governments  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy  and  Belgium 
designated  some  of  their  ablest  men  for  special  commissions 
to  visit  the  United  States  and  to  secure  American  help, 
financial,  military  and  political.  The  Japanese  Govern- 
ment did  the  same,  designating  a  former  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  and  Ambassador  to  Paris,  Viscount  Ishii.  He 
was  equal  to  the  task.  The  Chinese  Government,  on  the 
other  hand,  did  nothing.  After  frequent  conferences  of 
this  Japanese  Envoy  with  Secretary  Lansing,  at  opportune 
times  and  in  a  friendly  spirit,  there  appeared  on  November 
2,  1917,  the  exchange  of  Notes  between  the  two.  The 
Agreement  being  in  this  form  did  not  need  to  be  referred 
to  the  Senate  for  ratification. 

*  Putnam  Weals,  "  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China,"  p.  479. 


A  SERIES  OF  AGGHAVATIONS  127 

On  the  one  hand  the  Notes  reaffirmed  the  "open  door" 
principle  in  China  and  the  preservation  of  China's  inde- 
pendence and  territorial  integrity;  and  on  the  other  hand 
there  were  introduced  phrases  capable  of  more  than  one 
interpretation,  as  follows: 

The  Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Japan  recognize 
that  territorial  propinquity  creates  special  relations  between 
eountries,  and,  consequently,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  recognizes  that  Japan  has  special  interests  in  China,  par- 
ticularly for  the  parts  to  which  her  possessions  are  contiguous. 

It  was  known  that  only  in  a  narrow  sense  was  there  an 
''open  door"  in  China,  so  long  as  spheres  of  interest  existed 
and  preferential  concessions  were  granted  to  particular 
countries  in  particular  parts  of  China.  Japanese  and  also 
Chinese  would  naturally  give  more  attention  to  the  other 
words  quoted  above,  "special  relations"  and  "special  in- 
terests. ' '  However  much  Americans  might  claim  that  these 
words  meant  nothing  or  only  reaffirmed  the  principle  of  the 
"open  door,"  Orientals  were  positive  that  a  new  day  had 
come  in  which  Japan,  through  recognition  of  the  United 
States,  had  a  prior  position  in  China,  ahead  of  all  others. 

The  Japanese  Legation  in  Peking  was  the  first  to  make 
announcement  of  the  new  agreement.  A  translation  into 
Chinese  was  made,  in  which  the  Japanese  used  a  strong 
term  for  "interests,"  implying  both  power  and  benefit. 
The  American  Legation,  later  on,  made  another  translation, 
implying  simply  relationship.  The  American  Minister  also 
issued  a  formal  statement  that  these  words  which  attracted 
go  much  attention  were  meant  to  harmonize  with  the  tradi- 
tional policy  of  the  "open  door"  and  equal  opportunity. 

Dr.  Reinsch  wrote: 

The  visit  of  the  Imperial  Japanese  Mission  to  the  United  States 
afforded  an  opportunity  for  free  and  friendly  discussion  of  the 


128  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

United  States  and  Japan  in  the  Orient  by  openly  proclaiming 
that  the  policy  of  Japan  as  regards  China  is  not  one  of  aggression 
and  by  declaring  there  is  no  intention  to  take  advantage  com- 
mercially or  indirectly  of  the  special  relations  to  China  created 
by  geographical  position. 


The  Japanese  preferred  to  explain  for  themselves  what 
was,  and  will  be,  **the  policy  of  Japan,"  and  their  ex- 
planation carried  greater  weight. 

Secretary  Lansing  also  issued  a  statement  in  Washing- 
ton, practically  overlooking  the  words  which  made  the  stir : 

The  statements  in  the  Notes  require  no  explanation.  They 
not  only  contain  a  reafi&rmation  of  the  "  open  door  "  policy,  but 
introduce  a  principle  of  non-interference  with  the  sovereignty  and 
territorial  integrity  of  China,  which,  generally  applied,  is  essential 
to  perpetual  international  peace,  as  clearly  declared  by  President 
Wilson,  and  which  is  the  very  foundation,  also,  of  Pan-American- 
ism, as  interpreted  by  this  Government. 

The  Chinese  Government,  seeing  a  meaning  in  the  words, 
and  the  particular  meaning  attached  thereto  by  the  Jap- 
anese, issued  a  kind  of  protest  to  both  Japan  and  the  United 
States,  and  so  to  all  the  world: 

The  principle  adopted  by  the  Chinese  Government  toward  the 
friendly  nations  has  always  been  one  of  justice  and  equality,  and 
consequently  the  rights  enjoyed  by  the  friendly  nations  derived 
from  the  treaties  have  been  consistently  respected,  and  so  even 
with  the  special  relations  between  countries  created  by  the  fact  of 
territorial  contiguity  it  is  only  in  so  far  as  they  have  already 
been  provided  for  in  existing  treaties.  Hereafter  the  Chinese 
Government  will  still  adhere  to  the  principles  hitherto  adopted, 
and  hereby  it  is  again  declared  that  the  Chinese  Government  will 
not  allow  herself  to  be  bound  by  any  agreement  entered  into  by 
other  nations. 


A  SERIES  OF  AGGRAVATIONS  129 

Thus,  as  the  United  States  sent  an  identic  Note  in  1915 
to  China  and  to  Japan  about  agreements  those  two  coun- 
tries had  made,  China  in  1917  sends  an  identic  Note  to 
Japan  and  the  United  States  about  an  agreement  which 
they  had  just  made. 

China  had  good  reason  to  complain.  Was  it  a  friendly 
act  for  two  Governments  to  consult  among  themselves  about 
rights  in  China,  without  ever  consulting  China  ?  All  along, 
in  previous  arrangements  with  Great  Britain,  France, 
Russia  and  the  United  States,  Japan  had  pursued  the  same 
policy  of  negotiating  about  China,  with  China  left  out.  As 
Japan  has  prior  position  in  Japan,  so  China,  and  no  outside 
country,  has  prior  position  in  China.  To  infringe  to  the 
least  degree  on  this  simple  rule  is  to  put  an  entering  wedge 
into  China's  national  integrity. 

III.  TJie  reign  of  military  autocracy  with  the  overthrow 
of  the  democratic  system  of  government. 

Probably  no  aspect  of  the  Great  War,  as  affecting  China, 
has  proved  a  greater  misfortune  to  China  and  the  Chinese 
people  than  this  which  concerns  China's  internal  and  po- 
litical condition. 

Autocracy  was  supposed  to  be  an  essential  characteristic 
of  monarchies,  just  as  true  of  Chinese,  Manchu  or  Mongol 
monarchies  as  of  the  monarchies  of  the  Romanoffs,  Haps- 
burgs  and  HohenzoUerns.  But  here  we  find  something 
anomalous :  autocracy  flourishing  in  the  seventh  and  eighth 
years  of  the  Chinese  Republic  and  among  a  people  who  for 
centuries  had  enjoyed  local  self-government  and  believed 
in  the  fundamental  ideas  of  liberal  institutions. 

As  for  militarism  it  had  never  been  the  political  creed 
of  the  old  dynasties  where  the  literati  ruled  as  it  was  in 
days  of  the  Republic,  where  Military  Governors  assumed 
to  dictate  national  and  international  policies  as  well  as 
those  of  their  own  provinces. 


130  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

This  ascendancy  of  autocracy  and  militarism  began, 
strange  to  say,  when  the  scholarly  representative  of  the 
American  Republic  first  broached  a  topic  for  discussion 
and  then  strenuously  agitated  for  a  definite  and  prompt 
line  of  action — that  of  breaking  relations  between  China 
and  Germany.  From  February,  1917,  to  the  time  of  arm- 
istice, in  November,  1918,  and  even  since,  the  military 
faction  of  autocratic  mould  under  the  leadership  of  General 
Tuan  Chi-jui,  Premier  and  Minister  of  War,  dominated 
China's  political  affairs,  both  in  the  preliminaries  of  the 
declaration  of  war  and  in  the  character  and  degree  of 
subsequent  participation. 

Nations  which  stood  for  free  democracy  in  the  Western 
■world — France,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States — 
gave  in  the  Orient  their  sympathetic  countenance  to  the 
plans  and  deeds  of  men  who  stood  for  despotic  rule  and 
the  military  system.  That  which  united  these  divergent 
elements  was  the  common  readiness  to  wage  war  on  a  com- 
mon enemy,  when  for  safety's  sake  a  dividing  line  should 
have  separated  that  which  was  democratic  from  that  which' 
was  autocratic.  The  union  which  existed  might  bring 
victory  on  the  field  of  battle,  but  never  a  victory  for  de- 
mocracy; it  could  effect  the  conquest  of  a  nation  but  not 
the  defeat  of  a  wrong  principle. 

It  is  here  that  the  Great  War  made  China  suffer.  The 
Republic  under  President  Li  Yuan-hung  had  had  a  chance 
to  prove  its  worth,  but  the  injection  of  the  poison  of  war 
and  the  passion  of  hate  brought  on  dissension  and  turmoil, 
turbulence  and  bloodshed,  resulting  in  a  complete  collapse 
of  a  diseased  body  politic. 

Dr.  Arthur  J.  Brown  ^  says : 

China  has  a  weary  road  to  travel  before  the  discordant  ele- 
ments of  her  vast  population  settle  themselves  into  a  compact 

* "  The  Mastery  of  the  Far  East,"  p.  294. 


A  SERIES  OF  AGGRAVATIONS  131 

and  well-governed  republic  j  but  the  monarchy  has  gone  beyond 
possibility  of  recovery. 

True,  the  monarcliy  has  gone,  but  not  autocracy.  Give 
men  power  anywhere,  and  they  will  love  to  keep  it  for 
themselves,  and  this  is  autocracy. 

Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang^  in  an  address,  July,  1917,  after  he 
had  retired  from  Peking,  used  these  words: 

We  are  engaged  in  a  struggle  between  democracy  and  mili- 
tarism. Between  fifty-five  and  sixty  per  cent,  of  the  taxes  of 
China  ax'e  now  going  to  support  militarism  in  China.  This  must 
be  changed,  but  the  change  must  be  gradual.  I  ask  Americans 
to  be  patient  and  give  China  a  chance.    Democracy  will  triumph. 

IV.    The  renewal  of  revolution  and  internecine  strife. 

When  the  first  revolution  arose  in  1911,  I  was  conserva- 
tive enough  to  favour  the  peaceful  but  advancing  movement 
of  the  liberal,  constitutional  government  of  the  Manchu 
House,  and  was  wont  to  say:  "The  fever  of  revolution  is 
hard  to  check.  When  about  to  cease,  there  comes  a  relapse. 
One  revolution  will  lead  to  a  second,  and  this  to  a  third, 
and  no  telling  when  it  will  stop  among  a  populous  nation 
like  China." 

The  revolution  which  began  in  July,  1917,  was  the  fourth 
revolution.  By  introducing  the  war  question — ^war  the 
other  side  of  the  globe — there  came  a  clash  between  the 
liberal  and  military  elements  with  the  ascendancy  of  the 
military,  the  dissolution  of  Parliament,  and  the  revolt  and 
protest  of  the  constitutional  element,  with  headquarters  in 
Canton.  These  constitutionalists  are  commonly  spoken  of 
as  revolutionists,  but  the  real  revolutionists  were  the  Mili- 
tary Governors  who  declared  independence  from  the  author- 
ized government  in  May  and  June,  1917,  and  shattered 
the  fabric  of  the  Republic. 

*  China  Press,  July  14,  1917. 


132  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

The  overthrow  of  the  Tuan  Chi-jui  military  faction  in 
the  autumn  of  1920  seemed  to  many  to  be  a  sign  of  hope, 
but  it  meant  the  establishment  in  power  of  another  military 
faction,  not  the  strengthening  of  democratic  ideas.  Up  to 
1921  the  Republic  has  not  yet  been  restored  as  a  real  en- 
tity and  a  living  factor. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  cause  of  all  strife  in  early  1917 
was  neither  the  wrangling  over  war  or  the  dissolution  of 
Parliament,  but  the  germ  of  revolutionary  fever.  The 
germ,  however,  was  dormant,  and  in  a  healthy  constitution 
would  soon  have  been  destroyed.  When  the  more  lively 
germ  of  a  great  war-fever  was  taken  into  the  system,  it  at 
once  set  into  action  the  old  revolutionary  germ,  and  no 
Western  physician  has  been  able  to  effect  a  cure. 

As  an  outsider,  I  would  say  to  the  Chinese  in  the  words 
of  Hiawatha, 

"  I  am  weary  of  your  quarrels, 
Weary  of  your  wars  and  bloodshed, 
Weary  of  your  prayers  for  vengeance, 
Of  your  wranglings  and  dissensions: 
All  your  strength  is  in  your  union. 
All  your  danger  is  in  discord; 
Therefore  be  at  peace  henceforward, 
And  as  brothers  live  together." 

V.  Increased  scope  for  bringing  China  in  thraldom  to 
Japan. 

Japan  through  the  fortunes  of  war  had  from  August, 
1914,  to  August,  1917,  many  chances  to  strengthen  her 
position  in  China.  When  China  declared  war,  August  14, 
1917,  very  largely  at  Japan's  behests,  new  opportunities 
appeared  to  Japan  to  augment  her  growing  advantages. 
She  was  aided  by  the  good  luck  of  having  the  pro-Japan 
faction  in  power  in  Peking.  The  President,  Feng  Kuo- 
chang,  was  an  opportunist  and  was  easily  managed.    The 


A  SERIES  OF  AGGRAVATIONS  133 

Premier,  head  of  the  militarists,  had  already  taken  his 
orders  from  Japan,  though  presented  in  the  form  of 
friendly  advice. 

Even  before  China  declared  war,  there  was  pretty  good 
evidence  that  the  two  Governments  were  negotiating  a  se- 
cret Convention  on  military  affairs  and  the  sale  of  arms  to 
China  by  means,  strange  to  say,  of  a  loan  to  China.  This 
Military  Convention  got  wrought  into  shape  early  in  1918, 
when  Japan  was  called  upon  by  the  Allies  to  make  an  ex- 
pedition into  Siberia.  Japan  made  use  of  this  necessity  to 
urge  upon  China  co-operation  in  the  military  advance 
under  the  military  leadership  of  Japan,  When  pressure 
was  brought  to  bear  by  true  patriots  of  China  to  make 
public  the  secret  arrangements,  this  innocuous  portion 
bearing  on  joint  action  to  be  taken  in  Siberia  was  duly 
published.    Other  arrangements  were  still  kept  secret. 

"Two  agreements  were  concluded,"  as  the  Chinese  Min- 
ister wrote  in  a  dispatch  to  Viscount  Motono,  * '  one  relating 
to  the  army  being  signed,  May  16,  and  the  other  relating 
to  the  navy,  May  19."  He  continues  in  the  exchange  of 
Notes : 

These  Agreements  only  embody  concrete  arrangements  as  to 
manner  and  conditions  under  which  the  armies  and  navies  of  the 
two  countries  are  to  co-operate  in  common  defence  against  the 
enemy,  on  the  basis  of  the  above  mentioned  Notes  exchanged  on 
March  25.  The  details  of  the  arrangements  constituting  as  they 
do  a  military  secret,  cannot  be  made  public,  but  they  contain  no 
provision  other  than  those  pertaining  to  the  object  already  defined.^ 

The  Peking  Government,  namely,  that  of  Tuan,  which 
was  recognized  by  the  Allied  Powers  for  the  declaration 
of  war,  was  also  ready  to  hold  confidential  conferences  with 
various  Japanese  that  money  and  arms  might  be  secured 

*  The  Agreement,  so  far  as  the  military  part  is  concerned,  was 
rescinded  in  the  early  part  of  1921. 


134  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE! 

for  carrying  on  war  with  the  Southern  Chinese.  A 
new  department  called  War  Participation  Bureau  was 
formed,  of  which  General  Tuan  Chi-jui  was  head,  even 
when  he  was  no  longer  Premier.  This  Bureau  took  matters 
out  of  the  hands  of  the  Foreign  Office,  of  which  Lou  Tseng- 
tsiang  was  Minister,  being  afterwards  the  chief  delegate  at 
the  Paris  Conference.    A  writer  in  Asia  ^  says : 

...  Of  between  $200,000,000  and  $225,000,000  loaned,  much 
has  gone  into  the  hands  of  corrupt  officials  and  the  Military 
Governors  and  by  them  wasted  instead  of  being  used  for  the 
demobilization  of  the  troops  and  for  the  constructive  purposes 
declared. 

With  civil  war  on  hand,  the  Peking  Government  was 
helpless  in  securing  revenue  from  the  provinces  sufficient 
for  its  own  needs  and  also  for  the  requirements  of  the 
loyal  Military  Governors.  European  countries  and  the 
United  States,  even  if  so  disposed,  were  too  absorbed  in  the 
war  in  Europe  to  give  attention  or  help  to  China.  Japan 
remained  sole  benefactor.  Moreover,  the  Japanese  are 
intensely  patriotic,  placing  Japanese  interests  and  the 
honour  of  their  country  first.  Money  to  supply  China's 
needs  was  loaned  again  and  again,  on  most  liberal  terms 
as  to  control  of  expenditure,  thus  placing  China  in  bondage, 
financially,  to  Japan.  Loans  were  made  not  only  to  the 
Central  Government,  but  to  the  provincial  authorities,  con- 
trary to  law,  and  even  to  the  opposing  Government  in  the 
south.  By  further  loans  to  the  Bank  of  Communications 
and  the  Bank  of  China,  these  two  financial  institutions  of 
the  Government  came  under  the  control  of  Japanese  banks. 

The  other  important  circumstance  in  Japan's  path  of 
opportunity  was  the  facility  granted  through  loan-bargain- 
ing for  receiving  concessions  of  various  kinds  as  security 

»"A8iaticus"  in  Asia,  March,  1919,  p.  216. 


A  SERIES  OF  AGGRAVATIONS  135 

for  monies  lent  and  as  quid  pro  quo  for  deeds  of  generous 
helpfulness.  As  the  article  in  Asia  cites  for  a  sample, 
"for  a  paltry  $15,000,000  loan  China  has  signed  away  a 
lien  in  all  her  forests  in  the  two  northern  provinces  of 
Heilungkiang  and  Kirin,  equal  in  area  to  the  combined 
area  of  all  the  states  of  the  United  States  touching  the 
Atlantic  seaboard  from  Maine  to,  but  not  including, 
Florida." 
Millard's  Review  for  July  27,  1918,  says: 

To  pay  for  these  loans  China  has  mortgaged  railway  lines, 
gold,  coal,  antimony  and  iron  mines.  She  has  mortgaged  the 
Government  printing  office  at  Peking,  the  Hankow  electric  light 
and  water  works  and  native  forests  in  various  parts  of  the  coun- 
try. There  is  a  chance  in  each  of  these  loan  agreements  to  the 
effect  that  the  Chinese  authorities  shall  not  obtain  additional 
funds  upon  these  securities  unless  the  consent  of  the  Japanese 
bankers  first  has  been  obtained. 

The  year  1898  has  been  called  the  year  of  the  war  of 
concessions,  wherein  Great  Britain,  France,  Germany  and 
the  United  States  were  competitors.  Twenty  years  later, 
1918,  saw  another  war  of  concessions,  but  exclusively  for 
Japan's  benefit. 

It  has  been  estimated  that  Chinese  and  Japanese  agents 
in  1918  made  upwards  of  40  contracts,  and  their  Govern- 
ments a  dozen  Agreements  or  exchanges  of  Notes. 

With  all  this  growth  of  peaceful  expansion,  even  after 
the  signing  of  the  Versailles  Treaty,  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment has  maintained  a  rigid  attitude  as  to  the  conduct  of 
Chinese  officials,  especially  in  Peking,  Manchuria,  Shantung 
and  Fukien  as  to  whether  their  conduct  be  friendly  and 
obliging  or  antagonizing  and  annoying.  Not  only  under  the 
Terauchi  rule  but  under  that  of  Hara,  who  is  supposed 
to  stand  for  democratic  ideas,  has  Japan's  influence  in 
China  been  both  commercial  and  political. 


136  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

The  Associated  Press  telegraphed  from  Peking,  March 
27,  1919,  the  followmg: 

The  Japanese  Minister  here  has  warned  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment that  if  the  premature  disclosures  of  secret  documents  by 
China  causes  loss  to  Japanese  financial  and  conamercial  interests, 
Japan  will  hold  China  responsible  for  such  loss. 

Baron  Goto  afterwards  explained  that  as  with  all  con- 
fidential negotiations  or  agreements,  the  parties  concerned 
must  in  all  honour  consult  each  other  as  to  the  time  and 
mode  of  publications. 

In  fairness  to  Japan  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  in 
1918  as  in  1915  Japan  safeguarded  her  predominant  po- 
sition by  definite  Agreements  with  the  recognized  Peking 
Government.  If  fault  there  be,  it  must  rest  with  the  agents 
of  the  Peking  Government,  men  who  urged  on  war  with 
Germany  and  were  then  congratulated  for  their  noble  deed. 

"VT.  Dictation  hy  the  Governments  with  which  China  had 
associated  herself  in  war. 

I  have  already  referred  to  the  warning  I  gave  President 
Feng  Kuo-chang,  on  the  eve  of  China's  declaration  of  war, 
as  to  the  impossibility  of  China  acting  alone.  China's  dif- 
ficulty in  this  regard  became  more  apparent  as  the  months 
passed  by.  I  have  just  outlined  Japan's  engrossing  grip 
on  China's  finances  and  political  policies  and  war  measures. 
But  all  the  eight  Legations  forming  the  one  group  were 
equally  persistent  in  asserting  their  superior  position  and 
the  negligence,  remissness  or  incapacity  of  the  Peking  Gov- 
ernment. Sometimes  they  acted  as  a  body,  sometimes 
singly.  The  British  Minister,  Sir  John  Jordan,  versed  in 
Chinese  affairs,  was  doyen  of  the  diplomatic  body  as  well 
as  chief  among  the  eight.  Of  course,  they  issued  no  orders ; 
they  generally  gave  advice,  or  insinuated  some  misfortune 


A  SERIES  OF  AGGRAVATIONS  137 

if  China  continued  to  act  foolishly.  Frequently  China  was 
presented  with  an  cuids  memmre.  Not  a  week  passed,  it 
may  be  safely  said,  that  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  did  not 
receive  some  reminder  that  the  Associated  Nations  expected 
to  have  their  wishes  followed.  The  nearer  the  end  of  war, 
the  greater  this  outside  pressure.  Even  after  the  armistice, 
China  was  being  admonished.  Notice  the  joint  Allied  Note 
of  October  29,  1918 :  ^ 

1.  At  the  commencement  of  China's  declaration  of  war  against 
the  Central  Powers,  the  Allied  Governments  agreed  to  the  post- 
ponement of  the  payment  of  the  Boxer  indemnity  and  other 
privileges  in  the  hope  that  the  Chinese  Government  would  use  the 
proceeds  for  the  betterment  of  China's  industry  and  economical 
conditions  to  the  mutual  advantage  of  both  China  and  the  Allied 
Powers;  but,  to  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  Allies,  it  is  reported 
that  the  proceeds  have  been  squandered  by  certain  high  Govern- 
ment authorities  for  party  strifes. 

2.  Although  the  War  Participation  Bureau  has  been  estab- 
lished for  some  time  in  Peking,  nevertheless  it  has  done  nothing 
to  assist  the  Allies,  and  it  is  rumoured  that  part  of  the  troops 
who  were  originally  trained  for  services  in  Europe  have  been 
misused  for  civil  war  in  certain  provinces  of  China. 

3.  Without  previous  consultation  or  knowledge  of  the  Allied 
Powers,  the  Chinese  Government  suddenly  appointed  Tai  Chen- 
lin  as  China's  representative  to  the  Vatican. 

4.  The  ineffective  manner  in  which  the  Chinese  Government 
have  acted  towards  the  liquidation  of  enemy  properties  in  China 
is  unsatisfactory  to  the  Allies,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Deutsche- 
Asiatische  Bank,  etc. 

5.  The  movements  of  enemy  subjects  in  China  are  not  effec- 
tively scrutinized  by  the  Chinese  Government  authorities,  so  that 
dangerous  Germans,  such  as  Hanneken  and  others,  are  not  in- 
terned up  to  the  present  time.  It  is  said  that  the  recent  dispute 
between  the  American  Mongolian  Trading  Company  and  General 
Tien  Chung-yu  of  Chabar  was  also  mentioned  in  this  category. 

*  From  Asiatic  News  Agency. 


138  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

6.  The  prohibition  of  Chinese  subjects  to  trade  with  the  ene- 
mies as  promulgated  by  the  last  Cabinet  was  not  carried  out  by 
China. 

7.  It  was  known  to  everybody  that  the  Hotel  du  Nord  was 
enemy  property  and  it  was  used  as  headquarters  of  enemy  sub- 
jects in  North  China  for  their  unlawful  conferences  and  activities 
against  the  Allied  cause;  that  the  Chinese  Government  did  not 
do  anything  to  close  it  until  the  matter  had  been  many  times 
brought  to  the  notice  of  China  by  the  Allied  Legations  in  Peking. 
This  is  a  strong  witness  that  China  does  not  intend  to  help  the 
Allies  to  cheek  German  activities. 

8.  In  spite  of  the  protest  of  the  Allied  Legations,  the  Chinese 
Government  has  done  nothing  to  punish  the  Taoyin  or  Neiho,  of 
Heilungkiang,  on  account  of  his  pro-Bolshevik  German  actions. 

9.  The  lack  of  sincerity  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment authorities  in  conducting  cases  concerning  Allied  subjects 
and  enemies  and  the  arrested  enemy  subjects  was  quoted  as  an 
example,  because  China  refuses  to  permit  Allied  consuls  to  act 
as  witnesses  in  the  court. 

10.  The  enemy  internment  camps  are  not  properly  conducted, 
and  in  consequence  many  dangerous  Germans  are  not  interned  at 
all.  The  action  of  the  Chinese  authorities  in  certain  eases  is  quite 
unsatisfactory  to  the  Allies. 

11.  Chinese  bandits  have  been  permitted  to  overrun  the  dis- 
tricts along  the  Tientsin-Pukow  and  Lunghai  railways,  so  that 
Allied  interests  are  suffering  greatly  on  account  of  these  bandit 
activities. 

12  There  is  still  ample  time  for  China  to  do  something  to 
satisfy  the  Allied  Powers;  as  one  of  the  members,  the  Chinese 
Government  will  pay  attention  to  the  twelve  points  enumerated 
by  the  Allied  representatives  so  as  to  gain  for  China  equal  rights 
of  speech  in  the  future  peace  conference  in  Europe. 

Let  me  briefly  review  these  twelve  points. 

The  first  admonition  is  sound,  except  that  men  who  had 
been  praised  and  congratulated,  Au^st,  1917,  should  not 
be  thus  reproved,  October,  1918. 


A  SERIES  OF  AGGRAVATIONS  139 

The  second  is  a  slur  on  China's  aid  rendered  to  Russian 
Siberia  and  on  the  Manchurian  border.  Moreover,  the 
eight  Allies  had  never  represented  that  China  was  expected 
to  aid  in  a  military  way. 

The  third  rebuke  is  a  case  of  outside  interference  in 
China's  affairs.  It  was  a  wedge  thrust  into  the  indepen- 
dence and  national  integrity  of  China,  which  the  Lansing- 
Ishii  agreement  and  other  conventions  had  guaranteed  to 
respect.  For  over  twenty  years  the  priests  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  Missions  other  than  French  had  been  withdrawn 
from  the  French  protectorate.  In  this  war  the  French  saw 
an  opportunity  to  bring  back  the  German  missions  under 
French  control.  This  plan  disagreed  with  the  desire  of  the 
Chinese,  who  favoured  a  complete  separation  of  political  and 
ecclesiastical  affairs,  and  direct  dealing  with  the  authorities 
of  the  Church.  The  incidents  of  war  seemed  to  have 
blinded  the  eyes  of  British  and  American  diplomats  as  to 
what  was  best  for  China. 

The  fourth  specification,  that  of  liquidating  enemy 
property,  deserves  special  consideration.  I  shall  only  re- 
mark here  that  the  Allied  Ministers  regarded  the  destruc- 
tion of  German  business  as  indispensable  to  winning  the 
war,  and  thereby  came  into  conflict  with  the  modern  spirit 
of  the  law  of  nations. 

The  fifth  point  as  to  internment  of  enemy  subjects  de- 
volved upon  the  Chinese  Government  to  act  as  it  saw  fit. 
It  was  no  affair  of  the  Allies  as  to  the  way  the  Chinese 
Government  acted,  any  more  than  the  way  the  Japanese 
Government  acted  on  the  same  matter. 

The  sixth  specification  is  misleading.  Almost  from  the 
beginning  of  the  war  there  had  been  no  trade  between  Ger- 
many and  China.  Since  China  declared  war,  the  only  busi- 
ness dealings  of  Germans  were  of  those  living  in  China, 
acting  as  commission  agents  for  Chinese  and  American 
goods. 


14Q  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

The  seventh  makes  special  reference  to  the  Hotel  du 
Nord,  which  was  kept  by  a  subject  of  Austria-Hungary,  not 
of  Germany.  The  Germans  rented  a  room  for  their  round- 
table,  and  the  Chinese  kept  close  oversight  as  to  whether 
this  club  went  beyond  the  bounds  of  propriety.  The  Ger- 
man Protestant  community  also  held  divine  service  on 
Sunday  in  the  dining-room  of  the  hotel.  What  displeased 
the  Allies  was  the  failure  of  the  Chinese  to  expel  the  Ger- 
mans. In  fact,  the  Chinese  treatment  of  the  Germans  was 
generous,  like  the  policy  of  the  Japanese. 

The  eighth  specification  was  another  case  of  intermed- 
dling. The  Chinese  officer  who  was  complained  of  merely 
gave  protection  to  refugees  from  Russian  Siberia  or  in- 
terned them,  whatever  their  supposed  political  affiliations. 

The  ninth  is  more  intermeddling.  When  German  and 
Austrian  consuls  were  given  their  passports,  German  and 
Austrian  subjects  remaining  in  China  came  under  Chinese 
jurisdiction,  not  under  British  or  French. 

The  tenth  is  a  case  of  useless  worry.  There  was  certainly 
no  more  remissness  than  in  Japan  or  even  in  the  United 
States.  Anyway,  the  kind  of  internment  was  China's  sole 
affair.  So  far  as  I  know,  there  was  more  cause  of  complaint 
on  the  part  of  those  interned.  Those  interned  were  non- 
combatants,  not  prisoners  of  war  as  in  Japan.  The  un- 
healthy condition  of  these  internment-camps  was  brought 
to  the  notice  of  the  American  Red  Cross  Society  for  pos- 
sible relief. 

The  eleventh  point  deserves  no  notice.  In  time  of  war 
and  revolution  is  it  usual  to  have  law  and  order  as  in 
piping  days  of  peace? 

The  twelfth  point  is  a  summary,  but  it  gives  the  gist  of 
the  Allied  motif,  namely,  that  compliance  with  Allied 
wishes  must  be  forthcoming,  if  China  is  to  secure  "equal 
rights  of  speech  in  the  future  peace  conferences  in 
Europe." 


'A  SERIES  OF  AGGRAVATIONS  141 

After  the  armistice,  not  before,  the  Allied  Ministers 
(with  whom  was  associated  the  American  Minister)  insisted 
on  the  issue  of  two  mandates  by  the  new  Chinese  President, 
one  concerning  repatriation  of  enemy  subjects  and  the  other 
concerning  liquidation  of  enemy  property.  Failure  here 
implied  refusal  to  China's  participation  in  the  Peace 
Conference. 

Several  joint  dispatches  or  oral  reminders  were  given 
the  Chinese  Government  as  to  restoration  of  internal  peace. 
As  a  result  the  two  Governments  at  Peking  and  Canton 
appointed  delegates  to  their  own  Peace  Conference  in 
Shanghai,  and  thus  were  allowed  to  send  delegates  to  the 
Peace  Conference  in  Paris. 

What  the  reader  must  bear  in  mind  is  China's  loss  of 
independent  action,  with  the  increased  power  of  outside 
nations  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  China.  In  all  this 
interference,  the  European  Allies  were  as  active  as  was 
Japan,  and  with  them  the  United  States  was  sympathet- 
ically and  officially  associated.  This  was  the  goal  of  China's 
entry  into  the  war,  under  Allied  pressure. 

VII.  Kindred  with  the  previous  calamity  that  has  be- 
fallen China,  is  the  other  possible  calamity  of  being  placed 
under  a  foreign  protectorate.  This  was  the  possibility  dur- 
ing the  Boxer  craze  of  1900;  it  was  held  in  check  by  the 
generous  policy  of  the  American  Government  through 
action  taken  by  Secretary  of  State,  John  Hay.  It  may  be 
said  that  the  United  States  saved  China  twenty  years  ago 
both  from  dismemberment  and  from  a  foreign  protectorate. 

Today  China  faces  the  same  alternative  dangers,  or 
rather  three  alternatives,  dismemberment,  a  foreign  pro- 
tectorate, or  a  Japanese  protectorate.  It  remains  to  be 
seen  whether  China's  salvation  will  again  come  from  the 
United  States,  by  a  wise  and  generous  policy. 

As  opposed  to  the  threatened  domination  by  Japan  of 


142  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Eastern  Asia,  there  stands  a  threefold  combination.  One 
is  euphemistically  called  the  League  of  Nations,  but  which 
actually  consists  of  the  victorious  nations.  A.nother  com- 
bination is  that  of  the  four  financial  as  well  as  military 
Powers,  forming  the  consortium,  the  United  States,  Japan, 
Great  Britain  and  France.  A  third  combination,  as  op- 
posed to  Japan  as  well  as  to  Germany,  is  that  of  Great 
Britain,  France  and  the  United  States.  Either  form  of 
governing  China  would  be  not  only  a  wrong  to  China,  but 
a  reproach  to  the  nations  participating  in  the  war.  Ex- 
Senator  Burton,^  writing  of  a  "joint  protectorate"  or  a 
"protectorate  by  a  single  nation,"  says: 

To  both  these  plans  there  is  the  objection  that  jealousies  and 
conflicting  interests  would  render  agreement  difficult  if  not  im- 
possible. Then  there  is  the  more  substantial  objection  that 
eventually  every  nation  must  work  out  its  own  salvation. 

The  only  true  policy  is  that  of  the  "open  door,"  one  that 
includes  as  before  the  war  "equal  opportunity"  in  all 
parts  of  China  for  all  nations.  To  profess  the  '  *  open  door '  * 
and  to  practise  exclusion  of  some  one  nation  stultifies  all 
right,  generous  and  remedial  policy  in  treatment  of  China. 

Towards  the  end  of  1919  the  British  Chambers  of  Com- 
merce in  China,  which  assembled  in  Shanghai  in  confer- 
ence with  the  British  Minister,  Sir  John  Jordan,  passed 
the  following  resolution: 

That  this  conference  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  time  has  come 
when  the  policy  of  the  open  door  should  be  reaffirmed  as  an 
essential  commercial  principle  and  that  its  reaffirmation  be  ac- 
companied by  an  international  agreement  for  the  abolition  of 
spheres  of  influence. 

This  action  is  most  commendable.  It  is  worthy  of  the 
traditional  spirit  of  the  British  merchant.    But  the  reso- 

*  New  York  Times,  April  4,  1920. 


A  SERIES  OP  AGGRAVATIONS  143 

lution  must  mean  what  it  says.  That  is,  (1)  the  policy  of 
the  open  door  must  be  internationally  observed,  (2)  Ger- 
many, Austria,  Hungary  and  Russia  must  be  again  in- 
eluded,  and  (3)  the  combination  of  all  nations,  with  aboli- 
tion of  spheres  of  influence,  must  not  lead  to  an  interna- 
tional protectorate  or  a  mandate  from  the  "five  great  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers." 

Through  the  war  China  has  grown  weaker  and  the  power 
and  dictation  of  the  victorious  group  of  foreign  nations 
have  grown  stronger.  Hence  the  renewal  of  the  old  cry, 
"A  foreign  protectorate  for  China!" 

VIII.  Another  trouble  to  arise  for  China  comes  from 
the  spread  of  Bolshevism.  The  end  is  not  yet,  it  lies  in  the 
future.  It  looks  now  as  if  an  Asiatic  conflagration  is  to 
take  the  place  of  the  European  conflagration.  Unless  pre- 
ventive measures  are  taken  and  a  just  scheme  of  recon- 
struction is  initiated,  the  danger  of  the  peace  to  Asia  is 
imminent. 

How  Bolshevism  may  become  a  disturbing  factor  is  easily 
explained.  Of  all  the  countries  of  Asia,  China  borders  on 
Russia  to  the  longest  extent.  When  Japan  took  the  lead  in 
repelling  the  Bolshevist  advance  in  Russian  Siberia,  over- 
tures were  made  to  the  Peking  Government  to  join  forces 
under  Japan's  leadership.  This  plan  enabled  China  like 
Japan  to  take  part  in  the  war  near  to  the  home  base.  Thus 
the  military  government  of  Japan  first  joined  with  the 
militarists  of  China,  and  then  they  unitedly  joined  with 
the  dictator  rule  of  Russia. 

At  the  same  time  the  democratic  element  of  China,  which 
was  arrayed  against  the  military  autocracy  of  Peking,  was 
receiving  no  countenance  from  democratic  nations  of  the 
Western  world.  Appeal  for  help  in  democratic  develop- 
ment was  ignored.  The  power  of  militarism  grew  apace. 
Here  and  there  a  few  Chinese,  revolting  against  the  rule 


144  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

of  Peking  oflfieialdom,  ventured  into  Russia  and  became 
mercenary  troops  for  the  Bolshevik  leaders.  Is  it  not  ap- 
parent that  if  the  democratic  element  in  China  finds  no 
succour  or  encouragement  from  Western  democracy,  while 
the  Peking  militarists  are  hand-in-glove  with  the  Japanese 
militarists,  then  approach  will  be  made  to  the  proffered  aid 
of  Bolshevik  Russia  ?  The  mast  discontented  in  China  will 
join  the  most  discontented  in  Russia  and  together  work  for 
the  overturn  of  all  government.  The  extreme  of  conserva- 
tism leads  to  the  extreme  in  liberalism;  autocracy  breeds 
anarchy.  It  is  becoming  clearer  every  day  that  all  the 
peoples  of  Asia  are  agreed  in  casting  off  European  rule. 
John  Spargo^  points  out  the  coming  danger.    He  says: 

Bolshevism  is  peculiarly  adapted  to  the  Orient,  both  as  regards 
its  philosophy  and  its  methods.  Indeed,  the  whole  political  ex- 
perience and  psychology  of  these  Asiatic  peoples  tend  to  make 
them  ready  recipients  of  Bolshevism  as  a  political  system.  It  is 
far  easier  for  them  to  accept  and  believe  in  political  dictatorships 
established  by  eonspiratory  uprisings  than  it  is  for  Occidental 
peoples  who  for  centuries  Jiave  been  subject  to  the  discipline  of 
stable  government  and  of  established  political  and  legal  forms. 
.  .  .  For  desperate  and  unthinking  and  even  fanatical  hordes  to 
follow  daring  political  adventurers  and  give  allegiance  to  them  is 
as  common  today  in  Asia  as  it  was  in  Europe  ten  centuries  ago. 
In  surveying  the  recent  history  of  China,  Persia  and  India,  for 
example,  it  is  remarkable  how  many  close  and  striking  parallels 
to  the  Lenin-Trotzsky  regime  one  finds. 

Dr.  W.  D.  P.  Bliss,  an  expert  on  the  problems  of  Asia 
Minor,  refers  in  an  illuminating  article  ^  to  the  possibility 
of  the  Turkish  Pan-Turanian  movement  being  linked  to  the 
Russian  Bolshevist  movement,  and  still  further  of  the 
"combination  of  Qerman  science  and  militarism  with  Bol- 
shevist communism,  Turkish  nationalism  and  Tartar  fierce- 

»  New  York  Times,  February  29,  1920. 
*  New  York  Times,  March  14,  1920. 


'A  SERIES  OF  AGGRAVATIONS  145 

ness."  He  mentions  a  statement  of  Radek,  Bolshevist  rep- 
resentative at  Berlin,  that  if  they  cannot  be  consulted  on 
measures  for  restoring  peace,  they  will  set  the  Near  East 
and  the  Far  East  on  fire.  "We  will,"  so  Radek  is  reported 
as  saying,  "stir  up  such  trouble  in  Turkey,  Afghanistan, 
Turkestan,  Kurdistan,  Persia  and  India  that  England  will 
not  have  another  moment  of  peace."  Then  Dr.  Bliss  gives 
this  advice: 

The  best  cure  ror  Bolshevism  is  industry.  Give  both  Germany 
and  Russia  a  chance  to  get  busy  and  ere  long  Bolshevism  will 
disappear. 

The  discontent  and  desperation  of  different  peoples  are 
apt  to  ignore  true  logic  in  forming  combinations,  but  unite 
in  spite  of  the  inherent  dissimilarity  of  other  elements  in 
the  problem.  It  is  not  at  all  a  question  of  China  adopting 
a  Soviet  form  of  government,  but  of  her  favouring  the  gen- 
eral spirit  of  revolution. 

What  would  have  kept  her  from  this  new  menace  of 
Bolshevism  was  the  continuance  of  the  Republic 's  evolution 
under  President  Li  Yuan-hung  in  1917,  free  from  all  the 
perils  and  entanglements  of  war.  This  was  the  course  of 
safety,  the  policy  of  moderation.  But  Fates,  that  is,  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Nations,  decided  otherwise.  New  in- 
tricate problems  arise  for  China  to  solve,  if  her  perpetuity 
is  to  be  assured. 

A  fitting  summing-up  may  be  given  in  the  following 
forcible  language  of  President  Wilson  ■  as  addressed  to  a 
group  of  pro-League  Republicans,  October  27,  1920 : 

We  should  not  be  deceived  into  supposing  that  imperialistic 
schemes  ended  with  the  defeat  of  Germany,  or  that  Germany  is 
the  only  nation  that  entertained  such  schemes  or  was  moved  by 
sinister  ambitions  and  long-standing  jealousies  to  attack  the  very 


146  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

structure  of  civilization.  There  are  other  nations  which  are  likely 
to  be  powerfully  moved,  or  are  already  moved  by  commercial 
jealousy,  by  the  desire  to  dominate  and  to  have  their  own  way  in 
politics  and  in  enterprise,  and  it  is  necessary  to  check  them  and 
to  appraise  them  as  it  was  against  Germany,  if  attempt  of  any 
similar  thing  is  made. 


CHAPTER  VII 

COMMERCIAL  RIVALRIES  AS  AFFECTING  CHINA 

One  of  the  misfortunes  which  has  befallen  China  as  a  result 
of  her  participation  in  the  war  is  the  way  the  political  and 
commercial  equilibrium  has  been  upset.  China's  compli- 
cations in  the  sphere  of  commerce  are  inferior  only  to  those 
in  the  sphere  of  international  politics. 

* '  Economic  rivalries  and  hostilities, ' '  as  much  as  * '  special 
alliances,"  as  President  Wilson  has  pointed  out,  have  been 
the  source  of  all  wars;  they  had  to  do  with  China's  part  in 
the  Great  War.  It  was  commercial  jealousy  that  fired  war 
passions  and  emblazoned  war  policies.  President  Wilson 
in  one  of  his  late  addresses  (in  St.  Louis,  September  5, 
1919)  said:  "This  was  a  commercial  and  industrial  war. 
It  was  not  a  political  war. ' '  How  much  more  true  that  part 
of  the  war  which  touched  China. 

When  the  European  War  began  there  were  four  great 
trading  peoples  in  China,  British,  Americans,  Germans  and 
Japanese,  of  whom  the  Germans  were  more  and  more  forg- 
ing to  the  front,  competitors  of  British  and  American  mer- 
chants, though  often  having  a  part  in  British  and  Amer- 
ican trade  and  helping  it  on.  In  the  matter  of  railway  and 
mining  concessions  the  rivals  were  British,  Americans, 
French,  Belgians  and  Germans,  while  in  Manchuria  there 
were  two  other  rivals,  Russians  and  Japanese. 

From  the  outset  of  the  war,  as  conducted  in  the  Far  East, 
the  clash  was  between  British  and  Germans  more  than  be- 
tween any  other  two  peoples.  To  the  eyes  of  the  Britisher 
living  in  the  Far  East  "the  German  menace"  to  be  up- 
rooted by  Japan  was  the  menace  to  British  trade.    If  as  a 

147 


148  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

result  of  war  a  stop  could  be  put  to  German  enterprise,  the 
war  would  not  have  been  fought  in  vain.  War  was  simply 
one  way  to  destroy  German  business.  To  the  Japanese, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  object  in  mind  was  more  political 
than  military  or  commercial. 

In  the  early  months  of  the  war  the  contest  was  not  so 
much  between  belligerents,  like  British  and  Germans,  as 
between  belligerents  on  the  one  side  and  neutrals  on  the 
other.  In  the  former  group  were  British,  French,  Rus- 
sians, Belgians  and  Japanese.  In  the  latter  group  were 
Americans,  Italians,  Hollanders,  Swiss,  Danes,  Norwegians, 
Swedes,  Spaniards,  and  above  all  the  Chinese.  In  large 
treaty-ports  like  Shanghai  the  British  element  predomi- 
nated. British  oflScials  took  it  upon  themselves  to  dictate 
to  everybody.  The  Orders  in  Council  as  to  Trading  with 
the  Enemy  were  made  to  apply  to  neutrals  as  well  as  to 
Britishers.  For  an  American  in  China  in  those  days  to 
trade  with  a  German  in  China  was  to  place  him  on  the 
British  black-list.  Neutral  rights  had  to  give  place  to  ques- 
tions of  expediency  and  livelihood.  Most  Americans,  for 
convenience  in  trade  and  banking,  consented  to  yield  to 
the  superior  force  and  persistent  dictation  of  British  au- 
thorities. Americans  in  China  as  in  the  home  country  were 
neutral,  but  through  force  of  circumstances  became  aligned 
with  the  British  as  the  pressure  increased.  After  the  fall 
of  Tsingtao  there  were  no  more  battles  to  be  fought;  the 
only  object  then  was  to  destroy  German  business,  and  in- 
cidentally to  oppress  every  neutral  who  declined  to  be 
amenable  to  British  behests.  The  ones  most  affected  were 
neutral  Americans  and  neutral  Chinese. 

The  method  of  restrictive  procedure  was  not  difficult. 
If  an  American  firm,  for  instance,  desired  to  sell  Amer- 
ican goods  to  a  German  firm  to  be  in  turn  sold  to  the 
Chinese,  or  to  sell  Chinese  goods  through  a  German  firm 
to  some  company  in  the  United  States,  there  were  two  ways 


CO^IiVIERCIAL  RIVALRIES  149 

to  hamper  the  transaction.  One  was  to  refuse  transporta- 
tion by  British  or  Japanese  ships.  Another  was  for  the 
banks  to  refuse  a  draft.  An  American  bank  would  make 
the  same  kind  of  refusal,  under  warning  that  action  taken 
contrary  to  British  orders  would  mean  closing  up  the 
business  of  the  bank's  branches  under  British  jurisdiction. 
In  a  word,  bankruptcy  stared  a  neutral  firm  in  the  face,  if 
it  proposed  to  trade  with  opposing  belligerents  in  the  same 
manner.  It  was  not  a  question  of  law  and  right,  but  for 
the  neutral  trader  one  of  expediency  and  self-preservation. 
It  was  a  practical  question,  not  one  of  theory,  precedent 
or  morals. 

In  attacking  German  business  all  that  was  necessary  was 
to  attack  some  neutral,  notably  an  American  or  Chinese. 

It  was  one  thing  for  the  British  to  seize  and  sell  out 
German  business  houses  in  British  possessions.  It  was  an- 
other thing  to  bring  this  about  within  the  confines  of  China. 

This  destruction  of  German  business  was  the  controlling 
purpose  in  trying  to  get  China  to  enter  the  war  against 
Germany.  It  was  not  disclosed  till  China,  under  American 
persuasion,  severed  relations  with  Germany,  and  was  not 
consummated  till  China  actually  declared  war,  or,  strange 
to  say,  till  armistice  was  declared.^ 

Definite  action  was  taken  early  in  March,  1917,  by  the 
secret  agreement  of  France  and  Japan.  In  return  for  the 
guarantee  to  Japan  of  all  German  rights  in  Shantung  and 
of  all  German  colonies  north  of  the  equator,  it  was  made 


'  It  may  seem  that  this  judgment  of  the  British  is  wrong,  owing 
to  the  apparent  friendly  attitude  of  the  British  Government  towards 
German  industrial  restoration.  This  new  symptom  of  friendliness,  a 
stroke  of  good  policy,  is  partly  due  to  a  liberal  sentiment  of  the 
average  Briton  and  to  insistent  demands  of  English  labourites,  and 
partly  to  the  fact  of  British  investments  in  big  business  in  Germany 
and  by  the  use  of  the  consequences  of  war  for  the  supremacy  of  the 
Briton  over  the  German  in  matters  of  trade  the  world  over.  So  long 
as  Great  Britain  is  on  top  why  should  a  Briton  be  anything  but 
generous  to  the  defeated  German  foe  ? 


150  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

known  to  Japan,  as  outlined  in  a  previous  chapter,^  that 
the  French  Premier,  M.  Briand,  demanded,  among  other 
things,  first,  the  repatriation  from  China  of  all  German 
subjects,  and  second,  "requisition  of  German  commercial 
houses  established  in  China."  France  thus  became  the 
active  supporter  of  British  designs,  and  through  her  Japan 
became  another  supporter. 

The  Chinese,  accustomed  to  trade  with  Germans  as  with 
the  British,  the  French  and  Japanese,  little  realized  the 
commercial  complication  of  taking  part  in  a  European 
war. 

No  sooner  had  China  severed  relations  with  Germany, 
March  14,  1917,  than  the  French  ordered  closed  the  best 
scientific  school  in  China,  namely,  the  German  Medical  and 
Engineering  School,  situated  in  the  French  Concession  of 
Shanghai.  The  Chinese  immediately  took  steps  to  re-start 
the  school  outside  Shanghai  under  Chinese  jurisdiction. 

British  and  French  plans  could  not  be  carried  out  with 
any  show  of  legality  till  China  should  actually  become  an 
associate  in  war.  It  was  also  necessary  to  have  the  United 
States  an  associate,  ready  to  yield  to  the  British  and  French 
interpretation  of  international  law. 

The  Chinese,  left  to  their  own  sense  of  justice,  and  fol- 
lowing the  precedent  of  their  recent  wars  with  France  and 
with  Japan,  or  of  the  war  between  Russia  and  Japan,  were 
not  disposed  to  follow  the  ancient  and  more  rigid  rule  of 
confiscating  property  of  enemy  subjects.  In  this  attitude 
they  opposed  British  and  French  demands,  and  in  the  early 
stages  of  the  war  found  encouragement  in  the  more  liberal 
policy  of  Japan  and  the  United  States.  When  the  United 
States  altered  her  policy  to  the  harsh  one  of  ancient  days, 
China,  too,  had  to  change. 

In  the  Regulations  issued  by  the  Chinese  Government  in 
August,  1917,  reference  was  made  to  the  transfer  or  sale  of 

*  See  Chapter  V,  last  part. 


COMMERCIAL  RIVALRIES  151 

, property  of  enemy  subjects,  ''whenever  such  transfer  or 
sale  is  rendered  necessary  either  by  special  circumstances 
or  for  the  convenience  of  safe-keeping. "  It  is  then  added : 
"The  sale  of  said  property  must  be  assented  to  hy  the  owner 
of  such  property." 

The  Chinese,  however,  refrained  from  such  action  until 
the  spring  of  1919  (after  the  armistice),  by  which  time,  as 
before  mentioned,  pressure  from  eight  Allied  and  Associ- 
ated Nations  was  too  great  to  be  resisted. 

It  is  recalled  that  on  the  eve  of  armistice  these  eight 
foreign  Ministers,  representing  a  higher  civilization,  had 
admonished  the  Peking  Government  under  twelve  specifi- 
cations. One  was  remissness  in  interning  enemy  subjects, 
and  another,  failure  to  liquidate  enemy  properties.  Intern- 
ment regulations,  in  fact,  were  not  issued  by  the  Chinese 
Government  until  October  5,  1918.  November  9,  the  In- 
spector-General of  Maritime  Customs  and  of  Salt  Gabelle, 
and  the  Director-General  of  the  Post  Office,  two  British  and 
one  a  Frenchman,  decided  that  no  Germans  were  to  be  re- 
admitted to  these  three  services  after  the  war.  About  the 
same  time  French -soldiers  also  gave  a  pitiable  spectacle  to 
the  Chinese  populace  in  dynamiting  the  Von  Keteler  mon- 
ument in  Peking,  and  the  German  bank,  .situated  within 
the  Legation  quarter. 

Towards  the  end  of  January,  1919,  the  new  President  of 
China  issued  two  Mandates,  one  for  repatriation  of  all 
enemy  subjects,  and  the  other  for  sequestration  of  enemy 
property.  For  repatriation  needs  the  British  Government 
agreed  to  provide  the  ships,  but  the  cost  would  be  charged 
against  the  Chinese  Government.  For  meeting  this  ex- 
pense, the  Allied  banks  agreed  to  loan  $500,000,  at  8  per 
cent,  interest !  In  this  way  the  British  could  consummate 
their  designs  with  no  burden  to  themselves.  The  disposal 
of  German  property  at  the  treaty-ports,  while  properly  a 
Chinese  affair,  if  done  at  all,  met  constant  intrusion  from 


152  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

British  and  American  municipal  authorities,  thus  retarding 
the  free  action  of  the  Chinese. 

When  the  question  of  deportation  of  enemy  subjects  came 
up  for  discussion  at  an  earlier  date,  the  editor  of  the  Japan 
Chronicle,  an  Englishman,  wrote: 

It  is  stated  that  negotiations  are  proceeding  between  the 
Chinese  Government  and  those  of  Japan  and  France  for  obtaining 
a  supply  of  vessels  for  the  transportation  of  these  enemy  subjects. 
It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  in  these  days  of  tonnage  scarcity  such 
a  proceeding  can  be  contemplated.  In  any  case,  unless  it  be  for 
the  benefit  of  the  enemy  subjects  themselves — e.g.,  against  a  possi- 
ble uprising — the  whole  proceeding  appears  to  be  as  unnecessary 
as  it  is  likely  to  be  futile  and  expensive. 

(However,  while  peacemakers  were  conferring  in  Paris, 
Germans  and  Austrians,  both  men  and  women  and  children, 
were  being  sent  home  at  China's  expense,  and  all  German 
business  houses  were  being  liquidated  and  sold.  As  an 
English  writer,  July  20,  1919,  in  the  North  China  Herald 
says:  "The  liquidation  of  all  enemy  business  in  the  coun- 
try, and  the  repatriation  of  enemy  subjects,  were  matters 
of  the  most  vital  importance  to  the  Allied  cause  in  China, 
from  the  point  of  post  bellum  considerations."  The  war 
was  thus  a  tool  for  commercial  advantage  in  the  piping  days 
of  peace. 

German  merchants,  German  educationists,  German  mis- 
sionaries, whether  from  North  Germany  or  South  Germany, 
were  made  to  suffer  as  an  outcome  of  China's  entry  into 
war  and  through  the  pressure  of  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Nations.  Whether  just  or  unjust  was  not  much  considered. 
So  long  as  one  was  German,  that  was  enough  to  condemn 
him  even  in  far-away  China.  It  must  be  said  that  not  every 
Britisher  living  in  the  Far  East  approved  these  harsh  and 
drastic  measures. 

If  it  had  not  been  for  American  example,  the  Chinese 


Commercial  rivalries  153 

would  have  refrained  from  anything  more  than  intern- 
ment of  a  few  enemy  subjects.  "What,  then,  is  American 
example?  One  thing  one  day,  and  another  thing  another 
day,  but  in  the  end  conforming  to  the  dominating  mind  of 
Britain  and  France,  our  associates  on  the  field  of  battle, 
in  the  struggle  between  Right  and  Wrong. 

At  the  time  the  United  States  broke  with  Germany,  there 
was  anxiety  as  to  the  probable  effect  on  Germans  living  in 
the  United  States.    John  B.  McMaster  ^  says : 

To  quiet  the  anxiety  felt  by  Gdrman  subjects  residing  in  our 
country  lest  their  bank  deposits  and  other  property  should  be 
seized  by  the  Government  in  the  event  of  war,  the  President  in- 
structed the  Secretary  of  State  to  say  that  such  fears  were  un- 
founded. Under  no  circumstances  would  the  Government  take 
advantage  of  a  state  of  war  to  seize  property  to  which  interna- 
tional law  and  the  law  of  the  land  gave  it  no  just  claim  or  title. 
All  rights  of  property  both  of  American  citizens  and  of  subjects 
of  foreign  states  would  be  respected. 

That  the  American  Government  would  abide  by  this  an- 
nouncement of  the  President  was  all  the  more  to  be  ex- 
pected from  the  remarkable  Agreement  of  Prussia  and  the 
United  States  made  in  1785  and  reaffirmed  in  the  Treaty 
of  1828.  This  Treaty,  which  has  never  been  abrogated, 
provided  that  Germans  in  the  United  States,  in  ease  of  war 
between  the  two  countries,  should  be  given  nine  months  to 
wind  up  their  business  affairs,  to  dispose  of  their  property, 
and  to  return  to  Germany  "without  molestation  or  hin- 
drance. "^ 

In  due  time,  at  request  of  the  Executive  Department,  a 
legislative  act  was  passed  giving  power  to  a  Custodian  of 
Alien  Property,  A.  Mitchell  Palmer,  to  take  over  the  prop- 

^  "  The  United  States  in  the  World  War,"  p.  329. 

'  The  Treaty  of  1785  was  negotiated  by  Benjamin  Franklin, 
Thomas  JeflFerson  and  John  Adams,  and  that  of  1828  by  Henry  Clay- 
all  great  and  true  Americans. 


154  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

erty  of  German  aliens  living  in  the- United  States.  Thus 
from  an  American  point  of  view  the  seizure  of  enemy 
property  became  a  legal  act. 

In  the  spring  of  1918  the  same  rule  was  applied  to  Ger- 
mans doing  business  in  the  Philippine  Islands.  A  large 
number  of  Germans  were  deported  to  the  United  States, 
and  here  interned.  All  German  business  was  liquidated  and 
sold  to  Americans  or  Filipinos,  the  money  being  held  by 
the  Custodian. 

When  the  American  Government  acted  in  the  Philip- 
pines in  the  same  way  as  the  British  Government  acted  in 
Hongkong,  it  became  well-nigh  impossible  for  the  Chinese 
Government,  taking  the  example  of  the  United  States,  to 
deal  differently  in  treatment  of  Germans  living  in  China. 
China  had  to  do  as  others  did.  She  had  entered  the  war 
and  must  bear  some  of  the  war's  burdens. 

The  question  is:  Did  this  harsh  method  conform  to  the 
best  spirit  of  international  law,  and  was  it  a  good  rule 
to  teach  an  Oriental  people  ? 

Chief  Justice  Marshall  once  said:  "When  war  breaks 
out,  the  question  what  shall  be  done  with  enemy  property 
in  our  country  is  a  situation  rather  of  policy  than  of  law." 

The  policy,  and  the  law,  too,  of  America's  Custodian  of 
Alien  Property  is  seen  in  the  following  language  delivered 
in  Philadelphia,  November  7,  1918: 

Germany  must  be  made  to  understand  that  her  plan  has  failed 
in  the  industrial  field  as  in  the  military.  Industrial  disarmament 
must  come  along  with  military  disarmament.  Autocracy  in  in- 
dustry must  fall  with  the  fall  of  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty.  The 
same  peace  which  frees  the  world  from  the  menace  of  the  auto- 
cratic militarism  of  the  German  Empire  should  free  it  from  the 
menace  of  its  autocratic  industrialism  as  well. 

American  ideas  have  travelled  far  since  the  early  days 
of  the  war,  when  the  United  States  stood  as  champion  of 


COMMERCIAL  RIVALRIES  155 

neutral  rights,  and  as  the  coming  pacificator  in  a  world  of 
passion. 
Oppenheim,  the  English  authority,  says: 

Under  a  former  rule  of  international  law  belligerents  could  ap- 
propriate all  public  and  private  enemy  property  they  found  on 
enemy  territory.    This  rule  is  now  obsolete.^ 

Ho  adds: 

Private  personal  property  which  does  not  consist  of  war  ma- 
terial and  means  of  transport  serviceable  to  military  operations 
can  regularly  not  be  seized. 

Hall,  of  Oxford  University,  is  even  more  explicit.  He 
says  of  sequestration  of  private  property  of  enemy  subjects 
that  it  "would  be  looked  upon  with  extreme  disfavour."  He 
continues:  "It  is  evident  that  although  it  is  within  the 
bare  rights  of  a  belligerent  to  appropriate  the  property  of 
his  enemies  existing  within  his  jurisdiction,  it  can  very 
rarely  be  wise  to  do  so."    Once  again: 

The  absence  of  any  instance  of  confiscation  in  the  more  recent 
European  wars,  no  less  than  the  common  interests  of  all  nations 
and  present  feelings,  warrant  a  confident  hope  that  the  dying  right 
will  never  again  be  put  in  force,  and  that  it  will  soon  be  wholly 
extinguished  by  disuse.^ 

The  text-book  in  American  schools  of  Wilson  and  Tucker 
says: 

The  most  recent  practice  has  been  to  exempt  personal  property 
of  the  subject  of  one  belligerent  state  from  all  molestation,  even 
though  it  was  within  the  territory  of  the  other  at  the  outbreak  of 
war.^ 


a  (( 


International  Law,"  Vol.  II,  pp.  127,  144. 
International  Law,"  pp.  368,  373. 
•  "  International  Law,"  p.  249, 


156  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

The  modern  spirit  of  liberality  was  embodied  in  the 
Hague  Convention  of  1907,  Article  46:  *' Private  property 
cannot  he  confiscated." 

From  an  American  point  of  view  it  is  interesting  to  go 
back  in  memory  to  over  a  hundred  years  ago,  to  the  Jay 
Treaty  of  the  United  States  made  with  the  British  Gov- 
ernment. Article  X  stipulates  that  in  the  event  of  future 
wars  between  the  United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom 
private  property  shall  be  inviolable.  Alexander  Hamilton 
in  a  memorandum  to  President  Washington  wrote  thus  on 
Article  X : 

In  my  opinion  this  article  is  nothing  more  than  an  affirmation 
of  the  modern  law  and  usage  of  civilized  nations,  and  is  valuable 
as  a  check  upon  a  measure  which,  if  it  could  ever  take  place, 
would  disgrace  the  government  of  the  country,  and  injure  its  true 
interests. 

What  is  most  remarkable  is  that  men  whose  countries 
had  been  fighting  for  righteousness  should  embody  in  the 
Versailles  Treaty  the  very  opposite  of  this  recognized  prin- 
ciple of  the  Hague  Convention  and  the  Law  of  Nations. 
Thus  Article  297  (B)  reads: 

Subject  to  any  contrary  stipulations  which  may  be  provided 
for  in  the  present  treaty,  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  reserve 
the  right  to  retain  and  liquidate  all  property  rights  and  interests 
of  German  nationals  and  companies  controlled  by  them,  within 
their  territories,  colonies,  possessions  and  protectorates,  including 
territories  ceded  to  them  by  the  present  treaty. 

This  means  the  possible  liquidation  of  German  property 
in  the  larger  part  of  the  globe.  It  means  at  least  the  pos- 
sibility of  liquidating  German  property  in  China,  The 
ground  for  hope  that  the  Chinese  Government  will  continue 
to  protect  the  property  rights  of  all  nationals  within  the 


COMMERCIAL  RIVALRIES  157 

limits  of  China,  making  no  discrimination  against  those  of 
German  nationality,  is  that  the  Chinese  delegate  has  not 
signed  the  treaty,  and  that  the  President  of  China  has 
already  declared  a  state  of  peace  with  Germany.  Moreover, 
the  act  of  sequestrating  German  private  property,  though 
approved  by  the  Big  Five  Military  Nations,  is  not  agreeable 
to  the  Chinese  for  three  reasons.  One  is  that  many  Chinese 
have  had  satisfactory  business  relations  with  Germans  in 
the  past,  A  second  is  that  such  procedure  does  not  appeal 
to  the  Chinese  sense  of  fairness.  A  third  is  that  the  British 
and  French  at  treaty-ports  insist  on  taking  the  liquidating 
out  of  Chinese  hands  and  on  managing  it  themselves. 

Concerning  this  last  point,  it  is  well  for  citizens  of  ad- 
vanced nations  to  bear  in  mind  that  at  most  of  the  treaty- 
ports,  especially  at  Shanghai,  the  largest  foreign  eomw 
munity  of  all,  the  British  and  French,  and  not  the  Chinese, 
exercise  control  within  extensive  areas,  where  Germans  in 
the  past  have  built  up  business  and  owned  property.  The 
Chinese  attempt  to  sequestrate  German  property  therein 
is  sure  to  meet  with  British  and  French  interference — none 
from  Americans. 

Moreover,  it  has  been  customary  in  past  years  for  Com- 
panies, formed  of  shareholders  other  than  British,  to  be 
incorporated  under  the  Ordinances  of  the  Colony  of  Hong- 
kong, When  war  was  declared,  dividends  due  to  enemy 
shareholders  were  held  back  from  payment  till  the  close 
of  the  war.  By  another  Ordinance  in  1915  a  Custodian  of 
Alien  Property  was  appointed  by  the  Governor  of  Hong- 
kong, but  this  only  affected  property  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  Hongkong.  In  1919,  after  the  armistice,  a  new  Ordi- 
nance was  passed  recognizing  the  Custodian  appointed  by 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  so  by  the 
British  Minister  in  Peking,  as  to  all  China  Companies  with 
British  registration.  ' '  In  the  ease  of  every  China  Company 
the  term  'Custodian'  means  'the  Custodian  of  Enemy 


158  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREEt 

Property  in  China'  " — a  Britisher,  not  a  Chinese.  "SueK 
Custodian  shall  be  deemed  to  have  had  and  shall  have  full 
powers  of  selling,  managing  and  otherwise  dealing  with 
and  transferring  such  shares,  stocks,  annuities  and  other 
obligations  of  such  China  Company."  Every  Company 
must  report  to  this  British  Custodian — in  China — all  enemy 
shares,  and  these  shares  will  be  invested  in  his  name. 

Here,  then,  is  introduced  a  most  bewildering  compli- 
cation for  the  Chinese  Government  in  its  new  experiment 
of  trying  out  the  laws  of  war,  as  inculcated  by  one  side 
in  the  Great  "War.  Incidentally  it  can  now  be  seen  that 
if  the  British  are  to  acquire  German  property  at  the  large 
treaty-ports,  they  cannot  object  to  Japanese  possession  of 
German  rights  in  Shantung. 

That  the  clauses  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  relating  to  seizure 
of  enemy  property  in  private  hands  have  not  been  more 
generally  criticized  by  liberty-loving  Englishmen  and 
Americans  is  probably  due  to  a  fear  of  being  dubbed  pro- 
German.  If,  however,  the  settlement  reached  is  to  be  more 
righteous  than  any  in  past  history,  then  the  leader  of  polit- 
ical thought  and  world-rejuvenation  should  have  the  moral 
courage  to  defend  recognized  principles  of  international 
law  and  the  innate  sense  of  right  and  fair-play,  without 
regard  to  race  or  nationality. 

Furthermore,  according  to  the  Treaty,  Germans  are  to 
be  deprived  of  the  regular  processes  of  law,  or  of  counter- 
claims, or  of  appeal  or  protest ;  they  must  bow  to  the  ruling 
of  arbitrary  Might.  And  this  is  to  be  the  new  teaching 
of  moral  ideas  to  enter  into  the  life  of  the  Orient.  Thus 
Article  298,  under  the  head  of  "Claims,"  reads: 

No  claim  or  action  shall  be  made  or  brought  against  any  Allied 
or  Associated  Power  or  against  any  person  acting  on  behalf  of 
or  under  the  direction  of  any  legal  authority  or  department  of 
the  government  of  such  a  Power  by  Germany  or  by  any  German 


COMMERCIAL  RIVALRIES  159 

national  wherever  resident  in  respect  of  any  act  or  omission  with 
regard  to  his  property,  rights  or  interests  during  the  war  or  in 
preparation  for  war. 

Not  only  is  this  drastic  ruling  applied  to  German  prop- 
erty and  investment  in  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers, 
of  whom  China  is  one,  but  also  to  all  German  ' '  rights  and 
titles  over  her  oversea  possessions,"  which  by  Article  119 
"Germany  renounces  in  favour  of  the  principal  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers."    Thus  Article  120  reads: 

All  movable  and  immovable  property  in  such  territories  be- 
longing to  the  German  Empire  or  to  any  German  State  shall  pass 
to  the  Government  exercising  authority  over  such  territories. 

As  Article  297  stipulates  that  private  property  in  **  terri- 
tory ceded"  may  also  be  liquidated,  the  transaction  of 
world-wide  appropriation  may  be  regarded  as  complete. 

In  the  future,  Germans  are  to  have  a  hard  time  of  it  in 
former  German  possessions.    Article  122  reads: 

The  Government  exercising  authority  over  such  territory  may 
make  such  provisions  as  it  thinks  fit  with  reference  to  the  re- 
patriation from  them  of  German  nationals  and  to  the  conditions 
upon  which  German  subjects  of  European  origin  shall,  or  shall 
not,  be  allowed  to  reside,  hold  property,  trade  or  exercise  a 
profession  therein. 

How  different  the  opportunities  of  all  nationals  of  vic- 
torious Powers,  as  seen  in  Article  277: 

The  nationals  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  shall  enjoy 
in  German  territory  a  constant  protection  for  their  persons  and 
for  their  property,  rights  and  interests,  and  shall  have  free  access 
to  the  courts  of  law. 

Verily  this  is  the  day  of  the  rule  of  Might.  How  strange 
this  guarantee  of  lasting  and  just  peace! 


160  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

When  these  economic  phases  of  the  Treaty  were  tele- 
graphed to  the  New  York  Globe  from  Paris,  June  2,  1919, 
the  correspondent  began : 

For  many  years  the  United  States  has  contended  for  the  in- 
violability of  individual  property  rights  in  war. 

And  then  he  proceeded  to  state  these  remarkable  Articles 
of  the  economic  clauses,  depriving  Germans  of  property 
rights  within  the  sway  of  other  nations. 

The  leader  of  the  Administration  in  the  United  States 
Senate,  Senator  Hitchcock,  discussed,  September  3,  1919, 
the  bearings  of  these  Articles  on  the  United  States,  and  his 
words  make  one  doubt  the  moral  aims  of  the  peace  settle- 
ment.   He  said : 

Again,  take  the  matter  of  German  property  in  the  United 
States — the  matter  of  private  property  owned  by  German  na- 
tionals in  the  United  States  when  the  war  broke  out.  Under  Acts 
of  Congress  that  property  was  seized  and  much  of  it  has  been 
sold  and  liquidated.  In  the  aggregate  its  value  runs  into  hun- 
dreds of  millions  of  dollars — not  less  than  $750,000,000  and  possi- 
bly more  than  $1,000,000,000. 

Under  this  Treaty  all  acts  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  Alien 
Property  Custodian  with  regard  to  that  property  are  validated 
unless  Germany  can  show  actual  fraud. 

Under  this  Treaty  they  are  validated.  Under  this  Treaty  the 
money  derived  from  the  liquidation  of  German  property  can  be 
used  to  pay  for  the  debts  of  Germans  to  Americans  and  the 
balance  is  subject  to  the  absolute  disposition  of  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States.  This  power  can  be  used  to  protect  American 
claims  and  property  in  Germany. 

Suppose  Germany  refuses  to  validate  our  acts  with  regard  to 
this  property.  Suppose  she  points  to  the  Treaties  of  1799  and 
1828,  under  which  we  agreed  that  we  would  respect  the  private 
property  of  German  nationals  in  the  United  States,  under  which 
we  agreed  that  we  would  give  them  nine  months  after  the  out- 


COMMERCIAL  RIVALRIES  161 

break  of  any  war  between  Germany  and  the  United  States,  during 
which  time  they  could  sell  their  property  and  leave  the  United 
States ;  under  which  we  agreed  that  Germans  engaged  in  business, 
agriculture  or  manufacturmg  in  this  country  could  continue 
peacefully  in  carrying  on  their  occupations  under  the  protection 
of  law,  even  though  war  existed  between  the  United  States  and 
Germany.  Can  any  one  doubt  that  we  would  have  a  serious  and 
dangerous  controversy  with  Germany  over  that  question  which 
might  last  for  generations? 

Another  day,  after  a  long  conference  with  President  Wil- 
son, Senator  Hitchcock  issued  a  statement  containing  these 
words : 

Through  the  Treaty,  we  will  yet  get  very  much  of  importance. 
...  In  violation  of  all  international  law  and  treaties  we  have 
made  disposition  of  a  billion  dollars  of  German-owned  property 
here.    The  Treaty  validates  all  that. 

Is  this  the  kind  of  law,  politics  and  morals  that  American 
people  and  English  people  desire  to  see  taught  to  Oriental 
nations,  brought  up  under  other  systems  of  ethics? 

May  I  quote  President  Wilson,  when  he  called  upon  Con- 
gress to  agree  to  a  declaration  of  war: 

We  shall,  I  feel  confident,  conduct  our  operations  as  belligerents 
without  passion,  and  ourselves  observe  with  proud  punctilio  the 
principles  of  right  and  fair-play  we  profess  to  be  fighting  for. 

Defenders  of  the  moral  value  of  these  portions  of  the 
treaty  have  been  known  to  point  to  a  new  mode  of  protect- 
ing the  property  rights  of  German  citizens,  who  have  had 
residence  outside  the  Fatherland.  The  world's  conscience 
is  directed  to  this  sentence  that  closes  Article  297: 

Germany  undertakes  to  compensate  its  nationals  in  respect  of 
the  sale  or  retention  of  their  property,  rights  or  interests  in  Al- 
lied or  Associated  States. 


162  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Naturally  one  may  conclude  that  if  Germans  still  fail 
of  compensation,  the  blame  lies  with  the  German  Gov- 
ernment, and  not  with  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers. 
But  how  is  the  German  Government  to  possess  the  capac- 
ity, or  even  the  opportunity,  of  reimbursing  the  great  losses 
of  Germans  all  over  the  world,  amounting  to  many  hundreds 
of  millions  of  dollars  and  billions  of  marks?  Will  the  Al- 
lied nations  postpone  reparation  charges  till  the  rights  of 
German  citizens  have  been  met?  Is  not  this  hold  of  a  pri- 
vate German  on  his  own  Government  like  a  third  mortgage 
rather  than  a  first  ?  No  German  merchant  whose  property 
has  been  seized  in  Shanghai,  Hongkong,  Calcutta,  Bombay, 
East  Africa  or  Cape  Colony  need  expect  any  restitution  in 
this  roundabout  fashion,  till  the  rival  merchants  of  Eng- 
land and  the  United  States  have  successfully  pre-empted 
the  ground  and  closed  the  door. 

Granted  that  ten  years  hence  the  then  German  Govern- 
ment, out  of  the  taxes  of  the  people,  advance  the  money 
to  the  former  heads  of  business  firms  in  China  for 
rebuilding  their  establishments  and  resupplying  a  mar- 
ketable stock  of  goods,  will  not  these  men  be  greatly 
handicapped  in  the  new  competition  and  find  themselves  at 
an  unjust  disadvantage?  Help  may  come  from  Chinese, 
and  it  probably  will,  but  others  of  Western  nations  will 
be  seen,  as  they  are,  the  opposing  influence  to  German 
enterprise. 

The  wrong  done  will  never  be  realized  till  some  one  of 
the  present  conquering  nations  enters  on  another  war,  is 
then  defeated,  and  learns  anew  that  no  law  exists  for  pro- 
tecting private  property.  It  is  henceforth  an  absurdity  to 
speak  of  "life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness"  as 
"the  inalienable  rights  of  man." 

Another  absurdity  is  that  in  overthrowing  German  mili- 
tarism it  is  equally  legitimate  to  destroy  German  business 
and  uproot  the  ambition  to  be  strong  commercially.    Does 


COMMERCIAL  RIVALRIES  163 

any  one  imagine  that  this  is  the  way  to  guarantee  a  lasting 
peace?    Or  that  this  is  justice? 

Worse  than  all,  the  Treaty  of  Peace  did  not  limit  itself 
to  political  and  commercial  issues.  It  ventured  forth  into 
the  realm  of  ethics  and  religion.  Commercialism  swamped 
the  boat  of  Christian  missions.  At  the  very  end  of  the 
Treaty — a  sort  of  climax — an  Article  is  drawn  concerning 
the  work,  the  interests  and  property  of  German  missions. 
The  property  of  Christian  missions  under  German  man- 
agement "shall  continue  to  be  devoted  to  missionary  pur- 
poses" (Article  438),  but  under  control  of  "boards  of 
trustees  appointed  by  or  approved  by  the  Governments  and 
composed  of  persons  holding  the  Christian  Faith."  Ger- 
many must  agree  to  such  arrangements  as  these  Govern- 
ments will  make.  Germany  as  to  these  missions  "waves  all 
claims  on  their  behalf. ' '  ^ 

Is  this  not  the  limit  of  dictatorial  determination?  Is 
this  not  the  greatest  surprise  of  all,  that  President  Wood- 
row  Wilson  and  Premier  Lloyd  George  should,  in  the  name 
of  Righteousness  and  "impartial  justice,"  countenance  re- 
strictions of  this  nature  to  the  world-wide  commands  of 
the  great  Head  of  the  Church? 

My  own  views  are  best  expressed  by  a  Memorial  to  the 
Peace  Conference  of  the  Society  of  Friends  in  London : 

It  is  understood  that  it  has  been  proposed  to  exclude,  at  any 
rate  temporarily,  all  German  missionaries  and  missionary  societies 
from  British  possessions,  that  China  is  being  urged  to  take  a 
similar  course,  and  that  it  is  likely  that  German  colonies  handed 
over  to  mandatory  Powers  will  be  in  the  same  position.  If  this 
were  carried  out,  it  is  not  impossible  that  some  five-sixths  of  this 
splendid  work  would  be  terminated.  We  desire  to  point  out: 
(1)  That  any  such  policy  or  exclusion  means  that  Christian  enter- 
prise becomes  a  matter  for  exclusive  national  treatment.     This 

*  See  Appendix  III. 


164  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

work  should  be  essentially  both  international  and  supra-national, 
and  to  legislate  for  it  on  a  merely  national  basis  would  be  to 
mistake  its  contribution  to  the  world  order.  (2)  That  the 
churches  of  Germany  will  have  scarcely  any  opportunity  for  out- 
ward expression.  This  will  surely  lead  to  disastrous  results  for 
Germany  and  the  world.  (3)  That  temporary  exclusion  for  more 
than  a  very  short  time  (say,  twelve  months)  would  be  tantamount 
to  permanent  exclusion.  There  has  already  been  a  long  interrup- 
tion, and  it  will  be  difficult  enough  to  resume  the  work  in  any 
case.  (4)  That,  on  the  other  hand,  a  different  policy  would  do 
a  great  deal  to  help  in  the  strengthening  of  the  best  elements  in 
German  national  life,  and  in  enabling  her  to  take  a  right  and 
helpful  place  in  the  society  of  nations. 

In  view  of  these  and  other  weighty  considerations,  we  urge 
that  all  these  matters  be  not  hastily  decided,  but  rather  be 
referred  to  a  special  commission,  which,  besides  Government  of- 
ficials should  include  representative  missionary  leaders  from  the 
different  countries,  whose  duty  it  shall  be  to  discover  means  by 
which  this  valuable  work  may  be  continued,  by  which  German 
missions  and  missionaries  may,  under  suitable  guarantees  and 
safeguards,  be  readmitted  to  the  territories  concerned,  and  to 
emphasize  the  supra-national  character  of  the  Christian  enter- 
prise. .   .   . 

An  admirable  memorandum  on  German  missions,  both 
Protestant  and  Roman  Catholic,  was  presented  in  Novem- 
ber, 1919,  by  Professor  Julius  Richter  of  Berlin  University 
to  Dr.  Arthur  J.  Brown  of  the  American  Presbyterian 
Board  of  Foreign  Missions.*    I  make  a  few  citations : 

About  half  of  the  fields  of  the  German  missions  are  wholly  or 
almost  wholly  deprived  of  the  paternal  care  of  their  fathers  in 
Christ.  ...  A  million  and  a  half  of  native  Christians  under  the 
care  of  German  missions,  Protestant  and  Roman  Catholic,  are  in 
serious  danger  of  disintegration  for  lack  of  the  necessary  super- 
vision and  leadership.  .  .  .  An  enormous  amount  of  spiritual 
capital  seems  to  be  hopelessly  lost.     The  knowledge  of  the  lan- 

*  In  Chrieti<m  Work,  February,  1920. 


COMMERCIAL  RIVALRIES  165 

guage  and  of  the  customs  of  the  peoples,  the  confidence  won  by 
the  patient  work  of  generations  of  missionaries,  scientific  re- 
search, Bible  translations  and  other  literary  work  pursued  with 
usual  German  thoroughness  will  fade  away.  ...  On  the  other 
hand,  the  repatriated  missionaries,  most  of  them,  stand  at  the 
market,  looking  out  eagerly  for  a  corner  in  the  vineyard  of  the 
Lord  where  they  can  pursue  their  noble  work,  and  nobody  calls 
them.  Many  of  them  are  really  in  serious  distress.  And  so  about 
two  thousand  German  missionaries,  Protestant  and  Roman  Catho- 
lic, are  pushed  aside  at  a  time  when  the  non-Christian  world 
seems  to  cry  out  loud  with  one  voice,  "  Come  over  and  help  us," 
and  when  the  missionary  conferences  are  sounding  forth  again 
and  again  the  call  for  more  labourers  in  the  harvest.  .  .  .  Para- 
graph 438  of  the  Peace  Treaty  creates  a  new  international  law, 
and  this  law  seems  to  be  disastrous  for  the  rest  of  the  German 
missions.  If  this  paragraph  should  be  put  into  operation  to  its 
full  extent,  nine-tenths  of  the  German  missions  which  have  been 
saved  through  the  stormy  years  of  war-time  would  be  lost  by  and 
by — the  missions  in  German  Southwest  Africa,  in  German  New 
Guinea,  in  Usambara,  and  on  the  slopes  of  the  Kilimanjaro,  in 
South  Africa,  China  and  Japan;  only  the  rest  which  lie  in 
the  Dutch  Colonial  empire  might  perhaps  be  retained  in  spite  of 
Paragraph  438.  .  .  .  Remember  in  China  now  for  two  years 
and  a  half  the  German  missionaries  know  that  the  Entente  is 
demanding  their  expulsion;  more  than  once  the  situation  seemed 
critical.  At  any  time  missionaries  had  already  been  ordered  to 
the  harbours.  Happily  the  majority  of  them  have  been  able  to 
remain  up  to  the  present  time.  They  do  not  know  how  long. 
This  awful  Paragraph  438  gives  them  no  security.  It  eats  out 
the  life  of  mission  work;  it  puts  the  whole  property  of  German 
missions  at  the  disposal  of  the  colonizing  power,  only  under  the 
condition  that  the  profit  of  it  must  be  spent  for  missionary  and 
educational  purposes.  It  is  the  strongest  contradiction  of  the 
super-nationahty  of  Christian  missions.^ 

As  I  have  stated  concerning  commercial  penalties  in- 
flicted on  Germany,  so  in  regard  to  Christian  missions  and 
*  See  Appendix  IV. 


166  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

mission  property  financed  by  the  gifts  of  German  Chris- 
tians, there  is  more  hope  that  justice  will  be  rendered  by 
the  Chinese  than  by  the  Entente  and  Associated  Powers. 
Through  China's  declination  to  sign  the  Versailles  Treaty, 
due  to  injustice  in  the  Shantung  settlement,  she  may  yet 
become  an  example  to  the  rest  of  the  world  in  just  treat- 
ment of  peoples,  once  enemy,  now  friends,  once  belligerent, 
now  reconciled.  Not  only  does  the  cause  of  justice  receive 
a  blow  from  these  treaty  demands,  but  the  cause  of  Chris- 
tianity will  inevitably  suffer  in  the  estimation  of  all  classes 
of  the  Chinese,  when  comparison  is  made  both  with  the 
teachings  and  the  practice  of  the  old  Faiths  of  China.  It  is 
certain  that  Chinese  officials  and  the  Chinese  people,  even 
those  outside  the  Christian  constituency,  if  free  to  act  with 
no  pressure  from  outside  nations,  will  accord  in  the  future 
as  in  the  past  equal  opportunities  to  the  commerce  and 
missionary  enterprises  of  all  nations,  in  the  spirit  of  fair- 
ness and  hospitality.  That  which  is  beneficial  China  will 
never  reject.  She  opposes  that  which  works  her  harm, 
whether  from  Buddhist  Japan  or  Christian  Europe. 

Would  not  the  cause  of  justice  and  world-wide  law  have 
fared  better,  if  the  negotiators  at  Paris,  in  respect  both  to 
private  property  and  to  Christian  missions,  had  observed 
international  law  as  already  established?  Was  it  wise  to 
ignore  the  Hague  Conventions  in  forming  a  League  of  Na- 
tions? Was  it  fitting  to  overlook  the  fundamentals  of  the 
Christian  Faith? 

Bishop  Gore,  when  speaking  in  this  country  in  1918, 
said: 

The  mere  determination  to  beat  Germany  is  apt  to  absorb  all 
else.  Whereas,  in  fact,  we  might  defeat  Germany  and  at  the  same 
time  absorb  so  much  of  what  is  false  in  the  spirit  of  the  war  as 
to  defeat  our  professed  aims  in  entering  upon  it.  That  is  what 
makes  me  ready  to  do  anything  that  lies  in  my  power  to  keep  the 
right  moral  principles  of  the  war  to  the  fore. 


COMMERCIAL  RIVALRIES  167 

The  late  Governor-General  of  Canada,  the  Earl  of  Grey, 
shortly  before  his  death,  said: 

You  know  the  idea  of  those  words,  "  He  being  dead,  yet  speak- 
eth."  A  voice  from  the  dead  often  gets  a  hearing.  That's  what 
I'm  after.  .  I  want  you  to  make  my  voice  sound  from  the  grave. 
I  want  to  say  to  the  people,  there's  a  real  way  out  of  the  mess 
materialism  has  got  us  into.  I've  been  t»rying  to  tell  them  for 
thirty  years — "It's  Christ's  way."  Mazzini  saw  it.  We've  got 
to  get  together.  We've  got  to  realize  we're  all  members  of  one 
family.  There's  nothing  can  help  humanity,  I'm  perfectly  sure 
there  isn't,  except  Love.  Love's  the  way  out  and  the  way  up. 
That's  my  farewell  to  the  world. 

So  far  as  the  victorious  nations  conform  to  these  noble 
sentiments,  will  they  be  able  to  exert  an  influence  that  will 
work  out  for  China  moral  regeneration  and  national 
salvation. 


CHAPTER  Vni 

THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  AT  THE  PEACE  TABLE 

We  now  reach  the  climax  of  the  War's  great  drama  as 
affecting  China.  If,  indeed,  it  was  a  wise  move  to  induce 
China  to  enter  the  war,  then  the  high  hopes  held  out  to  her 
for  redressing  past  wrongs  should  have  met  at  least  a  fair 
measure  of  fulfilment.  If  the  results  were  bad,  then  the 
initiative  move  of  Americans,  supported  by  seven  Allies, 
was  a  wrong  to  China  additional  to  all  past  wrongs. 

In  brief,  the  war  has  brought  havoc  to  China,  and  gain 
to  Japan.  Germany's  interests  in  China  have  been  injured 
commercially;  China's  interests  have  been  injured  polit- 
ically and  morally.  Japan's  position  in  China  has  been 
strengthened  both  commercially  and  politically,  but  not 
morally.  The  confirmation  of  these  charges  is  to  be  found 
in  the  Versailles  Treaty  of  Peace  and  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  It  is  in  respect  to  China  that  the  Treaty 
and  the  Covenant  show  how  far  short  they  fall  in  meeting 
the  high  ideals  and  professions  of  Americans  and  the 
Allied  peoples — victors  in  the  greatest  war  of  the  ages. 

When  armistice  was  declared,  and  a  Peace  Conference 
was  to  take  place,  the  Japanese  tried  to  persuade  the 
Chinese  Government  to  leave  all  matters  in  the  hands  of 
Japanese  negotiators.  This  proposition  was  not  altogether 
unacceptable,  for  the  Chinese  Government  ever  since  its 
entrance  into  the  war  was  of  the  military  faction  under 
General  Tuan  Chi-jui,  and  had  more  and  more  entered  into 
close  relations  with  Japan,  culminating  in  numerous  Agree- 
ments of  1918.  However,  the  new  President  of  China,  Hsii 
Shih-chang,  backed  by  popular  sentiment,  insisted  on  a  rep- 

168 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  169 

resentation  from  the  Chinese  Government.  At  once  there 
appeared  divergence  of  opinion  between  China  and  Ja- 
pan, until  the  antagonists  seemed  not  so  much  to  be  Ger- 
many on  the  one  side  and  China  and  Japan  on  the  other, 
as  China  arrayed  against  Japan.  There  has  grown  to  be 
more  enmity  between  Chinese  and  Japanese,  kindred  in 
race  and  culture,  than  between  Chinese  and  Germans,  or 
between  Japanese  and  Germans. 

As  soon  as  the  Chinese  delegation  appeared  in  Paris,  the 
demand  came  for  making  public  all  secret  agreements  be- 
tween the  Chinese  and  Japanese  Governments.  This  move, 
which  was  meant  to  strengthen  China's  claims,  was  dis- 
pleasing not  only  to  Japan,  but  to  the  military  pro-Jap- 
anese Peking  Government.  However,  the  Chinese  delegates 
gained  their  wishes  in  part,  but  cordiality  between  the  two 
countries  was  weakened.  At  different  times  during  discus- 
sion of  the  League  or  the  Treaty  the  two  delegations  ap- 
peared as  opponents.  The  final  settlement  of  the  China- 
Japan  question  depended  on  other  than  the  strength  of 
argument;  Japanese  military  power  and  all  possible  com- 
plications arising  therefrom  cast  a  spell  over  the  thoughts 
and  purposes  of  the  Supreme  Council. 

Because  Japan  was  a  strong  military  nation,  she  was 
welcomed  to  the  inner  group,  known  as  the  Council  of  Five, 
and  later  on  was  assured  a  permanent  position  in  the  Coun- 
cil of  the  League.  China,  though  she  represented  a  great 
population  and  an  ancient  civilization,  was  not  thus 
honoured.^ 

Moreover,  Japan  was  allowed  five  delegates,  and  China 
only  two.  The  five  of  Japan  were  Marquis  Saionji,  one 
of  the  Elder  Statesmen,  a  veteran  in  years  and  experience, 
and  in  his  early  days  educated  in  France ;  Baron  Makino, 

^  It  is  pleasing  to  record  that  through  the  capable  statement  of 
Dr.  Wellington  Koo,  the  first  meeting  of  the  League  at  Geneva  elected 
China  as  one  of  the  Council. 


170  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Viscount  Chinda,  Ambassador  Matsui  and  Ambassador 
Ijuin,  all  of  whom  had  received  an  education  or  held  a 
diplomatic  position  in  some  one  of  the  countries  of  Europe. 

Of  the  Chinese  delegation  the  chief  was  Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  for  many  years  Minister 
to  France.  He  spoke  elegant  French,  had  married  a  Bel- 
gian lady  and  had  joined  the  Catholic  Church.  He  rep- 
resented the  Peking  Government,  though  not  the  military 
and  pro-Japan  faction.  He  was  more  in  touch  with  the 
French  aims  than  with  the  American.  The  second  dele- 
gate was  C.  T.  Wang.  He  had  been  educated  at  Michigan 
and  Yale  Universities,  was  active  in  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  and 
connected  with  the  Protestant  body.  He  was  first  the  rep- 
resentative of  the  constitutional  or  revolutionary  govern- 
ment centred  at  Canton,  but  afterwards,  for  his  recognized 
patriotism  and  ability  as  well  as  for  the  impression  to  be 
made  of  national  unity,  he  was  formally  designated  by  the 
President  of  China  as  representative  of  the  Peking  Gov- 
ernment. He  was  an  exponent  of  the  American  idea,  and 
had  taken  an  active  part  in  following  America 's  advice  that 
China  sever  relations  with  Germany  and  be  aligned  with 
the  United  States.  He,  like  his  chief,  was  opposed  to  the 
pro- Japan  clique  and  to  Japan's  ambitious  aggressions. 

With  this  delegation  there  was  associated  a  group  of 
young  men,  who  were  more  in  sympathy  with  the  de- 
mocracy of  the  Southern  Government  than  with  the  mili- 
tarism of  the  recognized  Peking  Government.  They  were 
all  antagonistic  to  Japan.  Of  these  the  leader  was  Minister 
Wellington  Koo,  an  honoured  graduate  of  Columbia  Univer- 
sity. As  Minister  at  Washington,  he  was  given  a  place  on 
the  special  committee  in  Paris  for  drafting  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  of  Nations.  He  and  Dr.  Wang  had  an  elo- 
quent command  of  the  English  language,  which  was  un- 
matched by  the  Japanese  delegation.  As  the  months  passed 
by,  the  impression  made  was  that  the  Chinese  delegation 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  171 

stood  not  only  against  the  Japanese  demands,  but  in  sup- 
port of  President  Wilson's  well-known  principles.  It  was 
thought  that  China  by  aligning  herself  with  the  United 
States  had  a  better  chance  to  frustrate  the  designs  of  Japan 
and  to  win  liberty,  democracy  and  political  independence. 

The  Japanese  achieved  a  victory  over  their  neighbour  and 
ally  by  choosing  the  right  moment  for  calling  for  a  deci- 
sion. It  was  at  the  close  of  the  deliberations.  The  Italian 
delegation  had  already  withdrawn.  Japan's  argument  for 
equality  had  been  cast  aside.  The  hint  was  thrown  out 
that  if  Japan's  claims  as  to  German  rights  in  Shantung 
should  also  be  rejected,  Japan,  like  Italy,  might  also  with- 
draw. The  decision  was  hastily  made  in  Japan's  favour. 
The  ones  who  made  the  decision  were  not  all  the  members 
of  the  Assembly  and  not  even  the  Japanese  delegation,  but 
three  men — the  Big  Three — Woodrow  Wilson,  David  Lloyd 
George  and  M.  Clemenceau.  For  making  a  wrong  decision 
these  three  men,  one  an  American  who  stood  at  the  pinnacle 
of  fame,  and  not  Japan,  must  bear  the  blame.  Moreover, 
Britain,  France  and  Italy,  in  the  secret  compacts  of  early 
1917,  had  guaranteed  to  Japan  all  German  rights  in  Shan- 
tung, and  had  not  disclosed  the  fact  to  President  Wilson 
prior  to  the  Peace  Conference. 

Bearing  closely  on  the  Treaty  I  advance  the  thought 
which  has  revolved  in  my  own  mind,  but  which  I  have  not 
seen  expressed  by  others,  "Is  it  really  right  that  Germany, 
the  new  Germany,  should  be  compelled  by  her  conquerors  to 
'renounce'  all  her  rights  in  Kiaochow  and  Shantung,  and 
to  sign  a  treaty  consenting  to  such  renunciation?"  This 
termination  of  German  rights  is  a  vital  feature  of  these 
Articles  of  peace  settlement.  No  one  of  President  Wilson 's 
Fourteen  Points  bears  directly  on  this  requirement.  But 
the  fifth  point,  concerning  "a  free,  open-minded  and  abso- 
lutely impartial  adjustment  of  all  colonial  claims,"  while 
not  regarded  as  very  imperative  in  the  matter  specified, 


172  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

might  properly  be  applied  to  territory  that  is  only  leased, 
or  to  concessions  that  have  been  legitimately  acquired,  as 
was  true  of  Germany  in  Shantung.  To  this  fifth  point  the 
President  adds  a  principle,  a  most  important  one,  that ' '  the 
interests  of  the  populations  concerned"  must  have  weight. 
And  here  the  Chinese  are  concerned.  On  July  4,  1918, 
President  Wilson  enlarged  on  this  principle  thus : 

The  settlement  of  every  question,  whether  of  territory,  of 
sovereignty,  of  economic  arrangement,  or  of  political  relationship, 
upon  the  basis  of  free  acceptance  of  that  settlement  by  the  ma- 
terial interest  or  advantage  of  any  other  nation  or  people  which 
may  desire  a  different  settlement  for  the  sake  of  its  own  exterior 
influence  or  mastery. 

The  people  and  the  territory  concerned  are  Chinese.  The 
Germans  are  concerned  in  only  a  minor  way.  Kiaochow 
had  never  ceased  to  be  Chinese  territory.  It  was  never  a 
German  colony;  it  was  only  leased  to  Germany  for  a  lim- 
ited period  of  years.  If  self-determination  is  to  mean  any- 
thing, it  means  that  Chinese  territory  is  not  to  be  appro- 
priated by  Japan  without  China's  free  consent,  and,  par- 
ticularly, that  the  Chinese  people  living  in  Kiaochow  ter- 
ritory shall  determine  for  themselves  whether  they  prefer 
to  remain  Chinese,  be  under  German  rule,  or  come  under 
Japanese  rule. 

Considering  only  the  best  interests  of  China,  and  not 
"the  material  interest  or  advantage  of  any  other  nation  or 
people,"  it  would  have  been  better  if  Germany  had  not 
renounced  her  rights  in  Shantung  in  favour  of  Japan.  With 
Germany  in  Shantung,  the  spheres  of  influence  of  rival  na- 
tions were  more  nearly  equalized,  except  that  Germany's 
sphere  was  a  little  less  than  that  of  France,  Great  Britain, 
Russia  and  Japan.  By  a  transfer  under  compulsion  to 
Japan,  Japan  acquired  thereby  a  preponderating  influence 
over  all  the  rival  nations,  while  Germany  was  totally  elim- 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  173 

inated.  Moreover,  by  the  elimination  of  Germany  the 
Chinese  lost  their  most  conciliatory  friend,  even  surpassing 
the  United  States.  This  statement  will  be  startling  to 
many,  but  it  is  true  to  the  facts.  Germany  after  the  Boxer 
upheaval  changed  her  policy  from  the  forceful  kind  of  Ger- 
man officialdom  to  the  co-operative  kind  of  German  com- 
mercialism. Since  1900  the  Chinese  have  had  little  cause 
to  complain  of  German  aggressiveness. 
Alpheus  H.  Snow  says : 

There  appears  to  have  been  no  abuse  by  Germany  of  the  social, 
political  and  economic  privileges  granted  to  her.  That  such  privi- 
leges are  capable  of  gross  abuse  in  the  hands  of  a  Power  dis- 
posed to  use  them  for  political  purposes  goes  without  sajdng.^ 

Prof.  John  Dewey,  after  a  late  tour  through  Shantung 
and  able  to  revise  his  preconception  as  to  the  superiority 
of  Japan  over  Germany  in  their  bearings  on  China,  says :  * 

No  foreigner  can  be  found  who  will  state  that  Germany  used 
her  ownership  of  port  and  railway  to  discriminate  against  other 
nations.  No  Chinese  can  be  found  who  will  claim  that  this  owner- 
ship was  used  to  force  the  Chinese  out  of  business,  or  to  extend 
German  economic  rights  beyond  those  definitely  assigned  her  by 
treaty.  Common  sense  should  also  teach  even  the  highest  paid 
propagandist  in  America  that  there  is,  from  the  standpoint  of 
China,  an  immense  distinction  between  a  national  menace  lo- 
cated halfway  around  the  globe,  and  one  within  two  days'  sail 
over  an  inland  sea  absolutely  controlled  by  a  foreign  navy, 
especially  as  the  remote  nation  has  no  other  foothold  and  the 
nearby  one  already  dominates  additional  territory  of  enormous 
strategic  and  economic  value,  namely,  Manchuria. 

He  then  enlarges  on  this  comparison  of  Germany  and 
Japan.    This  statement  being  one  of  facts,  should  effectu- 

*  The  Nation,  September  20,  1919. 

*  The  New  Republic,  March  3,  1920. 


174  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE?  "   " 

ally  offset  the  somewhat  prevalent  opinion  that  Germany's 
elimination  was  desirable,  and  that  Japan's  substitution- 
ary position  is  equally  to  be  desired.    He  says : 

The  Germans  exclusively  employed  Chinese  in  the  railway  shops 
and  for  all  the  minor  positions  on  the  railway  itself.  The  rail- 
way guards  (the  difference  between  police  and  soldiers  is  nominal 
in  China)  were  all  Chinese,  the  Germans  merely  training  them. 
As  soon  as  Japan  invaded  Shantung  and  took  over  the  railway, 
Chinese  workmen  and  Chinese  military  guards  were  at  once  dis- 
missed and  Japanese  imported  to  take  their  places.  .  .  .  Within 
a  few  hundred  feet  of  the  railway  [at  Tsinan-fu]  that  connects 
Shanghai,  via  the  important  centre  of  Tientsin,  with  the  capital, 
Peking,  you  see  Japanese  soldiers  on  the  nominally  Chinese  street, 
guarding  their  barracks.  Then  you  learn  that  if  you  travel  upon 
the  ex-German  railway  towards  Tsingtao,  you  are  ordered  to  show 
your  passport  as  if  you  were  entering  a  foreign  country.  And  as 
you  travel  along  the  road  (remember  that  you  are  over  two 
hundred  miles  from  Tsingtao)  you  find  Japanese  soldiers  at  every 
station,  and  several  garrisons  and  barracks  at  important  towns  on 
the  line.  Then  you  realize  that  at  the  shortest  possible  notice, 
Japan  could  cut  all  communications  between  southern  China  and 
the  capital,  and  with  the  aid  of  the  Southern  Manchurian  Railway 
at  the  north  of  the  capital,  hold  the  entire  coast  and  descend  at  its 
good  pleasure  upon  Peking. 

Theodore  E., Burton,  who  has  also  made  a  visit  to  Japan 
and  China,  expresses  much  the  same  opinion:* 

It  is  the  practically  universal  opinion  that  the  control  exercised 
by  Japan  since  the  expulsion  of  the  Germans,  in  the  autumn  of 
1914,  has  been  more  severe  and  much  more  extensive  than  that  of 
its  predecessors.  The  Germans  were  at  first  somewhat  ruthless. 
Clashes  occurred  in  which  Chinese  were  killed.  But  about  the 
year  1908  [really  after  the  Boxer  year]  a  more  lenient  policy  was 
adopted.     The  inhabitants  were  treated  with  marked  considera- 

*  New  York  Times,  February,  1920. 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  175 

tion,  .  .  .  Last  October  all  conductors,  oflScials  at  stations  and 
most  of  the  trainmen,  were  Japanese.  The  spacious  barracks  for 
soldiers  which  have  been  constructed  or  are  under  construction  at 
many  stations  certainly  look  like  permanent  occupation. 

Herbert  Adams  Gibbons  writes  in  a  similar  strain :  * 

In  fact,  an  open-minded  examination  of  the  documents  sub- 
mitted by  the  Chinese  delegation  to  the  Peace  Conference  leads 
one  to  believe  that  the  Chinese  had  much  less  to  complain  of  in 
regard  to  the  Germans  in  Shantung  than  in  regard  to  the  Russians 
and  Japanese  in  Manchuria  and  Liao-tung.  The  Germans  were 
not  oppressive  masters  of  the  natives  within  the  leased  territory. 
Their  control  led  to  improved  sanitary  conditions  and  to  eco- 
nomic prosperity.  Germany  did  not  follow  the  tactics  of  Russia 
and  Japan  in  using  the  railway  concession  as  a  means  of  perma- 
nent military  control. 

Mr.  F,  Anderson,  Chairman  of  the  China  Association,  in 
his  annual  message  of  July  17,  1920,  said : 

The  Japanese  administration  of  Shantung  is  worse  than  the 
German.  While  there  were  only  about  five  hundred  Germans 
resident  in  Tsingtao,  all  of  whom  were  officials  or  leaders,  there 
are  now  over  35,000  Japanese  residents. 

These  facts  as  to  Japan  indeed  refer  to  her  military  occu- 
pation of  German  rights  and  sphere  of  interest  in  Shan- 
tung the  past  six  years,  and  of  course  are  no  criterion  as 
regards  the  future.  Whether  Japan's  policy  changes  for 
the  better  or  becomes  even  worse,  there  is  nothing  in  the 
settlement  of  the  Versailles  Treaty  to  determine  one  way  or 
the  other. 

Even  Americans  living  in  Shantung  must  soon  realize 
that  the  substitute  for  Germany  is  a  bane  to  their  enter- 
prise, whether  commercial  or  missionary.     They  must  re- 

»  "  The  New  Map  of  Asia,"  p.  489. 


176  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

call  that  when  this  German-constructed  port  was  formed, 
the  German  authorities  donated  the  ground  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  Presbyterian  mission,  adjoining  the  site  of 
the  German  Protestant  mission.  Since  Japanese  occupation 
the  American  missionaries  and  Chinese  teachers  and  evan- 
gelists have  been  subjected  to  many  annoying  regulations, 
while  below  the  girls'  school  has  been  erected  a  palace  of 
vice,  lit  up  by  electric  light,  and  an  alluring  tempter  to  the 
unfortified  Chinese. 

In  general,  Japan  in  capturing  Tsingtao  and  forcibly 
taking  possession  of  all  German  properties  in  Shantung, 
without  any  one 's  leave,  became  more  high-handed  than  the 
Germans  had  been  prior  to  1900.  Through  these  five  years, 
Japan  has  shown  herself  both  a  menace  and  an  exasperation 
to  China.  The  immoral  influences  of  the  Japanese,  espe- 
cially in  morphine  and  the  social  evil,  as  compared  with 
the  missionary  and  educational  influence  of  the  Germans, 
cause  the  Chinese  to  look  longingly  to  the  former  days  of 
German  administration. 

I  next  draw  attention  to  that  which  the  German  Govern- 
ment is  called  upon  to  renounce,  namely,  German  "rights." 
That  Germany  has  had  any  rights,  lasting  through  the  war 
down  to  the  peace  settlement,  is  beyond  dispute ;  it  is  rec- 
ognized by  all  the  nations  signing  the  Treaty;  the  word, 
"rights,"  is  even  introduced  by  the  Japanese  delegates, 
who,  it  is  understood,  drafted  these  three  important  Art- 
icles relating  to  Shantung.  For  Germany  to  renounce  rec- 
ognized rights  is  an  act  of  unparalleled,  though  compul- 
sory, self-abnegation.  For  Japan  to  acquire  them,  when 
Germany  held  them  only  through  a  grant  from  China,  is  a 
transaction  that  will  not  stand  in  any  court  of  equity. 

The  German  "rights,  titles  and  privileges"  in  Shan- 
tung, as  the  Treaty  words  it,  came  by  contract,  by  treaty. 
The  other  contracting  party  was  the  Chinese  Government, 
not  the  Japanese  or  the  American,  or  all  Europe  combined. 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  177 

For  dignitaries,  who  set  out  to  make  a  Treaty  and  a 
League  of  Nations  based  on  justice,  to  compel  Germany  to 
break  the  treaty  made  with  China  twenty  years  before,  is 
an  anomaly  so  great  as  to  throw  into  the  shade  all  other 
inconsistencies  of  the  Versailles  Treaty. 

The  question  then  becomes:  Did  these  German  rights 
still  exist  in  1919?  The  Chinese  and  Japanese  have  both 
advanced  arguments  against  the  validity  of  the  claim.  But 
the  inference  is  not  the  same.  The  Chinese  are  wont  to  say : 
''China's  declaration  of  war  on  the  Teutonic  Powers  in 
August,  1917,  abrogated  all  treaties  and  agreements  exist- 
ing between  China  and  the  former  German  Government, 
and  automatically  terminated  at  the  same  time  the  Chino- 
Japanese  Treaty  of  May  25,  1915,  respecting  the  province 
of  Shantung.  Upon  this  abrogation  and  termination  of 
treaties  and  agreements,  including  the  lease  of  Kiaochow, 
China  is  the  only  one  who  has  the  right  to  claim  back  all 
interests  and  privileges  conceded  to  the  former  German 
Government. ' '  ^ 

So  Alpheus  H.  Snow  argues  against  the  falsity  of  the 
assumption  that  the  Peace  Conference  in  1919  had  the 
authority  to  dispose  of  German  rights  to  Japan.    He  says : 

So  long  as  China  was  neutral,  the  concessions  to  Gennany 
doubtless  remained  in  force.  The  military  operations  of  Great 
Britain  and  Japan,  outside  the  leased  territory,  and  probably 
also  within  it,  were  violations  of  China's  neutrality.  By  China's 
co-belligerency  with  Great  Britain  and  Japan  (as  from  August, 
1917)  these  violations  were  doubtless  condoned.  On  the  declara- 
tion of  war  by  China,  Germany's  privileges  of  all  kinds  in  Shan- 
tung lapsed,  and  her  state  property  in  the  leased  territory  re- 
verted to  China.  The  action  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
is,  therefore,  not  a  transfer  of  Germany's  sphere  of  influence  to 
Japan,  but  the  attempted  institution  by  the  Allied  and  Associated 
States  other  than  China  of  a  new  sphere  of  influence  in  favour 

'     »  "  China's  Claims  at  the  Peace  Table,"  p.  15. 


178  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

of  Japan  in  Shantung  similar  to  that  which  Germany  had  before 
the  war;  and  an  attempted  transfer  to  Japan  of  the  title  of 
China  to  the  former  public  property  of  Grermany  in  Tsingtao.^ 

Therefore  what  was  transferred  to  Japan  under  compul- 
sion of  the  Peace  Conference  was  Chinese  rights,  which  pre- 
viously were  German  rights,  but  rights  under  grant  from 
China. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  inference  of  the  Japanese  is  that 
the  Chino- Japanese  Treaty  of  1915  could  not  be  abrogated, 
and  that  by  it  German  rights  had  passed  to  Japan.  Japan 
had  safeguarded  her  claim,  before  she  sent  delegates  to  the 
Peace  Conference,  and  even  before  she  allowed  China  to 
declare  war  on  Germany  in  August,  1917.  She  rested  her 
claim  on  these  Agreements  of  1915,  which  followed  the 
Twenty-one  Demands.  It  is  here  that  Japan  was  strong 
and  China  was  weak,  in  the  dispute  that  was  argued  before 
the  Big  Four  and  afterwards  decided  by  the  Big  Three, 
Italy's  delegates  having  withdrawn.  Through  American 
advice,  the  Chinese  delegate,  in  presenting  his  country's 
case,  placed  the  emphasis  on  this  their  weakest  point,  and 
Japan's  strongest  point.    And  Japan  won  out. 

Mr.  Snow,  and  nearly  all  the  writers  who  come  forward 
as  protagonists  of  China,  assert  that  "the  Twenty-one 
Demands  of  Japan,  backed  by  military  force,  are  in  law 
nugatory."  But  this  form  of  statement  is  not  the  question. 
The  Japanese  make  no  claim  as  to  the  original  Twenty-one 
Demands,  which  were  plainly  unjust  and  unfriendly,  but 
they  claim  that  the  Agreements,  whose  main  features  had 
been  agreed  to  by  China  before  Japan  issued  her  ultimatum, 
were  binding  and  could  not  be  broken,  all  the  more  that 
China  at  the  time  entered  no  formal  protest. 

The  wording  of  these  Agreements  of  1915,  as  mentioned 
in  a  previous  chapter,  is  more  favourable  to  China  than  the 

*  In  The  Nation  for  September  20,  1919. 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  179 

wording  of  the  Versailles  Treaty.  According  to  the  latter, 
all  German  rights  are  handed  over  in  1919  to  Japan  with 
no  stipulation  (in  the  treaty)  that  anything  is  to  be  re- 
stored to  China.  According  to  the  Chino-Japanese  Treaty 
of  May,  1915,  (a)  all  German  ** rights,  interests  and  con- 
cessions" in  Shantung  were  to  be  left,  with  China's  con- 
sent, to  subsequent  agreement  of  the  German  and  Japanese 
Governments;  (b)  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow,  though 
"left  to  the  free  disposal  of  Japan,"  is  to  be  restored  to 
China  under  certain  conditions;  (c)  "the  buildings  and 
properties  of  Germany"  in  Kiaochow  are  to  be  disposed  of 
by  subsequent  arrangement  of  "the  Japanese  Government 
and  the  Chinese  Government." 

The  one  who  signed  for  China  this  agreement  of  1915  was 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang,  who  was  also  the  chief  Chinese  delegate 
to  the  Peace  Conference  at  Paris.  The  Japanese  delegates 
at  Paris  felt  pretty  safe  in  holding  to  the  great  principle 
professed  by  the  Allied  nations — sacred  observance  of  all 
treaties.  This  assured  them  a  hold  on  its  Treaty  of  1915,  a 
treaty  to  Japan's  advantage. 

Japan  had  further  safeguarded  her  position  by  secret 
Agreements  with  three  Allied  Governments  in  February 
and  March,  1917.  By  these  all  German  rights  in  Shantung 
were  to  be  ceded  to  Japan — for  favours  received. 

It  was  thus  no  easy  task  for  Woodrow  Wilson,  in  secret 
conclave,  to  outvote  his  colleagues  from  London,  Paris  and 
Rome.  It  was  no  easy  task  to  insist  on  abolishing  secret 
agreements  of  all  kinds ;  if  he  looked  for  success,  it  should 
have  been  through  strong  action  taken  at  the  very  beginning 
of  the  conference,  and  not  at  the  very  end.  Neither  was  it 
an  easy  task  to  vote  for  China  as  against  Japan  in  insist- 
ing on  the  nullification  of  the  Chino-Japanese  Agreements 
of  1915. 

It  can  thus  be  seen  that  the  Chinese  have  suffered  three 
delusions.     (1)    They  were  deluded  in  putting  trust  in 


180  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

American  nelp,  should  they  enter  the  war.  (2)  They  were 
deluded  in  putting  trust  in  American  help,  along  with  the 
help  of  Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy,  should  they  pre- 
sent their  case  against  Japaa  at  the  Peace  Conference. 
(3)  Later  they  were  deluded  by  putting  trust  in  action  of 
the  United  States  Senate,  and  so  augmenting  the  antag- 
onisms between  China  and  Japan.  The  Chinese  are  now 
disillusioned;  but  only  in  part.  They  are  still  under  the 
delusion  that  Japan,  and  Japan  alone,  has  worked  harm 
to  China. 

We  are  now  able  to  examine  specifically  the  decision 
which  was  made  as  to  the  respective  claims  of  China  and 
Japan  concerning  German  rights  in  Shantung  and  other 
parts  of  China.  Both  the  Versailles  Treaty  made  with  Ger- 
many and  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  show 
clearly  the  results  attained  by  exclusive  negotiations  of  vic- 
torious Powers. 

L  The  Articles  of  the  Treaty,  under  the  separate  head 
** Shantung"  (as  if  Shantung  were  distinct  from  China), 
deserve  first  attention.  They  present  a  fairly  accurate  in- 
dication of  the  conferees'  conception  of  justice  and  law, 
when  applied  to  an  historic  but  unmilitary  nation  like 
China  and  to  an  equally  historic  but  strongly  military  na- 
tion like  Japan.  The  result  is  a  profit  and  loss  account, 
in  which  the  profit  is  to  Japan  and  the  loss  to  China.  The 
cause  of  righteousness  is  even  more  a  loser.  Why  should 
China,  first  a  neutral  and  then  an  associate  in  arms  on  the 
Allied  side — fighting  for  justice  and  freedom  as  against 
despotism — be  made  to  lose?  Why  should  President  Wil- 
son, Lloyd  George  and  Clemeneeau  decide  against  China 
and  for  Japan,  after  inducing  China  to  forego  the  securi- 
ties and  impartialities  of  neutrality  and  to  join  the  Allies 
in  the  world  contest? 

The  Articles  in  the  Treaty  bearing  on  Shantung  (the 
province  known  as  the  "sacred"  province  of  China,  from 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  181 

being  the  home  of  China's  Sages,  Confucius  and  Meneius) 
are  numbered  156,  157  and  158.  The  word  "China"  is 
only  used  once  and  then  only  in  an  incidental  way.  The 
words  "Germany"  and  "German"  appear  seven  times. 
The  word  "Japan,"  a  talisman,  is  used  six  times.  Though 
everything  mentioned  pertains  to  Chinese  territory  and 
China's  national  sovereignty,  the  conferees  at  Paris  recog- 
nize only  two  dominating  factors,  Germany  and  Japan,  the 
one  of  the  past  and  the  other  of  the  future.  A  person  from 
Mars — Mars  in  Europe  or  Mars  in  the  heavens — reading 
the  clauses  would  not  suppose  there  is  any  China,  or,  at 
least,  that  Kiaochow  or  Shantung  had  ever  been  a  part  of 
Chinese  territory. 
Article  156  reads  as  follows: 

Germany  renounces  in  favour  of  Japan  all  her  rights,  titles  and 
privileges — particularly  those  concerning  the  territory  of  Kiao- 
chow, railways,  mines  and  submarine  cables,  which  she  acquired  in 
virtue  of  the  Treaty  concluded  by  her  with  China  on  March  6, 
1898,  and  of  all  other  arrangements  relative  to  the  province  of 
Shantung. 

All  German  rights  in  the  Tsingtao-Tsinan-fu  Railway,  includ- 
ing its  branch  lines,  together  with  its  subsidiary  stock  of  all 
kinds,  stations,  shops,  fixed  and  rolling  stock,  mines,  plant  and 
material  for  the  exploitation  of  the  mines,  are  to  remain  acquired 
by  Japan,  together  with  all  rights  and  privileges  attaching  thereto. 

The  German  State  submarine  cables  from  Tsingtao  to  Shanghai 
and  from  Tsingtao  to  Chefoo,  with  all  the  rights,  privileges  and 
properties  attaching  thereto,  are  similarly  acquired  by  Japan,  free 
and  clear  of  all  charges  and  incumbrances. 

This  Article,  then,  relates  to  three  things:  (1)  to  German 
rights  in  the  territory  of  Kiaochow  leased  by  China,  in- 
cluding the  port  of  Tsingtao ;  (2)  to  German  concessionary 
rights  from  China  in  railways,  mines  and  their  further  ex- 
ploitation (a  fine  word  for  a  righteous  treaty),  and  (3)  to 
German  rights  in  submarine  cables. 


182  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Article  157  relates  to  German  State  property  in  the  ter- 
ritory of  Kiaochow.    It  reads: 

The  movable  and  immovable  property  owned  by  the  German 
State  in  the  territory  of  Kiaochow,  as  well  as  the  rights  that 
Germany  might  claim  in  consequence  of  the  works  or  improve- 
ments made  or  of  the  expense  incurred  by  her  directly  or  indi- 
rectly, in  connection  with  this  territory,  are  and  remain  acquired 
by  Japan,  free  and  clear  of  all  charges  and  incumbrances. 

Article  158,  as  if  to  fill  out  some  possible  defect,  enlarges 
on  Japan's  magnificent  acquisition — her  "spoils  of  war" 
at  China's  expense  as  much  as  at  Germany's  expense.  It 
reads : 

Germany  shall  hand  over  to  Japan,  within  three  months  from 
the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  Treaty,  the  archives,  reg- 
isters, plans,  title  deeds  and  documents  of  every  kind,  wherever 
they  may  be,  relating  to  the  administration,  whether  civil,  military, 
financial,  judicial  or  other,  of  the  territory  of  Kiaochow. 

Within  the  same  period  Germany  shall  give  particulars  to 
Japan  of  all  treaties,  arrangements  or  agreements  relating  to  the 
rights,  title  or  privileges  referred  to  in  the  two  preceding  Articles. 

In  all  this  Germany,  not  the  victorious  Allies,  is  com- 
pelled to  designate  Japan  to  be,  what  may  be  called,  the 
"mandatory"  of  all  German  rights  in  Shantung.  China, 
evidently,  is  one  of  the  backward  nations,  though  kindly 
invited  to  sign  such  a  Treaty, 

Assuming  that  it  is  lawful  to  deprive  Germany  of  her 
rights  bestowed  by  China,  the  disposal  of  these  rights  as 
determined  by  the  Treaty  must  now  be  studied. 

(1)  The  Kiaochow  transfer.  By  the  Treaty  this  territory 
passes  to  the  control  of  Japan.  This  transfer  is  obligatory. 
Any  subsequent  retrocession  to  China  is  not  obligatory,  for 
it  is  not  in  the  Treaty.    Germany,  too,  is  required  to  sign 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  183 

the  Treaty,  confirming  such  a  transfer — transfer  of  a  lease 
of  territory,  situated  not  in  Germany,  not  even  in  Japan, 
but  in  China,  and  of  which  China  alone  is  proprietor.  Ger- 
many merely  held  a  temporary  lease,  and  the  lease  had  to 
do  only  with  administrative  jurisdiction,  and  was  not  a 
lease  or  a  sale  of  landed  property.  ''Under  the  deed  of 
conveyance,"  as  a  Chinese  student  at  Columbia  University 
has  well  expressed  it,  "the  lessor's  sovereign  rights  were 
expressly  reserved  during  the  period  of  the  tenancy."  By 
the  terms  of  the  contract  it  was  assumed  that  if  Germany 
ever  relinquished  the  leasehold,  it  would  revert  to  China, 
the  original  and  real  owner.  The  trouble  with  the  Treaty 
at  this  point  is  not  so  much  that  possibly  by  Japan's  good 
grace  the  poorest  portion  of  the  territory  may  yet  come 
under  Chinese  administration — (the  best  part  being  an  In- 
ternational "Settlement,"  with  China  left  out,  and  Japan 
predominant,  or  an  out-and-out  Japanese  "Concession"  ex- 
isting alongside) — but  that  Japan  is  confirmed  in  her 
claim  that  her  wishes  and  not  those  of  China  are  to  be  re- 
spected, and  that  tJie  right  of  conquest  still  rules  in  modern 
international  law.  The  Treaty  not  only  enforces  the  cession 
of  Kiaochow  to  Japan,  but  confirms  a  bad  principle,  sup- 
posed to  have  no  place  in  a  model  treaty. 

The  Treaty,  moreover,  practically  condones  Japan's  il- 
legal method  of  effecting  the  conquest.  It  seems  strange 
that  moralists  and  legalists — and  they  thronged  Paris — 
who  complain  of  Germany's  violations  of  international  law 
should  have  so  readily  countenanced  a  clear  violation  of 
law  on  the  part  of  Japan.  It  is  also  strange  that,  under 
advice,  the  Chinese  delegates  omitted  reference  to  these  vio- 
lations, a  matter  that  should  have  appealed  to  the  eon- 
science  of  the  Supreme  Council.  The  Chinese  dwelt  much 
on  the  point  that  the  Agreements  made  with  Japan  in  1915 
had  been  signed  under  duress,  but  the  Big  Four,  being  en- 
gaged in  making  a  Treaty  also  to  be  signed  under  duress, 


184  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE! 

could  not  be  expected  to  give  serious  consideration  to  such 
a  plea. 

It  may  here  be  noted  to  China's  credit  that  when  the 
Japanese  claims  became  known  at  the  Peace  Conference, 
the  Chinese  delegates,  according  to  Thomas  F.  Millard,^ 
made  the  following  proposal: 

China  would  assent  to  have  the  German  concessions  in  Shantung 
ceded  directly  to  Japan  in  the  treaty  of  peace,  thus  saving  Japan's 
"  face  "  in  the  matter. 

Japan  to  promise,  same  also  to  be  written  in  the  treaty,  to 
restore  Shantung  and  Tsingtao  to  China  in  two  years. 

China  would  agree  to  repay  Japan  for  all  expenses  incurred  by 
Japan  in  the  military  operations  required  to  take  Tsingtao  from 
Germany. 

This  proposal  was  rejected  by  the  Japanese  delegation. 
"While  it  showed  good  spirit  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese 
towards  an  aggravating  neighbour,  it  is  my  opinion  that  it 
was  too  flabby  a  proposal  to  merit  success.  The  Chinese 
delegates  from  the  start  should  have  maintained  a  strong 
position  by  pressing  points  that  were  strong  in  law,  equity 
and  reason. 

In  connection  with  this  possible  restoration  of  territory  to 
China,  not  by  the  Treaty  but  by  Japan,  there  have  been 
many  misconceptions  and  misrepresentations,  such  as  al- 
ways tarnish  truth  in  periods  of  war.  Even  President  Wil- 
son ia  his  many  speeches  upholding  the  League  of  Nations 
has  unwittingly  misled  the  public.  Thus  at  Denver,  Sep- 
tember 25,  1919,  he  spoke  of  "the  provision  in  regard  to  the 
transfer  from  the  German  Empire  of  the  Shantung  prov- 
ince to  Japan."  Even  the  Chinese  delegation  at  Paris, 
or  Mr.  Millard,  in  the  statement  above,  falls  into  the  same 
error,  as  to  what  Japan  is  to  restore  to  China.  The  restora- 
tion of  Shantung  is  not  in  the  Treaty.    Shantung  was  not 

*  In  New  York  Times,  July  25,  1919. 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  185 

a  province  of  the  German  Empire,  but  of  China.  All  that 
is  transferred  to  Japan  is  the  territory  or  administrative 
rights  of  Kiaochow,  being  100  kilometres  from  the  Bay  of 
Kiaochow  on  all  sides. 

Another  misstatement,  emanating  from  the  Japanese 
delegates,  is  that  Japan,  in  return  for  ** economic  rights," 
will  restore  "Shantung  in  complete  sovereignty."  It  was 
never  known  before  that  Chinese  sovereignty  had  been 
taken  away.  As  for  the  Japanese  they  had  disclaimed  any 
infringement  of  China's  sovereignty.  Either  Japan  has 
been  deluding  the  world  as  to  her  intentions,  or  she  is  now 
assuming  to  give  to  China  that  which  was  already  China's 
and  not  Japan 's.  She  affects  a  generosity  by  giving  up  that 
which  she  had  never  acquired,  and  China  gets  back  that 
which  she  has  never  given  up. 

(2)  The  economic  concessionary  rights.  All  these  with 
all  the  property  ' '  are  to  remain  acquired  by  Japan. ' '  The 
Treaty  confirms  far  more  than  did  the  Chino-Japanese 
Agreement  of  1915.  It  was  this  allocation  of  the  spoils  of 
war  that  the  Allied  Ambassadors  in  Tokio  had  secretly 
agreed  to  early  in  1917.  There  is  even  no  private  under- 
standing that  ultimately  these  rights  shall  pass  to  China, 
although  the  Japanese  first  secured  them,  in  1914,  by 
military  force  and  military  occupation.  This  illegal 
acquisition  of  another's  property,  this  triumph  of  Force, 
and  these  secret  machinations  of  Governments  on  the  same 
side,  are  all  condoned  and  confirmed  by  the  Treaty  of 
Peace. 

As  the  Chinese  Government  was  one  of  the  contracting 
parties  when  granting  the  railway  and  mining  concessions 
to  Germany,  in  the  form  of  joint  German-Chinese  Com- 
panies, it  would  seem  as  if  these  German  rights  and  German 
property  on  Chinese  territory  should  pass  into  Chinese 
hands  in  case  it  should  be  necessary  for  Germany  to  relin- 
quish them.    But  Japan  said,  "No,  possession  is  nine  points 


186  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

of  the  law."  And  the  peace  conferees  said,  "Japan  is 
strong,  let  her  have  what  she  wants." 

Here,  then,  were  two  strong  points  for  the  Chinese  to 
press.  One  may  be  stated  thus:  "We  cannot  agree  to  Ja- 
pan's unheard-of  and  illegal  seizure  of  German  property 
within  our  domains.  We  do  not  claim  this  property  for 
ourselves.  It  belongs  to  the  Germans.  In  any  case  it  does 
not  belong  to  Japan."  The  other  point  may  also  be  stated 
thus:  "We  had  no  part  in  the  secret  intrigues  going  on  in 
Tokio.  We  disapprove  of  such  secrecy  and  such  intrigue. 
We  resent  the  intrusion  on  our  national  dignity  and  sov- 
ereign rights.    We  demand  a  just  settlement. ' ' 

But  the  Chinese  again  omitted  what  was  China's  strong- 
est point  and  Japan's  weakest. 

The  Tsingtao-Tsinan  Railway  in  its  construction  cost 
$14,500,000.  The  money  invested  in  the  mines  already  in 
operation  is  reckoned  as  amounting  to  $4,000,000,  though 
no  exact  official  statement  has  been  issued.  It  is  known, 
however,  that  the  coal  mines  in  1914  produced  upwards  of 
1,500,000  tons,  and  that  one  iron  mine,  just  opened  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  was  capable  of  producing  ore  with 
66.4  per  cent  of  iron.  Japan  acquires  all  this  "free  of 
charge. ' '  With  this  as  a  beginning  Japan  will  find  the  task 
of  developing  mines  and  maintaining  railways  much  easier 
than  have  the  Germans.  There  is  a  start  with  a  bonus. 
There  is  even  no  royalty  to  be  paid  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment. "Her  railway  and  mining  concessions  will  yield  at 
least  $40,000,000  a  year." ^ 

As  to  any  favours  to  be  extended  to  China  hereafter  there 
is  no  mention  in  the  Treaty.  China's  rights  are  not  im- 
portant enough  to  be  noticed  or  guaranteed.  The  Treaty 
is  even  less  considerate  of  China  in  this  respect  than  the 
Agreement  made  in  September,  1918,  by  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment and  by  the  militaristic,  pro-Japanese  Government 

*  Charles  Merz  in  Asia  for  September,  1919. 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  187 

of  Peking.    Concerning  this  Agreement  K.  K.  Kawakami  ^ 
writes : 

In  the  above-named  instrument  Japan  agreed  to  (1)  withdraw 
all  troops  along  the  railway  lines,  (2)  entrust  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment with  the  policing  of  the  lines,  (3)  defray  the  expenses  of 
such  policing  from  the  funds  of  the  railway  company,  (4)  employ 
Chinese  for  the  operation  of  the  lines,  and  (5)  abolish  the  civil 
government  established  by  Japan  for  the  administration  of  Kiao- 
chow  and  the  railway  zone. 

Young  China,  however,  takes  exception  to  Japan's  re- 
tention of  economic  rights,  judging  Japan  of  the  future  by 
Japan  of  the  past.  ''Japan,"  it  is  said,  ''will  keep  the 
oyster  and  return  to  us  only  the  shell." 

Dr.  Arthur  J.  Brown,  by  no  means  unfriendly  to  Japan, 
writes :  ^ 

While  the  Germans  had  employed  less  than  a  hundred  of  their 
own  nationals  on  the  railway,  including  the  officials  of  the  Com- 
pany and  had  used  Chinese  for  all  the  other  places,  the  Japanese 
staffed  and  operated  the  railway  exclusively  with  their  own  people. 
They  now  talk  of  joint  control  by  Japanese  and  Chinese,  but  no 
one  in  Shantung  believes  that  the  Chinese  share  of  the  control 
would  be  anything  more  than  nominal. 

Besides  acquiring  by  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  valuable 
concessions  already  undertaken — concessions  granted  by 
China  to  Germany  alone — Japan  acquires  what  is  called 
"the  exploitation  of  the  mines."  In  the  condensed  draft 
first  made  public  it  was  glaringly  stated  as  "the  rights  of 
exploitation."  Some  of  us  had  dreamed  that  Woodrow 
Wilson  would  be  able  to  persuade  his  diplomatic  comrades 
to  abandon  the  baneful  policy  of  exploiting  weak  nations, 

*  In  Asia  for  September,  1919. 
*In  Asia,  September,  1919. 


188  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREEt 

but,  instead,  we  find  exploitation  incorporated  as  a  prin- 
ciple in  the  Treaty  of  Peace.  Among  the  schemes  of  exploi- 
tation are  two  new  railway  lines  to  reach  into  the  two  other 
provinces,  Kiangsu  and  Chihli,  and  near  to  a  third  prov- 
ince, Honan.  Knowing  how  Japanese-controlled  railways 
in  Manchuria  have  been  managed  to  the  weakening  of 
China's  political  strength  and  the  retarding  of  foreign 
commercial  enterprises,  the  prospect  for  Chinese  and  other 
nationals  in  the  provinces  directly  south  of  Peking  is  by 
no  means  assuring.    Mr.  Kawakami  *  says : 

The  cost  of  building  these  two  lines  is  estimated  at  $35,000,000. 
Of  this  total  $10,000,000  was  advanced  to  China  in  September, 
1918,  when  the  agreement  was  made.  It  should  be  emphasized 
that  these  lines  are  not  to  be  built  or  owned  or  operated  by  Japan 
or  Japanese  interests.  They  are  to  be  built  by  China  herself,  and 
will  be  owned  and  operated  by  her.  Japan's  only  part  in  the 
enterprise  is  to  advance  the  necessary  funds,  which  is  absolutely 
legitimate. 

In  calculating  on  the  future  it  is  indeed  only  fair  to  rec- 
ognize the  bare  possibility  of  Japan's  adopting  a  concilia- 
tory, co-operative  policy  towards  the  development  of  China, 
just  as  the  equally  energetic  Germans  have  pursued  for 
nearly  two  decades.  Even  so,  Japanese  by  advancing  the 
capital  hold  first  mortgage  on  the  railways.  It  is  this 
method  of  exploiting  China,  in  which  all  concessionaires 
participate,  that  serves  to  enslave  China. 

(3)  Japan's  possession  of  German  State  submarine 
cables.  This  is  a  new  feature  of  the  peace  settlement  that 
goes  beyond  the  Arrangements  made  by  Japan  with  China 
in  either  1915  or  1918.  It  is  a  loss  to  China  only  in  the 
sense  that  it  adds  to  Japan,  In  the  first  place,  I  see  no 
justice  in  taking  these  cables  away  from  Germany.    In  the 

*  In  Asia,  September,  1919. 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  189 

second  place,  I  see  no  justice  in  transferring  them  to  Japan 
rather  than  to  China,  should  it  be  necessary  to  take  them 
from  Germany.  As  England,  France  and  Japan  insist  on 
controlling  the  land  end  of  all  cables  that  touch  their  soil, 
so  China  should  have  control  of  these  particular  cables 
that  connect  Chinese  ports,  Shanghai,  Tsingtao  and  Chefoo. 
Moreover,  by  previous  arrangements  these  submarine  cables 
are  all  linked  with  the  Chinese  telegraph  system.  They  con- 
cern China  and  no  outside  country. 

(4)  All  German  State  property  in  Eiaochow,  i.  e.,  in 
Tsingtao,  is  acquired  by  Japan,  "free  and  clear  of  all 
charges  and  incumbrances."  Why  by  Japan  and  not  by 
China?  This,  too,  goes  beyond  the  Agreement  of  1915, 
which  stipulates  that  their  disposal,  along  with  that  of  other 
German  property,  shall  be  by  "mutual  agreement"  of  the 
two  Governments,  Chinese  and  Japanese.  For  Japan  to 
possess  such  valuable  property  on  Chinese  sovereign  ter- 
ritory places  her  in  a  stronger  position  than  China.  The 
only  country  to  have  first  place  in  China  should  be  China. 

(5)  All  German  official  documents  bearing  on  the  ter- 
ritory of  Kiaochow  are  to  be  handed  over  to  Japan.  Most 
of  these  documents  which  do  not  concern  Germans  among 
themselves,  concern  China.  None  probably  concern  Japan. 
But  Japan  is  to  come  into  possession.  She  is  a  kind  of 
super-state,  as  by  appointment  of  the  Peace  Conference. 

Beside  all  these  astounding  dispositions  of  what  was  once 
German,  beside  the  recognition  by  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of 
various  illegalities,  of  the  principle  of  conquest,  of  the 
spoils  of  war,  of  the  reign  of  Force,  of  secret  compacts,  and 
of  the  continued  prevalence  of  exploitation,  the  Versailles 
Treaty  and  the  League  of  Nations,  one  and  inseparable, 
tacitly  confirm  Japan  in  her  position  of  supremacy  in 
China.  This  is  in  addition  to  previous  confirmation  in  the 
Lansing-Ishii  Exchange  of  Notes  in  1917.  For  Japan  to 
secure  such  recognition  is  all-important.     China,  on  the 


190  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

other  hand,  is  slighted,  ignored,  deserted.    The  Chinese  are 
disappointed,  chagrined,  and,  in  some  cases,  indignant. 

Dr.  Arthur  J.  Brown  ^  mentions  that  while  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  there  were  only  3,740  Germans  in  all  China, 
the  Japanese  at  Tsingtao  increased  from  a  few  dozen  to 
50,000  by  the  end  of  1917,  and  at  Tsinan-fu,  the  provincial 
capital,  to  22,000.  "Colonies  of  varying  size,"  he  says,  "are 
to  be  found  in  other  important  cities,  and  traders,  engineers 
and  other  Japanese  on  various  quests  are  in  evidence,  in 
almost  every  part  of  the  province,"  where,  by  the  way,  they 
have  no  right  to  be,  as  by  all  treaty  arrangements  not  yet 
annulled.  He  also  says:  "Politically,  their  ascendancy  is 
absolute.  It  is  true  that  outside  Tsingtao  Chinese  officials 
theoretically  have  'unimpaired  sovereignty';  but  the  aver- 
age official  finds  a  Japanese  '  advisor '  at  his  elbow  and  that 
it  is  the  part  of  prudence  to  heed  the  'advice'  that  is  given." 
He  then  quotes  from  a  local  observer: 

This  province  is  quite  under  the  power  of  the  Japanese.  There 
is  scarcely  a  department  that  has  not  been  entered  by  them.  They 
are  in  strategic  posts  and  positions  everywhere.  Non-residents  of 
China  cannot  conceive  of  the  situation.  Foreign  gold  bribes  un- 
scrupulous leaders  to  fight  each  other.  The  boundary  of  the 
"  leased  territory  "  is  being  illegally  extended. 

More  important  in  the  eyes  of  the  Japanese  than  the 
ultimate  disposal  of  Kiaochow  has  been  a  commanding  polit- 
ical principle,  and  that  is,  that  all  matters  affecting  the 
relationship  of  Japan  and  China  do  not  lie  within  the  pur- 
view of  the  Peace  Conference  or  the  League  of  Nations  and 
must  not  even  be  mentioned,  but  must  await  some  future 
conference  of  Chinese  and  Japanese.  And  the  Supreme 
Council  saw  fit  to  bow  to  this  assumption.  Where,  then,  was 
advantage  to  accrue  to  China  through  personal  represen- 

'  In  Asia  for  September,  1919. 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  191 

tation  at  the  Peace  Conference — the  beau  ideal  of  all  the 
dreams  when  in  1917  China  threw  herself  into  the  war 
maelstrom  ? 

Mr.  David  Fraser,  the  Peking  correspondent  of  the  Times 
of  London,  writing  of  the  claims  of  the  Chinese  delegates, 
says :  ^ 

They  did  not  explain  that  the  real  point  at  issue  was  not 
Kiaochow,  or  the  economic  rights  of  Germany,  but  the  fact  that 
these  things  in  the  hands  of  Japan  meant  something  quite  different 
from  what  they  meant  in  the  hands  of  Germany. 

C.  T.  "Wang,  the  second  Chinese  delegate  at  the  Peace 
Conference,  in  an  article  in  the  Outlook  of  August,  1919, 
speaks  of  Japan's  hold  on  ** China's  vastly  rich  mineral 
resources,"  and  her  training  of  "the  great  reservoir  of 
man  power"  in  China,  and  asks,  "Can  you  not  see  that 
there  would  be  a  menace  to  the  world  much  more  serious 
than  Germany  could  ever  be  ? "  He  then  refers  to  the  way 
Japan,  by  her  railway  schemes  jutting  from  Shantung, 
will  flank  the  two  grand  trunk  lines  from  Tientsin  to 
Nanking  and  from  Peking  to  Hankow.  He  also  cites  the 
railway  system  being  worked  out  in  Manchuria  and  Mon- 
golia.   He  sums  up  most  clearly : 

That  means  that  Peking  will  be  isolated.  ...  At  any  time 
the  Japanese  can  close  their  pincers  and  nip  Peking. 

That  this  discussion  may  be  fair  to  Japan,  I  here  quote 
from  a  speech  of  Kuo  Tai-chi,  an  advisor  to  the  Chinese 
delegation,  given  July  25,  1919,  in  New  York  City.  He 
said: 

Shortly  before  the  Fiume  question  came  up  in  Paris,  two 
Japanese  oflfieials  came  to  me  personally  with  an  offer  that  was 

*  North  China  Herald,  August  2,  1919. 


192  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

obviously  inspired  by  the  higher  Japanese  authorities.  Their 
offer  in  brief  was  this:  If  China  would  agree  to  the  indirect 
restitution  of  Germany's  former  rights  in  accordance  with  the 
1915  treaties,  Japan  would  agree  (1)  to  relinquish  the  right  of 
establishing  an  exclusive  settlement  in  Kiaochow,  (2)  to  operate 
the  trans-Shantung  Railway  jointly  with  China,  (3)  to  renounce 
any  claim  to  spheres  of  influence  in  Shantung,  thus  taking  the 
lead  in  this  matter  among  the  Great  Powers,  and  (4)  to  invite 
other  foreign  capital  to  aid  in  the  building  of  the  two  projected 
railroad  lines  connecting  northern  and  southern  China. 

This  offer  was  obviously  more  modest  than  what  Japan  actually 
got  through  the  treaty.  A  week  after  the  offer  was  made  the 
Fiume  question  came  up  so  as  to  obscure  everything  else,  but  the 
Japanese  saw  that  they  could  use  it  to  get  more  than  they  ex- 
pected. They  threatened  to  withdraw  from  the  conference,  and  it 
was  pointed  out  that  if  she  did  so,  England,  through  her  de- 
fensive alliance  with  Japan  and  as  a  result  of  the  pact  of  London, 
might  be  compelled  to  follow  suit.  Thus  she  forced  a  decision  in 
her  favour  through  simple  bluff  and  intrigue. 

It  is  to  be  doubted  whether  the  Chinese  were  wise  in  put- 
ting aside  the  proposals  as  here  made.  They  were,  as  Mr. 
Kuo  says,  "more  moderate"  than  appear  in  the  final  draft 
of  the  Treaty.  In  a  word,  it  seems  more  and  more  evident 
that  China  got  less  from  the  Peace  Conference  than  she 
would  have  got,  or  will  yet  get,  by  direct  negotiation  with 
Japan. 

II.  To  complete  this  study,  attention  must  be  given  to 
a  few  minor  blessings  bestowed  on  China  in  another  part 
of  the  Versailles  Treaty.  They  are  Articles  128-134,  in- 
clusive, under  the  separate  head  ''China,"  as  if  China  and 
Shantung  were  in  different  parts  of  the  world.  I  only  give 
a  summary,  for  that  is  all  these  Articles  deserve. 

(1)  Germany  renounces  in  favour  of  China  "all  benefits 
and  privileges"  from  the  Protocol  of  September,  1901,  after 
the  Boxer  uprising,  and  "any  claim  to  indemnity."    This 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  193 

relief  actually  came  to  China  when  she  declared  war  on 
Germany,  August,  1917,  but  the  Treaty  makes  it  appear 
that  the  relief  was  granted  through  the  thoughtfulness  of 
the  Peace  conferees.  The  Chinese  had  indeed  asked  that 
they  be  relieved  of  the  Boxer  indemnity  to  all  countries,  but 
all  that  the  Allied  countries  can  now  promise  is  that  Ger- 
many shall  be  forced  to  renounce  her  share.  Others  may 
follow  later.  Thus  far  only  the  United  States  and  Ger- 
many see  eye  to  eye! 

(2)  **  China  will  no  longer  be  bound  to  grant  to  Ger- 
many" any  advantages  from  the  Chinese  tariff  arrange- 
ment of  1902,  or  the  arrangements  of  1905  and  1912  re- 
garding the  Whang-Poo  River  Conservancy.  This  auto- 
matically occurred  when  China  declared  war,  and  needs  no 
mention  in  the  treaty.  It  only  remains  for  China  and  Ger- 
many to  make  new  treaties  after  peace  is  restored,  as  has 
already  been  done  by  proclamation  of  the  President  of 
China.  The  Chinese  sought  for  revision  of  all  treaties  with 
all  countries  and  for  complete  control  of  China's  own 
tariff.  It  may  be  that  the  German  Republic  will  set  an 
example  to  all  the  rest  of  kind  treatment  of  the  Chinese 
nation. 

(3)  All  German  State  property  in  the  once  German 
"Concessions"  of  Tientsin,  Hankow  or  elsewhere  in  China 
(except  of  course  Kiaochow)  is  acquired  by  China.  This  is 
most  considerate.  Why  did  not  Japan  ask  for  all  of  it? 
There  is  one  limitation  to  China's  sovereignty ;  she  must  not 
touch  the  public  or  private  property  of  Germany  within  the 
Legation  quarter  of  Peking,  a  quarter  which  is  an  eyesore  to 
all  Chinese. 

(4)  The  astronomical  instruments  seized  by  official  Ger- 
many in  1900  and  1901  are  to  be  sent  back  to  Peking.  Sev- 
eral years  ago  the  German  Government  offered  to  return 
the  instruments,  but  the  Chinese  politely  declined.  Now 
the  great  restitution  will  be  made. 


194  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

(5)  Germany  relinquishes  to  China  the  German  Conces- 
sions of  Tientsin  and  Hankow.  China  in  acquiring  them 
must  "open  them  to  international  residence  and  trade," 
thus  granting  more  than  the  Japanese,  under  the  Treaty, 
need  grant  in  the  territory  of  Kiaochow.  The  Chinese  have 
longed  for  the  extinction  of  all  extra-territorial  jurisdiction 
at  the  treaty-ports.  A  start  is  made  in  the  ex-German  Con- 
cessions of  two  treaty-ports. 

(6)  Germany  is  forbidden  to  present  any  claims  against 
China  or  the  Allied  and  Associated  Nations  in  connection 
with  the  internment  and  repatriation  of  Germans,  or  the 
liquidation  and  sequestration  of  German  property  in  China. 
Properly  handled,  the  Chinese  Government  ought  to  get 
quite  a  sum  of  money  by  this  dubious  transaction  duly 
legalized  by  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments.  The 
two  Allied  nations,  Britain  and  France,  reap  an  even 
greater  harvest.  And  no  German  can  find  redress  under 
any  known  law  of  these  advanced  nations. 

(7)  German  State  property  in  the  British  Concession  at 
Shameen  in  Canton  reverts  to  Great  Britain.  This  is  only 
a  drop  in  the  bucket  of  the  British  treasury,  but  it  helps 
to  soothe  the  thirst  for  gold. 

(8)  The  Medical  and  Engineering  School  established  by 
the  Germans  in  Shanghai,  and  unfortunately  located  in  the 
French  Concession,  must  be  given  over  to  the  joint  control 
of  the  French  and  Chinese.  As  the  German  educational 
work  in  Tsingtao  is  to  be  directed  by  Japanese,  that  in 
Shanghai  will  be  directed  by  Frenchmen.  The  Chinese  will 
be  "assistants."  The  future  will  reveal  results.  The 
astounding  fact  remains  that  German  scientific  skill  for  the 
benefit  of  the  Chinese  is  by  Treaty  placed  under  a  ban. 

Comparing  what  China  got  under  the  section  entitled 
"China,"  and  what  Japan  got  under  the  section  entitled 
* '  Shantung, ' '  it  seems  to  me  much  as  if  the  Big  Three — the 
greatest  men  in  the  world — ^had  given  Japan  a  most  sump- 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  195 

tuous  repast,  and  at  the  close  had  handed  as  a  "  tip "  a  few 
dimes  or  paper  rubles  to  China,  standing  by  in  "watchful 
waiting." 

III.  The  Covenant  of  the  proposed  League  of  Nations, 
incorporated  as  a  part  of  the  Treaty,  also  affects  China, 
equally  to  her  disadvantage. 

(1)  In  Article  21  of  the  Covenant  it  has  been  inserted 
that  '' regional  understandings"  shall  be  exempt  from  con- 
trol of  the  League.  These  words  with  special  mention  of 
the  American  Monroe  Doctrine  were  introduced  into  the 
re-draft  with  the  idea  of  satisfying  those  Americans 
who  felt  that  the  form  of  Covenant  was  endangering 
this  traditional  American  Doctrine.  But  if  reference 
was  needed,  there  should  have  been  a  distinct  and 
sole  reference;  the  Monroe  Doctrine  should  not  have  been 
made  subordinate  to  any  superior  idea  called  "regional 
understanding."  What  the  American  Senate  asked 
for  was  a  "specific  exemption"  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, but  here  in  the  League  it  is  wrapped  up  in  a  new 
terminology,  originating  in  a  British  brain,  "regional 
understanding."  The  Japanese  can  now  claim  that 
whether  they  have  any  Monroe  Doctrine  of  their  own  or 
not,  to  be  applied  to  Eastern  Asia,  they  certainly  have  a 
"regional  understanding"  with  the  United  States,  in  the 
Lansing-Ishii  agreement,  as  to  Japan's  "special  interests" 
in  China  through  "territorial  propinquity."  Quite  prob- 
ably Japan  has  also  an  understanding  with  Great  Britain 
and  France.  The  phraseology  is  a  most  unwise  selection 
for  preserving  a  particular  American  policy. 

(2)  An  indirect  harm  to  China  was  the  rejection  of  the 
clause  which  the  Japanese  desired  to  have  introduced  into 
the  preamble:  "by  the  endorsement  of  the  principle  of 
equality  of  nations  and  just  treatment  of  their  nationals." 
This  is  generally  spoken  of  as  "the  no-racial  discrimina- 
tion" clause.    Japan  has  not  sought  for  what  is  commonly 


196  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE! 

called  racial  equality,  but  for  equality  of  nations,  with  no 
discrimination  against  one  on  account  of  race.  This  was 
an  eminently  fair  proposal,  prudently  and  moderately 
phrased.  The  Japanese  laid  great  stress  upon  its  adoption. 
It  was  heartily  supported  by  the  Chinese,  for  China  and 
Japan  are  the  only  two  countries  of  the  world  which  are 
discriminated  against  merely  because  of  nationality  or  race. 
Even  when  the  principle  was  rejected,  the  Japanese  re- 
served the  right  to  bring  it  up  before  the  Assembly  at  some 
future  time.  This  was  one  reservation  which  did  not  need 
to  be  submitted  to  the  Peace  Conference  for  approval  or 
disapproval.  The  principle  is  distinct  from  the  right  which 
every  nation  possesses  to  make  its  own  laws  concerning  im- 
migration, only  that  those  excluded  are  excluded  because 
of  a  general  requirement,  based  on  character  or  other  qual- 
ity rather  than  on  nationality  or  race.  By  adoption  of  the 
principle,  Japan  and  China  would  have  been  satisfied. 
Moreover,  President  Wilson's  principle  of  religious  liberty 
might  also  have  been  adopted  at  the  same  time.  On  the 
other  hand,  by  rejection  of  these  two  great  principles,  the 
League  lost  much  of  its  power  for  good,  and  the  Japanese 
delegates  were  placed  in  an  ignominious  position.  They 
were  mortified  still  more,  because,  having  been  honoured  by 
a  seat  among  the  ruling  Five  in  the  Supreme  Council,  their 
presence  after  the  first  few  sessions  was  no  longer  sought. 
They  were  further  offended  by  the  insistence  that  Japan 
adopt  the  mandatory  system  as  to  the  late  German  colonies 
north  of  the  Pacific,  instead  of  being  allowed  actual  pos- 
session as  they  claimed  to  be  their  just  dues.  The  result 
was  that  they  insisted  on  being  satisfied  in  all  their  de- 
mands concerning  German  rights  in  Shantung.  If  Japan 
had  lost  out  here,  it  is  needless  to  say  her  delegates  would 
never  have  dared  to  return  home,  the  Japanese  nation 
would  have  been  aroused,  the  League  would  have  been  re- 
jected and  the  German  Treaty  with  it,  and  Japan  would 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  197 

have  made  a  separate  treaty  with  Germany,  in  which  the 
clause  of  no  race  discrimination  would  have  been  incorpo- 
rated. Thus  failure  to  be  just  on  one  matter — just  to  both 
Japan  and  China — ended  in  being  glaringly  unjust  to 
China. 

There  seems  to  be  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  whati 
Japan  would  have  done,  if  her  claims  as  to  Shantung  had 
been  rejected.  Secretary  Lansing  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee asserted  that  even  if  the  Shantung  agreement  had 
not  been  made,  the  Japanese  signature  to  the  League  of 
Nations  would  have  been  obtained,  as  also  the  Chinese ;  but 
President  Wilson  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  Japanese 
signature  would  have  been  lacking.^  E,  T.  Williams,  one 
of  the  expert  advisors,  thoroughly  familiar  with  Chinese 
questions,  also  expressed  the  opinion  that  "Japan  probably 
would  have  refused  to  sign  the  treaty, ' '  if  she  had  not  been 
awarded  the  Shantung  settlement.  "An  impasse  would 
have  resulted, "  ^  he  said. 

IV.  To  complete  an  understanding  of  the  feelings  of 
the  Chinese,  as  well  as  of  the  Japanese,  it  is  necessary  to 
know  just  what  the  Chinese  delegates  claimed  or  wanted. 
They  presented  desiderata  rather  than  claims.  They  asked, 
perhaps,  too  much,  but  their  much  asking  was  in  proportion 
to  their  great  faith  in  the  League  idea  and  in  the  justice  of 
the  Peace  Conference.  Their  requests  included  seven  im- 
portant particulars: 

1.  Spheres  of  influence  and  special  interests.  "The 
Powers  are  to  declare  that  they  neither  possess  nor  claim" 
any  of  these,  and  "are  ready  to  revise  all  treaties,  agree- 
ments, notes  and  contracts  establishing  such." 

2.  Troops  and  police.  "All  foreign  troops  and  police 
on  Chinese  soil  to  be  immediately  withdrawn,"  especially 
Legation  guards. 

'  Press  notices,  August  20,  1919. 
*  Press  reports,  August  23,  1919. 


198  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE?      ' 

3.  Foreign  post-oflBces,  wireless  stations  and  telegraphs. 
"All  the  post-offices  to  be  suppressed  before  January  1, 
1921,  and  no  telegraphic  installation  to  be  established  after- 
ward." 

4.  Consular  jurisdiction.  On  China's  promulgation  of 
five  new  codes  by  end  of  1924  and  creating  new  tribunals, 
extra-territorial  jurisdiction  is  to  be  abandoned. 

5.  Leased  territories.  "These  are  to  be  restored  to 
China." 

6.  Foreign  municipal  Concessions.  "All  such  are  to  be 
restored  to  China  at  the  end  of  1924." 

7.  Autonomy  in  respect  of  customs  tariff.  "After  a  time 
to  be  agreed  upon  mutually,  China  is  to  have  the  right  to 
fix  her  own  tariffs." 

All  these  were  just  requests.  Their  fulfillment  depended 
on  all  the  Treaty  Powers,  and  not  on  Japan  alone.  If  Great 
Britain,  France  and  the  United  States  had  complied,  Japan 
would  have  followed  suit.  Japan's  excessive  demands 
would  have  disappeared.  China  would  have  been  helped 
forward  on  the  path  of  progress,  independence,  self-deter- 
mination and  a  national  spirit.  President  Wilson,  in  an 
address  delivered  at  Pueblo,  September  25,  1919,  confessed 
•  that  China  had  not  been  treated  rightly,  but  trusted  to  the 
League  to  rectify  what  the  past  and  present  had  failed  to 
accomplish.  Better  men  in  the  future  were  to  come  to 
China's  rescue.    I  quote  in  part: 

You  have  heard  a  great  deal,  something  that  was  true  and  a 
great  deal  that  was  false,  about  that  provision  of  the  Treaty  which 
hands  over  to  Japan  the  rights  enjoyed  in  the  province  of 
Shantung  in  China.  In  the  first  place,  Germany  did  not  enjoy  any 
rights  there  that  other  nations  had  not  already  claimed.  For  my 
part,  my  judgment,  my  moral  judgment,  is  against  the  whole  set 
of  concessions.  They  were  all  of  them  unjust  to  China,  they  ought 
never  to  have  been  enacted,  they  were  all  exacted  by  duress  from 
a  great  body  of  thoughtful  and   ancient  and  helpless  people. 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  199 

There  never  was  any  right  in  any  of  them.  Thank  God,  America 
never  asked  for  any,  never  dreamed  of  asking  for  any.  But  when 
Germany  got  this  concession  in  1898,  the  United  States  made  no 
protest  whatever.  .  .  .  Immediately  following  that  concession  to 
Germany  there  was  a  concession  to  Russia  of  the  same  sort,  of 
Port  Arthur,  and  Port  Arthur  was  handed  over  subsequently  to 
Japan  on  the  very  territory  of  the  United  States.  Do  you  re- 
member that  when  Russia  and  Japan  got  into  war  with  one 
another,  the  war  was  brought  to  a  conclusion  by  a  treaty  written 
at  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire,  and  in  that  treaty,  without  the 
slightest  intimation  from  any  authoritative  sources  in  America 
that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  had  any  objection,  Port 
Arthur,  Chinese  territory,  was  turned  over  to  Japan?  .  .  . 
Article  X  says  that  no  member  of  the  League,  and  that  includes 
all  these  nations  that  have  demanded  these  things  unjustly  of 
China,  shall  impair  the  territorial  integrity  or  the  political  inde- 
pendence of  any  other  member  of  the  League ;  and  China  is  going 
to  be  a  member  of  the  League.  ...  I  for  my  part  have  a  pro- 
found sympathy  for  China  and  I  am  proud  to  have  taken  part  in 
an  arrangement  which  promises  the  protection  of  the  world  to  the 
rights  of  China. 

This  is  aU  very  well  to  say;  the  promises  are  glowing. 
But  China  has  had  promises  before — when  she  declared  war 
to  please  the  Allies,  and  when  she  appeared  through  official 
representation  at  the  Conference  in  Paris.  What  did  the 
promises  amount  to?  Why  postpone  an  act  of  redress? 
President  Wilson  took  part  in  the  arrangement  not  only 
of  a  League  of  Nations  but  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace.  The 
Treaty  was  the  first-fruits  of  the  League.  That  Treaty 
compelled  Germany  to  renounce  all  that  was  hers  in  Shan- 
tung in  favour  of  Japan.  And  China  was  deserted.  "By 
their  fruits  ye  shall  know  them."^ 

It  was  said  that  compromise  was  unavoidable.  But  on 
matters  of  principle  there  can  be  no  compromise.     This 

*  See  Appendix  V. 


200  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Treaty,  as  a  lesson  to  Germany,  was  to  be  a  treaty  of  justice. 
High  moral  ideas  had  been  proclaimed  by  the  head  of  the 
American  nation  and  had  been  accepted  by  both  sides  in 
the  deadly  conflict  as  a  basis  for  negotiation.  The  Covenant 
of  a  great  League  was  drafted,  safeguarding  peace  and  up- 
holding righteousness.  And  at  the  end  the  Chinese  are  told, 
"Yes,  we  have  all  done  wrong.  There  is  no  help  for  it. 
We  promise  by  an  oath  on  the  Covenant  that  we  will  not 
wrong  you  in  the  future." 

When  the  decision  of  April  30,  1919,  was  made  known  to 
the  Chinese  delegation,  and  consolation  was  offered  in  the 
remedial  powers  of  the  League  of  Nations,  if  the  Chinese 
only  remained  patient,  one  of  the  delegates  gave  this  apt 
reply ; 

Sirs,  your  assurances  do  not  give  us  any  ground  for  hope.  In 
the  first  place  the  League  of  Nations  as  yet  has  no  existence; 
secondly,  if  it  is  organized  its  power  and  authority  are  prob- 
lematical; thirdly,  in  any  event  the  real  ruling  power  of  the 
League  will  be  the  same  nations  that  made  the  decision  in  the 
Shantung  case  and  wrote  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  and  the  Cove- 
nant of  the  League;  fourthly,  it  is  not  logical  to  assume  that  a 
League  that  is  created  in  conjunction  with  the  Treaty,  and  by  the 
same  body,  is  intended  to  reverse  the  provisions  of  that  Treaty; 
fifthly,  it  is  only  the  weak  nations  that  are  told  to  depend  on  the 
League  for  justice,  while  the  strong  Powers  refuse  to  depend  on 
it  for  their  own  security  and  rights,  but  state  openly  that  other 
guarantees  are  necessary. 

What  happened  a  few  days  later  when  the  Treaty,  em- 
bodying the  Covenant,  was  signed,  is  that  the  Chinese  dele- 
gates, having  been  humiliated  and  wronged,  were  absent, 
and  all  because  their  requests  as  to  how  they  r-ould  sign  in 
honour  and  self-respect  were  spumed  as  had  been  all  their 
requests  at  the  Peace  Table  before  the  Supreme  Council. 
I  quote  the  Chinese  Statement  to  President  Wilson,  June 
28,  1919: 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  201 

Our  country  has  given  way  step  by  step  in  our  claim.  At  first, 
we  wanted  to  embody  a  reservation  in  the  Treaty  itself;  it  was  not 
granted.  Then  we  modified  our  demand  to  mentioning  it  in  an 
annex;  it  was  also  disallowed.  We  further  asked  that  a  declara- 
tion guaranteeing  restitution  be  given  us  independently  of  the 
Treaty;  again  not  granted.  At  last  we  even  offered  to  accept  a 
mere  declaration  without  any  guarantee;  our  offer  was  again  re- 
jected. We  were  obliged  to  say  that  as  a  final  compromise  we 
would  accept  a  letter  from  each  of  the  Great  Powers,  simply 
stating  that  our  signature  on  the  Treaty  would  not  prejudice  any 
readjustment  that  we  might  propose  in  the  future.  Up  to  this 
noon  all  our  requests  have  been  entirely  rejected  to  our  disap- 
pointment. .  .  .  It  is  to  our  surprise  and  indignation  that  the 
Plenary  Council  should  have  acted  in  such  an  autocratic  way, 
without  showing  even  an  infinitesimal  degree  of  consideration 
toward  the  honour  and  dignity  of  our  country. 

China  made  many  requests  to  the  Peace  Conference,  and 
from  the  standpoint  of  reason  and  the  sense  of  right  argued 
well.  China  had,  indeed,  a  hearing.  Secret  agreements 
made  by  China's  military  faction  and  Japan  were  brought 
to  the  light.  China  opposed  Japan,  antagonized  Japan  and 
trusted  America,  Great  Britain  and  France.  After  all  this, 
it  is  not  China,  but  Japan  in  China,  that  is  stronger  than 
before  the  war,  yea,  before  the  framing  of  that  Treaty  which 
is  to  assure  the  world  a  reign  of  justice  under  lasting 
peace. 

Japan  cannot  alone  be  blamed.  Even  the  United  States 
must  be  held  responsible,  especially  the  Executive  Branch 
of  the  Government.  The  American  Minister  in  Peking  for 
more  than  two  years  buoyed  China  up  with  assurances  of 
American  succour.  The  President  of  the  United  States, 
chief  exponent  of  right  principle  at  the  Peace  Conference, 
failed  to  satisfy  China's  hopes  or  the  world's  sense  of  jus- 
tice. The  whole  procedure  from  February,  1917,  to  June, 
1919,  has  been  detrimental  to  American  prestige  and  in- 


202  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

fluence  in  China.  The  Japanese  may  be  blamed,  but  not  by 
Americans. 

Having  failed  at  Paris  with  the  executive  and  diplomatic 
agents  of  the  three  mighty  nations  whose  word  is  law,  a  few 
of  the  Chinese  delegation  had  recourse  to  the  United  States 
Senate,  like  a  drowning  man  clutching  at  a  straw.  As 
early  as  May,  1919,  they  urged  the  Senate  to  assist  in  se- 
curing a  revision  of  the  Shantung  settlement  "by  speedily 
passing  a  resolution  affirming  the  same  to  be  inconsistent 
with  the  national  honour  and  interests  of  America,  an  in- 
credible injustice  to  China,  and  a  danger  to  the  world 
peace."  After  much  agitation  the  Senate  Committee  of  For- 
eign Relations  presented  to  the  Senate  a  majority  report 
favouring  as  an  amendment  the  substitution  of  "China" 
for  "Japan"  in  the  three  Articles  156,  157  and  158.  With 
my  knowledge  of  the  Oriental  temperament,  this  drastic 
alteration  seems  unnecessarily  offensive  to  the  Japanese, 
while  it  will  accomplish  nothing  for  China. 

Later  on,  November  18,  1919,  the  Senate  adopted  by  a 
majority  vote  fifteen  reservations,  the  seventh  of  which 
reads : 

The  United  States  withholds  its  assent  to  Articles  156,  157  and 
158,  and  reserves  full  liberty  of  action  with  respect  to  any  con- 
troversy which  may  arise  under  said  Articles  between  the  Re- 
public of  China  and  the  Empire  of  Japan. 

Still  later  the  words  at  the  close  referring  to  China  and 
Japan  were  omitted,  and  the  reservation  as  such  was  again 
adopted  by  a  majority  vote.  Either  form  being  linked  with 
all  the  other  reservations  and  then  with  ratification  of  the 
Treaty  as  thus  modified  requires  a  two-thirds  vote  to  be 
effective.  The  reservation,  however,  defends  American 
prestige  in  the  estimation  of  the  Chinese,  and  so  far  is  a 
patriotic  move.    But  no  one  need  suppose  that  China  will 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  203 

be  rescued  thereby  from  her  present  entanglements.  If 
China  is  rescued,  it  will  not  come  from  the  Versailles 
Treaty,  even  as  thus  modified,  neither  will  salvation  come,  I 
am  sorry  to  admit,  from  the  United  States  Government. 
China's  rescue  depends,  strange  to  say,  on  a  changed 
Japan. 

After  all  the  discussion  that  has  taken  place,  in  the  Sen- 
ate, in  the  White  House,  on  many  a  platform  and  in  the 
secular  and  religious  press,  the  conscientious-minded  man 
must  be  amazed  at  the  way  America's  chief  delegate  at 
Paris  failed  so  conspicuously  to  match  principle  with  prac- 
tice. Such  an  one  must  all  the  more  be  amazed  when  he 
sees  the  stand  taken  by  the  President,  even  in  February, 
1920,  in  reference  to  the  Adriatic  or  Fiume  question,  and 
how  he  remained  indifferent  on  the  Shantung  or  Tsingtao 
question.  Both  questions  concern  two  allies  in  the  late  war. 
Both  may  equally  well  be  settled  by  the  same  principles. 
This  is  what  the  President  promulgated  February  10,  1920 : 

The  American  Government,  while  no  less  generous  in  its  desire 
to  accord  to  Italy  every  advantage  to  which  she  could  offer  any 
proper  claims,  feels  that  it  cannot  sacrifice  the  principles  for 
which  it  entered  the  war  to  gratify  the  improper  ambitions  of  one 
of  its  associates,  or  to  purchase  a  temporary  appearance  of  calm 
in  the  Adriatic  at  the  price  of  a  future  world  conflagration. 

Substitute  the  word  "Japan"  for  "Italy,"  and  "Shan- 
tung" for  "the  Adriatic,"  in  the  above,  and  the  problem  of 
Eastern  Asia  is  well  stated. 

Note  also  these  words : 

It  [the  American  Government]  is  unwilhng  to  recognize  p.n 
unjust  settlement  based  on  a  secret  treaty,  the  tprms  of  which  are 
inconsistent  with  the  new  world  conditions,  or  an  unjust  settle- 
ment arrived  at  by  employing  that  secret  treaty  as  an  instrument 
of  coercion. 


204  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Apply  this  to  the  China-Japan  question,  and  what  would 
the  plain  Chinese  reasonably  infer?  But  the  President 
even  more  aptly,  and  without  any  change  in  language, 
states  the  truth  as  adapted  to  China  and  Japan,  just  as  well 
as  to  Jugo-Slavia  and  Italy.  The  words  may  be  pondered 
as  to  whether  their  significance  is  the  same  in  Eastern  Asia 
as  in  Southern  Europe : 

If  substantial  agreement  on  what  is  just  and  reasonable  is 
not  to  determine  international  issues;  if  the  country  possessing 
the  most  endurance  in  pressing  its  demands  rather  than  the  coun- 
try armed  with  a  just  cause  is  to  gain  the  support  of  the  Powers; 
if  forcible  seizure  of  coveted  areas  is  to  be  permitted  and  con- 
doned, and  is  to  receive  ultimate  justification  by  creating  a  situa- 
tion so  difficult  that  decision  favourable  to  the  aggressor  is 
deemed  a  practical  necessity;  if  deliberately  incited  ambition  is, 
under  the  name  of  national  sentiment,  to  be  rewarded  at  the 
expense  of  the  small  and  the  weak;  if,  in  a  word,  the  old  order 
of  things  which  brought  so  many  evils  on  the  world  is  to  prevail, 
then  the  time  is  not  yet  come  when  this  Government  can  enter  a 
concert  of  powers,  the  very  existence  of  which  must  depend  upon 
a  new  spirit  and  a  new  order. 

How  the  Chinese  nation,  yea,  how  the  whole  world  would 
be  stirred  with  new  moral  vigor,  if  it  could  realize  that  such 
words  were  to  be  applied  as  much  to  one  question  and  to 
one  portion  of  humanity  as  to  another !  If  President  Wil- 
son has  had  a  duty  to  speak  positively  to  Italy  and  the 
European  Allies,  how  much  greater  his  duty  to  warn  Japan 
and  to  help  China,  bearing  in  mind  that  it  was  the  Amer- 
ican Government  which  thrust  the  war  issue  into  China  and 
assured  the  Chinese  of  the  dawning  everywhere  of  a  new 
era. 

It  has  been  well  said  that  nothing  is  settled  until  it  is 
settled  right.  And  there  are  many  wrong  settlements  in 
this  Treaty  even  more  than  in  the  League.    The  following 


THE  BLOW  STRUCK  AT  CHINA  205 

brave  words  of  Dr.  Felix  Adler  ^  form  a  fitting  summing-up 
on  the  basis  of  high  ethics : 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  we  must  be  satisfied  with  the  begin- 
nings of  a  League  of  Nations,  and  trust  to  future  development 
to  improve  it.  But  if  it  begins  with  the  seeds  of  mischief  in  its 
very  constitution,  future  development  can  only  serve  to  ripen  the 
evil  seeds  into  full-blown  fruition.  It  is  said  that  half  a  loaf  is 
better  than  no  bread,  and  that  compromises  are  unavoidable.  But 
no  bread  is  better  than  a  fraction  of  a  loaf  if  that  fraction  con- 
tains poison;  and  compromise,  while  indispensable  as  to  the 
means  by  which  policies  and  principles  are  effectuated,  is  wholly 
inadmissible  in  respect  to  the  principles  themselves.  To  give 
way  in  first-rate  matters  of  principle  is  not  to  compromise  but  to 
capitulate. 

The  great  men  of  mighty  nations,  who  were  assembled 
in  Paris,  in  the  memorable  year,  1919,  thought  perhaps  in 
their  hearts,  as  they  arranged  so  delicately  the  sad  obse- 
quies for  China,  that  she  was  now  laid  away  to  rest,  never 
again  to  breathe  the  breath  of  life. 

China's  national  entity  and  her  glory  were  indeed  badly 
shattered  by  the  potentates  of  peace  who  met  in  Paris.  But 
was  her  life  wholly  extinct  ?  Is  there  hope  for  China  in  the 
future? 

»  The  Nation,  May  24,  1919. 


CHAPTER   IX 

THE  FUTURE  PROSPECTS  OF  CHINA 

The  obsequies  of  China  have  taken  place,  but  she  is  not  yet 
dead ;  she  is  not  even  asleep.  She  has  only  suffered  a  severe 
operation  and  is  now  convalescent. 

The  feeling  of  the  Ch::iese  over  the  decision  reached  at 
the  Paris  Conference  concerning  the  demands  of  China  and 
Japan  is  well  expressed  by  a  statement  from  a  delegate  to 
Paris,  the  seventy-fourth  descendant  of  Confucius,  a  state-'' 
ment  sent  out  by  the  Associated  Press  from  the  home  of 
Confucius,  September  6,  1919: 

We  trusted  Mr.  Wilson  entirely  too  much.  We  sent  a  note  to 
President  Wilson  asking  him  how  he  could  reconcile  assurances  he 
had  given  to  China  before  she  had  entered  the  war  with  the 
decision.  He  sent  a  representative  to  us  expressing  his  sorrow 
and  he  suggested  that  he  would  help  us  when  the  League  of  Na- 
tions was  formed. 

On  the  morning  of  the  day  set  for  the  signing  of  the  Treaty, 
after  China  had  been  refused  the  right  of  signing  with  reserva- 
tions, crowds  of  students  patrolled  in  front  of  the  hotel  of  Lou 
Tseng-tsiang,  our  chief  delegate,  who  had  been  suffering  ill-health 
and  was  again  confined  to  his  bed.  The  question  of  signing  had 
not  been  decided  when  the  delegates  gathered  in  his  room.  He 
was  asked  for  the  last  time  if  he  would  consent  to  sign  and  he 
replied  with  tears  streaming  from  his  eyes: 

"  I  signed  the  Twenty-one  Demands.  Can  I,  must  I,  also  sign 
this?"  It  was  the  only  answer  he  gave  and  the  delegates  under- 
stood. That  is  why  when  the  Conference  was  called  to  order  the 
Beats  of  the  Chinese  were  vacant. 

206 


THE  FUTURE  PROSPECTS  OF  CHINA        207 

Facts  are  hard  things  to  face,  but  they  must  be  faced  by 
China  if  she  hopes  for  rehabilitation,  prosperity  and  con- 
tentment. Facts  are  of  the  past  and  shape  the  destiny  of 
the  future.  That  is  the  reason  so  few  Chinese  are  hopeful. 
They  feel  themselves  in  bondage  to  Fate,  for  facts  are  fatal- 
istic. A  fadt  accompli  is  irreversible.  Wrongdoing,  more 
of  the  nation  than  of  the  individual,  cannot  be  wiped  out, 
though  it  may  be  condoned  or  forgiven.  Wrong  done  to  a 
nation — to  China,  for  example — is  a  blow,  not  only  at  na- 
tional existence,  but  at  the  indispensable  quality  of  hope- 
fulness. There  is  not  any  such  thing  as  return  to  statiis 
quo  ante.  Considering,  then,  what  has  happened  to  China 
these  last  five  years,  all  the  calamities  unnecessarily  im- 
posed upon  her  by  outside  nations,  how  can  we  Westerners 
expect  to  find  buoyant,  sanguine,  joyful  Chinese? 

The  people  of  China  through  hereditary  influences  are 
stoical  and  patient.  They  bow  to  the  inevitable.  Let  me 
give  to  them,  and  to  every  one  else  interested  in  China's 
future,  this  philosophy  of  an  ancient  Greek  Stoic:  "When 
what  thou  wiliest  befalls  not,  thou  then  must  will  what  be- 
f alleth. ' '  To  this  let  me  add  the  philosophy  of  Christian- 
ity, that  over  all  is  a  kind  Providence,  overruling  evil, 
' '  making  the  wrath  of  man  to  praise  Him, ' '  and  so  shaping 
human  events  that  for  him  who  follows  the  will  of  God 
"all  things  work  together  for  good."  As  I  look  at  events 
that  have  just  hurried  by,  this  philosophy  is  the  only  con- 
solation and  stay  for  the  millions  of  China,  distracted  and 
keenly  disappointed.  "Some  trust  in  horses  and  some  in 
chariots" — some  in  Governments  and  some  in  Presidents — 
but,  let  the  Chinese  now  say,  "we  will  trust  in  the  Lord 
our  God. ' '  On  the  negative  side,  the  Chinese  will  do  well 
if  they  no  longer  look  for  succour  to  outside  nations,  not 
even  to  the  American  Government,  and  on  the  positive 
side,  let  them  rely  on  Heaven  and  then  on  themselves. 
"Heaven,"  it  is  said,  "helps  those  who  help  themselves," 


208  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

A  people  who  have  pushed  ahead  for  so  many  centuries  are 
not  going  to  be  wiped  off  the  map.  A  few  selfish,  grabbing, 
callous  officials  have  not  the  power  to  write  over  China, 
"Mene,  Mene,  Tekel,  Upharsin."  If  China  escaped  the 
fatality  of  the  Boxer  folly,  how  much  more  is  it  possible 
to  escape  the  fatality  of  the  Great  War's  folly.  China, 
indeed,  presents  a  bewildering  maze,  but  no  more  so  than 
most  of  the  countries  of  Europe.  "Where  there's  a  will, 
there's  a  way.'* 

A  correspondent  of  the  Far-Eastern  Bureau  writes :  *  *  It 
is  unfair  to  say  that  China  must  suffer  because  'it  is  her 
own  fault,'  and  'China  ought  to  help  herself.'  "  He  then 
proceeds  to  denounce  Japan  for  solitary,  outstanding  culpa- 
bility. In  my  opinion,  China,  to  be  sure,  "ought  to  help 
herself, ' '  and  she  will  suffer — not  must  suffer — because  it  is 
partly  "her  own  fault."  Let  not  the  Chinese  any  more 
than  others  be  imposed  upon  by  the  fallacies  of  self-com- 
placency.   As  for  their  sufferings,  there  is  a  way  of  escape. 

In  giving  a  forecast  of  China's  future,  I  outline  in  part 
what  is  probable  and  in  part  what  is  possible. 

In  general,  all  the  elements  that  have  brought  misfortune 
to  China  and  that  retard  the  free  action  of  China's  devel- 
opment, should  be  reversed  in  the  reconstructive  policies  of 
the  future.  It  is  not  restoration — going  back  to  the  past — 
that  is  needed  in  China,  but  reconstruction — a  remodelling, 
the  building  of  a  new  structure. 
/  (1)  In  particular,  in  this  new  structure,  there  must 
dwell  a  new  soul,  vivified  by  the  highest  moral  energies. 
During  the  war  period,  and  even  from  the  overthrow  of 
an  alien  dynasty  in  the  first  revolution  of  1911,  the  Chinese 
have  laid  emphasis  on  the  unessential  and  subsidiary  qual- 
ities of  national  prosperity,  rather  than  on  the  essence  of 
the  inner  life.  And,  unfortunately,  this  attitude  of  mind 
has  been  encouraged  by  outside  environment.  The  Chinese 
have  been  thinking,  discussing,  wrangling  about  such  mat- 


THE  FUTURE  PROSPECTS  OF  CHINA       209 

ters  as  forms  of  State — a  monarchy  or  a  republic,  parlia- 
mentary government,  centralization  in  the  President  or  the 
Cabinet,  and  provincial  autonomy.  They  have  divided 
into  two  opposing  factions  over  the  war  issue,  and  then  over 
militarism  versus  democracy.  All  the  time  corruption  has 
been  rampant  in  the  government.  Persuasion  to  action  by 
the  free  use  of  money  played  a  part  when  China  severed 
relations  with  Germany,  and  later  in  the  negotiations  of 
1918  between  China  and  Japan  over  loans  and  concessions, 
the  sale  of  arms  and  military  conventions. 

"China,"  says  an  American  resident  in  Shantung,  "the 
land  richest  in  natural  resources,  richest  in  territory,  has 
already  become  the  power  of  heartless,  militaristic  Japan, 
sold  out  to  her  by  her  own  corrupt  militaristic  clique,  sedu- 
lously, incessantly  solicited  with  Japanese  gold."^ 

If  Japan  and  other  countries,  in  their  war-propaganda, 
in  their  political  ambitions  or  through  military  necessity 
and  commercial  advantages,  have  appealed  to  the  baser  in- 
stincts of  Chinese  oflficialdom,  and  are  to  this  degree  blame- 
worthy, the  Chinese  themselves  must  bear  the  blame  for  a 
quick  readiness  to  be  enticed,  and  for  the  existing  enslave- 
ment that  appalls  the  Chinese  mind.  Conservative  officials 
of  the  old-time  regime,  though  prejudiced  against  foreign 
innovations  and  the  material  improvements  of  the  Western 
world,  were  as  a  whole  more  upright,  patriotic  and  public- 
spirited  than  the  new  type  of  progressive  officials.  I  regard 
the  crux  of  the  question  of  China's  permanency  to  rest 
with  this  moral  factor. 

The  China  Press,  an  American  paper  in  Shanghai,  for 
June  10,  1919,  used  these  wor(?s: 

First  and  foremost,  if  China  is  ever  to  rise  out  of  her  present 
shameful  condition,  every  one  of  her  sons  must  be  taught  that 
treason  to  his  country  is  man's  greatest  crime.  .   .   .  The  Peking 

»  Far-Eaatem  FortnighUy,  September  29,  1919. 


210  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

officials  have  not  only  sold  the  wealth  of  the  country,  but  they 
have  betrayed  her  integrity.  The  worst  enemies  of  China  are  not 
in  Tokio  but  in  Peking. 

It  is  not  political  reform  or  any  kind  of  superficial,  ma- 
terial reform  that  can  save  China  in  her  present  entangle- 
ments; it  must  be  a  downright  moral  reform,  it  must  be 
I  spiritual  reformation.  Here  is  a  task  for  Christian  mis- 
sionaries; they  have  had  their  interlude  of  magnifying 
I  war,  let  them  now  revert  to  fundamental  principles  of  the 
1  religious  consciousness.  And  the  Chinese  will  respond.  No 
greater  opportunity  for  appeal  to  the  conscience,  to  reason, 
to  the  sense  of  fairness,  exists  anywhere  than  among  the 
Chinese  people.  Their  future  is  promising,  if  they  with  the 
aid  of  foreigners  build  their  new  structure  with  righteous- 
ness as  the  corner-stone. 
J  (2)  China's  future  lies  in  the  abandonment  of  militar- 
istic methods  and  in  the  pursuit  of  peace  and  international 
conciliation.  If  there  is  any  one  object  which  Americans, 
and  to  a  certain  extent  the  Allied  peoples,  have  proclaimed 
to  the  world  more  than  any  other,  it  is  the  overthrow  of 
Prussian  militarism.  But  men  are  learning  gradually  that 
some  other  tag  beside  "Prussian"  must  be  affixed  to  that 
enemy  of  mankind,  militarism.  In  reality  the  Allied  na- 
tions have  been  more  keen  on  destroying  the  Prussian 
species  of  the  genus  militarism  than  in  destroying  the  genus 
itself.  It  is  recognized  that  the  strongest  Allied  nation  in 
the  Orient  has  been  Japan,  and  that  Japan  is  the  prototype 
both  of  militarism  and  oi  its  Prussian  form.  It  must  also 
be  recognized  that  Japan,  Ijecause  of  her  superiority  in  a 
military  way,  has  been  accoided  a  permanent  position  in 
the  Supreme  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  "one  of 
the  five  great  Powers. "  Is  it  anj  wonder,  then,  that  young 
Chinese,  fired  with  a  new  national  spirit,  should  come  to 
believe  that  China,  in  order  to  be  pieserved,  must  also  be- 


THE  FUTURE  PROSPECTS  OF  CHINA       211 

come  military?     Prof.  John  Dewey,  writing  of  the  con- 
ditions in  China  after  the  war,  says :  ^ 

At  present  the  militaristic  faction  whose  power  was  confirmed 
by  the  happenings  of  the  summer  of  1917  is  still  in  control  of  the 
government.  .  .  .  They  have  welcomed  the  demonstration  offered 
at  Paris  that  Might  still  makes  Right  in  the  case  of  weak  nations, 
so  that  in  a  strange  and  subtle  way  the  diplomatic  victory  of 
Japan  in  particular  and  of  imperialism  in  general  has  been  a 
vindication  of  their  own  anti-democratic  and  militaristic  policy. 

One  of  the  younger  class  in  China,  a  representative  at 
Paris  of  the  Canton  Government  and  of  Christian  adher- 
ents, in  a  speech  in  New  York  City,  July  25,  1919,  spoke 
these  sensible  words: 

We  hope  our  defeat  will  serve  to  arouse  the  sentiment  of  all 
China,  to  the  end  that  she  will  depend  upon  herself  and  that  her 
sorrow  will  be  her  national  salvation.  The  war  started  as  a 
conflict  of  Right  over  Might,  but  I  do  not  see  that  the  end  of  the 
war  justifies  that  idea.  Germany  is  crushed,  but  there  is  another 
Germany  in  the  Far  East,  and  perhaps  this  will  not  be  the  last 
war,  for  there  surely  will  be  another  if  justice  is  not  done  now. 

It  would  have  been  better,  so  far  as  China  is  concerned, 
if  Americans  and  other  democratic  peoples,  instead  of  con- 
centrating their  energies  and  hate  on  the  overthrow  of 
Germany  had  fought  for  the  overthrow  of  militarism  and 
had  refused  for  any  reason  to  give  any  countenance  to  it, 
whether  found  in  Germany,  in  Japan,  or  in  the  military 
faction,  the  governing  body  of  China.  By  the  support  given 
to  such  a  body  of  men  in  China  by  such  nations  as  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  and  by  China 's  participa- 
tion in  the  war  and  her  advocacy  of  all  kinds  of  war-meas- 
ures, the  view  now  held  is  that  China,  too,  must  build  up 

*  The  New  Republic,  September  10,  1919. 


J 


212  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

a  strong  army  and  navy,  in  order  to  find  a  place  in  the 
family  of  nations,  and  perhaps  later  on  become  one  of  a 
future  Big  Six  in  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  world.  But 
this  view  is  superficial.  The  craze  for  war  and  disbelief  in 
the  power  of  ideas  cannot  last  forever.  Even  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  intimates  a  coming  universal  disarmament, 
making  a  start  with  the  Central  Powers.  Let  the  Chinese 
consider  how  much  greater  the  gain  of  their  country  would 
have  been,  if  they  had  remained  at  peace  at  home  and 
abroad  and  had  pursued  all  peaceful  pursuits.  Their  dire- 
ful experiences  from  the  war  should  make  them  turn  away 
from  war  in  disgust,  and  forego  hereafter  the  military  am- 
bition. That  extreme  lover  of  universal  peace  termed  a 
pacifist  may  be  a  fool  in  virile  America,  but  he  fits  in  well 
to  life  in  China,  where  the  indigenous  religion  known  as 
Taoism  teaches  both  pacifism  and  passive-ism. 

Let  it  be  borne  in  mind  that  if  China  should  begin  to 
spend  millions  on  a  vast  army  and  a  strong  navy  as  a  dis- 
tinctively national  movement,  the  Japanese  under  existing 
conditions  would  assume  direction,  or,  in  case  of  a  navy, 
would  wait  until  it  became  a  valuable  prize  and  then  cap- 
ture it.  Or,  if  China  should  join  with  Japan  in  a  defensive 
and  offensive  military  alliance,  the  development  of  China's 
military  capacity  under  Japanese  guidance  would  prove 
the  menace  of  the  future  and  the  opening  of  the  next  war. 
Is  this  to  be  the  result  of  the  world's  wisdom  which  arises 
from  the  horrors  of  the  last  World  War  ?  Are  the  Chinese 
to  continue  to  be  infatuated  by  the  war  spirit  and  along 
this  line  go  to  their  doom? 

(3)  There  are  great  possibilities  for  China  if  reunion  is 
brought  about  by  the  opposing  governments  centred  in  Pe- 
king and  Canton,  and  commonly  designated  as  the  North 
and  the  South.  The  fourth  revolution  of  China  has  been 
going  on  for  over  three  years.  During  the  period  of  the 
Great  War  no  reconciliation  was  possible,  for  the  military 


THE  FUTURE  PROSPECTS  OF  CHINA       213 

autocratic  Government  at  Peking  was  receiving  the  com- 
mendation and  recognition  of  all  the  Powers,  and  was 
therefore  in  too  sure  a  position  to  talk  peace  with  the 
"rebels"  of  the  Canton  Constitutional. Government.  When 
armistice  was  granted  to  the  Central  Powers  and  a  Peace 
Conference  opened  in  Paris,  another  Peace  Conference  be- 
gan in  Shanghai  between  chosen  representatives  of  the  op- 
posing factions.  They  met  and  discussed  all  manner  of 
questions,  but  came  to  no  agreement.  It  looked  as  if  this 
Shanghai  Peace  Conference  was  a  camouflage  for  the  Al- 
lied Powers  so  that  no  objection  might  be  raised  to  China's 
appearing  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference.  When  the  Treaty 
of  Peace  was  signed  at  Versailles,  the  Peace  Conference  at 
Shanghai  took  a  vacation.  When  the  President  of  China 
proclaimed  a  state  of  peace  with  Germany,  renewed  efforts 
were  put  forth  to  bring  together  China 's  opposing  factions. 
At  the  outset  the  hindrances  seemed  too  great.  But  Chinese 
leaders  should  persist  till  civil  strife  has  come  to  an  end, 
and  China  is  again  a  united  land  as  she  was  from  July, 
1916,  to  February,  1917,  under  the  leadership  of  President 
Li  Yuan-hung. 

Professor  Jenks  ^  says,  quite  correctly : 

The  Japanese  policy  in  China  has  been,  clearly,  to  keep  con- 
ditions unsettled  by  fomenting  disturbances  and  hostilities  be- 
tween the  so-called  North  and  South  factions,  and  to  keep  China 
weak.  This  is  not  a  matter  of  suspicion  or  careless  observation 
on  the  part  of  prejudiced  Americans.  It  is  a  matter  oflScially 
known,  reported  upon  and  recorded  in  our  State  Department,  and 
supported  by  the  overwhelming  testimony  of  Chinese,  American 
and  British  officials  both  North  and  South  who  are  fully  con- 
versant with  the  facts. 

This  task,  then,  set  before  the  Chinese  is  an  easy  one  as 
compared  with  the  attainment  of  even  a  modicum  of  their 
*  In  North  American  Review,  September,  1919. 


214  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

aims  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference.  The  first  thing  is  to 
hold  themselves  aloof  from  Japanese  blandishments  as  ex- 
tended to  either  side  in  the  civil  strife,  and  to  determine 
that  the  Chinese  must  draw  near  to  each  other — an  internal 
entente  cordiale — before  they  draw  near  to  others,  who 
have  State  interests  of  their  own.  The  second  thing  is  for 
the  two  factions  to  agree  on  a  perfectly  legitimate  compro- 
mise, vastly  different  from  all  the  Paris  compromises,  that 
both  the  old  Parliament  holding  over  at  Canton  and  the 
National  Council  peculiarly  chosen  for  Peking  alike  dis- 
solve themselves  and  that  new  members  of  the  National 
Parliament  be  elected  according  to  the  Regulations  drawn 
up  under  the  Provisional  Constitution  and  voted  upon  by 
the  old  legitimate  Parliament.  Other  divisive  questions  can 
easily  await  the  reconstructive  period.  The  only  fear  is 
that  the  Military  Governors  and  their  militaristic  com- 
rades, having  had  a  taste  of  power  and  having  felt  the 
glamour  of  gold,  will  put  self  ahead  of  nation.  Even  here, 
appreciating  as  I  do  the  moral  substratum  of  Chinese  char- 
acter, I  believe  in  the  efficacy  of  persuasive  argument  when 
brought  to  bear  on  the  higher  instincts  of  these  same  mili- 
tary men. 

(4)  Another  task  set  before  the  Chinese  is  to  seek 
friendly  co-operation  mth  the  Japanese,  rather  than  to  in- 
tensify the  spirit  of  alienation  and  antagonism  in  either 
people.  This  is,  of  course,  a  double  task,  as  great  for  Japan 
as  for  China,  but  for  the  moment  I  emphasize  China's  part 
in  the  laudable  undertaking.  That  which  makes  it  hard  for 
the  Chinese  to  adopt  this  policy  of  reconciliation  is  the 
plain  fact  that  China  has  been  woefully  wronged  by  Japan 
in  these  years  of  perilous  association.  Another  hindrance 
comes  from  the  prevailing  unwillingness  among  the  strong 
Powers  to  be  reconciled  to  their  own  enemies  in  war.  A 
third  obstacle  comes  from  the  atmosphere  which  the  Chinese 
.  daily  breathe  from  British  and  American  environment  in 


THE  FUTURE  PROSPECTS  OF  CHINA       215 

China,  that  Japan  is  the  wrongdoer,  that  Japan  is  the  fu- 
ture world-menace,  that  Japan  must  be  fought  sooner  or 
later,  and  that  Japan  cannot  be  trusted.  Let  me  give  two 
or  three  illustrations. 

At  the  end  of  May,  1919,  the  Peking  Missionary  Associa- 
tion, composed  of  British  and  American  missionaries, 
passed  a  resolution  to  be  dispatched  to  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence, expressing  in  a  most  commendable  spirit  and  in  mod- 
erate language  **the  deep  disappointment  and  apprehension 
caused  in  all  the  best  sections  of  Chinese  opinion"  over  the 
Shantung  settlement  in  the  peace  treaty.  Where  these  mis- 
sionaries erred  was  in  their  limited  horizon.  They  saw 
clearly  how  Japan  should  not  gain  at  China's  expense,  but 
they  overlooked  all  the  wrong  which  their  own  British  and 
American  Governments  had  wrought  upon  China  in  days 
gone  by,  especially  during  the  period  of  the  war,  and  their 
backwardness  to  release  to  China  powers  and  privileges  ac- 
corded Japan.  I  here  quote  from  a  letter  written  by  an 
American  missionary  in  Shanghai : 

The  poor  Japanese  are  now  the  Pariahs  of  Shanghai,  They 
are  absolutely  boycotted  by  Chinese  and  Americans,  and  many 
of  the  English.  So  far  as  Shantung  is  concerned,  I  don't  see  the 
justice  of  condoning  the  secret  treaty  of  England,  France  and  Co., 
giving  Shantung  to  the  Japs,  then  frothing  at  the  mouth  at  Japan 
for  proposing  to  abide  by  the  treaty.  It  is  so  funny  to  hear 
English  people  out  here  blaming  America  and  especially  Wilson 
for  the  Shantung  tragedy.  They  have  not  one  word  of  criticism 
for  England's  giving  away  Shantung  to  Japan,  but  criticize 
American  weakness  and  Wilson's  hypocrisy  as  the  cause  of  the 
debacle. 

Another  illustration  is  a  Resolution  of  the  Anglo-Amer- 
ican Association  in  Peking,  telegraphed  to  the  New  York 
Times,  June  7,  1919.  The  British  and  American  Ministers 
are  reported  as  being  present  at  the  meeting.    The  Resolu- 


216  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

tion  is  more  strongly  worded  than  that  of  the  missionary 
body.  The  implication  is  that  the  wrong  and  the  danger 
come  from  the  gain  which  Japan  acquires.  This  is  true, 
but  what  about  English  and  American  complicity  ?  I  quote 
a  few  sentences : 

We  express  our  solemn  conviction  that  this  decision  will  create 
conditions  that  must  inevitably  bring  about  extreme  discord  be- 
tween the  Chinese  people  and  Japan  and  raise  a  most  serious 
hindrance  to  the  development  of  economic  interests  in  China  and 
other  countries  .  .  .  conditions,  which  are  not  only  subversive 
of  the  principle  of  national  self-determination  but  also  a  denial 
of  the  policy  of  the  open  door  principle  of  equal  opportunity  will 
greatly  be  accentuated,  if  Japan,  a  near  neighbour,  be  now  sub- 
stituted for  Germany,  whose  centre  of  political  and  economic 
activities  was  on  the  other  side  of  the  globe. 

The  real  question  to  put  before  men's  consciences  is  this: 
Why  was  not  a  call  made  to  the  home  governments  by 
these  good  folk  in  Peking  that  England  and  America  ap- 
point a  day  of  prayer  and  humiliation  for  their  national 
complicity  in  international  wrongdoing?  Moreover,  was 
it  quite  playing  the  game  for  the  representatives  of  Eng- 
land and  America  to  pass  censure  on  an  Ally,  when  in  war 
and  peace  they  were  all  supposed  to  be  working  together  in 
a  holy  cause  and  by  the  use  of  holy  means  ?  As  for  China 
it  is  her  mistake  and  danger  to  concentrate  all  her  wrath 
on  one  nation. 

A  third  illustration  is  found  in  the  action  in  the  month  of 
May,  1919,  of  the  Chairman  and  Vice-Chairman  of  the 
Chinese  Chamber  of  Commerce  in  Shanghai,  who  sent  to 
Peking  a  telegram,  suggesting  that  an  envoy  be  sent  to 
Tokio  to  negotiate  for  the  return  of  Kiaochow,  and  that 
friendly  relations  continue  with  Japan.  This  action 
brought  the  wrath  of  the  Chinese  onto  the  heads  of  these 


THE  FUTURE  PROSPECTS  OF  CHINA       217 

two  men,  for  it  was  a  time  of  intense  excitement  over  the 
decision  of  the  Paris  Conference. 

My  own  conviction,  looking  at  the  facts  as  the/  are,  is  _ 
that  the  Chinese,  while  not  grovelling  in  the  dust  to  Japan,      \ 
would  do  well  not  to  stand  aloof  from  a  better  understand-      \ 
ing  and  rapprochement  with  Japan.    Japan  by  the  events 
of  war,  fortunate  for  her  though  unfortunate  for  China 
and,  as  will  be  seen,  also  for  others,  has  acquired  a  pre- 
dominant position  in  China.    It  is  of  no  benefit  to  China       1 
to  increase  the  estrangement.     She  must  exert  herself  to 
cement  the  old  bonds  of  friendship  and  to  regain  her  rights 
by  direct  approach  to  Japan.    Sooner  or  later,  this  direct 
negotiation  will  come  about,  and  the  Chinese  might  as  well 
conform  gracefully. 

The  dilemma  in  which  China  is  placed  has  been  made 
conspicuous  by  the  offer  of  the  Japanese  Government,  made 
January,  1920,  to  negotiate  with  China  as  to  the  restoration 
to  China  of  the  Kiaochow  territory  and  the  carrying  into 
effect  of  the  Versailles  treaty  bearing  on  Shantung.  The 
general  sentiment  of  the  Chinese  people  as  voiced  by  the 
student  class  is  to  stand  aloof  from  such  direct  negotiation. 
At  the  same  time  no  sign  of  relief,  no  cloud  on  the  horizon 
as  large  even  as  a  man's  hand,  is  anywhere  to  be  seen.  Hol- 
lington  K.  Tong  ^  while  plainly  opposed  to  direct  negotia- 
tions, presenting  the  argument  for  the  other  policy,  says: 

Another  view  taken  by  the  pro-direct-negotiation  Ministers  is 
that  following  its  ratification  by  Germany  and  the  principal  Al- 
lied Powers,  the  Treaty  of  Peace  has  come  into  force,  and  its 
Shantung  provision  has  likewise  become  effective.  China  is  too 
weak  to  oppose  the  Allies*  arbitrary  decision  and  the  United 
States  has  resumed  her  former  "  too-proud-to-fight  "  attitude  and 
taken  up  her  hermit  life  once  again,  leaving  European  and 
Asiatic  affairs  singularly  alone,  until  possibly  another  world-wide 

*  Milla/rd'8  Review,  January  31,  1920. 


218  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

war  menaces  her  own  shores.  In  the  meantime,  Japan  has  pos- 
sessed herself  of  all  the  German  rights  in  Shantung  and  is  not 
disposed  to  relinquish  them  in  China's  favour  although  she  is 
willing  to  return  an  empty  shell  in  the  form  of  Kiaoehow  by 
negotiations.  If  her  overtures  for  the  restoration  of  Kiaoehow 
were  rejected,  Japan  would  continue  functioning  in  that  territory 
and  might  one  day  perpetuate  her  possession  of  it  as  she  has  done 
in  Korea. 

It  really  comes  down  to  one  question:  Acknowledging 
that  relief  from  other  sources  is  futile,  has  the  Chinese 
Government  such  capable  men  today  as  to  dare  to  meet 
Japan  in  the  contest  of  diplomacy  with  a  prospect  of  suc- 
cess, or  at  least  with  gain  surpassing  either  an  antagonistic 
or  passive  and  stationary  attitude?  I  am  confident  that 
while  China  may  not  gain  all  that  she  deserves  by  right, 
she  can  gain  more  by  direct  negotiation  than  by  reliance  on 
Powers  which  have  evolved  the  Versailles  treaty  of  peace. 

What  makes  it  doubly  hard  for  calm-minded  Chinese  to 
consent  to  a  rapprochement  to  Japan  is  that  Japan  prior 
to  China's  consent  to  enter  on  negotiations  about  ex-Ger- 
man rights  in  Shantung,  has  begun  to  discuss  the  renewal 
of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance.  Now  such  an  Alliance, 
which  concerns  Chinese  affairs,  is  an  offense  to  all  public- 
spirited  Chinese,  who  have  felt  the  glow  of  a  new  national 
life.  How  inconsiderate,  then,  is  the  proposition  of  Dr. 
Henry  Van  Dyke,  made  in  Tokio,  June  7,  1920,  that  the 
United  States  join  the  Alliance?  Do  Americans  realize 
that  China  is  still  a  treaty-making  power,  and  that  the 
Chinese,  remembering  their  glorious  past,  have  sentiments 
of  national  dignity  which  resent  persistent  humiliation 
from  others  ?  ^ 

(5)  It  is  also  desirable,  as  well  as  probable,  that  the 
Chinese  and  Germans  renew  their  old  friendships.    During 

'  See  Appendix  VI. 


THE  FUTURE  PROSPECTS  OF  CHINA        219 

these  past  years  of  German  enterprise,  commercial,  educa- 
tional and  religious,  many  Chinese  have  become  good 
friends  of  the  Germans.  During  the  war  China's  Allies 
annoyed  China  more  than  China's  enemies  did.  Prof. 
John  Dewey  ^  has  said,  quite  correctly : 

The  German  nationals  in  China  were  upon  the  whole  more 
popular  personally  than  those  of  any  other  country  unless  perhaps 
those  of  the  United  States.  For  however  arrogant  Germany  was 
as  a  nation,  Germans  taken  individually  were  sufficiently  bent  on 
successful  business  to  be  unassuming,  friendly  and  attentive  to 
native  wishes  and  customs. 

I  regard  it  that  a  great  opportunity  lies  before  China  in 
renewing  and  improving  the  old  relations  with  German 
friends  and  with  the  German  Government.  It  is  very  likely 
that  Germany  will  go  much  further  than  the  Allied  nations 
or  even  the  United  States  in  granting  China's  expressed 
desires  for  larger  scope  in  the  development  of  the  Chinese 
spirit  and  in  the  exercise  of  authority  and  control  in  af- 
fairs political  and  economic.  The  Chinese,  moreover,  will 
be  quick  to  make  amends  for  the  personal  and  business  in- 
jury which  they  have  done  to  Germans  through  compulsion 
of  zealous  rivals. 

Already,  April  27,  1919,  a  presidential  mandate  was  is- 
sued from  Peking  that  the  citizens  of  nations  having  no 
treaties  with  China,  as  newly-created  nations,  will  be  de- 
nied the  extra-territorial  privileges  foreigners  have  hitherto 
enjoyed,  and  will  be  placed  under  Chinese  law.  They  in 
return  will  be  granted  residence,  like  the  Chinese,  away 
from  the  circumscribed  area  of  the  treaty-ports.  It  is 
within  possibility  that  the  new  German  Government  will, 
in  the  new  treaty  to  be  made  with  China,  fall  in  with  this 
worthy  desire  of  the  Chinese  to  their  mutual  advantage. 

*  Xa  The  New  Republic,  September  10,  1919. 


220  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

(6)  China,  moreover,  must  guard  herself  against  any 
attempt  to  break,  in  future,  ties  of  friendship  with  any 
nation.  To  be  at  peace  with  all  the  world  produces  a  better 
temper  of  mind  than  irritating  ainmosity  towards  any  par- 
ticular nation.  The  diplomacy  which  China  needs  is  that 
of  good-feeling.  She  can  very  well  leave  all  hate  and 
rancour,  all  clamour  and  bitterness,  to  "outside  nations." 
She  has  enough  territory  and  population  to  look  after  for 
many  a  year,  so  that  no  need  exists  for  again  mixing  in  the 
bewildering,  complicated  problems  of  the  Western  world. 
With  renewed  devotion  to  Chinese  interests,  the  Chinese 
people  of  all  classes  will  find  it  helpful  to  cultivate  the  in- 
ternational mind,  the  cosmopolitan  spirit,  with  no  barriers 
of  sentiment,  though  barriers  of  boundaries  must  ever  re- 
main, each  nation  dwelling  securely  within  its  own  ' '  bounds 
of  habitation." 

(7)  Whether  China  should  favour  a  so-called  interna- 
tional consortium  or  not,  I  am  not  so  sure  as  to  speak  posi- 
tively. I  am  dubious  of  the  scheme.  In  the  first  place  it  is 
an  exclusive  scheme,  much  like  the  League  of  Nations. 
Britain,  France,  the  United  States  and  Japan  are  the  finan- 
cial factors.  In  the  second  place  it  is  an  extraneous  scheme. 
China  is  not  included,  except  in  taking  the  terms  of  this 
foreign  combine.  In  the  third  place  the  group  of  bankers, 
backed  by  their  respective  governments,  may  easily  evolve 
into  a  Debt  Commission,  controlling  China's  finances,  and 
then  controlling  China. 

V       If  all  the  railways  of  China  could  be  nationalized  and 
J     brought  into  one  system  under  direction  of  the  Chinese 
Government  and  aided  by  foreign  experts,  China  would  fare 
better  than  under  a  scheme  of  internationalization. 

Comparing  China's  indebtedness  with  that  of  other  coun- 
tries, she  has  an  easy  task  in  straightening  out  her  financial 
affairs.  Let  civil  strife  come  to  an  end,  and  the  nation  be 
united  as  one  man,  then  in  a  few  years  by  honest  adminis- 


THE  FUTURE  PROSPECTS  OF  CHINA        221 

tration  all  debts  may  be  paid  off,  concessions  redeemed  and 
China  made  strong.  China  does  not  need  foreign  capital 
for  the  development  of  her  resources,  until  the  time  when 
complete  direction  shall  be  in  Chinese  hands  under  Chinese 
laws.  Putnam  Weale  in  his  latest  book  ^  has  given  utter- 
ance to  these  sentiments : 

There  should  not  have  been  a  constant  policy  of  frightening  the 
Chinese  with  visions  of  a  Foreign  Debt  Bureau  under  foreign 
control  on  the  Egyptian-Turkish  model.  A  real  Chinese  service 
of  the  national  debt,  in  place  of  the  present  semi-foreign  pawn- 
broking  methods.  A  proper  currency  system,  with  token  coins 
and  banknotes  maintained  at  parity — these  things  would  be  far 
more  beneficial  to  the  world  at  large  than  spheres  of  influence  or 
personal  victories  signalized  by  the  appointment  of  favoured  na- 
tionals to  sinecures. 

The  new  President  of  China  in  an  interview  with  Carl 
W.  Ackerman  ^  gave  the  Chinese  view  of  this  question : 

Some  Western  people  hold  the  view  that  it  would  be  a  great 
benefit  to  China  if  the  railroads,  present  and  prospective,  could 
be  internationalized  until  such  time  as  China  could  take  full  con- 
trol of  all  the  leased  zones  and  concessions,  and  likewise  be  inter- 
nationalized as  a  temporary  measure.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  China,  however,  a  very  different  policy  receives  general  in- 
dorsement, namely,  that,  with  the  view  of  preserving  her  terri- 
torial integrity,  all  railroads,  leased  zones  and  concessions  should 
revert  to  her  absolute  and  complete  control,  internationalization 
being  unthought  of. 

(8)  In  a  special  way  the  Chinese  should  build  up  a 
large  merchant  marine.  The  Government  would  do  better 
by  helping  the  China  Merchants  Steamship  Company  or 
the  China  Mail  Company  than  by  adding  on  more  cruisers 

» "Truth  about  China  and  Japan,"  p.  118. 
*  New  York  Times,  January  17,  1919. 


222  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

and  torpedo-boats  to  be  generously  donated  to  neighbour 
Japan  sometime  in  the  future.  When  I  went  to  China  in 
1882,  I  had  the  pleasure  of  meeting  the  head  of  the  China 
Merchants  Company,  Tong  King-Sing,  one  of  the  most  pub- 
lic-spirited and  unselfish  men  that  China  has  ever  had.  He 
had  just  returned  from  a  tour  of  Europe  and  the  countries 
of  the  Americas,  with  a  view  of  extending  trade  and  com- 
munication along  the  ocean  routes.  At  that  time  the 
Chinese  had  more  shipping  than  the  Japanese.  Since  then 
the  Chinese  have  lagged  behind,  while  Japan  with  astound- 
ing energy  has  become  one  of  the  great  shipping  nations  of 
the  world.  The  Chinese  merchants  still  retain  their  skill, 
industry  and  thrift.  In  the  Philippine  Islands  they  have 
seven-tenths  of  all  the  trade.  In  the  other  islands  of  the 
Pacific  and  along  the  Malay  Peninsula  the  business  mag- 
nates as  well  as  the  little  shopkeepers  are  Chinese.  When 
lecturing  through  the  Philippines  to  Chinese  audiences  in 
1918,  I  urged  this  duty  upon  them  as  one  way  to  make 
China  strong.  The  ships  plying  along  the  coast  of  China, 
or  between  China  and  the  near  trading  neighbours,  and, 
later  on,  the  far-away  countries  of  the  world,  should  be  a 
part  of  this  new  merchant  marine  of  China.  If  Chinese 
merchants  and  officials  at  home  lack  the  enterprise,  then 
those  who  venture  abroad  and  become  successful — men 
mostly  from  Amoy  and  Canton — should  make  the  start  in 
this  new  line  of  business,  raise  capital  and  form  companies, 
and  thus  stimulate  the  whole  Chinese  Government  to  plans 
of  self -development,  sure  in  the  end  to  bring  about  true, 
fully-evidenced  self-determination  and  national  indepen- 
dence. The  innate  capacity  of  the  mass  of  the  Chinese 
should  make  one  hopeful  as  to  the  future  of  China. 

These  are  a  few  suggestions  as  to  China's  relief  from  dis- 
tress, which  I  humbly  offer  as  one  whose  life  interest  centres 
in  that  land  of  splendid  record  and  great  potentialities. 


CHAPTER   X 

japan's  future  influence  in  china 

From  the  facts  narrated  in  the  previous  chapters  the  reader 
is  able  to  form  his  own  judgment  as  to  the  future  of  Japan's 
influence  in  China  as  made  possible  by  events  of  the  Great 
War  and  the  joint  participation  of  China  and  Japan.  I 
only  fear  that,  without  further  comment  and  the  presenta- 
tion of  other  facts,  the  judgment  rendered  may  not  be 
wholly  fair  to  Japan.  It  is  only  "impartial  justice"  that 
can  satisfy. 

It  is  extremely  hard  to  speak  well  of  Japan,  when  one 
considers  what  she  has  done  in  Korea  and  in  China,  par- 
ticularly during  the  tragic  days  of  war.  But  even  an  oppo- 
nent or  an  enemy  has  his  good  points.  Even  a  bad  policy 
gains  its  strength  from  the  good  that  is  in  it.  Misrepre- 
sentation only  succeeds  because  it  appears  in  the  garb  of 
truth. 

Most  modern  writers  on  Sino-Japanese  questions  have 
little  that  is  good  to  say  of  Japan.  I  may  cite  Putnam 
Weale,  J.  0.  P.  Bland,  Thomas  F.  Millard,  Professor  Jere- 
miah W.  Jenks,  Millard's  Review  and  the  Far-Eastern  Bu- 
reau. The  one  writer  who  has  evidently  tried  to  be  fair 
all-around  is  Dr.  Arthur  J.  Brown  in  his  "Mastery  of  the 
Far  East." 

Japan  is  manifestly  placed  at  a  disadvantage  by  one's 
preconceptions  as  to  China's  losses  and  Japan's  gains  re- 
sulting from  the  war.  She  is  at  further  disadvantage 
through  many  bad  policies  pursued  through  the  war  in 
haste  to  make  sure  her  future  position.  But  Japan  has  also 
adopted  and  tried  to  carry  out  many  sound  measures  and 

223 


224  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

good  ideas,  joined  as  they  are  with  an  intense  nationalism 
and  the  growing  imperativeness  of  self-preservation.  I  here 
quote  from  Dr.  Brown :  ^ 

If  one  is  to  err  at  all,  it  is  better  to  do  so  on  the  side  of 
charity,  to  magnify  good  qualities  rather  than  to  minimize  them. 
It  is  unreasonable  to  expect  an  Asiatic  people  to  exemplify  within 
sixty  years  standards  of  Christian  character  and  conduct  which 
Europe  and  America  but  imperfectly  exemplify  after  fifteen  hun- 
dred years.  The  Japanese  have  many  fine  qualities.  They  have 
also  some  grave  defects.  So  have  we.  It  is  easy  to  pick  out 
flaws  in  any  people  under  heaven,  including  our  own. 

This  is  fair  talk  emanating  from  a  missionary  Secretary. 

One  way  to  be  fair  to  Japan  is  to  divide  with  others  the 
responsibility  for  what  has  taken  place  in  China,  and  to 
share  the  blame  for  evident  wrongs  inflicted  on  China.  This 
I  have  tried  to  do.  Here  and  there  I  have  held  accountable 
Allied  action,  especially  that  of  the  British  and  American 
Governments,  and  to  a  minor  degree  the  military  clique  of 
the  Peking  Government.  I  have  had  little  occasion  to  blame 
the  action  of  the  Central  Powers,  so  far  as  China's  well- 
being  has  been  affected  during  the  period  of  war.  Ger- 
many has  received  her  full  quota  of  condemnation  for  what 
she  has  done  elsewhere.  Above  all,  it  is  well  to  be  reminded 
that  the  decision  reached  at  the  Peace  Conference  was  not 
rendered  by  the  Japanese  delegate,  but  by  the  three  chief 
men  sitting  at  the  Peace  Table,  and  that  the  German  Gov- 
ernment gave  assent  through  unavoidable  coercion.  The  re- 
sponsibility of  Japan  and  China  consisted  merely  in  pre- 
senting their  respective  claims. 

This  effort  or  desire  to  discriminate  may  account  for  the 
fact  that  I  have  been  able  to  retain  the  friendship  of  many 
Japanese,  even  when  I  have  criticized  Japanese  treatment 

*  "  Mastery  of  the  Far  East,"  p.  242. 


JAPAN'S  FUTURE  INFLUENCE  IN  CHINA    225 

of  China.  Mr.  Kawakami  rightly  says:^  "If  she  [China] 
singles  out  Japan  and  makes  her  the  sole  object  of  attack, 
her  purpose  is  obviously  sinister." 

Another  element  of  fairness  is  to  recognize  the  assump- 
tion that  as  between  Japan  and  all  Western  nations,  the 
former  has  a  prior  position  in  Eastern  Asia,  but  as  between 
Japan  and  China  the  former  has  prior  position  in  her  own 
bounds  but  not  in  the  confines  of  China,  not  even  in  Man- 
churia and  Mongolia.  Britain's  obstruction  to  Japan's  in- 
roads into  China  is  due,  not  to  concern  for  China's  interests 
but  solicitude  for  British  interests.  American  suspicion  of 
Japan's  motives  must  be  traced  to  the  future  relations  or 
possible  war  between  the  two  countries,  not  to  a  thought  of 
the  destiny  of  China's  national  existence.  No  Japanese 
resents  criticism  of  Japan's  conduct  towards  China,  if  it  is 
out  of  consideration,  primarily,  for  China. 

Again,  the  Japanese  resent  the  assumption  that  Japan 
must  forego  spheres  of  influence  in  China,  while  other  na- 
tions retain  the  same  for  themselves.  Still  more  do  they 
resent  the  idea  that  Western  nations,  besides  expanding  on 
other  continents  and  even  in  large  portions  of  Asia,  have 
also  first  place  in  China ;  or  on  the  other  hand,  that  Japan 
not  only  may  be  excluded  from  British  colonies  and  the 
countries  of  North,  Central  and  South  America,  but  has 
no  right  to  expand  on  the  mainland  of  Eastern  Asia. 

Senator  Phelan  on  October  16,  1919,  said  in  the  Senate, 
"If  she  [Japan]  must  expand,  then  her  expansion  in  Shan- 
tung, by  agreement  with  China,  is  more  acceptable  to  us 
than  her  expansion  in  America  both  North  and  South. ' '  It 
is  with  the  idea  that  Japan  must  be  given  scope  somewhere, 
that  censure  from  other  nations  irritates  Japanese  suscepti- 
bilities. So,  too,  the  query  arises  as  to  why  Americans 
should  seek  to  be  greater  than  the  Japanese  in  China  and 
Siberia,  when  they  have  the  leadership  in  the  New  World, 
Japan  and  World  Peace,"  p.  155. 


1 « 


226  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

and  now  claim  the  privilege  of  joint  decision  in  the  affairs 
of  Europe.  Is  Japan  to  be  content  with  a  second  place, 
even  in  territory  near  to  her  own  doors?  Is  world  ambi- 
tion suitable  alone  for  Great  Britain,  France  and  the  United 
States? 
Mr.  Kawakami,  referring  to  this  idea,  says :  * 

If  she  [China]  proposes  to  discuss  Japanese  railway  conces- 
sions at  the  Peace  Congress,  why  not  also  discuss  more  extensive 
concessions  granted  to  other  Powers?  While  China's  hands  were 
tied  by  the  constant  revolutionary  uprisings  in  recent  years,  Rus- 
sia and  England  steadily  encroached  upon  Mongolia  (1,300,000 
square  miles),  and  Tibet  (500,000  square  miles),  and  yet  China 
does  not  propose  to  bring  this  grave  matter  before  the  Peace 
Congress. 

Dr.  Arthur  J.  Brown,  who  throws  out  the  same  idea, 
says :  ^  j 

Some  Americans  talk  as  if  they  had  a  right  to  the  control  of 
the  Pacific.  If  they  were  familiar  with  the  history  of  their  own 
country,  they  would  know  that  the  United  States  did  not  possess 
a  clear  title  to  any  territory  bordering  on  the  Pacific  Ocean  till 
1846.  Why  should  we  regard  our  claim  to  the  supremacy  of  the 
Pacific  as  superior  to  that  of  nations  which  have  occupied  terri- 
tory on  that  ocean  for  more  than  two  thousand  years?  It  may 
be  that  the  Japanese  are  over-ambitious  and  oflfensively  self- 
assertive.  I  suspect  that  they  are  and  that  we  ourselves  belong 
in  the  same  category. 

One  of  the  latest  writers  on  the  problems  of  Asia,  Herbert 
Adams  Gibbons,  writes  with  discrimination  of  Japan's  pri- 
ority in  Eastern  Asia.    He  says :  ^ 

Japan  has  no  aggressive  intentions  against  America  or  Europe. 
The  ideas  of  Japan  about  the  future  of  Asia  and  the  islands  of 

»  "  Japan  and  World  Peace,"  p.  157. 

'  "  The  Mastery  of  the  Far  East,"  p.  252. 

•  "  The  New  Map  of  Asia,"  p.  476. 


JAPAN'S  FUTURE  INFLUENCE  IN  CHINA     227 

the  Pacific  form  a  different  problem — a  totally  different  problem. 
If  we  expect  that  we  Americans  and  Europeans  are  going  to  con- 
tinue indefinitely  to  keep  Asiatics  out  of  our  continents  and  out 
of  Africa  as  well  and  at  the  same  time  pretend  in  most  places  to 
superior  and  in  many  places  to  equal  rights,  politically  and  com- 
mercially, in  Asia,  we  shall  precipitate  a  great  struggle  that  may 
have  its  repercussions  in  our  own  hemisphere.  The  "  Yellow 
Peril "  is  far  from  imaginary  so  long  as  Europe  asserts  the  right 
to  dominate  and  exploit  Asia.  But  if  we  reconcile  ourselves  to 
treating  Asiatics  equitably  in  their  own  continent  (they  do  not 
ask  more  than  that!),  we  shall  not  need  to  prepare  for  " the  next 
war  "  with  Japan. 

Another  factor  is  the  feeling  which  Japanese  naturally 
have  that  for  far-away  nations  to  concern  themselves  with 
what  Japanese  and  Chinese  have  settled  between  them- 
selves is  an  act  of  presumption,  if  not  of  out-and-out  in- 
terference. 

What  the  peoples  of  the  Western  world  must  now  take 
into  account  is  that  as  the  result  of  the  war,  into  which 
Japan  and  China  were  invited  to  enter,  Japan,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  has  now  the  position  of  predominance  in  Eastern 
Asia.  No  Western  nation,  except  through  war,  can  dispos- 
sess Japan.  Western  nations  may  feel  chagrin  at  the 
altered  status  of  East  and  West,  but  they  are  reimbursed 
by  wider  scope  and  larger  power  in  other  parts  of  the 
earth's  surface. 

Dr.  lyenaga  has  written :  ^  — 

Japan  wants  her  position  in  the  Far  East  recognized  and 
appreciated,  and  to  her  should  be  confided  the  maintenance  of 
peace  and  order  there. 

This  fact  of  Japan's  predominance,  as  I  have  said  in 
previous  chapters,  must  be  faced  by  the  Chinese.    So,  too, 

*  New  York  Evening  Post,  Jime  30,  1917. 


228  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

the  Japanese  may  recognize  the  fact,  but  in  the  recognition 
they  do  well  to  place  a  curb  on  their  vanity  and  ambition, 
lest  in  the  use  of  this  new  power  they  work  injury  to  China, 
which  in  the  end  will  prove  a  boomerang  to  themselves. 

If  Japan  can  only  be  wise,  act  decently,  preserve  moder- 
ation, and  become  altruistic,  considerate  and  helpful,  she 
and  China  can  come  together  in  bonds  of  spiritual  alliance, 
to  their  mutual  advantage.  The  test  for  Japan  is  in  her 
attitude,  not  towards  expansion,  which  is  a  legitimate  am- 
bition, but  towards  territorial  aggrandizement.  Instead  of 
following  the  example  of  Western  nations  and  seizing 
Chinese  territory,  will  she  help  China  to  retain  that  which 
is  her  own,  and  so  become  a  benefactor  ? 

Enlightened  Japanese,  especially  those  who  are  the  heads 
of  great  mercantile  houses,  are  fully  conscious  that  the  ter- 
ritorial ambition  has  so  aroused  the  resentment  of  the 
Chinese  that  through  strikes  of  student  bodies  and  a  boy- 
cott of  Japanese  goods  relentlessly  and  persistently  adhered 
to,  Japan  in  a  commercial  way  is  a  loser  and  in  a  moral  way 
is  being  disgraced  in  the  estimation  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 

Besides  this  propensity  to  get  possession  of  that  which  is 
another's,  whether  under  the  name  of  suzerainty,  protec- 
torate, colony  or  complete  absorption,  there  are  other  phases 
of  influence  to  which  Japan  has  as  much  right  as  other 
nations. 

The  first  form  is  commercial  influence.  This,  of  course, 
is  unobjectionable,  so  far  as  China  is  concerned,  if  so  be  it 
is  co-operative  with  China  and  repudiates  the  aid  and  in- 
trusion of  the  Japanese  Government.  Mr.  Kawakami,  after 
referring  to  Japan's  necessity  of  finding  "a  field  of  activ- 
ity" in  Eastern  Asia,  says:^ 

With  this  in  view,  Japan  is  eager  to  convert  herself  into  a 
great  industrial  and  commercial  nation.    If  she  fails  in  this  at- 

' "  Japan  and  World  Peace,"  pp.  163-166. 


JAPAN'S  FUTURE  INFLUENCE  IN  CHINA     229 

tempt,  she  must  eventually  perish  from  congestion,  stagnation 
and  inanition.  And  in  order  to  become  a  foremost  industrial 
nation  she  must  have  the  essential  materials  of  modern  industry. 

To  her  great  disadvantage,  Japan  has  little  of  such  materials 
in  her  own  country.  The  volume  of  iron  ores  produced  at  home 
is  but  a  fraction  of  what  Japan  actually  consumes.  .  .  .  That 
is  why  Japan  is  anxious  to  secure  mining  concessions  in  China, 
before  China's  mines  and  colleries,  imutilized  by  herself,  will  be 
all  but  mortgaged  to  Western  nations — nations  which  have  already 
secured  vast  colonies  in  different  parts  of  the  world,  and  which 
have  plenty  of  raw  materials  and  mineral  supplies  in  their  own 
territories.  .    .   . 

For  three  years — from  the  fall  of  1914  to  the  summer  of 
1917 — Japan's  shipyards  and  iron-works  were  enabled  to  work 
almost  entirely  with  material  furnished  by  steel  mills  in  America. 
But  in  July,  1917,  the  United  States,  too,  declared  an  embargo 
upon  steel,  and  the  activities  of  Japanese  shipyards  and  iron- 
works came  suddenly  to  a  halt.  .    .    . 

The  American  embargo  intensified  Japan's  national  desire,  long 
uppermost  in  the  minds  of  her  industrial  leaders,  for  the  inde- 
pendence of  her  steel  industry  from  foreign  mills.  .  .  .  Unless 
Japan  succeeds  in  entering  into  a  satisfactory  agreement  with 
China  for  the  further  development  of  China's  iron  resources,  her 
industrial  structure  will  never  be  placed  upon  a  secure  founda- 
tion. .    .    . 

Whether  Japan  succeeds  in  this  attempt  is  not  a  question  of 
aggrandizement,  but  a  question  of  life  or  death.  With  her  grow- 
ing population  forbidden  to  seek  opportunities  in  countries  where 
profitable  employment  awaits  their  toil,  with  her  food  products 
inadequate  to  supply  her  own  need,  Japan  must  perforce  become 
an  industrial  country.  Surely  the  Western  nations,  which  have 
agreed  among  themselves  to  exclude  the  Japanese  from  their  own 
territories  will  not  conspire  to  block  Japan's  way  in  that  part  of 
Eastern  Asia  where  she  seeks  nothing  more  than  the  means  of 
self-preservation. 

This  reasoning  is  reasonable.  It  appeals  to  one's  sense 
of  fair-play.    If  Japan,  indeed,  **  seeks  nothing  more  than 


230  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREEf 

the  means  of  self-preservation,"  she  will  be  sure  of  the 
world's  commendation,  and  China  will  no  longer  stand  aloof 
with  a  feeling  of  dread  suspicion.  As  between  the  indus- 
trial and  commercial  requirements  of  Japan  and  those  of 
all  Western  nations,  Japan  deserves  sympathy  even  from 
her  many  competitors.  But  when  the  profit  is  exclusively 
Japan's,  with  China  left  destitute,  or  when  China  is  being 
exploited  by  Japan  more  than  by  all  the  other  countries 
put  together,  as  seen  in  the  contracts  of  1918,  then  Japan's 
reasonable  claim  for  self-preservation  is  weakened  by  an 
undue  amount  of  self-assertiveness  and  voracious  ambition. 
Just  a  little  self-restraint  mixed  with  a  little  altruism  will 
safeguard  the  reputation  of  Japan. 

Dr.  Arthur  J.  Brown,  referring  to  bad  features  of  Jap- 
anese commercialism,  sums  up  the  matter  thus :  * 

Rebates,  adulteration,  evasion  of  customs,  short  weight,  unfair 
crushing  of  competitors  and  kindred  methods  are  not  so  un- 
familiar to  Americans  that  they  can  consistently  lift  hands  of 
pious  horror  when  they  hear  of  them  in  Asia. 

The  next  form  of  influence  is  political.  This  may,  or  may 
not  be  a  menace  to  China.  There  is  no  harm  in  Japanese, 
as  other  nationals,  exerting  an  influence  on  the  political  life 
of  China,  but  not  for  the  purpose  of  weakening  or  destroy- 
ing, or  of  absorbing  China  into  the  Japanese  State,  as  Korea 
has  already  been  absorbed.  The  temptation  of  land-grab- 
bing is  so  great  that  all  influences  which  are  political  are 
generally  looked  upon  with  disfavour — except  in  one's  own 
case.  For  China's  sake,  I  appeal  to  the  Japanese  to  set  the 
pace  for  other  nations  in  right,  praiseworthy  treatment  of 
a  neighbour's  property,  rights  and  jurisdiction.  The  con- 
duct pursued  by  Japan  during  the  war  cannot  but  leave  an 
impression  on  Chinese  and  Europeans  and  Americans  as 

» "  The  Mastery  of  the  Far  East,"  p.  289. 


JAPAN'S  FUTURE  INFLUENCE  IN  CHINA     231 

being  of  a  high-handed,  grasping  character,  meaning  some- 
thing else  than  friendly  co-operation  or  legitimate  expan- 
sion. Thus  far,  then,  the  Japanese  are  handicapped  in  the 
estimate  formed  by  public  opinion. 

Most  Japanese  writers,  in  the  effort  to  defend  the  action 
of  their  Government  in  reference  to  Shantung  or  to  allay 
the  fears  of  critics  concerning  Japan's  ultimate  aims,  are 
prone  to  deny  the  political  character  of  Japanese  ambition. 
This  is,  however,  untrue  to  the  facts,  and  an  entirely  un- 
necessary argumentation  for  re-establishing  the  confidence 
of  their  fellow-men.  A  nation  that  holds  international  re- 
lations is  of  necessity  actuated  by  political  motives.  Dr. 
lyenaga  is  one  who  does  not  disclaim  these  motives,  though 
he  seems  to  resent  the  political  motives  of  others.  He 
writes :  * 

Let  me  say  quite  frankly  that  Japan  will  resent  an  attempt  at 
extending  the  political  influence  of  the  United  States  in  China. 
Our  political  interest  in  China  is  greater  than  yours.  China  is 
closer  to  us.  But  there  is  no  disposition  on  the  part  of  Japan  to 
close  the  open  door  or  to  create  inequalities  in  the  terms  on  which 
the  United  States  may  engage  in  Far  Eastern  trade. 

Thus  Americans,  according  to  this  opinion,  may  exert 
commercial  influence  in  China,  but  not  political.  Japanese 
may  exert  both  kinds  of  influence. 

Mr.  Kawakami  also  writes  on  the  same  matter :  ^ 

To  Americans,  unable  to  understand  Japan's  singular  position 
in  the  Far  East,  it  perhaps  makes  but  little  difference  whether 
China  is  dominated  by  England,  Germany,  France,  Russia  or 
Japan.  From  the  Japanese  point  of  view  it  is  different.  With  the 
history  of  European  diplomacy  in  the  Near  and  Far  East  before 
them,  the  Japanese  cannot  but  shudder  at  thought  of  the  day 
when  China  shall  be  held  fast  in  the  grip  of  Western  Powers. 

*  New  York  Evening  Post,  June  30,  1917. 
»  "Japan  and  the  World  Peace,"  p.  171. 


232  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREEt 

With  this  prevalent  feeling  of  intelligent  Japanese  I 
have  fullest  sympathy.  The  Chinese,  too,  if  they  had  been 
treated  with  fair  consideration,  would  undoubtedly  have 
gone  so  far  in  sympathetic  approach  as  to  favour  even  an 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance.  This  would  have  been  po- 
litical action  of  an  extreme  kind,  but  without  detriment  to 
China,  if  arranged  under  proper  conditions  of  equality  and 
practicality.  There  is  far  more  reason  that  Japan  have  an 
alliance  with  China  than  with  Great  Britain  or  Russia. 
Miss  La  Motte,  who  is  one  writer  who  can  see  two  sides  to 
this  Oriental  question,  like  Mr.  Gibbons  already  cited, 
says : ^ 

And  the  Japanese,  facing  race  discrimination  and  exclusion 
from  most  of  the  European  countries,  and  many  of  their  colonies, 
as  well  as  America,  cannot  afford  to  have  China  under  European 
control.    It  is  a  question  of  self-preservation. 

Here  the  same  word,  self-preservation,  is  used  as  in  the 
writings  of  Mr.  Kawakami.  The  word  states  what  is  su- 
preme in  Japanese  thought. 

The  Outlook  (of  New  York),  while  usually  a  supporter 
of  the  Japanese  side  in  the  questions  of  the  Far  East,  con- 
demns the  policy  of  ' '  political  domination ' '  as  compared  to 
"peaceful  commercial  penetration."    It  says:  ^ 

The  first  of  these  would  lead  her  to  continue  in  the  road  which 
she  is  now  travelling.  It  would  aim  at  a  more  or  less  complete 
control  of  Chinese  finances,  both  public  and  private,  exclusive 
concessions  for  the  building  of  railways,  the  development  of  mines 
and  the  erection  of  factories.  .  .  .  This  programme  is  that  of 
many  Japanese,  for  they  learned  their  diplomacy  from  the  preda- 
tory policies  of  certain  European  governments  in  the  last  half  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  Japan's  ancient  feudal  system  prepared 
her  for  bureaucratic  militarism.    This  policy  of  ruthless  domina- 

»  "  Peking  Dust,"  p.  223. 

■  The  Outlook,  May  14,  1919. 


JAPAN'S  FUTURE  INFLUENCE  IN  CHINA     233 

tion  would,  however,  mean  sorrow  for  China,  turmoil  for  the 
world  and  ultimate  disaster  for  Japan. 

Why  this  domination  by  Japan  should  mean  "turmoil 
for  the  world ' '  any  more  than  domination  insisted  upon  by 
Western  nations  is  hard  to  see.  Whether  it  brings  sorrow 
or  not  to  China  depends  on  the  degree  of  the  domination, 
which  may  supersede  merely  that  of  other  nations  or  may 
go  further  and  take  the  place  of  Chinese  rule  on  Chinese 
soil.  This  latter  seems  to  me  most  unlikely.  Japan's  po- 
litical influence,  in  all  probability,  will  stop  short  of  actual 
military  occupation  of  the  whole  vast  territory  of  China. 
Should  the  Japanese  Government  continue  its  predatory 
policy,  in  imitation  of  Western  nations,  then  North  China, 
with  the  militaristic  Peking  Government,  is  likely  to  come 
under  the  protectorate  of  Japan,  but  all  South  China  will 
secede  from  the  present  Government  which  is  thus  subservi- 
ent to  an  alien  nation,  will  form  a  real  Republic,  and  become 
a  distinct  nation,  progressive,  enlightened,  democratic  and 
prosperous. 

The  third  form  of  influence  is  moral.  For  any  nation 
to  aspire  to  such  influence  is  most  commendable.  It  looks, 
however,  as  if  the  Japanese  were  more  ready  to  exert  an 
immoral  influence  on  the  Chinese  people  than  a  moral  one. 
It  looks,  too,  as  if  the  Japanese  Government  countenanced 
the  immoral  conduct  of  its  subjects,  for  the  purpose  of 
weakening  the  stamina  of  the  Chinese  people.  If  the  Jap- 
anese Government  really  stands  for  morality  in  personal 
life  and  honesty  in  public  life,  it  must  make  quick  use  of 
the  strong  arm  of  the  law  and  put  a  check  to  the  inroads 
of  immorality  into  China. 

Two  powerful  and  disastrous  evils  have  been  introduced 
by  the  Japanese  into  those  parts  of  China  where  they  have 
been  exerting  authority.  The  one  is  the  social  evil,  the 
other  the  morphine  or  drug  evil.    The  former  is  not  of  the 


234  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

degrading,  repugnant,  brothel  type,  but  made  glaring  and 
attractive,  of  the  elegant,  palace  type.  Vice  is  flaunted  in 
the  eyes  of  the  Chinese,  and  is  too  alluring  to  be  resisted. 
I  quote  from  a  late  article  on  the  condition  in  Shantung  by 
Dr.  Arthur  J.  Brown :  ^ 

Morally,  oonditions  have  beeome  distinctly  worse  imder 
Japanese  influence.  The  Chinese  are  far  from  being  a  moral 
people,  but  vice  was  never  so  rampant  in  Shantung  as  it  is  now. 
The  social  evil  has  a  closer  relation  to  Japanese  officials  than 
among  any  other  people  of  my  acquaintance.  When  the  Japanese 
enter  a  country  like  China  or  Korea,  they  build  houses  of  prosti- 
tution just  as  they  build  court  houses,  post-offices  and  railway  sta- 
tions. They  set  aside  sections  for  brothels,  erect  handsome  build- 
ings, provide  them  with  music  and  electric  lights,  and  make  them 
as  attractive  as  any  place  in  the  city.  Nor  are  retired  locations 
selected.  An  elaborately  equipped  vice  district  was  opened  last 
winter  in  Tsinan-fu  opposite  one  of  the  Mission  compounds. 
.  .  .  A  particularly  embarrassing  situation  has  developed  at 
Tsingtao.  One  of  the  early  acts  of  the  Japanese  was  to  select  a 
spacious  tract  for  a  "  red  light "  quarter  and  to  put  several  blocks 
of  buildings  upon  it.  The  site  chosen  was  close  to  the  Presby- 
terian Mission  compound,  with  its  residences  and  schools.  .  .  . 
Conditions  substantially  similar,  although  on  a  smaller  scale,  exist 
in  practically  every  Japanese  colony  in  Shantung.  Even  where 
the  number  of  Japanese  is  very  small  it  includes  prostitutes. 

The  other  vice,  that  of  morphine,  is  equally  a  disgrace 
to  Japanese  civilization  and  a  menace  to  China  far  beyond 
the  opium  menace  of  the  British  or  the  beer  menace  of  the 
Germans.  I  quote  on  this  point  from  an  English  physician 
in  Tsinan-fu,  as  cited  in  Dr.  Brown's  article: 

I  know  the  wholesale  debauchery  of  the  Chinese  that  is  going 
on  at  our  very  doors  in  morphine  shops  and  houses  of  ill-fame 
opened  and  run  by  the  Japanese.    Since  their  seizure  of  Tsingtao 

'  Asia  for  September,  1919. 


JAPAN'S  FUTURE  INFLUENCE  IN  CHINA    235 

they  have  been  transporting  literally  tens  of  thousands  of  eases 
of  morphine  into  China  through  this  port,  all  of  them  labelled 
"  Government  stores."  These  are  received  and  distributed  by 
Japanese  agents,  with  the  result  that  hundreds  and  thousands  of 
Japanese  "  drug  shops "  and  peddlers  are  taking  this  accursed 
drug  all  over  the  country.  .  .  .  The  methods  in  whieh  this 
morphia  is  being  used  are  even  more  sinister.  Every  one  of  these 
drug  shops  and  most  of  these  morphia  peddlers  possess  one  or 
more  hypodermic  syringes,  and  for  the  matter  of  a  few  cash  the 
poor  Chinaman  gets  an  injection. 

There  is  no  palliation  for  either  of  these  curses  inflicted 
on  China.  If  the  Japanese  permitted  them  in  their  own 
land,  outsiders  could  not  complain,  but  it  becomes  a  scan- 
dal, a  complaint,  a  clear  case  of  culpability,  when  the  Jap- 
anese, under  the  guise  of  military  measures  or  in  the  name 
of  legitimate  peaceful  penetration,  inflict  upon  China,  al- 
ready cursed  enough,  these  two  curses  from  Japan.  The 
Chinese  may  well  rue  the  day  when  Japan  first  issued  an 
ultimatum  to  German  Tsingtao,  and  at  the  call  of  England 
drove  out  the  Germans. 

But  the  Japanese  even  here  are  not  the  sole  offenders. 
As  to  the  social  evil,  notice  the  British  municipal  rule  in 
the  "Model  Settlement"  of  Shanghai,  where  thousands  of 
young  Chinese  girls,  called  "singing  girls,"  throng  the 
busiest  thoroughfares  of  the  business  section  in  the  night- 
hours,  and  ply  their  trade  of  song,  amusement  and  lust. 

As  to  the  morphine  habit,  it  takes  the  place  of  opium, 
but  vnth  more  fatal  consequences,  and,  in  fact,  Japanese 
morphia  is  the  offspring  of  British  Indian  opium.  The 
Chinese  in  waging  their  gallant  war  against  opium  are  to- 
day beset  by  the  hostile  action  of  two  strong  Allies,  Britain 
and  Japan.  Now  that  British  trade  in  opium  directly  with 
China  is  forbidden,  the  indirect  method  is  utilized.  The 
Japanese  are  the  purveyors.  In  both  opium  and  morphia 
they  act  as  agents  through  ports  in  China  under  Japanese 


236  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

control.    A  correspondent  to  the  British  official  organ  in 
Shanghai  writes:^ 

The  chief  agency  in  the  distribution  of  morphia  in  China  is  the 
Japanese  post-office.  Morphia  is  imported  by  parcels  post.  .  .  . 
A  conservative  estimate  would  place  the  amount  of  morphia  im- 
ported by  the  Japanese  into  China  in  the  course  of  a  year  as 
high  as  eighteen  tons,  and  there  is  evidence  that  the  amount  is 
steadily  increasing.  In  South  China  morphia  is  sold  by  Chinese 
peddlers,  each  of  whom  carries  a  passport  certifying  that  he  is 
a  native  of  the  Island  of  Formosa  and  therefore  entitled  to 
Japanese  protection.  .  .  .  Through  Tairen  morphia  circulates 
throughout  Manchuria  and  the  province  adjoining;  through 
Tsingtao  morphia  is  distributed  over  Shantung  province,  Anhui 
and  Kiangsu,  while  from  Formosa  morphia  is  carried  with  opium 
and  other  contraband  by  motor-driven  fishing-boats  to  some  point 
on  the  mainland,  from  which  it  is  distributed  throughout  the  prov- 
ince of  Fukien  and  the  north  of  Kuangtung.  Everywhere  it  is 
sold  by  Japanese  under  ex-territorial  protection. 

The  same  writer  then  shows  Britain's  part  in  the  sale  to 
Japan  of  Indian  opium: 

In  the  Calcutta  opium  sales  Japan  has  become  one  of  the  con- 
siderable opium  purchasers  of  Indian  opium.  She  purchases  for 
Formosa,  where  the  opium  trade  shows  a  steady  growth  and 
where  opium  is  required  for  the  manufacture  of  morphia.  Sold 
by  the  Government  of  India  [the  British  Government,  remember], 
this  opium  is  exported  under  permits  applied  for  by  the  Japanese 
Government  [another  Government,  please  notice],  is  shipped  to 
Kobe  and  from  Kobe  is  trans-shipped  to  Tsingtao.  .  .  .  It  is 
smuggled  through  Shantung  into  Shanghai  and  the  Yangtsze 
Valley.  This  opium  is  sold  in  Shanghai  and  the  Yangtsze  Valley. 
This  opium  is  sold  in  Shanghai  at  $500  [Mexican  dollars]  a 
ball,  forty  balls  to  the  chest,  a  total  valuation  of  about  $20,000 
a  chest.     There  is  reason  to  believe   that  between   January  1 

•  North  China  Herald,  December  21,  1918. 


JAPAN'S  FUTURE  INFLUENCE  IN  CHINA     237 

and  September  30,  1918,  not  less  than  2,000  chests  of  opium 
purchased  in  India  were  imported  into  Tsingtao  through  Kobe. 
Upon  this  amount  the  Japanese  authorities  levy  a  tax,  which  does 
not  appear  in  the  estimates,  equivalent  to  2,000,000  pounds  ster- 
ling. ...  At  both  Dalny  and  Tsingtao  these  offices  are  wholly 
under  the  control  of  the  Japanese. 

It  is  a  matter  of  chagrin  to  right-minded  Americans, 
zealous  for  the  good  name  of  their  country,  that  clandes- 
tine trade  in  morphia  has  also  heen  carried  on  by  Ameri- 
cans, through  connivance  with  Japanese.  According  to  the 
Japan  Chronicle  (English  edited)  113,000  ounces  of  mor- 
phia were  shipped  from  the  United  States  to  Kobe  for 
trans-shipment  to  China  in  the  first  five  months  of  1919. 
It  is  a  criminal  offense  to  ship  this  drug  direct  to  China, 
but  not  to  Japan.  The  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
however,  enjoins  on  all  members  of  the  League  to  exercise 
control  over  "the  traffic  in  opium  and  other  dangerous 
drugs. ' '  Surely  the  American  people  are  not  willing  to  be 
partners  in  drugging  China  with  opium  as  used  in  its  worst 
form. 

To  be  true  to  the  facts,  a  great  deal  of  opium  has  been 
brought  the  last  few  years  into  Japan  via  Siberia  from 
Persia,  the  agents  being  a  motley  sort  of  traders,  subject 
to  no  law,  though  possessed  of  passports  of  different 
governments. 

The  chief  agents,  however,  in  introducing  morphia  into 
China  are  the  Japanese,  and  the  ports  through  which  it 
passes  into  Chinese  territory  are  mostly  those  under  control 
of  Japanese  authorities. 

It  is  shameful,  unfortunate,  unwise,  that  the  Japanese 
Government  in  collusion  either  with  the  Indian  Government 
or  evil-minded  Americans,  should  perpetuate,  rather  than 
help  to  exterminate,  this  curse  of  China,  opium  and  mor- 
phia.   Cannot  the  high-minded  men  of  Japan,  embued  with 


238  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

the  great  moral  precepts  of  Eastern  Religions,  see  how 
much  Japan  as  well  as  China  is  losing  by  these  immoral 
practices  ?  If  the  Japanese  are  friends  to  China,  they  must 
at  once  put  forth  efforts,  in  conjunction  with  the  best  in 
China,  to  drive  out  these  vices  which  are  sapping  the  life- 
blood  of  the  Chinese  people. 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  Japan  in  her  approach  to  China, 
with  a  desire  for  closer  and  more  cordial  relationship,  has 
at  the  present  crisis  in  world  affairs  certain  distinct  respon- 
sibilities, as  well  as  rights.    Let  me  specify: 

(1)  Men  of  moral  and  religious  conviction  in  Japan, 
whether  advocates  of  democracy  or  imperialism,  must  join 
hands  with  kindred  minds  in  China  for  the  spiritual  re- 
juvenation of  both  these  ancient  nations  of  the  Far  East. 

(2)  The  Japanese  must  abandon  their  harsh,  high- 
handed, intermeddling  in  China 's  political  affairs,  and  show 
themselves  sincerely  friendly,  helpful  and  fair.  It  is  quite 
possible  that  Japanese  merchants,  bankers,  educationists 
and  reformers  will  insist  on  a  saner  policy  of  adaptation 
and  co-operation. 

(3)  How  much  greater  the  achievement,  with  permanent 
advantage  to  both  Japanese  and  Chinese,  if  the  present 
estrangement  gives  place  to  a  fellowship  based  on  restored 
confidence. 

(4)  Japan  is  fitted  to  be  the  leader  of  Eastern  Asia,  but 
her  leadership  will  be  null  and  void  without  a  hearty,  spon- 
taneous following.  The  Chinese  can  be  taught  to  follow, 
but  not  ordered  or  bullied.  A  combination  of  the  peoples  of 
Eastern  Asia,  under  Japan's  leadership,  for  their  liberation 
and  uplift,  seems  to  me  a  worthy  object  and  not  a  terror  to 
the  rest  of  mankind,  but  it  can  never  be  brought  about, 
unless  Japan,  its  Government  and  people,  reverse  their  pol- 
icy of  the  past  five  years. 

(5)  Whether  Japan  ever  adopts  a  republican  form  of 
state  does  not  matter,  but  it  is  good  policy  for  her  to  en- 


JAPAN'S  FUTURE  INFLUENCE  IN  CHINA    239 

courage  at  home  the  spread  of  democratic  ideas,  which 
means  the  rights  of  man,  and  to  foster  among  other  Asiatic 
peoples  the  same  liberalizing  spirit,  which  can  never  be  re- 
strained for  any  length  of  time.    Mr.  Gibbons  writes  thus :  ^ 

Internal  signs  of  democratic  evolution  in  Japan  are  encourag- 
ing. If  America  and  Europe  make  a  sincere  effort  to  form  a 
society  of  nations  on  the  basis  of  equality,  the  growth  of  demo- 
cratic feeling  and  liberalism  in  Japan  will  undoubtedly  lead  to 
anti-militarism,  A  new  era  will  open  for  the  Far  East — an  era 
of  Korean  autonomy,  if  not  independence,  and  of  reapproachment 
between  Japan  and  China.  It  behooves  us  to  study  carefully 
recent  events  in  Japan. 

(6)  If  Japan,  in  these  days  of  secret,  selfish  diplomacy, 
acts  with  chivalry,  and  hands  over  to  China  the  whole  ter- 
ritory of  Kiaochow  for  Chinese  administration,  and  not  for 
Japanese  or  for  any  international  ex-territorial  jurisdic- 
tion; and  if  in  addition  she  withdraws  from  the  railway 
and  mining  occupation  in  Shantung,  for  either  German  or 
Chinese  possession,  she  will  establish  herself  in  the  affec- 
tions of  the  Chinese  and  will  assure  herself  a  moral  predom- 
inance. Through  the  boycott  raised  by  the  Chinese  against 
the  Japanese,  the  latter 's  trade  diminished  50  per  cent.  The 
Chinese  may  have  been  mistaken  in  overlooking  the  com- 
plicity of  Western  nations  in  war  intrigues  and  in  the  peace 
settlement,  but  they  recognized  clearly  the  main  fa«t  that 
it  was  Japan's  claims,  successfully  won,  that  brought  shame 
and  danger  to  China. 

The  American  Minister  to  China,  Dr.  Paul  S.  Reinsch, 
on  arriving  in  San  Francisco,  October  9,  1919,  after  resign- 
ing from  his  official  position,  stated  ^  that  '  *  Japan  holds  a 
wonderful  trump  card  if  she  will  only  play  it,  which  is  the 
return  to  China  of  those  things  wrung  from  her  by  Ger- 

*  "  The  New  Map  of  Asia,"  p.  477. 

'  The  New  York  World,  October  10,  1919. 


240  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

many."  The  Japanese  may  not  be  likely  to  accept  this 
advice  from  one  who  assured  the  Chinese  of  aid  against 
Japan,  but  they  can  respond  to  these  words  of  the  Outlook : 

The  Japanese  must  win  the  confidence  and  friendship  of  the 
Chinese.  That  they  have  not  succeeded  in  doing.  They  have  so 
far  been  confronted  by  the  almost  unanimous  distrust  and  hate 
of  their  neighbours — an  attitude  which  augurs  ill  for  the  future. 
A  necessary  preliminary  step  would  seem  to  be  the  voluntary  re- 
turn of  Tsingtao  to  China,  the  cancellation  of  part  or  all  of  the 
concessions  wrung  from  her  in  1915,  the  strict  repression  of 
Japanese  purveyors  of  morphine  and  all  other  predatory  traders, 
and  a  hearty  willingness  to  co-operate  with  the  Powers  in  any 
joint  attempt  to  rehabilitate  China. 

(7)  The  Japanese  must  treat  the  Chinese  with  respect, 
not  with  contempt  or  superciliousness,  which  always  nulli- 
fies the  best  intentions.  If  the  Chinese,  under  outrages  re- 
ceived, speak  with  anger  of  Japan,  the  Japanese  have  been 
wont  to  look  with  condescension  upon  China.  If  the  Jap- 
anese, more  advanced  in  Western  knowledge,  change  their 
attitude  towards  China,  they  will  be  met  with  hearty  re- 
sponse. In  too  many  ways  the  Japanese  have  adopted  the 
worst  features  of  Western  civilization,  so  contrary  to  the 
teachings  of  Buddhism  and  Confucianism,  which  entered 
Japan  from  China.  One  of  these  bad  qualities  is  the  over- 
bearing attitude  in  social  and  political  intercourse.  An 
American  who  lives  in  Shantung,  under  date  of  July  23, 
1919,  writes :  ^ 

The  one  thing  noticeable  to  all  foreigners  in  the  Far  East  is 
that  the  honeyed  words  of  Japanese  leaders,  as  to  solicitude  for 
the  welfare  of  China,  inspired  by  their  Government's  cunning 
press  propaganda,  are  always  at  variance  with  the  arrogant, 
cynical,  cruel,  sinister  Prussian  policy  of  despoiling  China — ^that 

*  Far-Eastern  Fortnightly,  September  29,  1919. 


JAPAN'S  FUTURE  INFLUENCE  IN  CHINA    241 

policy  pushed  relentlessly,  and  every  day,  with  new  and  un- 
dreamed-of aggressions  and  brutalities  against  the  sovereignty  of 
the  Chinese  Government  and  the  right  of  the  Chinese  people  j 
against  their  own  persons,  legitimate  pursuits  and  their  soil. 

Personally  I  have  not  come  in  contact  in  China  with  this 
class  of  Japanese,  but  the  testimony  of  others  as  to  the 
repulsive  side  of  Japanese  life  must  be  accepted  as  true. 

A  more  favourable  view  of  Japanese  characteristics  and 
possibilities  is  given  by  an  English  writer,  H.  M.  Hyndman. 
These  are  his  words :  ^ 

That  Japan  should  use  the  present  terrible  state  of  affairs  in 
Europe  to  impose  upon  the  unwilling  population  of  China — 
possessing  even  by  the  admission  of  the  highest  Japanese  states- 
men qualities  superior  to  their  own — is  a  policy  which  ought  to 
be  resisted  as  soon  as  possible,  if  the  Chinese  themselves  desire 
help  against  this  aggression.  The  Japanese  are  not  popular  in 
Asia,  and  their  unpopularity  has  undoubtedly  increased  during 
the  past  four  years.  On  the  other  hand,  whatever  their  differ- 
ences may  be,  Asiatics  understand  one  another  at  bottom  far 
better  than  they  understand  or  trust  or  like  Europeans  or  Ameri- 
cans.   This  the  United  States  is  beginning  to  comprehend. 

J.  W.  Robertson,  a  publicist  in  Tokio,  recognizes  that 
whatever  the  difficulties,  Japan  is  to  be  leader  in  Asia.  He 
sums  up  thus :  ^ 

Japan  in  her  best  manifestations  is  the  hope  of  Asia.  Her 
friends  trust  that  she  may  be  so  guided  as  to  be  the  light  of 
Asia.  The  great  experiment  in  the  adaptation  of  Western  ideas 
and  methods  to  Eastern  traditions  and  conditions  must  not  fail. 
That  Japan  shall  succeed  in  her  gallant  attempt,  for  which  she  has 
sacrificed  so  freely,  is  a  great  American,  a  great  British,  a  great 
world  interest. 

*  "  The  Awakening  of  Asia,"  p.  155. 
•New  York  Times,  March  23,  1919. 


242  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

The  Great  War  has,  indeed,  enlarged  the  possibilities  of 
Japan  in  all  Eastern  Asia,  especially  in  China,  but  her  real 
future,  whether  one  of  growing  strength  or  one  of  decline, 
will  be  determined  by  the  way  she  abandons  policies  proved 
by  the  war  to  be  bad  everywhere,  by  her  readiness  to  sanc- 
tify opportunity  for  purposes  of  the  common  good,  and  to 
do  to  China  as  she  would  have  China  do  to  Japan. 

I  close  with  an  extract  of  a  Japanese  writer,  Mr.  lehi- 
hashi :  ^ 

China  is  close  at  hand  and  possesses  what  Japan  needs;  there- 
fore, a  friendly  attitude  on  the  part  of  China  is  most  earnestly 
desired  by  Japan.  .  .  .  There  is  a  set  of  foreign  residents  in 
China  who  have  inherited  the  old  Occidental  prejudice  against 
Orientals.  These  men  think  they  would  lose  their  monopolistic 
power,  be  it  commercial  or  racial,  unless  they  fight  Japan's  activi- 
ties in  China.  Another  obstacle  in  the  way  of  co-operation  be- 
tween Japan  and  China  is  the  fact  that  in  the  past  Japan  has 
made  blunders  in  dealing  with  China.  These  have  caused  many 
of  the  Chinese  to  lose  confidence  in  the  Japanese.  Some  actually 
distrust  them  and  still  others  fear  Japan.  Japan  must  acknowl- 
edge her  past  blunders  and  endeavour  to  rectify  them.  .  .  . 
When  confidence  has  been  restored  between  China  and  Japan 
then  the  two  nations  can  co-operate  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word 
with  mutual  benefit.  Moreover,  Japan  should  adopt  some  positive 
measures  of  service  for  the  benefit  of  the  Chinese.  Japan's 
friendship  must  be  substantiated. 

*  "The  Industrial  Plight  of  Japan,"  in  Asia  for  September,  1919. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE   INFLUENCE  OF  WESTERN   NATIONS   IN   CHINA 

The  relative  influence  of  all  nations  in  China,  commercial, 
financial,  political  and  missionary,  has  been  greatly  changed 
by  the  war.  The  elimination  of  German  influence,  whether 
permanent  or  only  temporary,  has  for  the  moment  en- 
hanced the  already  growing  influence  of  Japan.  The  result 
has  been  the  supremacy  of  Japan  in  the  Far  East  not  only 
over  Germany,  but  over  Great  Britain,  the  United  States, 
France  and  Russia,  all  of  whom  connived  at  bringing  about 
the  change,  and  also  over  China,  who  preferred  to  retain 
the  status  quo.  The  movement  set  on  foot  by  Westerners 
to  direct  the  animosity  of  the  Chinese  toward  Japan,  made 
manifest  in  the  greatest  boycott  of  Japanese  goods  that 
China  has  ever  been  able  to  carry  out  for  a  considerable 
length  of  time  with  unflagging  energy  and  unanimity,  has 
been  the  one  factor  to  minimize  Japanese  influence.  This 
assault  on  Japan's  influence  has  been  almost  as  pleasing  to 
Western  peoples  as  was  the  previous  assault  on  German 
influence.  Whether  Japan  will  retain  her  exclusive  dom- 
ination, or  will  have  to  yield  to  new  conditions,  and  take  an 
equal  place  with  the  other  great  Powers;  and  whether 
China,  by  the  separate  action  of  one  nation  or  the  joint 
action  of  all,  as  in  a  big  financial  consortium,  loses  control 
of  her  own  affairs — becomes  an  Egypt,  a  Turkey,  a  Persia, 
an  India,  a  Korea  or  a  Filipino  subject  nation — or 
by  the  helpful,  reformative  influences  of  others  is  able  to 
regain  sovereign  rights  and  national  autonomy  as  in  past 
centuries — these  two  things  and  many  others  must  remain 
conjecture.    In  previous  chapters  I  have  pointed  out  what 

243 


244  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

is  probable  or  at  least  desirable  as  to  China's  permanency 
and  Japan's  leadership. 

As  to  the  influence  of  Entente  nations  and  of  the  United 
States,  it  must  be  recognized  that  they  are  handicapped  by 
the  wrong  done  to  China  at  the  Peace  Table.  As  factors  of 
moral  power  they  are  far  below  their  past  record,  which 
has  been  none  too  good.  By  the  decision  reached  at  Paris, 
the  three  nations,  the  United  States,  Great  Britain  and 
France,  have  left  on  the  Chinese  mind  a  more  unfavourable 
impression  than  the  two  Central  Powers.  Herbert  Adams 
Gibbons  touches  on  this  supreme  mistake  of  the  victorious 
Powers  in  the  following  language :  ^ 

In  the  discussion  and  solution  of  no  problem  before  the  Con- 
ference of  Paris  were  the  insincerity  and  bad  faith  of  the  great 
powers  more  apparent  than  in  the  disposition  of  the  Shantung 
question.  The  facts  of  history  were  distorted,  the  principles  for 
which  the  Entente  Powers  and  the  United  States  declared  they 
had  fought  were  ignored.  The  Powers  showed  their  inability  to 
rise  to  the  high  level  of  international  morality  essential  for  the 
creation  of  a  society  of  nations.  Instead  of  trying  to  lay  the 
foundations  of  a  durable  peace  in  the  Far  East,  the  statesmen 
of  the  Entente  Powers  and  the  United  States  decided  for  the 
continuation  of  a  policy  that  has  provoked  several  wars  and  given 
rise  to  injustice  and  oppression.  For  the  European  Powers  and 
Japan,  the  solution  proposed  for  the  Shantung  question  was  the 
holding  fast  to  traditions  and  practices  of  the  past.  For  the 
United  States,  it  was  the  abandonment  by  our  government  of 
the  idealism  and  disinterestedness  that  for  more  than  half  a  cen- 
tury have  characterized  American  diplomacy  in  the  Far  East. 
The  solution  of  the  Shantung  question  incorporated  in  the  Treaty 
dictated  to  Germany  is  the  triumph  of  the  policy  of  economic 
exploitation  through  political  blackmail  against  which  John  Hay 
and  his  predecessors  in  the  American  State  Department  struggled 
with  skill  and  a  large  measure  of  success. 

» "The  New  Map  of  Asia,"  p.  385. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  WESTERN  NATIONS     245 

Briefly  we  may  now  consider  the  future  prospects  in 
China  of  Western  nations.  As  for  Russia,  China 's  nearest 
neighbour,  her  power  has  departed,  though  it  will  doubtless 
return  in  future  years.  Japan  in  Siberia  will  be  of  more 
concern  to  China  than  Russia  in  Siberia.  Already  the  Jap- 
anese, through  many  concessionary  privileges  from  various 
Russian  leaders,  have  pre-empted  the  resourceful  regions  of 
Eastern  Siberia.  Americans,  striving  as  best  they  may,  can 
never  outstrip  the  Japanese  in  those  regions  of  Northern 
Asia.  Japan's  position  in  Siberia  is  more  assured  than  her 
position  in  China.  With  the  disappearance  of  Russian 
influence,  the  Japanese  have  been  laying  plans  for  also 
pre-empting  the  ground  in  Outer  Mongolia  and  Northern 
Manchuria.  As  yet  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  running 
across  Northern  Manchuria,  and  built  by  Russian  capital, 
has  not  been  seized  by  Japan  instead  of  controlled  by  China, 
co-partner  with  Russia  in  the  Railway  Company.  Harbin, 
also,  is  still  regarded  as  a  Chinese-administered  town,  tak- 
ing the  place  of  Russian  administration.  Thus  Japan's 
only  check  in  these  regions  is  from  China,  not  from  West- 
ern nations. 

As  for  France,  she  is  not  eliminated  as  is  Germany, 
neither  has  she  disappeared  as  a  factor  to  be  reckoned  with 
as  Russia,  but  it  will  be  some  time  before  she  can  do  more 
than  retain  the  railway  concessions  which  she  had  before 
the  war.  She  will  not  have  the  capital,  unless  underwrit 
by  American  capitalists,  to  develop  new  concessions,  and 
as  for  general  trade  she  has  never  been  so  conspicuous  as 
even  smaller  nations,  Belgium,  Holland,  Denmark  and 
Switzerland. 

As  for  Italy,  honoured  as  one  of  the  Big  Five  for  her 
military  power  alone — a  rather  poor  standard  in  the  New 
Era — she,  too,  from  lack  of  capital  will  be  of  small  account 
in  the  international  relations  of  China. 

There  remain,  then,  three  Western  peoples  of  strong  eom- 


246  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

mercial  capacity,  with  an  instinct  for  venturesome  enter- 
prise, whose  future  possibilities  demand  more  minute  con- 
sideration, as  an  offset  to  the  present  predominating  in- 
fluence of  Japan.    These  are  British,  Americans,  Germans. 

(1)  First,  then,  British  future  influence  in  China. 

Before  the  war  no  one  outside  nation  was  dominant  in 
China.  But,  clearly,  Great  Britain  was  predominant.  By 
calling  for  the  intrusion  of  Japan,  in  order  to  oust  Ger- 
many, predominance  passed  to  Japan.  Should  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  continue,  for  political  reasons,  Japan's 
predominance  in  China  will  not  be  greatly  modified,  much 
less  endangered,  and  China  will  then  have  to  reckon  with 
a  combined  menace  rather  than  a  divided  menace  or  a 
menace  of  one.  Should  the  Alliance  be  allowed  simply  to 
terminate  at  the  expiration  of  the  Agreement — in  1921 — 
then  Japan  will  either  seek,  for  her  own  safety,  to  draw 
nearer  to  Russia,  whatever  the  Government,  and  to  Ger- 
many, or  will  be  isolated  except  as  she  succeeds  in  com- 
bining the  Orient  against  the  Occident.  While,  then,  a 
section  of  the  Japanese  is  anti-British  and  a  very 
large  section  of  the  British  in  China  is  anti-Jap- 
anese, yet,  politically,  it  may  be  expedient  to  both  the 
British  and  Japanese  Governments  to  renew  the  Alliance. 
In  conjunction  with  this,  the  Japanese  will  not  forego  the 
aspiration  for  predominance  in  China,  and,  as  in  1916,  they 
made  a  separate  alliance  with  Russia,  so  at  a  fitting  time 
they  may  form  an  alliance  with  China  or  with  some  other 
Power  of  suitable  potentialities. 

In  political  influence  the  action  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment in  appealing  to  Japan  to  join  her  in  the  great  strug- 
gle, and  the  subsequent  machinations  with  Japan  to  bring 
China  into  the  war,  naturally  leave  an  unfavourable  im- 
pression on  the  Chinese  mind;  but  the  British  in  China, 
and  especially  the  press  propaganda,  have  had  the  requi- 
site ingenuity  to  lead  the  Chinese  to  overlook  Britain's 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  WESTERN  NATIONS     247 

part,  and  to  concentrate  attention  on  Japan's  part  in  the 
varied  complications  to  China. 

A  Britisher  is  still  Inspector-General  of  Chinese  Mari- 
time Customs  and  another  the  head  of  the  Salt  Gabelle. 
If  Japan  forges  ahead,  some  Japanese  will  in  a  few  years 
legitimately  supersede  the  British  in  these  positions — un- 
less competent  Chinese  are  deemed  worthy. 

In  a  missionary  way  the  British  have  exerted  most  benefi- 
cent influence,  and  will  continue  so  to  do,  and  more  and 
more  in  hearty  union  with  American  missionaries — a  noble 
example  of  Anglo-American  alliance.  This  combination 
may  be  reckoned  upon  to  resist  any  immoral  or  unjust  in- 
fluences coming  from  Japan. 

In  a  commercial  way  the  British  will  find  more  intense 
competition  from  the  Japanese  and  Americans  than  in 
former  years  from  Germans,  Japanese  and  Americans. 
The  British,  moreover,  will  be  more  efficient  competitors 
than  in  the  past.    England  has  commercial  preparedness. 

Isaac  F.  Marcosson  has  made  special  investigations  of 
England's  preparedness  for  trade- war.  He  shows  the  great 
changes,  the  new  life,  brought  into  the  Board  of  Trade  and 
the  new  British  Trade  Corporation  of  which  at  the  time 
Sir  Albert  Stanley  was  sponsor.    He  says :  ^ 

It  would  take  a  book  to  explain  the  entire  trade  exploitation 
scheme  of  the  Board  of  Trade.  .  .  .  England  is  giving  many 
evidences  of  her  determination  to  take  every  possible  leaf  out  of 
the  book  of  German  efficiency.  In  the  Board  of  Trade  is  a  special 
German  department  to  study  German  newspapers  and  German 
economic  literature.  A  pet  sponsorship  of  the  Board  of  Trade 
is  the  encouragement  of  organization  of  specific  industries  for  the 
foreign  field.  ...  No  undertaking  is  quite  so  significant  or  so 
far-reaching  in  its  effects  as  its  establishment  of  an  adequate  com- 
mercial intelligence  department.  .  .  .  After  the  war  the  com- 
mercial intelligence  department  will  take  over  the  staff  of  records 

*  Saturday  Evening  Post,  January  26,  1918. 


248  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

of  the  war  trade  intelligence  and  statistical  departments.  No  ally 
could  be  more  powerful.  .  .  .  Meantime  England  is  being  con- 
verted into  a  monster  Trust. 

The  Far  Eastern  section  of  this  mammoth  Trust  has  been 
going  through  the  same  course  of  thorough  preparation. 
A  school  in  Chinese  has  been  in  operation  for  some  four 
years  in  Shanghai  under  the  superintendence  of  a  gifted 
"Welsh  missionary.  Young  men  of  the  big  English  firms, 
who  might  have  been  conscripted,  were  exempted,  that  they 
might  be  lieutenants  in  the  coming  trade  war.  German 
trade  secrets,  as  well  as  the  trade  itself,  have  been  zealously 
seized,  except  where  Japanese  and  Americans  have  come 
in  ahead.  It  is  just  possible  that  in  attempting  to  trip  up 
the  German  merchants,  the  English  merchants  may  them- 
selves be  tripped. 

Francis  H.  Sisson,  Vice-President  of  the  Guaranty  Trust 
Company,  after  a  visit  to  Europe,  returned  with  a  glowing 
report  of  England's  financial  strength.^  He  speaks  of  the 
**  returns  from  investments  abroad  and  the  receipts  of 
British-owned  ocean  carriers."  England's  "power  of  pro- 
duction has  been  increased  by  about  50  per  cent  by  the 
speeding-up  process  induced  by  war  needs."  The  follow- 
ing summing-up  is 'made  by  Mr.  Sisson: 

All  in  all,  the  outlook  for  industrial  progress  in  England  is 
favourable.  The  manufacturing  capacity  of  the  country  has  been 
greatly  increased  during  the  war.  Even  more  notable  have  been 
the  improvements  in  port  and  warehouse  facilities.  Ships  are 
being  turned  out  rapidly,  and  the  British  merchant  marine  still 
exceeds  in  tonnage  that  of  any  other  nation.  A  system  of  prefer- 
ences which  unites  the  various  parts  of  the  Empire  commercially 
more  closely  than  ever  before  will  give  the  vast  colonial  resources 
a  new  significance  for  the  development  of  British  industry  and 
trade.  .  .  .  The  recent  removal  of  restrictions  on  the  exporta- 
tion of  capital  for  investment  will  naturally  result  in  an  ex- 

*  Reported  in  New  York  Sun,  October  19,  1919. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  WESTERN  NATIONS     249 

pansion  of  the  export  trade  and  a  stimulation  of  domestic  produc- 
tion. Much  depends  upon  the  spirit  and  temper  of  a  people. 
Their  record  of  achievements  in  industry  and  finance  has  amply 
demonstrated  the  capacity  of  the  English  for  doing  big  things  in 
a  big  way,  and  for  meeting  emergencies  with  the  requisite  energy 
and  ability. 

Perhaps  the  only  threatening  drawback  to  this  portrayal 
is  the  overturn  of  the  industrial  system  and  commercial 
enterprise  by  a  big  upheaval  in  the  labour  section  of  Brit- 
ain's life,  united  with  revolutionary  schemes  among  other 
peoples. 

Comparatively  speaking,  Great  Britain  has  come  through 
the  war  catastrophes  more  unscathed  than  other  bellige- 
rents, unless  we  except  the  United  States.  Moreover,  she 
is  more  ready  than  all  others  for  world  domination.  *  *  The 
British  Empire  has  expanded  from  about  11,500,000  square 
miles  to  about  15,000,000.  The  character  of  the  British 
control  ranges  from  actual  annexation  to  military  occupa- 
tion or  political  domination. ' '  ^ 

As  a  whole,  and  more  than  ever  in  the  past,  British 
merchants  have  all  the  push  which  guarantees  success. 
They  started  early  to  reap  every  advantage  possible  from 
the  war  situation.  On  the  one  hand,  hardly  had  armistice 
been  declared,  when  British  merchants  in  China  brought 
pressure  to  bear  on  the  Chinese  Government  to  carry  into 
effect,  even  when  hostilities  had  ceased,  the  closure  and 
liquidation  of  all  German  firms.  On  the  other  hand,  Brit- 
ish merchants  at  home,  as  soon  as  the  Treaty  with  Germany 
was  signed,  hastened  to  renew  such  trade  with  Germany  as 
would  be  of  profit  to  British  interests.  Thus  an  ^^nglish 
newspaper  report  for  August,  1919,  reads: 

The  Peninsular  and  Oriental  Steam  Navigation  Company,  the 
British  India  Steam  Navigation  Company,  and  the  Well  Line,  will 

*  New  York  Independent,  September  27,  1919. 


250  CfilNA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

this  month  and  onwards  have  steamers  loading  in  Hamburg, 
Bremen  (if  sufficient  offers)  and  Rotterdam  in  connection  with 
their  service  to  India. 

Major  Sanford  Griffith  of  the  Inter-Allied  Commission 
on  Industrial  Restitution,  writing  of  British  commercial 
preparedness  in  Germany,  and  just  as  applicable  to  other 
parts  of  the  world,  says :  ^ 

The  British  have  invested  too  heavily  in  German  industries  to 
share  the  enthusiasm  of  French  soldiers  for  further  crippling 
Germany.  Substantial  trade  relations  with  Germany  mean  more 
to  the  English  than  with  any  other  country  on  the  Continent,  and 
are  a  necessary  preliminary  to  extended  trade  relations  with 
Russia. 

Thus  capturing  German  trade,  the  British  outstrip  all 
others,  including  even  Americans. 

British  merchants  in  China  begin  the  new  campaign  with 
certain  peculiar  advantages.  They  have  long-established 
firms,  with  branches  at  all  the  great  centres  of  Asia  and 
Australasia.  They  are  for  the  moment  free  of  the  German 
competitor.  In  reputation  for  honourable  and  fair  dealing 
with  the  inhabitants  of  Asiatic  countries,  they  hold  a  com- 
manding position  for  inspiring  confidence,  if  not  always 
affection,  and  need  fear  no  comparison  with  their  Japanese 
rivals — or  shall  we  call  them  Allies?  It  is  evident  that,  in 
a  political  and  commercial  way,  for  bringing  about  the 
exploitation  of  China  and  other  Asiatic  countries.  Great 
Britain  and  Japan  must  reckon  with  each  other. 

(2)  Next  to  be  noticed  is  American  influence  in  China. 

When  the  Great  War  opened,  and  early  began  to  entangle 
China,  Americans  had  a  decided  advantage  over  all  others 
for  expanding  their  influence,  in  perfectly  legitimate  ways, 
to  the  profit  and  security  of  China.     Both  the  American 

*  The  Qlohe,  March  26,  1920. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  WESTERN  NATIONS     251 

Government  and  the  American  individual,  through  many 
years  of  creditable  conduct,  were  looked  upon  by  Chinese 
as  the  truest  friends  of  China.  The  return  of  a  part  of  the 
Boxer  indemnity  for  educational  purposes  evinced  not  only 
a  sense  of  justice  on  the  part  of  the  American  Government, 
but  feelings  of  generosity  in  accord  with  the  general  sen- 
timent of  American  people.  Early  in  the  Wilson  Admin- 
istration American  bankers  withdrew  from  the  "Five- 
Power  Consortium,"  dominating  loans  to  China,  since  the 
Administration  regarded  that  guarantees  of  security  to 
American  bankers  by  the  American  Government  rather 
than  by  the  Chinese  Government  were  a  form  of  interfer- 
ence in  China's  political  affairs.  This  action,  criticized 
by  American  bankers,  made  an  impression  on  the  Chinese 
of  America's  regard  for  China's  sovereign  rights. 

These  advantages  and  opportunities  were  not  properly 
utilized  by  Americans  in  China,  as  the  war  waged  far  and 
wide,  and  other  nations  were  absorbed  in  plans  near  the 
centres  of  conflict.  Financially  Americans  were  the  only 
ones  able  to  make  loans  to  China.  The  American  banking 
group  of  J.  P.  Morgan  and  others  were  bound  not  to  act 
separately  from  the  original  ''Five-Power  Consortium." 
Other  bankers  hesitated  to  make  the  venture,  even  from 
motives  of  national  prestige.  When  Chicago  bankers  stood 
ready  to  make  loans  on  proper  security,  they  misunderstood 
the  Chinese  situation  by  approaching  the  Chinese,  not  di- 
rectly as  welcomed  business  men,  but  through  the  American 
Legation.  Instead  of  open  reference  to  Parliament,  which 
alone  can  sanction  a  loan  and  whose  members  would  gladly 
have  favoured  American  advances  in  money,  private  or  con- 
fidential or  secret  negotiations  were  carried  on  with  the 
militaristic  Premier,  who  afterwards  fell  under  the  spell 
of  Japanese  financiers.  As  an  amusing  incident,  when  I 
wrote  in  my  Peking  paper  an  article  making  inquiries  as 
to  these  mysterious  conferences,  just  as  I  had  previously 


252  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

probed  Japanese  proposals  in  finance,  I  was  placed  before 
the  United  States  Court  for  China  under  charge  of  libelling 
Paul  S.  Reinsch,  the  American  Minister — a  case,  however, 
which  like  two  other  charges  never  came  to  trial. 

The  Wilson  Administration  has  since  reversed  its  position 
on  "dollar  diplomacy,"  and  in  1920  assisted  in  forming 
a  larger  consortium,  with  bigger  groups  of  national  bankers 
from  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  France  and  Japan. 
This  perpetuates  the  "special  alliance"  theory  in  the  world 
of  finance. 

While,  financially,  American  bankers  were  losing  their 
golden  opportunities  in  China  all  through  the  war,  Jap- 
anese bankers,  financiers,  merchants  and  diplomats  were 
quietly  progressing,  with  even  more  than  customary  se- 
crecy, to  gain  a  dominant  financial  position  in  China,  and 
with  this  a  political  position. 

Even  greater,  so  it  seems  to  me,  and  as  is  confirmed  by 
facts  already  described,  was  the  failure  of  Americans  to 
use  their  outstanding  influence  to  keep  China  in  a  state  of 
peace.  Instead  of  this,  American  reputation  was  lowered 
by  the  effort  to  induce  China  to  sever  relations  with  Ger- 
many. Harm  to  America's  good  name  has  since  developed 
by  the  failure  to  make  good  the  assurances  of  help  which 
were  given  by  the  American  Minister  to  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment. The  expression  of  assuring  words  became  an 
expression  of  assuring  friendship.  But  when  at  the  Peace 
Table,  no  American  assistance  was  given  to  China,  not  even 
by  President  Wilson,  the  high  hopes  of  the  Chinese  re- 
versed themselves  into  intense  disappointment. 

Prof.  John  Dewey,  after  personal  investigation,  sums 
up  the  status  of  American  influence  in  the  following 
language :  ^ 

Our  prior  behaviour  has  left  with  many  Chinese,  especially 
those  who  have  not  been  in  the  United  States,  the  impression  that 
'■  The  New  Republic,  December  3,  1919. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  WESTERN  NATIONS    253J 

we  are  not,  in  our  foreign  dealings,  a  very  practical  people,  that 
we  lack  alertness,  quickness  of  decision  in  emergencies,  prompt- 
ness of  action  and  especially  pei-sistence.  We  are  thought  of  as, 
upon  the  whole,  a  well-disposed  people,  but  somewhat  ineffectual 
in  action. 

Hsu  En-yuan,  Vice-President  of  a  new  China-American 
Bank,  also  says :  ^ 

About  once  every  five  years  American  men  of  big  business  and 
finance  become  interested  in  China,  but  this  interest  does  not  last. 
Something  always  happens  to  frighten  the  bankers  away.  First 
it  is  a  change  in  political  affairs  at  home;  then  international 
politics  is  to  blame;  then,  again,  the  business  and  financial  repre- 
sentatives sent  to  China  become  impatient  at  the  delays  and 
intrigues  always  present  in  Chinese  affairs,  grow  tired  of  the 
interminable  negotiations  and  go  home. 

On  the  whole,  American  men  of  enterprise  have  greater 
opportunities  in  China  than  the  British,  but  it  looks  at 
present  as  if  the  British  by  well-laid  plans  going  back  sev- 
eral years  would  outstrip  Americans.  Americans  have  also 
a  better  chance  than  the  Japanese,  who  through  antipathy 
aroused  have  been  losing  commercially,  and  yet  it  looks  as 
if  a  few  years  hence  the  Japanese,  like  the  British,  would 
outstrip  Americans. 

Only  by  large  schemes  persistently  adhered  to  can  Amer- 
ican merchants  secure  a  first  or  even  a  second  place  in  the 
new  form  of  competition.  In  opportunity  America  is  first/ 
but  not  in  achievement.^ 

America's  influence  in  China  has  been  retarded  not  only 
by   a  mistaken   policy,   but   by   obstruction  from   associ- 

»  New  York  World,  February  23,  1920. 

'  In  securing  the  friendship  of  the  Chinese  people,  the  great  gen- 
erosity of  the  American  public  in  the  China  famine  more  than  makes 
amends  for  the  wrong  done  to  China  by  the  settlement  of  the 
Versailles  Treaty. 


254  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

ates  in  war.  During  the  war  period  it  was  almost  a 
crime  for  an  American  to  criticize  the  Allies.  Now  that 
war  is  over,  and  loyalty  to  truth  may  reassert  itself,  it  is 
well  for  Americans,  who  plan  for  influence  in  the  Far  East, 
to  know,  on  the  basis  of  past  conduct,  just  what  help,  if 
any,  American  merchants  may  expect  from  our  late  asso- 
ciates in  arms.  About  the  time  the  United  States  was 
contemplating  relief  to  the  Entente  Allies  in  Europe,  these 
same  Allies  stood  in  the  way  of  American  enterprise  in 
China.  The  greatest  American  syndicate,  that  of  Siems- 
Carey,  was  negotiating  with  the  Chinese  Government  for 
concessions  in  different  parts  of  China.  The  French  Lega- 
tion objected  to  railway  concessions  thus  negotiated  in 
South  China;  the  British  Legation  objected  to  other  rail- 
way concessions  in  Central  China;  the  Japanese  Legation 
objected  to  a  conservancy  concession  along  the  Grand  Canal, 
in  or  near  to  Shantung,  and  the  Russian  Legation  objected 
to  railway  concessions  in  North  China.  Again,  after  hostil- 
ities had  ceased,  when  the  secret  arrangements  of  this  same 
syndicate  with  the  Chinese  Government  had  been  made 
public,  like  Chino-Japanese  agreements,  the  British  Min- 
ister, learning  that  a  concession  had  been  granted  for  a 
railway  running  south  from  Hangchow  in  the  province  of 
Chekiang,  at  once  hastened  to  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office 
and  entered  an  emphatic  protest.^ 

So  far  as  experiences  in  China  are  concerned  during 
the  period  of  the  war,  American  enterprise  met  interference 
not  from  Germans,  but  from  the  European  Allies.  What 
may  be  expected  in  future  is  hard  to  say,  but,  in  general, 
co-operation  with  Germans  will  be  no  harder  than  with  the 
British  or  the  French.  As  something  idealistic,  I  recom- 
mend the  cultivation  of  friendship  on  the  part  of  Amer-. 

*  A  new  illustration  is  the  opposition  of  the  British  and 
Japanese  Governments  to  the  Chinese  desire  to  allow  in  China  an 
American  wireless  station. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  WESTERN  NATIONS     255 

icans  with  all  peoples,  the  English  of  course,  and  also 
others.  t 

In  matters  of  ordinary  trade  Americans  will  still  have 
their  opportunities,  unaffected  by  Governmental  policies. 
Great  corporations  like  the  Standard  Oil  Company,  the 
British  and  American  Tobacco  Company  (really  an  Eng- 
lish-chartered concern),  and  Singer  Sewing  Machine  Com- 
pany, are  bound  to  succeed  by  their  wise  methods  of  send- 
ing agents  and  goods  direct  to  the  interior  towns  of  China. 
At  the  same  time,  the  competition  in  all  branches  of  trade 
will  be  more  acute  than  in  former  years. 

In  religious  and  educational  enterprise  Americans  have 
unique  opportunities.  Their  fine  record  in  the  past  is  not 
going  to  be  upset  by  any  misconceptions  of  American  diplo- 
macy, unless  they  advocate  and  support  American  policies 
which  are  detrimental  to  China.  Officially  Americans  have 
lost  greatly  in  China;  in  commerce  and  missions,  particu- 
larly the  latter,  Americans  face  a  bright  future.  Between 
British  and  American  missionaries  there  is  a  close  bond  of 
sympathy.  They  all  wish  well  to  the  Chinese  people,  and 
to  the  experiment  of  a  Republic. 

As  a  distinct  matter  for  consideration  is  the  annoyance 
and  opposition  which  American  merchants,  educationists 
and  missionaries  have  received  from  Japan.  This  has  re- 
ceived abundant  testimony  from  Americans  in  Shantung 
and  the  strong  protest  of  different  American  organizations 
in  Shanghai  and  Peking.  The  preferential  policy  applied 
in  Manchuria  before  the  war  has  been  accentuated  during 
the  prosecution  of  the  war.  The  clash  that  has  come  be- 
tween Japanese  ambition  and  the  interests  of  all  others,  in- 
cluding the  Chinese,  is  not  surprising,  considering  the 
engrossing  cares  of  war  assumed  by  Europeans  and  Amer- 
icans. One  slight  benefit  apt  to  arise  is  that  the  victorious 
nations  may  now  be  convinced  that  the  displacement  of 
Germany  by  Japan  has  resulted  in  no  good,  but  in  decided 


256  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

harm.    The  American  Chamber  of  Commerce  in  Shanghai 
thus  repeats  the  growing  sentiment  of  intelligent  Chinese: 

Germany's  control  in  Shantung  province,  while  irksome,  had 
nothing  of  the  present  effect,  because  Germany  was  on  the  other 
side  of  the  world,  and  the  weight  of  the  iron  hand  in  China  was 
light. 

As  to  restrictions  placed  on  American  enterprise  by  the 
Japanese,  Charles  Hodges  writes :  ^ 

American  trade,  confronted  by  Japanese  competition  over  the 
Pacific  markets,  is  face  to  face  with  the  most  highly  co-ordinated 
government-backed  business  in  the  world. 

And  again: 

The  American  business  world  must  realize  that  their  trade  with 
China  is  jeopardized  wherever  the  Japanese  secure  a  foothold,  be 
it  only  "  economic  rights  "  or  a  leasehold. 

And  again: 

That  is  the  whole  meaning  of  Japan's  determination  to  duplicate 
in  Shantung  the  grip  she  has  gotten  on  Manchuria — a  grip  which 
is  constantly  tightened  against  American  interests  in  the  regions 
affected.  Japan  is  a  business  adversary  of  ours;  she  will  not  be 
swerved  from  this  objective  unless  she  is  forced  to  abandon  this 
scheme  to  bind  the  Far  East  economically  to  Japan's  political 
enda. 

(3)  Lastly  I  consider  the  future  influence  of  Germans 
in  China. 

Any  other  people  except  the  Germans,  called  upon  to 
face  such  world-wide  and  multifarious  restraints  as  the 
Versailles  Treaty  of  Peace  has  imposed  on  Germany,  would 

'  The  Far-Eastern  Fortnightly,  September  1,  1919. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  WESTERN  NATIONS     257 

lose  heart.  The  difficulties  which  beset  the  Chinese  are  as 
nothing  in  comparison.  The  complete  eradication  of  Ger- 
man business  and  the  liquidation  of  German  property 
everywhere  throughout  the  world,  except  in  a  few  neutral 
countries,  is  the  most  amazing  performance  ever  sanctioned 
by  professed  adherents  of  high  moral  aims.  I  recognize 
the  desirability  of  overthrowing  the  military  machine  and 
the  absolute  authority  that  existed  in  Germany,  or  that 
exists  among  other  peoples,  but  I  candidly  confess  I  see 
no  justice  in  the  attempt  to  destroy  Germany,  Austria  and 
Hungary,  industrially,  economically  and  commercially. 

H.  W.  Massingham  has  stated  the  case  in  all  the  intensity 
of  an  aroused  English  conscience.    I  quote  his  words :  * 

Is  it  a  legitimate  use  of  military  success  in  modern  Europe 
for  one  Power  to  pile  up  against  another  a  series  of  perquisitions, 
requisitions  and  inquisitions  which  deprive  her  of  millions  of 
people  of  her  blood  and  soil,  of  about  half  her  coal  supply  and 
three  parts  of  her  iron  ore,  of  all  her  greater  ocean-going  marine, 
of  her  colonies,  of  her  foreign  treaty  rights  and  concessions,  of 
free  use  of  her  railways,  free  disposal  of  her  industrial  products, 
and  the  effectual  right  of  taxation,  which  destroy  her  power  to 
save  and  limit  her  power  to  work?  Who  gave  this  jurisdiction 
of  life  and  death?  What  conception  of  the  civilized  and  the 
moral  order  does  it  advance?  .  .  .  Under  the  rule  of  Paris  Ger- 
many surrendered  every  absolute  political  right  of  nationhood, 
including  the  deep  underlying  human  right  of  self-respect.  .  .  . 
Within  the  period  of  the  treaty  she  ceases  to  be  self-determined. 

As  for  myself,  I  do  not  write  of  the  barriers  to  German 
rehabilitation  at  home,  but  limit  myself  to  the  combined 
movement  to  eject  from  China,  German  enterprise,  com- 
mercial, educational  and  religious,  for  generations  to  come. 
It  cannot  be  done.  Men 's  consciences  will  protest  sooner  or 
later.    For  the  best  interests  of  the  victors,  for  the  welfare 

'  In  The  Nation  of  New  York,  May  24,  1919. 


258  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

of  the  Chinese,  a  welcome  must  yet  be  given  to  those  so 
suddenly  and  unjustly  repatriated.  It  is  cowardice  for 
great  Powers  like  the  United  States,  the  British  Empire, 
the  French  Republic  and  the  Empire  of  the  Mikado,  to 
call  for  the  annihilation  of  German  enterprise,  initiative 
and  eflficiency,  along  with  disarmament  and  the  overthrow 
of  the  Monarchy.  Seventy  millions  of  people  who  held  out 
for  more  than  four  years  against  the  strongest  military 
combination  the  world  had  ever  known  cannot  be  kept 
within  a  vacuum. 

William  G.  Shepherd,  under  date  of  August  25,  1919, 
writes  thus  to  the  New  York  Evening  Post  from  The  Hague : 

However  one  looks  at  matters  in  Germany,  it  appears,  at  this 
close  range,  that  the  German  commercial  firms,  so  far  as  within 
them  lies,  are  doing  more  to  set  the  sails  of  their  business  prop- 
erly than  are  the  business  men  of  any  of  the  other  European 
countries. 

Under  date  of  August  28  the  same  correspondent  writes : 

In  her  purchasing,  Germany  is  using  a  coin  that  no  other 
nation  seems  to  be  employing.  She  is  paying  for  what  she  buys 
in  the  coin  of  work. 

What,  then,  is  possible  for  German  enterprise  in  the  Far 
East  in  the  near  future? 

(a)  The  Chinese  are  going  to  receive  back  their  German 
friends.  If  the  heads  of  the  great  German  hongs  come 
back  empty-handed,  the  Chinese  compradores  who  have  as- 
sociated with  them,  and  other  Chinese  merchants  who  have 
become  rich  through  German  business  connections,  will 
advance  the  capital  and  provide  the  rooms  for  re-starting 
business.  The  Chinese  merchant  is  noted  for  his  apprecia- 
tion of  kind  deeds  and  true  friendship. 

(b)  The  Japanese  will  also  seek  to  make  amends  for  the 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  WESTERN  NATIONS     ^59 

hardships  thrust  on  the  Germans  in  their  midst.  Commer- 
cially, the  Japanese  will  link  hands  with  the  Germans,  if 
not  by  ocean  routes,  then  across  the  land  route  of  Eastern 
Europe  and  Northern  Asia.  If  the  English  P.  and  0.  and 
the  Glen  Line  refuse  to  carry  goods  between  Hamburg  and 
Shanghai,  then  the  Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha  or  some  new  line 
of  steamships  will  seize  the  opportunity  and  facilitate 
communication. 

(c)  German  business  men  are  not  going  to  be  withheld 
from  Russian  Europe  and  Russian  Siberia  at  the  mere  be- 
hest of  old-time  enemies.  To  use  one's  genius  in  check- 
mating German  enterprise  in  Eastern  Europe,  as  in  West- 
ern, will  not  long  succeed.  Every  people  have  a  right  to 
trade  somewhere  on  God's  earth.  German  business  capac- 
ity is  needed  in  Russia.  The  advance  in  that  direction  fol- 
lows a  natural  law.  In  due  time  German  and  Japanese 
enterprise  will  meet  somewhere  in  Russian  Siberia. 

(d)  A  better  spirit  will  yet  come  to  British  and  French 
and  American  capitalists — who  are  of  necessity  interna- 
tionalists— and  they,  as  of  yore,  will  again  hold  dealings 
with  the  great  minds  of  Germany  and  Austria,  who  take 
big  views  of  big  projects  along  lines  of  concordant  action 
and  mutual  well-being.  Dr.  Alonzo  E.  Taylor  before  the 
American  Manufacturers  Export  Association  in  the  month 
of  October  (1919),  after  serving  on  the  Economic  Council 
of  Allies,  said: 

Every  one  now  realizes  that  if  Germany  is  ever  to  pay  the  bill 
she  must  be  allowed  to  be  a  going  concern.  If  England,  France 
and  Italy  want  that  reparation  they  have  got  to  help  her  to  earn 
it.  In  these  circumstances  talk  of  paralysing  German  industry 
is  idle. 

I  know  how  far  the  Powers,  great  and  small,  were  ready 
to  go  in  the  punitive  spirit  towards  China  after  the  Boxer 


260  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

cataclysm  of  1900,  and  I  know  how  a  better  spirit  of  for- 
giveness, conciliation  and  goodwill  at  last  prevailed  among 
all  the  nations  in  contact  with  China.  This  better  spirit 
will  reassert  itself  before  many  days  have  passed  after  the 
five  defeated  nations  have  duly  signed  their  doom.  Retali- 
ation is  not  a  single-handed  force,  but  reciprocal.  Its  ad- 
vance is  that  of  geometrical  progression.  Its  presence  is 
persona  non  grata  to  lasting  peace. 

The  natural  relationship  before  the  war  in  both  trade 
and  missions  in  China  and  elsewhere  was  that  between 
Britons,  Americans  and  Germans.  To  re-unite  on  this  basis 
will  still  be  for  the  good  of  them  all. 

Should  Germany  be  excluded  from  this  natural  fellow- 
ship, she  must  then  turn  elsewhere,  and  that  means  to 
Russia  and  Japan. 

The  hope  of  the  world  is  in  cultivated  fellowship  among 
all  peoples,  allowing  to  each  its  fullest  development,  no 
people  infringing  on  the  rights  of  another.  Thus  may 
peace  be  lasting.  Thus  will  China  be  secure.  Thus  will 
Japan  be  satisfied.  Thus  will  the  dread  of  a  second  war, 
arising  in  the  Pacific,  pass  from  the  mind,  and  men  every- 
where may  give  themselves  to  the  occupations  of  peace, 
charity  and  justice. 

"  Peace  calls  to  man  to  follow  her  henceforth  forever, 
In  brotherhood  that  binds  all  lands  and  tribes, 
Peace  never  was  the  Child  of  War. 
But  was  before  War  was, 
And  shall  be  after  it, 

Reigning  triumphant  down  the  happy  years 
Around  the  globe."  ^ 

*  James  Harcourt  West. 


CHAPTER   XII 

VITAL   PRINCIPLES  VERSUS  SPOLIATION 

During  the  period  of  the  World  War,  President  Wilson 
announced  many  great  principles,  eternal  verities,  which 
can  be  gainsaid  by  no  one.  Greatest  approval  has  come 
from  peoples  the  world  over  who  are  most  oppressed.  Men's 
conceptions  have  for  once  been  idealized.  January  8,  1918, 
the  President  enunciated  his  Fourteen  Points,  four  of  which 
were  of  general  application.  July  4,  1918,  he  enunciated 
four  factors  of  world  peace  to  take  the  place  of  World  War. 
September  27,  1918,  he  enunciated  five  requisites  of  per- 
manent peace,  and  also  five  issues  of  the  war,  all  of  a  highly 
moral  character.     There  is  no  trouble  with  the  principles. 

Having  dwelt  on  the  political  problems  in  China  and  on 
plans  of  reconstruction  for  China  amid  her  war-entangle- 
ments; and  having  stated  a  large  number  of  facts  and 
shown  their  bearing  on  China,  it  is  now  possible  to  deduce 
a  few  principles  that  pertain  to  China's  political  future 
and  to  her  relations  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  Whether 
she  is  to  be  captive  or  free,  independent  or  with  no  longer 
a  national  entity,  is  still  unknown.  Much  depends  on  an 
appreciation  of  all  the  facts,  on  a  true  perspective  to  be 
formed  in  the  mind,  and  on  adherence  to  correct  and  well- 
tested  principles.  The  author  in  his  statement  of  things  as 
they  are,  holds  to  certain  definite  opinions,  which  may  al- 
most be  called  convictions,  and  which  are  here  outlined  as 
guiding  principles.  These  principles  issue  forth  from  a 
knowledge  of  the  facts  already  recounted,  and  are  the  out- 
come of  actual  experience.  There  are  ten  specifications  of 
principles  which  bear  particularly  on  China. 

^(1)  The  first  may  be  stated  thus:  The  war  as  fought  in 

261 


262  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

Europe,  in  Africa,  in  Asia,  on  land  and  on  all  the  seas, 
should  have  been,  as  professed,  supremely  a  war  for  prin- 
ciple rather  than  a  war  to  subjugate  particular  nations. 
Still  more  docs  this  necessity  exist  in  re-establishing  a  world 
peace.  By  concentrating  animosity  on  some  one  people, 
good  and  evil  have  been  marked  off  according  to  territorial 
boundaries.  Good  men  in  enemy  nations  are  condemned 
with  the  bad,  while  bad  men  and  bad  policies  among  our 
Allies  or  in  ourselves  are  condoned.  If  the  United  States 
had  lead  the  way  in  siding  with  Right  wherever  found, 
and  opposing  Wrong  wherever  found,  the  sound  ideas  of 
President  Wilson,  who  spoke  for  the  best  everywhere,  would 
have  had  better  chance  of  being  effected. 

Loyalty,  for  example,  has  been  gauged  by  the  degree  of 
one's  hatred  to  the  "enemy,"  whether  combatant  or  non- 
combatant,  at  home  or  abroad,  rather  than  by  devotion  to 
those  principles  which  are  formulated  in  the  National  Con- 
stitution, and  in  the  sacred  traditions  of  the  past,  and  which 
change  not  in  war  or  peace.  Too  much  has  it  been  taken 
for  granted  that  he  is  the  best  patriot  who  hurls  tirades 
at  other  peoples,  rather  than  the  one  who  aims  to  live  out 
in  daily  life  the  truest  and  best  in  his  own  country  as  in 
all  humanity. 

Suppose,  again,  that  the  supreme  motive  had  been  the 
overthrow  of  militarism,  or  the  war  spirit,  wherever  found, 
how  would  it  have  been  possible  for  liberty-loving  Ameri- 
cans, Englishmen  and  Frenchmen,  to  countenance  the  mili- 
tarism of  Japan  or  the  military  autocrats  of  the  Chinese 
Government  ?  How  possible  to  form  plans  in  our  own  Gov- 
ernments for  military  and  naval  expansion?  The  Bishop 
of  Oxford,  addressing  the  clergy  of  Boston,  uttered  these 
words  of  sober  counsel : 

I  am  always  dreadfully  afraid  of  the  intoxicating  power  of 
militarism,    I  know  what  it  means,  .    .    .  Are  we  in  no  danger 


VITAL  PRINCIPLES  VS.  SPOLIATION        263 

of  militarism?  I  can  conceive  of  no  disaster  comparable  with 
this — that  we  should  win  a  great  victory  and  be  able  to  dictate 
to  the  military  autocracy  of  Germany  a  peace  the  most  desirable 
that  we  could  imagine;  that  we  should  have  them  under  our  feet, 
defeated  before  all  Europe,  and  that  then  we  should  return  to  our 
several  countries,  ourselves  having  imbibed  that  very  disease  from 
which  we  were  seeking  to  deliver  the  world. 

And  suppose  that  China  catches  the  disease,  will  it  be 
good  for  mankind,  an  aid  to  Righteousness  ? 

It  is  currently  reported  that  when  Viscount  Ishii  as  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs  at  the  close  of  1915,  was  approached 
by  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia  to  join  with  them  in 
urging  China  to  enter  the  war,  he  said  ^  that  Japan  could 
not  view  without  uneasiness  "a  moral  awakening  of  400,- 
000,000  Chinese, ' '  that  is,  along  military  lines.  Whether  he 
used  these  exact  words  or  not,  and  whatever  his  own  as- 
sumption, I  agree  that  it  was  no  child's  play  to  arouse  the 
vast  Chinese  population  to  such  form  of  moral  awakening 
as  was  contemplated  by  an  ambition  for  feats  of  arms. 

I  give  one  other  illustration.  Suppose  that  the  supreme 
object  of  the  war  had  really  been  to  overthrow  autocracy, 
and  to  make  the  world  safe  for  democracy.  A  greater  re- 
sult would  have  been  achieved  by  applying  the  purpose  to 
all  peoples  than  by  a  sole  desire  to  overthrow  the  consti- 
tutional Government  of  Germany  or  to  bring  about  the  dis- 
memberment of  Austria-Hungary.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
under  modern  forms  of  government  and  with  the  growing 
impact  of  liberalism,  the  autocracy  of  any  one  ruler  has 
been  made  impossible,  whether  with  the  Kaisers  of  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary,  the  Tsar  of  all  the  Russias,  the 
Mikado  of  Japan,  or  even  the  Sultan  of  Turkey.  It  is  very- 
much  to  be  doubted  whether  it  will  be  better  to  encourage 
the  overthrow  of  enemy  Governments  and  the  upheavals  of 
revolution  than  to  work  together  for  the  maintenance  of 

*  Professor  Jenks  in  North  American  Review,  September,  1919, 


264'  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

law  and  order  under  the  natural  development  of  the  demo- 
cratic spirit.  The  evil  to  be  uprooted  is  the  autocratic 
spirit  wherever  found,  whether  in  a  mob  or  in  a  monarch, 
in  an  Emperor  or  a  bureaucrat.  The  essential  idea  of  de- 
mocracy is  human  freedom.  Under  this  spirit  how  would 
it  have  been  possible  for  the  democratic  Governments  of  the 
world  to  have  accorded  highest  honour,  not  to  the  demo- 
cratic aspirations  of  Young  China,  but  to  Japan  with  its 
repressions  in  Korea  and  its  coercions  in  China?  How, 
too,  would  it  have  been  possible  to  give  support  to  the 
Military  Governors  of  China,  mostly  a  group  of  provincial 
autocrats,  or  to  the  military  Premier,  General  Tuan  Chi-jui, 
most  autocratic  of  them  all,  and  at  the  same  time  to  refuse 
a  modicum  of  praise  for  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen,  Dr.  Wu  Ting- 
fang,  Mr.  Tang  Shao-yi  and  all  the  supporters  of  the  dem- 
ocratic, constitutional,  parliamentary  Government  centred 
at  Canton?  What  controlled  diplomatic  action  was  only 
this:  "Whosoever  joins  with  us  in  fighting  the  Germans 
is  a  true  friend  and  a  worthy  ally."  The  question  of  ad- 
vancing democratic  ideas  in  either  Japan  or  China  or  of 
helping  the  democratic  form  of  government  in  China  was 
of  minor  consideration.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  main 
thought  had  been  to  safeguard  the  Republic  of  China,  no 
encouragement  would  have  been  given  to  embroiling  China 
in  the  war,  and  in  all  probability  the  result  would  have 
been  a  firmly-established  Republic  in  the  Orient. 

The  great  moral  mistake  in  all  of  these  matters  has  been 
that  along  with  wide  profession  of  fine  principles  there  has 
been  a  proneness  to  make  use  of  those  methods  and  to  nour- 
ish that  spirit  which  were  condemned  in  our  late  enemies. 
The  war  gospel  has  been  this :  Cast  out  devils  1  y  Beelzebub. 
But  St.  Paul,  in  his  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  after  itemizing 
the  sins  of  the  Gentiles,  made  special  application  to  his  own 
people ;  he  asked  of  them  this  question :  * '  Thou  that  makest 


VITAL  PRINCIPLES  VS.  SPOLIATION        265 

thy  boast  of  the  law,  through  breaking  of  the  law  dishon- 
ourest  thou  God?" 

(2)  It  is  essential  to  bear  in  mind  that  since  November 
11,  1918,  the  victorious  nations  should  have  been  striving 
to  make  peace,  and  to  do  this  they  should  have  placed  fore- 
most the  inner  spirit  of  peace.  Back  of  all  peace  is  con- 
ciliation. Failure  to  reconcile,  no  matter  which  side  is  at 
fault,  means  a  failure  to  make  peace.  There  may  be  peace- 
terms  but  no  peace  spirit.  The  breathing  of  hate  and  the 
pronunciamento  of  fierce  anathemas  may  be  of  the  very 
nature  of  war  and  military  necessity,  but  they  have  no 
place  in  a  world  of  peace  within  the  limits  of  widespread 
and  lasting  conciliation.  "To  conquer  with  arms,"  said 
President  Wilson,  addressing  Congress  on  armistice  day, 
"is  to  make  only  a  temporary  conquest;  to  conquer  the 
world  by  earning  its  esteem  is  to  make  permanent  con- 
quest. I  am  confident  that  the  nations  that  have  learned 
the  discipline  of  freedom  and  that  have  settled  with  self- 
possession  to  its  ordered  practice  are  now  about  to  make 
conquest  of  the  world  by  the  power  of  example  and  friendly 
helpfulness. ' ' 

But  what  do  we  find?  Not  so  much  that  a  dozen  wars 
are  being  waged  after  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace, 
but  that  leaders  of  political  thought  and  guides  of  the 
Church  continue  to  endorse  or  inoculate  the  old  war  phrase- 
ology of  hate  and  enmity.  Worse  than  general  unrest,  yea, 
that  which  breeds  this  unrest,  is  unholy,  un-Christian, 
unwise  adherence  to  the  war  spirit.  To  love  peace  is  to 
have  peace.  The  whole  temper  of  mind,  the  very  phrases 
one  uses,  all  need  to  be  changed  and  sanctified. 

So  contrary  to  the  true  spirit  of  peace,  of  conciliation, 
and  "friendly  helpfulness,"  is  that  which  has  occurred  in 
China  since  the  declaration  of  armistice,  very  largely  under 
British  initiative.    And  these  Britons  were  mostly  Chris- 


266  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREEt 

tians,  with  a  few  Jews;  none  of  them  were  Buddhists,  not 
even  Moslems.  I  confess  that  even  in  wartime  I  have  failed 
to  see  the  reason,  the  duty,  or  the  pleasure,  out  there  in 
China,  to  vent  wrath  on  the  Germans,  whose  friendship  we 
all  had  prized  in  former  days.  How  much  less  jBtting  was 
any  such  uncharitableness,  when  once  war  had  terminated. 
So  far  as  life  in  China  was  concerned,  war  had  terminated 
November  7,  1914,  when  all  the  German  combatants  became 
prisoners  of  war  to  Japan.  To  illustrate  my  point,  I  take 
the  liberty  of  quoting  from  a  private  letter,  dated  August 
23,  1919,  written  from  Shanghai  by  a  devoted  Christian : 

I  never  shall  forget  the  events  following  the  signing  of  the 
armistice.  In  my  ignorance  I  supposed  that  there  would  be  a 
cessation  of  petty  hostilities  here  in  Shanghai.  But  it  was  only 
the  beginning.  There  was  a  big  victory  procession  ending  with 
the  burning  of  the  Kaiser  and  other  notables,  after  they  had 
"  kotowed "  to  the  Allies.  This  will  give  you  a  key  as  to  the 
parade  itself,  which  did  not  please  any  Chinese  with  whom  I 
spoke.  "  I  thought  it  would  be  a  Peace  parade,"  said  one  Chinese, 
"  but  it  was  only  a  Hate  parade."  I  had  arranged  Christmas 
decoration  for  my  house  with  letters  of  evergreen  across  the  upper 
veranda,  "  On  earth,  peace,  good-will  to  men."  But  there  wasn't 
any  peace  in  Shanghai  and  there  wasn't  any  good-will.  I  was 
ashamed.  Almost  at  once,  and  with  very  short  warning,  the  Ger- 
mans were  evicted  from  their  houses  unless  they  were  living  in 
houses  owned  by  neutrals  or  Chinese.  Being  winter  time,  this 
worked  great  hardship.  Next  came  the  cutting  off  of  telephones 
for  Germans.  This  also  worked  hardship,  especially  for  the 
Paulun  Hospital  and  German  doctors.  The  German  School, 
including  its  apparatus,  was  confiscated,  and  then  soon  com- 
menced the  deportation  of  the  Germans.  To  me  the  saddest  thing 
about  that  was  the  gusto,  the  lack  of  sympathy,  the  evident  enjoy- 
ment of  their  humiliation  shown  by  the  foreign  community  and 
even  by  the  missionaries.  In  some  eases  the  proceedings  seemed 
to  me  very  stern.  A  large  number  of  old  Shanghai  residents 
(German)  were  given  less  than  twenty-four  hours'  notice  to  get 


•'       VITAL  PRINCIPLES  VS.  SPOLIATION        267 

ready  to  leave.  A  tragic  procession  of  about  a  thousand  were 
passing  along  the  bund  on  a  Sunday  morning  during  divine 
service.  The  Te  Deum  was  chanted  and  the  thanksgiving  Psalms. 
No  word  of  prayer  for  our  enemies,  now  vanquished. 

There  were  two  incidents  that  made  a  deep  impression  on  me. 
One  was  the  repatriation  of  the  German  pastor's  family.  They 
have  two  darling  little  children.  The  little  four-year-old  child 
could  not  understand  why  they  had  to  leave  their  pretty  home 
and  why  her  mother  was  crying.  She  was  told  it  was  because  of 
the  English.  "  Mother,"  she  asked,  "  do  the  English  know  any- 
thing about  our  God,  the  dear  Lord  Jesus?"  At  the  church, 
where  they  had  last  been  stopping,  they  were  hurriedly  getting 
their  packages  of  condensed  milk,  water,  bedding,  etc.,  ready, 
while  the  pastor  was  trying  to  make  arrangement  disposing  of 
the  church  services  and  other  matters.  And  so  they  were  not  off 
the  place  by  8:30  a.m.  (though  the  prison-boat  was  not  to  sail 
till  the  next  day).  Soon  came  a  batch  of  Shanghai  Volunteers 
dressed  in  Scotch  Highland  fashion,  armed  with  swords  and 
rifles,  and  followed  by  the  foreign  police.  The  little  children 
looked  up  so  wonderingly  at  these  big  Englishmen  all  ready  to 
bind  and  carry  away  their  father,  the  gentle  pastor.  The  Volun- 
teers looked  ashamed  and  ill  at  ease. 

The  other  incident  was  of  a  lady,  daughter  of  an  American 
missionary.  She  was  ill  with  influenza  and  the  physician  had 
advised  against  her  sailing,  but  she  refused  to  leave  her  husband. 
He  had  also  been  exempted  by  the  Chinese,  who  alone  were 
responsible  for  the  repatriation.  But  the  Municipal  Chief  of 
Police,  English,  said  if  he  was  not  out  of  the  house  within  two 
hours  the  Volunteers  would  carry  bim  to  the  ship.  On  receiving 
the  information  he  expressed  his  hatred  of  us  Shanghai  Allies. 
His  intensity  was  frightful.  I  could  not  really  blame  him,  as  I 
realized  that  his  properties  were  to  be  confiscated  and  auctioned 
off  and  he  and  his  wife  allowed  to  take  home  about  three  hundred 
taels  (ounces  of  silver)  apiece.  He  had  been  very  wealthy  and 
had  a  luxurious  home.  When  I  multiplied  his  hate  by  that  of 
about  60,000,000  Germans,  and  that  of  Frenchmen,  Belgians, 
Americans,  Austrians  and  countless  others,  I  was  overwhelmed  by 
the  thought  of  the  hate  of  the  world. 


268  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

All  this,  remember,  after  the  deeds  and  demands  of  war, 
when  world  peace  is  to  be  re-established.  All  this  in  Far 
Cathay,  under  British  administration,  in  the  sight  of  dis- 
cerning Chinese. 

As  a  word  of  hope  comes  the  news  from  the  very  centre 
of  the  war  in  Europe  that  a  Franco-German  Association  is 
being  formed  to  aflSrm  before  the  world  the  ardent  desire 
for  international  peace  by  means  of  mutual  reconciliation, 
rallying  to  the  cry  of  "War  against  hate!  War  against 
war!  Live  peace  and  brotherhood  among  the  peoples!" 
May  this  vision  of  holy  prophets  become  the  vision  of  suf- 
fering and  oppressed  Asia,  as  well  as  of  distracted  Europe. 

(3)  Correct  conceptions  of  the  situation  in  Eastern  Asia 
must  be  free  from  preconceptions  based  on  the  situation  in 
Europe.  It  is  impossible  to  get  a  true  perspective  of  con- 
ditions in  the  Far  East,  if  the  eye  looks  merely  on  condi- 
tions in  Europe  or  America.  Observation  true  to  the  facts 
must  be  all-around,  and,  as  far  as  possible,  free  from  the 
bewilderment  of  passion.  There  must  be  poise  of  judg- 
ment. It  is  only  natural  to  have  misconception  of  the 
doings  and  inter-relations  of  the  Chinese  on  the  one  side, 
and  of  all  other  peoples,  Western  or  Japanese,  on  the  other, 
if  there  is  already  a  preconception  either  for  or  against 
some  particular  people  as  shaped  by  bias  incident  to  war- 
fare in  Europe  or  on  the  high  seas.  Preconception  breeds 
misconception.  Animosity  to  German  ways  of  waging  war 
has  caused  many  an  American,  otherwise  fair-minded,  to 
conclude  ipso  facto  that  everything  done  by  Germans  in 
China  has  been  bad  and  that  their  extinction  ought  to  be 
viewed  with  favour  by  Chinese  and  by  every  one  else.  So, 
too,  prejudice  directed  against  Japan  may  lead  one  to  over- 
look all  the  misdeeds  of  the  Allies  and  the  United  States  as 
perpetrated,  somewhat  under  cover,  in  both  China  and 
Japan.  To  understand  the  situation,  to  appreciate  the 
wrongs  done  to  China  and  by  whom,  both  in  war  and  at  the 


VITAL  PRINCIPLES  VS.  SPOLIATION         269 

Peace  Table,  it  is  all-important  that  all  predilections — ^the 
pro  and  anti  spirit — be  shaken  off,  leaving  the  mind  in  a 
state  of  clarity  and  unruffled  judiciousness. 

One  of  President  Wilson's  axiomatic  truths  is  this:  "The 
impartial  justice  meted  out  must  involve  no  discrimination 
between  those  to  whom  we  wish  to  be  just  and  those  to  whom 
we  do  not  wish  to  be  just.  It  must  be  a  justice  that  plays 
no  favourites  and  knows  no  standard  but  the  equal  rights 
of  the  several  peoples  concerned. ' '  No  doubt  the  President 
was  thinking  particularly  of  the  Germans  as  "those  to 
whom  we  do  not  wish  to  be  just. "  As  to  the  Far  East,  the 
Pacific,  and  America's  Oriental  problems,  he  would  prob- 
ably include  the  Japanese  in  the  same  category.  As  for 
myself,  I  desire  to  be  just  to  all,  to  the  Germans  as  well 
as  to  my  kin  of  Scotland  and  England,  to  the  Japanese  as 
well  as  to  the  Chinese  people,  whose  interests  I  have  tried 
to  serve. 

Americans — and  I  mention  no  others — can  never  grasp 
the  intricate  problem  of  the  Far  East  if  they  continue  to 
read  into  the  study  the  bugaboo  of  pro-Germanism  or  the 
agitation  of  anti-Japanese-ism,  or  the  war  criterion  of  pro- 
Ally  or  anti-Ally.  The  war  is  over,  the  muzzle  is  off,  let 
all  men  see  the  nations,  the  Governments,  the  diplomats, 
as  they  really  are. 

Already  surprise  and  chagrin  have  come  to  Americans 
and  Chinese  by  the  disclosures  of  the  Allied  connivance 
with  Japan  to  deal  with  China  as  they  saw  fit,  unknown  to 
both  the  Chinese  and  Americans.  Other  disclosures  which 
have  been  made  in  these  pages  may  possibly  have  displeased 
those  whose  minds  are  already  made  up,  or  have  passed 
judgment  before  trying  the  case.  But  truths  sometimes 
hurt  as  well  as  soothe. 

The  conduct  of  the  two  groups  of  warring  nations  in 
their  dealings  may  be  stated  thus :  With  China  the  princi- 
ples as  proclaimed  by  President  Wilson  have  been  better 


270  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

adhered  to  in  China  by  the  officials  and  subjects  of  the  two 
Central  Powers  than  by  the  European  Allies,  by  Japan,  or 
even  by  America.  Or  it  may  be  stated  thus :  The  policy  and 
conduct  of  the  Allied  group  in  China  has  been  very  nearly 
the  reverse  of  what  they  professed  in  Europe. 

(4)  A  very  simple  rule  is  this :  Know  the  facts,  the  more 
the  better,  and  accept  the  truth  as  derived  from  facts.  This 
is  inductive  philosophy  as  applied  to  search  for  truth. 

"  Truth,  crushed  to  earth,  shall  rise  again, 
The  eternal  years  of  God  are  hers, 
But  Error,  wounded,  writhes  with  pain. 
And  dies  among  his  worshippers." 

One  of  the  great  injuries  wrought  by  war  of  any  kind 
is  the  subjection  of  the  moral  to  the  military,  as  seen  in  the 
compulsion,  oftentimes  legislative,  and  largely  executive, 
for  misrepresenting  the  facts,  for  hiding  the  truth,  for  mis- 
construing the  aims,  speech  and  conduct  of  those  abroad 
who  are  foes  in  war  and  those  at  hf)me  who  dare  to  disagree 
and  criticize. 

It  will  take  many  a  year  to  know  the  real  situation  of 
the  European  nations  prior  to  the  war  and  during  the  war. 
As  to  the  real  intent  of  the  Japanese,  the  real  heart  of  the 
Chinese,  and  the  real  doings  of  Allies  and  Americans  in 
China,  much  light  has  been  thrown  by  public  discussion, 
but  even  yet  fallacious  arguments  are  being  used,  some 
point  is  being  unduly  stretched,  Japan  is  an  enigma  and 
China  a  conundrum.  As  to  the  real  soul  of  the  nations 
arrayed  against  Germany,  or  at  least  of  their  leaders,  Pres- 
ident Wilson  on  Memorial  Day  gave  in  France  this  startling 
account  of  what  he  had  learned : 

You  are  aware,  as  I  am  aware,  that  the  airs  of  an  older  day 
are  beginning  to  stir  again,  that  the  standards  of  an  old  order 
are  trying  to  assert  themselves  again.    There  is  here  and  there  an 


VITAL  PRINCIPLES  VS.  SPOLIATION        271 

attempt  to  insert  into  the  counsel  of  statesmen  the  old  reckoning 
of  selfishness  and  bargaining  and  national  advantage  which  were 
the  roots  of  this  war,  and  any  man  who  counsels  these  things 
advocates  a  renewal  of  the  sacrifice  which  these  men  have  made: 
for  if  this  is  not  the  final  battle  for  right,  there  will  be  another 
that  will  be  final. 


These  are  serious  facts.  The  more  such  facts  are  made 
known,  the  better  it  will  be  for  the  peace  of  the  world,  for 
law  and  order,  for  justice  and  good-will. 

(5)  In  normal  times  every  enlightened  State,  every  pro- 
gressive people,  every  man  of  faith  and  courage,  is  under 
obligation  to  see  that  all  men  everywhere  are  accorded 
liberty  of  conscience,  liberty  of  thought  and  liberty  of 
speech.  As  to  the  latter  I  put  it  thus :  The  right,  and  with 
the  right  the  responsibilities,  of  legitimate  free  discussion. 
Abnormal  times,  as  those  of  war  and  revolt,  place  restric- 
tion on  the  individual  for  the  sake  of  the  nation,  a  group 
or  a  cause.  The  world  is  now  trying  to  become  normal 
again,  and  so  once  more  free. 

I  think  I  am  right  in  asserting  that  the  British  people 
have  held  to  their  free  rights  all  through  the  war  more  than 
have  Americans.  Men  who  were  opposed  to  Britain's  en- 
trance into  the  war,  or  who  believed  in  the  rule  of  reason, 
refused  to  hide  their  sentiments,  after  war  became  a  na- 
tional problem.  The  United  States,  however,  as  "land  of 
the  free  and  home  of  the  brave,"  sadly  stultified  itself,  as 
soon  as  it  joined  the  fray  of  the  Old  World.  ' '  Conscientious 
objectors"  have  received  longer  sentences  in  the  U.  S.  A. 
than  have  those  in  England. 

These  two  countries  have  in  past  years  had  a  great  repu- 
tation among  the  Chinese  as  defenders  of  liberty,  contrasted 
with  such  countries  as  Russia,  Roumania,  Turkey,  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany.  France,  too,  has  been  known  to  be 
the  home  of  "liberty,  equality,  fraternity."    These  three 


272  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

nations,  "however,  have  inflicted  on  China  such  things  as 
Trading  with  the  Enemy  Acts,  "black  lists,"  censorship, 
boycotts  and  spies.  They  have  forced  China  to  take  extreme 
measures  of  old-time  oppression.  For  example,  in  Peking 
there  were  three  papers  published  in  English.  Of  these, 
two  were  closed  down  by  the  Chinese  Government,  one 
under  pressure  of  the  Japanese  Legation,  and  the  other  of 
the  British  and  French  Legations.  (I  myself  was  editor 
of  one  of  these.) 

What  I  wish  to  emphasize  is  the  duty  in  all  lands  to  re- 
vert to  the  normal  condition  of  liberal  institutions,  and 
wage  war  by  moral  forces  on  all  oppression,  tyranny, 
slavery. 

July  4,  1919,  President  Wilson  spoke  these  words  on 
the  ship  George  Washington: 

We  told  our  fellow-men  throughout  the  world  when  we  set 
up  the  free  State  of  America  that  we  wanted  to  serve  liberty 
everywhere  and  be  the  friends  of  men  in  every  part  of  the  world 
who  wanted  to  throw  off  the  unjust  shackles  of  arbitrary  govern- 
ment. Now  we  have  kept  our  pledge  to  humanity  as  well  as  our 
pledge  to  ourselves. 

Time  has  again  come  for  men  to  have  convictions,  and 
with  convictions  the  courage,  the  right,  the  chance  to  ex- 
press them. 

It  was  James  Russell  Lowell  who  wrote : 

"  They  are  slaves  who  will  not  choose 
Hatred,  scoflBng  and  abuse 
Rather  than  in  silence  shrink 
From  the  truth  they  needs  must  think; 
They  are  slaves  who  dare  not  be 
In  the  right  with  two  or  three." 

(6)  I  believe  it  a  cardinal  duty,  made  clear  by  the  ex- 
periences of  the  war,  that  in  whatever  country  one  finds  his 


VITAL  PRINCIPLES  VS.  SPOLIATION        273 

lot  in  life,  the  interests  of  that  country  must  he  made 
supreme.  Just  as  all  aliens  residing  in  the  United  States 
should  in  times  of  emergency  place  America's  interests 
first,  or  return  to  the  land  whence  they  came,  so  all  for- 
eigners in  China  should  place  first,  not  the  interests  of 
their  own  country,  but  the  interests  of  China,  or,  under  the 
stress  of  patriotism,  return  to  their  native  land,  at  least  till 
the  interests  of  all  shall  work  injury  to  none.  Missionaries 
and  educationists  in  China  ought  especially  to  observe  this 
rule;  otherwise  their  work  will  be  looked  upon  as  political 
— to  denationalize  those  whom  they  profess  to  aim  to 
bless. 

We  Americans  have  learned  to  detest  German  propa- 
ganda under  the  Stars  and  Stripes.  On  principle,  ought 
we  not  to  frown  down  every  other  form  of  propaganda, 
whether  Russian,  Soviet,  Bolshevik,  Polish,  Italian,  Eng- 
lish, Japanese?  If  we  Americans  want  no  more  German 
spies,  have  we  really  any  place  for  all  the  kinds  of  foreign 
spies  who  frequent  our  shores,  even  when  honoured  with 
the  name  of  Intelligence  Officers  and  Naval  Attaches  ?  An 
Exclusion  Law  for  foreign  spies  might  not  be  bad  for  our 
free  land. 

Now  apply  the  same  principle  to  China.  What  shall  we 
say  when  the  Japanese  and  British  have  in  their  archives 
complete  maps  of  every  part  of  China,  and  complete  re- 
ports of  every  district  in  the  country?  What  are  we  to 
think  of  political  and  diplomatic  advisors,  drawing  pay 
from  the  Chinese  Government,  but  in  the  momentous  days 
of  war  making  supreme  the  war  schemes  of  their  respective 
countries,  and  using  their  confidential  position  to  bring 
China  into  the  fray?  Can  we  commend  conduct  in  China 
which  we  condemn  in  our  own  land? 

(7)  Closely  linked  with  the  above  principle  is  another — 
that  the  time  has  come  for  all  nations  to  allow  China  a 
greater  part  in  her  own  development.    In  President  Wil- 


274  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

son's  speech  of  April,  1918,  when  he  enunciated  the  Four- 
teen Points,  he  said: 

What  we  demand  in  this  war,  therefore,  is  nothing  peculiar  to 
ourselves.  It  is  that  the  world  be  made  fit  and  safe  to  live  in, 
and  particularly  that  it  be  made  safe  for  every  peace-loving 
nation,  which,  like  our  own,  wishes  to  live  its  own  life,  determine 
its  own  institutions,  be  assured  of  justice  and  fair-dealing  by  the 
other  peoples  of  the  world  as  against  force  and  selfish  aggression. 

The  Chinese  are  a  practical  people;  they  are  quick  to 
detect  pretence  and  to  abhor  inconsistency.  Now  that  peace 
has  come,  it  behooves  the  nations  which  have  been  asso- 
ciated with  China  in  war — some  rather  dubious  companions 
— to  make  good  their  professions  by  disowning  secret  com- 
pacts to  China's  disadvantage,  by  restoring,  one  and  all, 
territory  that  has  been  pressed  from  her  in  various  ways, 
particularly  the  foreign  areas,  foreign  administration,  and 
foreign  dictatorship  at  treaty-ports.  Dr.  Sidney  L.  Gulick, 
while  advocate  for  Japan,  is  no  less  a  friend  of  China,  as 
these  words  show :  ^ 

China  should  be  given  fair-play  and  opportunity  to  become 
a  great  self-governing  democratic  nation.  As  rapidly  as  possible 
she  should  be  given  complete  control  of  all  her  own  affairs,  with 
judicial  and  tariff  autonomy.  To  these  ends,  not  only  Japan,  but 
England  as  well,  and  France,  and  every  other  nation,  should 
undertake  to  restore  to  China  their  respective  "  rights  " — secured 
in  too  many  cases  by  force,  intimidation  or  fraud;  they  should 
withdraw  their  troops  and  police.  By  the  application  of  the 
principles  of  amortization  China  should  be  enabled  to  purchase 
back  all  railroad  and  mining  concessions. 

(8)  In  harmony  with  the  above,  all  schemes  termed  in- 
ternational for  reshaping  China  should  include  all  nations, 
and  not  merely  the  '  *  Five  Big  Powers, ' '  and,  what  is  more, 

*  In  Christian  Work,  August,  1919, 


VITAL  PRINCIPLES  VS.  SPOLIATION        275 

should  include  China.  In  Shanghai,  for  instance,  there  is 
an  International  Settlement,  where  most  of  the  population 
is  Chinese,  but  in  which  not  one  Chinese  has  any  part  in 
municipal  affairs.  Most  of  the  Municipal  Councillors  are 
British,  with  whom  are  associated  one  American  and  one 
Japanese.  Is  it  not  an  insult  to  the  Chinese  nation  to 
allow  a  Japanese  to  serve  on  this  select  body,  while  from 
all  the  educated  Chinese,  graduated  from  Yale,  Columbia, 
Cambridge,  Paris  or  Berlin,  not  one  is  deemed  to  have  the 
qualifications  for  municipal  office  ? 

So,  too,  as  an  offset  to  Japanese  designs  in  Tsingtao, 
Americans  have  proposed  an  International  Settlement, 
which,  according  to  their  theory,  is  to  be  dominated  by 
Americans  and  British,  from  which  Germans  are  to  be  ex- 
cluded, and  in  which  Chinese  are  given  no  important  place. 
Should  an  International  Settlement  be  formed  there  under 
present  circumstances,  the  Japanese  would  dominate. 

So  the  proposed  consortium  is  to  consist  of  bankers  from 
America,  Great  Britain,  France  and  Japan,  and  possibly 
Belgium  and  Russia.  Even  if  the  consortium  idea  be 
adopted,  what  about  other  nations  ?  What  about  Holland  ? 
What  about  Germany  of  the  future?  And  what  especially 
about  China? 

Too  many  schemes,  contracts,  conventions,  have  been 
drawn  up  in  the  past  dealing  with  China,  and  China  left 
out.  There  should  have  been  no  Lansing-Ishii  agreement, 
but  a  Lansing- Wu  Ting-fang  agreement,  both  guarantee- 
ing and  recognizing  the  "special  interests"  and  "prior 
position"  of  China,  and  no  other  country. 

(9)  "The  interest  of  the  weakest  is  as  sacred  as  the  inter- 
est of  the  strongest."  This  is  so  good  a  formula  that  I 
transcribe  it  from  what  one  may  call  Wilson's  "Analects," 
more  than  a  match  for  the  * '  Analects  of  Confucius. ' ' 

Recognition  for  the  sacred  character  of  the  Chinese  State, 
which  today  is  weak,  is,  on  this  theory,  no  less  a  duty  than 


276  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

that  accorded  Japan,  which  today  is  strong.  Smaller  States 
are  to  have  as  much  "say"  in  the  new  dispensation  as  the 
Great  Powers.  The  rights  of  one  nation  are  as  great  as 
those  of  another.  Big  nations  are  not  to  domineer  over 
small  nations.  The  strong  are  not  to  arrogate  authority 
over  the  weak.  To  begin  with,  suppose  a  start  be  made 
with  China.  She  is  called  weak,  because  her  military  power 
is  inferior  to  others ;  but  she  is  great  in  ideas,  philosophy, 
ethics,  religion,  political  theories,  great  achievements,  art, 
literature,  commerce  and  personal  character.  She  deserves 
the  esteem  of  mankind;  let  her  have  it,  in  all  the  glow  of 
intelligent  recognition.  As  to  the  words  quoted  from 
President  Wilson,  let  them  be  lived  out  in  the  political  in- 
tercourse of  the  nations  that  are,  and  of  those  that  are  yet 
to  be. 

(10)  The  final  principle  is  that  of  universal  brotherhood. 
This  means  the  gradual  elimination  of  racial,  religious  and 
national  discords  that  impede  the  progress  of  the  human 
race.  It  is  co-operative  fellowship  among  all  peoples,  not 
merely  those  that  are  free,  but  even  more  those  that  are  not 
free,  in  a  spirit  of  concord  and  friendship,  educationally 
developed,  and  for  the  combined  task  of  preserving,  each 
in  its  own  sphere,  law  and  order,  justice  and  liberty.  This 
is  a  task  of  peoples,  not  of  governments,  a  spiritual  enter- 
prise, not  a  political  or  military  one.  Such  was  the  world- 
wide fellowship,  of  which  prophets  of  old  dreamed,  and 
which  the  greatest  of  all  prophets  proclaimed  in  the  King- 
dom of  God.  The  message  of  such  an  idea,  again  and  again 
passed  on  from  heart  to  heart  along  the  centuries,  is  that 
which  I  believe  suitable  to  China,  and  to  all  the  nations 
of  the  world.  As  President  Wilson  said  in  Manchester, 
England,  "There  is  only  one  thing  that  can  bind  peoples 
together,  and  that  is  common  devotion  to  right." 

This  is  something  different  from  giving  approval  to  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  drawn  up  at  Paris, 


VITAL  PRINCIPLES  VS.  SPOLIATION        277 

and  which  already  has  aroused  many  discordant  notes  and 
deep-seated  forebodings.  Along  with  others,  I  was  capti- 
vated with  the  original  idea,  the  impulse  of  souls  longing 
for  peace.  But  candidly,  as  the  months  go  by,  I  fail  to  see 
how  China  or  the  United  States  will  receive  good  from 
such  a  League,  in  the  future  any  more  than  in  the  imme- 
diate past. 

The  New  York  World  has  made  the  surprising  statement 
that  there  is  more  to  be  criticized  in  the  Treaty  than  in  the 
League.  With  this  I  agree,  and  I  am  astonished  that  in 
the  United  States  so  little  criticism  has  been  given  the 
Treaty.  Both  the  League  and  the  Treaty  fall  far  short  of 
the  great  ideals  set  forth  by  President  Wilson.  The  end 
is  that  of  a  decline.  Judge  the  League  by  the  Treaty  and 
then  judge  the  Treaty  by  its  treatment  of  China.  ''A  chain 
is  no  stronger  than  its  weakest  link!"  The  Treaty  as  a 
whole  must  be  judged  by  the  section  headed,  "Shantung." 
I  quote  from  the  President  of  China,  Hsii  Shih-chang,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  year  1919 :  ^ 

The  proposal  of  President  Wilson  for  making  the  League  one 
of  the  terms  of  peace  and  for  the  cancellation  of  the  doctrines 
of  spheres  of  influence  and  balance  of  power  in  Europe  and  else- 
where naturally  receives  the  whole-hearted  indorsement  of  China. 
If  the  proposed  League  becomes  a  fact,  the  nations  of  the  world 
should  stand  on  an  equal  plane,  and  secret  diplomacy  will  then 
naturally  be  deprived  of  its  sanction.  If  this  is  not  so,  the  prin- 
ciple involved  in  the  proposed  League  will  not  prove  really 
effective  or  a  source  of  benefit  to  the  undeveloped  Powers. 

The  President  of  the  Republic  of  America  may  well  listen 
to  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  China.  The  Chinese,  we 
may  rest  assured,  will  no  longer  applaud  a  League,  or  a 
Treaty,  or  even  any  of  the  professed  principles,  that  have 

*  New  York  Times,  January  11,  1919. 


278  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FREE? 

treated  the  claims  and  aspirations  of  their  country  in  such 
a  shameful  fashion  as  disclosed  in  the  final  settlement. 

For  one  I  disapprove  of  the  proposed  League,  because  it 
is  one  of  Governments,  not  of  peoples,  because  it  represents 
imperialism  not  democracy,  because  it  was  conceived  in 
secret  conclave  of  a  select  few  and  not  in  open  court,  be- 
cause it  sanctioned  "special  alliances"  and  not  "the  com- 
mon interest  of  all,"  and  because  it  is  more  a  League  of 
War  and  Force  than  a  League  of  Peace  and  free,  individual 
and  national  initiative.  I  commend  to  the  attention  of  all 
Americans  these  words  of  President  Wilson  spoken  before 
the  actual  deed  was  done,  September  27,  1918 : 

Only  special  and  limited  alliances  entangle;  and  we  recognize 
and  accept  the  duty  of  a  new  day  in  which  we  are  permitted  to 
hope  for  a  general  alliance  which  will  avoid  entanglements  and 
clear  the  air  of  the  world  for  common  understandings  and  the 
maintenance  of  common  rights. 

I  also  commend  the  words  of  J.  A.  Hobson,  written  after 
the  deed  was  done,  February  8,  1919 :  ^ 

Nowhere  does  the  breath  of  democracy  enter  its  frame.  Every- 
where the  arbitrary  and  despotic  will  of  the  five  big  fighting 
Powers  of  the  Entente  holds  sway.  Everywhere  the  functions  of 
the  League  are  to  be  administered  by  this  little  group  of  war 
Ministers,  so  as  to  continue  their  domination  over  Europe  and 
to  extend  it  even  beyond  the  ultimate  limits  of  the  League. 

The  true  principle,  not  illustrated  in  this  League,  or 
probably  attainable  in  any  political  project  called  a  League 
or  Alliance,  whether  "holy"  or  not,  is  taught  in  the  calm 
discriminating  language  of  Washington's  Farewell  Ad- 
dress : 

Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests  which  to  us  have  none 
or  a  very  remote  relation.    Hence  she  must  be  engaged  in  frequent 

^  The  Nation  of  London,  February  8,  1919. 


VITAL  PRINCIPLES  VS.  SPOLIATION        279 

controversies,  the  causes  of  which  are  essentially  foreign  to  our 
concerns.  Hence,  therefore,  it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to  implicate 
ourselves  by  artificial  ties  in  the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of  her 
politics  or  the  ordinary  combinations  and  collisions  of  her  friend- 
ships or  enmities. 

This  principle  I  have  from  the  very  opening  of  the  war 
held  paramount  for  China — that  it  was  unwise,  and  ever 
will  be,  to  ''implicate"  herself  in  "the  vicissitudes"  of 
European  or  American  "politics,"  "combinations  and  col- 
lisions," revolutions  and  wars. 

As  for  the  American  people,  the  British,  the  German  and 
the  Japanese,  I  am  confident  that  they  will  all  ever  be  ready 
to  give  China  a  helping  hand.  They  need  no  League  of 
Governments  to  force  them  to  right  action. 

The  first  mistake  of  the  negotiators  of  peace  was  that 
the  great  and  true  principles  accepted  by  vanquished  and 
victors  were  not  introduced  definitely  into  the  Preamble  of 
the  Treaty  as  a  "Whereas"  to  subsequent  Articles,  and  as 
a  basis  of  what  was  expected,  namely,  mutual  negotiation. 
The  second  mistake  was  that  the  association  of  nations  for 
preventing  war  and  establishing  peace  was  not  left  to  the 
calm  conference  of  all  nations,  after  the  termination  of  the 
present  war,  and  as  a  natural  evolution  and  historical  de- 
velopment of  the  Conventions  of  the  Hague  Peace  Confer- 
ences. The  present  League  seems  to  ignore  recognized  in- 
ternational law  as  already  established,  and  sets  out  to  re- 
construct the  world  as  a  de  novo  transaction.  Moreover, 
the  League  has  too  little  of  the  legal  and  judiciary  quality 
and  too  much  of  the  quality  of  political  disputes  and  na- 
tionalistic ambitions.  "In  my  opinion,"  says  Oppenheim,'- 
"the  organization  of  a  new  League  of  Nations  should  start 
from  the  beginning  made  by  the  two  Hague  Peace  Con- 
ferences."    This  is  the  reason  I  would  rejoice  to  see  the 

*  "  The  League  of  Nations  and  its  Problems,"  p.  36. 


280  CHINA,  CAPTIVE  OR  FEEE? 

present  League  vanish  into  thin  air,  and  all  nations  get 
back  to  the  solid  foundation  of  a  third  Hague  Conference 
for  completing  the  eminently  just,  sane  and  judicial  work 
already  accomplished,  worthy  of  hearty  recognition. 
David  Jayne  Hill  has  well  said :  ^ 

The  experience  of  the  war  has  taught  us  that  henceforth  no 
nation  can  preserve  its  seclusion  and  live  apart.  Actively  or 
passively,  its  life  is  affected  by  the  needs,  the  animosities  and 
the  purposes  of  other  nations.  Whatever  our  theories  of  national 
policy  may  be,  we  cannot  escape  some  kind  of  relation  with 
every  other  nation  in  the  world.  The  important  question  is,  what 
shall  be  the  basis  of  those  relations?  Shall  we  base  them  upon 
a  combination  of  world  power,  or  shall  we  base  them  upon  the 
principles  of  free  co-operation  under  the  regulation  of  accepted 
law?  .  .  .  It  is  of  vital  importance  to  recognize  the  indisputable 
fact  that  this  Covenant  (of  the  League  of  Nations)  not  only 
makes  no  advance  in  the  development  of  International  Law,  but 
wholly  overlooks  the  status  attained  by  it,  through  the  work  of 
the  great  international  congresses  since  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
in  1815. 

These,  then,  are  the  ten  principles  which  have  shaped 
themselves  in  my  mind  from  the  opening  of  the  awful 
struggle  in  August,  1914,  as  bearing  indeed  upon  world 
problems  of  friend  and  foe,  and  particularly  upon  the  des- 
tiny of  China.    For  one  and  all  let  this  be  our  prayer : 

"  Faith  of  our  fathers,  we  will  love 
Both  friend  and  foe  in  all  our  strife. 
And  preach  Thee,  too,  as  love  knows  how. 
By  kindly  words  and  virtuous  life  j 
Faith  of  our  fathers,  holy  faith, 
We  will  be  true  to  Thee  till  death." 

*  Nortk  American  Review,  October,  1919. 


APPENDICES 

Appendix  I 

[Note:  A  full  discussion  of  Japan's  violation  of  international  law 
was  attempted  in  an  article  by  the  author  in  the  Yale  Law  Journal 
for  December,  1915.] 

THE   NEUTRALITY   OP   CHINA 

In  the  December  number  (1914)  of  The  North  American^ 
Review  an  able  legal  argument  on  "The  Neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium" appeared  from  the  pen  of  Prof.  A.  G.  De  Lapra- 
delle  of  Paris.  The  argument  proves  to  be  an  indictment 
of  Germany.  Others  may,  perhaps,  advance  an  argument 
which  may  be  an  indictment  of  both  Great  Britain  and 
France.  Our  purpose  in  writing,  is  to  make  use  of  the 
sound  legal  principles,  advanced  by  this  distinguished 
Frenchman,  to  indict  Japan  for  her  violation  of  the  neu- 
trality of  China.  To  discuss  the  subject,  Japan  must  suffer 
criticism. 

There  is  a  marked  difference  between  the  character  of 
Belgian  neutrality  and  of  Chinese  neutrality.  Belgium 
represents  what  is  known  as  perpetual  neutrality,  when  the 
neutral  nation  ''renounces  the  right  to  make  war"  and  is 
in  turn  "protected  from  all  hostilities."  China  represents 
simple  or  temporary  neutrality,  wherein  there  is  less  guar- 
antee of  protection  from  others,  while  its  sovereignty  as  a 
state  remains  intact.  In  the  case  of  perpetual  neutrality, 
it  is  imposed  on  the  neutral  state ;  in  the  case  of  temporary 
neutrality,  it  is  inherent  in  every  sovereign  state.  The 
rights  and  duties  of  neutral  states,  as  recognized  in  inter- 
national law,  not  only  apply  to  perpetual  neutrality  but 
also  to  every  non-belligerent  state.    We  desire,  therefore, 

281 


282  APPENDICES 

to  apply  the  ordinary  and  well-known  principles  and  laws 
of  neutrality  to  the  situation  in  China,  when  Japan  pro- 
ceeded to  wage  war  on  Germany, 

Scarcely  had  war  in  Europe  been  declared  when  the 
Chinese  Government  issued  regulations  for  the  observance 
of  neutrality,  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  nations.  Real- 
izing that  the  great  warring  powers  of  Europe  had  inter- 
ests or  leased  territory  in  China,  the  Chinese  Government 
desired  two  things,  that  the  war  be  limited  to  Europe,  and, 
that  if  any  conflict  arose  in  China  between  the  warring  na- 
tions, the  neutrality  of  China  might  be  respected.  To  bring 
this  about,  negotiations  took  place  between  the  foreign 
Ministers  chiefly  cbneerned,  especially  the  British  and  Ger- 
man. The  German  representative,  knowing  that  Tsingtao 
was  open  to  attack,  and  thus  likely  to  involve  China,  was 
willing,  with  the  consent  of  the  German  governor-general 
at  Tsingtao,  to  consent  to  three  things :  first,  that  the  Ger- 
man squadron  remain  away  from  Tsingtao;  second,  that 
the  small  gunboat  and  torpedo  boats  still  in  harbour  be  in- 
terned; and,  third,  that  Tsingtao  with  the  Shantung  Rail- 
way be  placed  under  Chinese  jurisdiction  or  be  neutralized, 
until  the  end  of  the  war.  The  German  Legation  also  prom- 
ised to  abstain  from  hostile  operations,  if  Japan  remained 
neutral. 

The  Chinese  Government,  anxious  to  avoid  danger  of 
complications,  determined  upon  a  policy  of  equal  treat- 
ment, namely,  that  no  obstacle  should  be  placed  in  the  way 
of  belligerent  action  within  any  territory  leased  to  the  na- 
tions at  war,  and  not  neutralized,  that  is,  to  Germany, 
Great  Britain  and  France.  Any  fighting  within  these 
leased  territories  at  Kiaochow,  at  Weihaiwei,  at  Kowloon 
(opposite  Hongkong),  and  at  Kuangchowan  would  not 
be  regarded  as  fighting  on  Chinese  territory;  thus  would 
China's  neutrality  be  preserved. 

China  approached  both  Japan  and  the  United  States  and 


APPENDICES  283 

asked  them  to  remain  neutral  in  the  Far  East.  Japan, 
after  some  delay,  decided  to  reject  China's  proposal,  and 
to  yield  to  Great  Britain 's  request  for  aid.  If  Great  Britain 
needed  Japan's  help  on  the  seas,  she  did  not  need  it  on 
Chinese  soil.  Even  if  an  attack  on  Tsingtao  was  found  to 
be  unavoidable,  the  fighting  should  have  been  confined  to 
the  leased  territory,  going  back  for  more  than  30  miles 
from  the  shore,  a  restriction  which  the  British  contingent 
faithfully  observed. 

If  the  Alliance  forced  Japan  to  enter  the  war,  it  should 
also  have  forced  her  to  **  preserve  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  China,"  for  which  the  Alliance  was  ostensibly 
formed. 

Tsingtao,  or  the  larger  leased  area  of  Kiaochow,  lies  on 
the  south  side  of  the  long  Shantung  promontory.  On  the 
north  side,  running  from  east  to  west,  are  three  ports,  Wei- 
haiwei,  leased  to  Great  Britain ;  Chefoo,  a  treaty-port ;  and 
Lungkow,  only  a  Chinese  harbour,  but  at  the  time  not  yet 
a  treaty-port.  In  all  this  section  of  the  country,  Germany 
had  no  railway  or  other  established  interests.  The  German 
** sphere  of  interest"  runs  west  of  Tsingtao.  It  should 
also  be  noted  that  Lungkow  is  on  the  side  of  the  Pehchihle 
Gulf  opposite  Port  Arthur,  which  is  leased  to  Japan. 

Very  early  in  the  war  Japanese  cruisers  and  transports 
entered  the  harbour  of  Lungkow  and  remained  there  be- 
yond the  24  hours'  limit,  while  troops  forcibly  landed  and 
occupied  the  town,  and  later  on  marched  across  Chinese 
territory  to  the  rear  of  Tsingtao.  The  Chinese  customs  and 
post  offices  were  taken  possession  of,  and  a  military  tele- 
graph and  railway  were  stretched  across  the  country,  with- 
out regard  to  the  rights  of  the  Chinese  people  and  despite 
repeated  protests  of  the  Chinese  Government. 

May  we  be  allowed  to  quote  Professor  De  Lapradelle : 

"Furthermore,  to  demand  of  Belgium  to  allow  the  Ger- 
man troops  to  pass  through  Belgian  territory  was  not  only 


284  APPENDICES 

contrary  to  perpetual  neutrality,  it  was  contrary  to  tem- 
porary neutrality. ' '  What  Japan  did  was  contrary  to  tem- 
porary neutrality;  the  law  of  nations  was  broken.  No 
Western  nation  apparently  regards  the  matter  of  any 
consequence. 

"The  Hague  Convention  of  October  18,  1907,  on  the 
rights  and  duties  of  neutral  states,  signed  by  Germany  and 
Belgium  [by  Japan  and  China],  is  explicit  on  this  point: 
*Art,  1.  The  territory  of  neutral  powers  is  inviolable. 
Art.  2.  Belligerents  are  forbidden  to  move  troops  or  con- 
voys, whether  of  munitions  of  war  or  of  supplies,  across 
the  territory  of  a  neutral  power.'  "  What  is  a  sacred  obli- 
gation in  Europe  should  be  a  sacred  obligation  in  Asia  as 
well,  especially  since  Japan  is  an  honoured  Ally  of  Great 
Britain. 

*  *  To  ask  passage  of  her  troops  was  for  Germany  to  asso- 
ciate Belgium  with  her  in  the  war,  to  expose  her,  in  the 
improbable  case  of  her  assenting,  to  a  just  punishment  by 
the  Powers  from  such  treason  to  her  duties.  If  the  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium  had  been  temporary,  Germany  could  not, 
without  forcing  her  to  enter  into  an  alliance  with  her,  have 
demanded  passage;  such  a  concession  would  have  been  on 
the  part  of  the  neutral  state  an  act  of  belligerence."  The 
same  principle  applies  to  Japan's  conduct  towards  China. 

The  Chinese  Government  barely  escaped  becoming  a  bel- 
ligerent on  Japan's  side.  Japan  forced  a  passage,  and 
China  protested ;  this  was  safe  and  proper.  Following  the 
advice  of  Dr.  Ariga, 'the  Japanese  legal  advisor  to  the 
Chinese  Government,  and  with  the  approval  of  the  British 
Minister,  China  consented  to  a  war  zone.  The  Japanese 
legal  expert  cited  as  precedent  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 
when  Manchuria  east  of  the  Liao  River  was  made  a  war 
zone. 

China  was  placed  in  an  awkward  position;  not  more  so, 
perhaps,  than  neutral  countries  in  Europe.    China  had  one 


APPENDICES  285 

of  three  courses  open  to  her.  One  was  to  defend  her  neu- 
trality, and  resist  by  force  of  arms  the  passage  of  Japanese 
soldiers.  Such  action  would  not  conflict  with  international 
law,  for  the  Hague  Convention  of  1907,  Article  10,  says: 
"The  fact  of  a  neutral  power  resisting,  even  by  force,  at- 
tempts to  violate  its  neutrality  cann,ot  be  regarded  as  a 
hostile  act."  Such  resistance  was  what  Belgium  made,  and 
in  so  doing  she  had  the  promised  help  of  Great  Britain  and 
France.  If  China,  in  resisting  Japan,  had  looked  to  Great 
Britain  and  France  for  help,  she  might  have  looked  in  vain. 
She  might  have  expected  help  from  Germany,  but  in  that 
case  the  ties  between  Japan,  Great  Britain  and  France 
would  have  been  knit  the  stronger.  In  fact  Japan  treated 
the  rules  of  The  Hague  as  "a  scrap  of  paper,"  so  far  as 
her  relations  with  China  were  concerned.  If  China  had 
resisted,  Japan  would  beyond  doubt  have  declared  war 
upon  China  as  well  as  on  Germany,  and  China's  dangers 
would  have  increased  a  thousand-fold.  She  would  have 
suffered  more  than  Belgium  suffered  when  she  decided  to 
resist  Germany.  China,  knowing  the  danger,  was  wise, 
therefore,  in  not  adopting  the  method  of  resistance. 

A  second  course  to  pursue  was  simply  to  protest,  and  to 
record  her  protest  for  future  deliberation  and  decision. 
China  was  advised  to  adopt  this  method,  but  she  was  finally 
persuaded  to  adopt  another  method,  namely,  that  of  pro- 
testing and  also  granting  a  war  zone.  By  so  doing,  she,  in 
accordance  with  recognized  principles,  practically  became 
a  belligerent  on  the  side  of  Japan  as  against  Germany.  The 
precedent  cited  from  the  Russo-Japanese  War  was  in  reality 
no  precedent ;  the  circumstances  were  in  no  wise  the  same. 
In  that  war,  Russian  troops  had  already  for  several  years 
occupied  Southern  Manchuria ;  in  the  present  case,  German 
troops  had  never  gone  outside  the  limits  of  the  German 
leased  territory.  In  the  former  war,  Russia  as  well  as 
Japan  had  agreed  to  the  proposition  of  a  war  zone;  in  the 


286  APPENDICES 

present  war,  Germany  had  not  given  her  consent,  and  was 
not  even  consulted.  In  the  former  war,  the  war  zone  was 
of  equal  benefit  to  Russia  and  to  Japan ;  in  the  present  case 
it  was  to  Japan's  advantage  and  to  Germany's  disadvan- 
tage. Though  it  now  appears  from  these  and  other  reasons 
that  China  should  never  have  consented  to  a  war  zone, 
through  which  Japanese  troops  were  permitted  to  pass,  the 
consent  was  given  that  conflict  with  Japan  might  be 
avoided.  This  yielding  of  China  to  Japan's  wishes  has 
not  been  appreciated  by  Japan;  rather,  the  leniency  has 
been  made  a  pretext  for  Japan  to  assume  the  role  of  sov- 
ereign on  Chinese  soil. 

The  forced  passage  of  Japanese  troops  from  Lungkow 
to  Tsingtao  was  called  a  ' '  military  necessity. ' '  The  absurd- 
ity of  such  a  claim  is  readily  seen,  when  one  considers  that 
on  the  one  side  were  less  than  5,000  Germans,  a  poorly- 
fortified  garrison,  facing  Japanese  and  British  men-of-war, 
with  30,000  Japanese  soldiers  equipped  for  action,  and  the 
whole  Japanese  army  within  a  few  hours'  call.  There  was 
no  military  necessity,  but  only  a  political  necessity  to  carry 
out  a  political  strategy  for  the  occupation  of  the  province 
of  Shantung. 

The  first  violation  of  China's  neutrality  was  soon  fol- 
lowed by  a  more  pronounced  violation.  Japanese  troops 
marched  outside  the  war  zone,  took  possession  of  the  rail- 
way station  at  Weihsien,  to  the  west  of  Tsingtao,  and  then 
occupied  the  entire  railway  as  far  as  Tsinan-fu  and  also  all 
the  mines  worked  by  the  Germans.  The  occupation  con- 
tinues. The  military  guard  was  not  removed  after  Tsingtao 
was  captured. 

Defenders  of  Japanese  action  hold  two  positions  which 
are  irreconcilable  the  one  to  the  other.  The  claim  is  made 
that  the  railway  was  a  German  Government  railway,  and 
another  claim  is  made  that  the  Germans  had  first  violated 
China's  neutrality  by  the  transport  of  troops  and  muni- 


APPENDICES  287 

tions  of  war.  If  the  railway  belonged  to  the  German  Gov- 
ernment, then  the  transport  of  troops  and  munitions  would 
have  been  legitimate,  and  therefore  no  infringement  of 
Chinese  neutrality. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  railway  has  been  built  and  is 
the  property  of  a  German-Chinese  Company,  incorporated 
in  Germany,  just  as  other  companies  or  syndicates  have 
been  incorporated  in  other  countries.  The  railway  and 
mines  were  "concessions"  granted  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment through  treaty  arrangement  with  the  German  Gov- 
ernment; it  was  clearly  stipulated  that,  as  in  the  leased 
territory  of  Kiaochow,  there  were  "no  treacherous  inten- 
tions towards  China"  on  the  part  of  Germany.  The  com- 
pany was  a  German-Chinese  Company,  a  private  and  not  a 
government  company ;  the  territory  through  which  it  runs 
is  Chinese  and  neutral  territory,  over  which  China's  sov- 
ereign rights  are  retained.  By  special  agreement  with  the 
Chinese  Government  only  Chinese  soldiers  were  to  act  as 
railway  guards. 

Taking,  then,  the  position  that  the  railway  was  on  Chi- 
nese, not  on  German  territory,  were  the  Germans  the  first  to 
be  guilty  of  violating  China 's  neutrality  ?  From  the  outset 
the  Chinese  Government  determined  to  make  no  discrim- 
ination between  one  belligerent  and  another  in  the  matter 
of  travel  by  land  or  by  sea.  If  belligerents  traveled  as 
civilians,  in  civilian  dress  and  without  weapons,  the  Chinese 
authorities  would  present  no  objection.  Chinese  action  was 
one  of  impartiality,  the  essence  of  neutrality.  German 
action  conformed  to  the  Chinese  arrangement  just  as  much 
as  the  British,  the  Russian  and  the  French,  and  far  more 
than  the  Japanese. 

With  reference  to  the  transport  of  munitions  of  war  by 
Germany,  no  protest  was  entered  at  the  time  by  any  bellig- 
erent, and  China,  a  neutral  Power,  was  under  no  obligation 
to  lay  upon  herself  additional  burdens,  because  of  war  be- 


288  APPENDICES 

tween  other  nations.  There  was,  moreover,  no  question  of 
the  Chinese  selling  contraband.  If  there  were  any  arms 
transported  over  neutral  territory,  they  were  already  in 
German  possession,  and  before  Japan  declared  war.  So  far 
as  international  law  has  established  a  clear  principle,  seiz- 
ure by  an  enemy  can  only  take  place  *'on  the  high  seas." 
No  enemy  thinks  of  capturing  contraband  of  war  on  neutral 
soil. 

Even  if  China  was  "liable  to  penalty,"  the  wrong  kind 
of  penalty  was  inflicted  by  Japan,  namely,  forceful,  mili- 
tary occupation  of  the  Shantung  Railway  in  neutral  terri- 
tory, and  the  refusal  to  China  of  the  right  of  management, 
control  and  protection.  Japan  drove  out  not  only  Ger- 
many, but  China  as  well.  Continued  occupation  from 
Tsingtao  to  Tsinan-fu,  like  continued  occupation  from 
Lungkow  to  Tsingtao,  is  a  contir'ued  infringement  not  only 
of  China's  neutrality,  but  of  China's  sovereignty,  and  this 
in  the  face  of  an  alliance  guaranteeing  China's  indepen- 
dence and  autonomy. 

In  this  additional  violation  of  China's  neutrality,  Japan 
made  the  same  excuse  as  in  the  previous  case,  namely,  "mil- 
itary necessity";  but  this  was  only  to  conceal  her  real 
purpose,  that  of  political  aggression.  It  was  plain  that  in 
capturing  Tsingtao  there  was  no  need  of  occupying  the 
railway  westward  as  far  as  Tsinan-fu.  In  fact  the  obliga- 
tion to  defend  China's  neutrality  or  to  consult  China's 
wishes  carried  no  weight  with  Great  Britain's  chosen  Ally, 
Japan. 

It  is  somewhat  diflBcult  to  understand  the  feeling  of 
Americans  regarding  the  rights  of  nations  and  the  wrongs 
done  by  one  nation  to  another.  Americans  seem  to  con- 
demn Germany  for  violating  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  but 
seem  at  the  same  time  to  overlook  Japan's  infringement  of 
China's  neutrality.  The  length  of  territory  thus  violated 
by  Japan  in  China  is  twice  the  length  of  that  violated  by 


APPENDICES  289 

Germany  in  Belgium.  Americans  seem  to  applaud  Great 
Britain  for  claiming  that  her  purpose  was  to  defend  the 
weaker  nations,  and  so  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  yet 
at  the  same  time  seem  to  countenance  her  action  in  abetting 
Japan's  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  China.  They  pity 
Belgium  for  what  she  suffers  in  resisting  Germany,  but 
they  do  not  show  even  interest  in  the  political  misfortunes 
which  threaten  China  at  the  hands  of  Japan,  although 
China  has  scrupulously  refrained  from  giving  offence  or 
from  committing  any  act  of  war.  They  lament  the  reported 
German  atrocities  to  Belgium,  but  they  practically  ignore 
the  good  which  Germany  has  wrought,  in  missions,  in  sci- 
ence, in  education  and  in  trade,  for  the  Chinese  people. 
Americans  declare  that  Germany  should  pay  for  the  losses 
she  has  inflicted  on  Belgium,  but  they  excuse  the  harm,  the 
loss,  the  encroachment  which  China  continues  to  suffer  at 
the  hands  of  Japan,  abetted  by  Great  Britain.  Does  it 
mean,  then,  that  Americans  regard  these  questions  of  in- 
ternational intercourse,  not  from  the  standpoint  of  high 
principle,  law  and  justice,  but  from  a  standpoint  prejudiced 
by  natural  preference? 

*'If  Belgium  [China]  is  now  suffering  more  than  any 
people  has  ever  suffered,  it  does  not  mean  that  in  the  mass 
of  legal  institutions  that  of  neutrality  is  particularly  fragile 
or  more  particularly  imperfect,  but  that  international  law 
is  at  this  moment  too  weak  to  resist  the  audacious  onslaught 
of  those  Powers  whose  military  pride  has  perverted  their 
sense  of  right  and  whose  devouring  ambition  has  corrupted 
their  sense  of  justice. ' '  How  can  we  hope  that  the  careless 
unconcern  of  the  Great  Powers  towards  the  rights  of  China 
can  fail  to  bring  upon  themselves  unlooked-for  suffering 
in  the  generations  yet  to  come  ?  Every  country  professing 
to  believe  in  international  law  should  come  forward  to  the 
defence  of  China  and  the  indictment  of  Japan. 


Appendix  II 

A    CHINESE    president's    PROCLAMATION    ON    THE   WAS    AND 
EDITORIAL   COMMENTS 

The  Proclamation  of  President  Feng  Kuo-chang,  August 
14,  1917,  declaring  war  against  the  two  Central  Powers  is 
a  most  important  document.  It  deserves  careful  reading, 
that  China's  aims  in  participating  in  the  Great  War  may 
be  fully  understood.    It  is  as  follows: 

On  the  9th  day  of  the  2nd  month  of  this  year  we  addressed  a 
protest  to  the  German  Government  against  the  policy  of  sub- 
marine warfare  inaugurated  by  Germany,  which  was  considered 
by  this  Government  as  contrary  to  international  law,  and  im- 
perilling neutral  lives  and  property,  and  declared  therein  in  case 
the  protest  be  ineffectual  we  would  be  constrained,  much  to  our 
regret,  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany. 

Contrary  to  our  expectations,  however,  no  modification  was 
made  in  her  submarine  policy  after  the  lodging  of  our  protest. 
On  the  contrary,  the  number  of  neutral  vessels  and  belligerent 
merchantmen  destroyed  in  an  indiscriminate  manner  was  daily 
increasing  and  the  Chinese  lives  lost  were  numerous.  Under  such 
circumstances,  although  we  might  yet  remain  indifferent  and 
endure  suffering,  with  the  meagre  hope  of  preserving  a  tem- 
porary peace,  but  in  so  doing  we  would  never  be  able  to  satisfy 
our  people  who  are  attached  to  righteousness  and  sensible  to 
disgrace,  nor  would  we  justify  ourselves  before  our  sister  States 
which  had  acted  without  hesitation  in  obedience  to  the  dictates 
of  the  sense  of  duty.  Both  here  as  well  as  in  the  friendly  Powers 
the  cause  of  indignation  was  the  same,  and  among  the  people  of 
this  country  there  could  be  found  no  difference  of  opinion.  This 
Government,  thereupon,  being  compelled  to  consider  the  protest 

290 


APPENDICES  291 

as  being  ineffectual,  notified,  on  the  14th  day  of  the  3rd  month, 
the  German  Government  of  the  severance  of  the  diplomatic  rela- 
tions and  at  the  same  time  the  events  taking  place  from  the 
beginning  up  to  that  time  were  announced  for  the  general  in- 
formation of  the  public. 

What  we  have  desired  is  peace  j  what  we  have  respected  is 
international  law;  what  we  have  to  protect  are  the  lives  and 
property  of  our  own  people.  As  we  originally  had  no  other  grave 
causes  of  enmity  against  Germany,  the  German  Government,  if 
it  had  manifested  repentance  of  the  deplorable  consequences 
resulting  from  its  policy  of  warfare,  might  still  be  expected  to 
modify  that  policy  in  view  of  the  common  indignation  of  the  whole 
world.  That  was  what  we  eagerly  desired,  and  it  was  the  reason 
why  we  felt  reluctant  to  treat  Germany  as  a  common  enemy. 
Nevertheless,  during  the  five  months  following  the  severance  of  the 
diplomatic  relations  the  submarine  attacks  continued  in  operation 
as  vigorously  as  before.  It  is  not  Germany  alone,  but  Austria- 
Hungary  as  well,  which  pursued  this  policy  without  abatement. 
Not  only  has  international  law  been  thereby  violated,  but  also 
our  people  are  suffering  injury  and  loss.  The  most  sincere  hope 
on  our  part  to  bring  about  a  better  state  of  affairs  is  now  shat- 
tered. Therefore,  it  is  hereby  declared,  against  Germany  as  well 
as  Austria-Hungary,  that  a  state  of  war  exists  commencing  from 
10  o'clock  of  the  14th  day  of  the  8th  month  of  the  6th  year  of 
the  Republic  of  China.  In  consequence  thereof  all  treaties,  agree- 
ments, conventions,  concluded  between  China  and  Germany,  and 
between  China  and  Austria-Hungary,  as  well  as  such  parts  of  the 
international  protocols  and  international  agreements  as  concern 
the  relations  between  China  and  Germany,  and  between  China 
and  Austria-Hungary,  are,  in  conformity  with  the  law  of  nations 
and  international  practice,  all  abrogated.  This  Government,  how- 
ever, will  respect  the  Hague  Conventions  and  her  international 
agreements  respecting  the  humane  conduct  of  war. 

The  chief  object  in  our  declaration  of  war  is  to  put  an  end  to 
the  calamities  of  war  and  to  hasten  the  restoration  of  peace, 
which  it  is  hoped  our  people  will  fully  appreciate.  Seeing,  how- 
ever, that  our  people  have  not  yet  at  the  present  time  recovered 
from  sufferings  on  account  of  the  recent  political  disturbances 


292  APPENDICES 

and  that  calamity  again  befalls  us  in  the  breaking  out  of  the 
present  war,  I,  the  President  of  this  Republic,  cannot  help  having 
profound  sympathy  with  our  people  when  I  take  into  considera- 
tion their  further  suffering.  I  would  never  resort  to  this  step  of 
striving  for  the  existence  of  our  nation  unless  and  until  I,  con- 
sidering it  no  longer  possible  to  avoid  it,  am  finally  forced  to  this 
momentous  decision. 

I  cannot  bear  to  think  that  through  us  the  dignity  of  inter- 
national law  should  be  impaired,  or  the  position  in  the  family 
of  nations  should  be  undermined  or  the  restoration  of  the  world 
peace  and  happiness  should  be  retarded.  It  is,  therefore,  hoped 
that  all  of  our  people  will  exert  their  utmost  in  these  hours  of 
hardship,  with  a  view  to  maintaining  and  strengthening  the 
existence  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  so  that  we  may  establish 
ourselves  amidst  the  family  of  nations  and  share  with  them  the 
happiness  and  benefits  derived  therefrom. 

The  same  day  in  the  Peking  Post,  of  which  I  was  editor 
and  proprietor,  I  extended  my  congratulations  in  the  fol- 
lowing brief  statement : 

We  congratulate  the  President  of  China,  Feng  Kuo-chang,  on 
issuing  with  the  aid  of  his  Cabinet  Ministers  a  Declaration  of 
War  that  is  dignified  and  stately  in  form,  without  hatred  and 
animosity  in  spirit,  adhering  to  the  basal  principle  of  international 
law,  and  actuated  by  high  and  enduring  aims.  In  spite  of  the 
declaration  being  one  of  war  against  hitherto  friendly  States — 
which  for  many  reasons  we  regret — the  Chinese  Government  de- 
serves credit  for  the  way  an  unpleasant  act  is  gracefully  per- 
formed. The  two  enemy  countries  are  not  denounced  in  fierce  and 
excessive  terms;  and  possibly  future  Allies  are  not  exonerated  or 
applauded.  Amid  all  minor  motives  there  looms  aloft  this  mag- 
nificient  chief  object,  to  which  as  citizen  of  an  allied  country 
we  give  our  sincere  allegiance :  to  put  an  end  to  the  calamities 

OF  WAR  AND  TO  HASTEN  THE  RESTORATION  OF  PEACE. 

The  next  day  I  published  a  longer  editorial,  advising  at 
the  end  that  China  act  out  her  noble  professions.    I  reprint 


APPENDICES  293 

it  here  as  illustrative  of  a  continued  interest  in  China's 
well-being : 

We  Americans  know  the  sensation  of  being  transferred  over 
night  from  the  state  of  neutrality  into  a  state  of  war,  from  being 
advocates  of  peace  into  advocates  of  belligerency,  tempered  with 
mUd  doses  of  democracy.  Some  who  had  only  pretended  to  be 
neutral  and  impartial  found  no  great  difficulty  in  the  passing 
transformation;  others  of  us  rolled  over  to  the  other  side  less 
gracefully  and  so  got  into  trouble. 

As  to  China,  it  does  not  much  matter  whether  she  goes  to  war 
against  two  distant  countries  in  Central  Europe  or  remains  at 
peace.  So  we  told  President  Feng  the  other  day.  Under  present 
circumstances  no  large  number  of  the  German  navy  will  attack 
Chinese  ports  and  fortresses  and  no  startling  crowd  of  China's 
brave  Generals  and  soldiers  will  find  passage  to  the  western  front. 
It  does  not  look  as  if  the  Chinese  and  their  newly-created  enemies 
would  have  much  of  a  chance  to  get  at  each  other.  Most  probably 
the  first  time  they  meet  will  be  at  the  Peace  Conference.  There  is 
more  likelihood  of  China  being  able  to  send  tea  to  England  than 
to  send  Kiangnan  guns  to  France. 

Merely  to  declare  war — which  is  all  that  a  war  declaration 
means — is  nothing  very  dangerous  or  alarming.  Of  course,  it  is 
a  serious  affair  in  point  of  democracy's  safety,  when  war  is  de- 
clared without  regard  to  Parliament,  but  that  is  internal  politics, 
not  external. 

What  creates  a  little  sensation  of  fright  is  the  associations  that 
get  tagged  on  to  war's  declaration.  President  Feng  and  his 
Proclamation  are  clear  enough  on  this  matter — no  obligations  to 
the  enemies  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  This,  too,  was  the 
American  attitude,  but  any  number  of  Americans  are  more  keen 
on  linking  up  with  France  or  Great  Britain  or  the  Russian  Pro- 
visional Government  (seldom  is  Japan  mentioned)  than  on  fight- 
ing Germany. 

It  will  be  harder  with  weak  China.  If  she  withstands  all  form 
of  pressure,  she  will  deserve  to  be  called  one  of  the  Great  Powers. 

But  we  will  not  worry  or  complain  or  ridicule.  We  hope  for 
the  best. 


294  APPENDICES 

China's  political  and  financial  condition  could  hardly  be  worse 
than  it  is  or  has  been  for  some  weeks.  This  war  declaration  is 
only  a  ripple  on  the  waves. 

Having  declared  war,  China  should  now  get  ready;  she  should 
get  her  house  in  order.  Having  the  German  and  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ministers  out  of  the  way,  the  house-cleaning  should 
be  easy. 


Appendix  III 

THE    VERSAILLES    TREATY    CONCERNING    THE    CHRISTIAN    MIS- 
SIONS OP   GERMANY 

Article  438 — The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  agree  that 
where  Christian  religious  missions  were  being  maintained 
by  German  societies  or  persons  in  territory  belonging  to 
them,  or  of  which  the  Government  is  entrusted  to  them  in 
accordance  with  the  present  treaty,  the  property  which 
these  missions  or  missionary  societies  possessed,  including 
that  of  trading  societies  whose  profits  were  devoted  to  the 
support  of  missions,  shall  continue  to  be  devoted  to  mis- 
sionary purposes. 

In  order  to  ensure  the  due  execution  of  this  undertaking 
the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  will  hand  over  such 
property  to  boards  of  trustees  appointed  by  or  approved  by 
the  governments  and  composed  of  persons  holding  the 
Christian  faith.  It  will  be  the  duty  of  such  boards  of  trus- 
tees to  see  that  the  property  continues  to  be  applied  to 
missionary  purposes. 

The  obligations  undertaken  by  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Governments  in  this  article  will  not  in  any  way  prejudice 
their  control  or  authority  as  to  the  individuals  by  whom 
the  missions  are  conducted. 

Germany,  taking  note  of  the  above  undertaking  agrees 
to  accept  all  arrangements  made  or  to  be  made  by  the  Allied 
or  Associated  Governments  concerned  for  carrying  on  the 
work  of  the  said  missions  or  trading  societies,  and  waives 
all  claims  on  their  behalf. 

Article  439 — ^Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  the 

295 


296  APPENDICES 

present  treaty,  Germany  undertakes  not  to  put  forward, 
directly  or  indirectly,  against  any  Allied  or  Associated 
Power,  signatory  of  the  present  treaty,  including  those 
which,  without  having  declared  war,  have  broken  off  diplo- 
matic relations  with  the  German  Empire,  any  pecuniary 
claim  based  on  events  which  occurred  at  any  time  before 
the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  treaty. 

The  present  stipulation  will  bar  completely  and  finally 
all  claims  of  this  nature,  which  will  be  thenceforward  ex- 
tinguished, whoever  may  be  the  parties  in  interest. 


Appendix  IV 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  GERMAN  MISSIONS 

Some  Personal  Impressions  from  a  Recent  Visit  to  Holland 
and  Germany 

By  Rev.  Arthur  J.  Brown,  D.D.,  LL.D. 
{Christian  Work,  May,  1920) 

Imagine,  however,  what  it  means  if  the  major  Powers  are 
to  deal  in  a  nationalistic  spirit  with  the  hundreds  of  mil- 
lions of  people  that  they  directly  or  indirectly  rule  in  Asia 
and  Africa,  and  hold  that  missionary  work  for  the  evan- 
gelization and  moral  uplifting  of  these  vast  populations 
must  be  conducted  with  supreme  reference  to  the  political 
plans  of  the  ruling  government.  Only  a  small  fraction  of 
the  non-Christian  world  would  be  left  for  free  missionary 
work. 

Let  us  bear  in  mind  that  if  this  principle  is  to  be  recog- 
nized and  acquiesced  in  it  will  almost  certainly  react  upon 
ourselves.  Why  should  not  France  adopt  the  same  policy 
toward  British  and  American  missionaries?  Instructive 
from  this  viewpoint  is  the  French  dealing  with  British  mis- 
sionary work  in  Madagascar  and  American  missionary 
work  in  West  Africa  and  Indo-China. 

At  this  moment  a  new  danger  is  threatening  in  Syria. 
During  the  dark  days  of  the  war  Great  Britain  entered  into 
an  agreement  with  France  that,  in  the  event  of  the  victory 
of  the  Allies,  French  claims  in  Syria  would  be  recognized. 
In  accordance  with  that  agreement,  France  is  now  adminis- 
tering that  country.    A  French  official  has  intimated  to  a 

297 


298  APPENDICES 

representative  of  the  Paris  Missionary  Society  that  he 
hoped  that  the  society  would  prepare  itself  to  take  over  the 
Protestant  missionary  work  in  Syria,  as  the  French  author- 
ities do  not  like  to  have  missionary  work  in  that  country 
conducted  by  American  and  British  Protestants.  Some  ir- 
ritation has  recently  developed  between  the  British  and 
French  Governments.  The  former  views  with  concern  the 
pushing  of  a  French  wedge  across  the  road  to  Britain's 
interests  in  Mesopotamia,  and  the  French  allege  that  the 
British  military  and  civilian  officials,  connected  with  and 
following  General  Allenby's  expedition,  have  made  the 
French  task  harder  by  words  and  acts  which  have  tended 
to  prejudice  the  minds  of  the  Syrian  people  against  their 
new  masters.  The  French  involve  the  American  Presby- 
terian missions  and  the  faculty  of  the  Syrian  Protestant 
College  in  their  irritation,  believing  that  their  use  of  the 
English  language  and  their  English  ancestry  and  sympa- 
thies make  them  a  hindrance  to  the  French  plans.  It  is  not 
at  all  improbable  at  this  writing  that  both  the  mission  and 
college,  as  well  as  the  British  missions,  may  face  in  the 
near  future  very  serious  diflBculties  from  the  disposition  of 
the  French  authorities  to  regard  Syria  as  their  national 
preserve  in  which  it  is  deemed  undesirable  that  American 
Protestant  Christians  should  continue  to  conduct  the  ex- 
tensive missionary  work  which  they  have  been  doing  for 
generations,  unless  they  strictly  conform  to  French  ideas 
and  methods  as  interpreted  by  authorities  on  the  ground, 
who  will  probably  get  their  advice  in  religious  matters  from 
the  French  Roman  Catholic  bishops. 

What  France  is  inclined  to  do  in  Syria  she  may  do  in 
other  non-Christian  lands  under  her  control,  so  that  British 
and  American  missionaries  may  either  be  excluded  or  so 
hampered  that  they  will  be  crippled  and  ultimately  forced 
out,  just  as  they  were  forced  out  of  the  valley  of  the  Gaboon 
river  in  West  Africa.    One  of  the  French  Protestant  mis- 


APPENDICES  299 

sionary  leaders  said,  in  our  conference  in  Paris,  that  he 
believed  that  the  French  Government  was  disposed  to  be 
more  friendly  than  formerly  to  the  missionary  work  of  the 
French  Protestant  Society  and  to  appreciate  the  value  of 
its  work;  and  he  thought  that  this  more  liberal  attitude 
might  be  extended  to  British  and  American  missionaries, 
if  they  are  careful  and  tactful.  The  trouble  in  the  past, 
however,  has  not  been  so  much  with  headquarters  in  Paris 
as  with  local  officials  on  the  field.  Another  member  of  our 
Paris  conference,  good-naturedly  but  with  undoubted  mean- 
ing, gave  us  of  other  lands  food  for  thought  by  remarking 
that  Anglo-Saxon  missionaries,  both  British  and  American, 
take  Anglo-Saxon  ideas  with  them  to  a  greater  extent  than 
they  realize,  and  he  evidently  had  some  sympathy  with  the 
feeling  which,  he  said,  prevailed  in  the  French  Government, 
that  the  average  British  and  American  missionary  fails  to 
adapt  himself  to  the  legitimate  point  of  view  of  another 
governing  power,  and  that  his  effort,  perhaps  unconsciously, 
is  to  Anglicize  the  native  population  with  the  result  that 
the  Government  regards  him  as  a  disturbing  factor.  One 
is  reminded  of  the  remark  of  a  Norwegian  delegate  at  the 
Edinburgh  Conference,  that  many  American  and  British 
missionaries  apparently  imagine  that  what  our  Lord  actu- 
ally commanded  His  disciples  to  do  was  to  go  into  all  the 
world  and  teach  the  English  language  to  every  creature. 

And  why  should  not  Japan  follow  the  example  of  "West- 
ern Powers  ?  Every  well-informed  student  of  the  Far  East 
knows  perfectly  well  that  the  Japanese  authorities  regard 
the  large  American  and  British  missionary  work  in  Korea 
as  an  obstacle  to  their  plans  for  the  amalgamation  of  that 
country  with  Japan.  I  am  aware  that  responsible  officials 
of  the  Japanese  Government  are  not  likely  to  say  this  pub- 
licly, and  when  spoken  to  on  the  subject  will  suavely  and 
courteously  deny  it.  I  am  also  aware  that  the  statement  is 
absolutely  true,  and  that  Japan  would  like  nothing  better 


300  APPENDICES 

than  to  have  the  confessedly  Christian  Powers  of  the  West 
set  the  example  of  regarding  foreign  missionary  work  as 
a  political  instrument  to  be  utilized  or  eliminated  as  the 
furtherance  of  a  government's  political  plans  may  require. 
A  foretaste  of  what  may  be  expected  is  seen  in  the  fact  that 
last  May  the  Japanese,  assigning  Section  438  of  the  Peace 
Treaty  as  their  reason,  expelled  all  the  German  mission- 
aries, both  Protestant  and  Roman  Catholic,  from  the  Car- 
oline Islands,  although  some  of  them  had  been  allowed  to 
remain  throughout  the  war. 

The  instances  cited  do  not  by  any  means  exhaust  the 
list  of  probabilities.  China  is  rapidly  falling  under  Jap- 
anese influence,  and  the  Japanese  attitude  toward  Amer- 
ican and  British  missionary  work  in  certain  sections,  not- 
ably the  great  province  of  Shantung,  finds  open  expression 
in  the  Japanese  vernacular  press,  in  which  the  writers  do 
not  hesitate  to  demand  the  expulsion  of  American  mis- 
sionaries as  an  alleged  hindrance  to  Japan's  program.  In 
Siam  the  king  is  energetically  trying  to  develop  the  nation- 
alistic spirit  of  the  Siamese,  and  is  using  Buddhism,  the< 
State  religion,  as  one  of  the  most  effective  agencies  to 
accomplish  his  purpose.  In  spite  of  all  the  personal  kind- 
ness of  officials  to  the  American  missionaries,  some  of  them 
feel  that  the  large  American  missionary  work  in  Siam  does 
not  fit  in  well  with  the  king's  policy  of  nationalization,  and 
a  veteran  missionary  has  recently  said  that  there  is  more 
active  opposition  to  Christianity  in  Siam  today  than  there 
has  been  for  thirty  years. 

There  is  danger  that,  in  dealing  with  a  temporary  exi- 
gency regarding  German  missions,  we  may  see  war  animos- 
ities and  restrictions  projected  into  the  period  of  peace 
reconstruction;  government  inspection  and  supervision  of 
mission  schools  established  in  ways  that  exacting  or  hostile 
officials  may  render  oppressive;  the  freedom  of  unselfish 
missionary  work  for  the  evangelization  and  moral  uplift 


APPENDICES  301 

of  non-Christian  people  subordinated  to  the  nationalistic 
political  program  of  a  ruling  power,  and  principles  adopted 
which  will  ere  long  be  turned  with  disastrous  effect  against 
British  and  American  missionary  work  in  several  import- 
ant fields. 

The  Church  cannot  always  take  her  orders  from  Caesar, 
nor  can  her  missionary  work  wait  indefinitely  upon  politi- 
cal considerations.  The  notion  that  the  State  is  certain  to 
be  right  and  that  its  officials  are  infallible  was  the  heresy  of 
the  HohenzoUerns.  Let  us  who  fought  against  it  be  careful 
how  we  fall  into  it  ourselves.  If  the  followers  of  Christ 
in  England  and  France  had  not  withstood  their  govern- 
ments in  former  centuries  Protestantism  in  these  countries 
would  have  been  strangled  at  its  birth.  From  the  days  of 
Peter  and  John  to  the  present,  Christian  men  have  some- 
times found  it  necessary  to  say:  "We  ought  to  obey  God 
rather  than  men."  A  Christianity  which  stands  for  uni- 
versalism  inevitably  collides  at  times  with  politics  which 
stand  for  nationalism.  Christian  obligation  cannot  always 
be  defined  in  terms  of  governmental  expediency.  There  are 
times  when  we  must  obey  the  higher  law,  in  the  spirit  of 
Lord  Hugh  Cecil,  who  is  reported  to  have  said  recently: 
"I  am  a  Christian  first  and  an  Englishman  afterwards." 


Appendix  V 

CONVERSATION    OP    PRESIDENT    WILSON    AND    U.    S.    SENATORS 
AUGUST  19,  1919 

Senator  Borah — When  did  the  secret  treaty  between 
Great  Britain,  France  and  the  other  nations  of  Europe  with 
reference  to  certain  adjustments  in  Europe  first  come  to 
your  knowledge?  Was  that  after  you  had  reached  Paris 
also? 

The  President — ^Yes,  the  whole  series  of  understandings 
was  disclosed  to  me  for  the  first  time  then. 

Senator  Borah — Then  we  had  no  knowledge  of  these 
secret  treaties  so  far  as  our  Government  was  concerned  until 
you  reached  Paris  ? 

The  President — Not  unless  there  was  information  at  the 
State  Department  of  which  I  know  nothing. 

Senator  Borah — Do  you  know  when  these  secret  treaties 
between  Japan,  Great  Britain  and  other  countries  were  first 
made  known  to  China? 

The  President — No,  sir ;  I  do  not.  I  remember  a  meeting 
of  what  was  popularly  called  the  Council  of  Ten,  after  our 
reaching  Paris,  in  which  it  was  first  suggested  that  all  these 
understandings  should  be  laid  upon  the  table  of  the  con- 
ference. That  is  some  time  after  we  reached  there,  and  I 
do  not  know  whether  that  was  China's  first  knowledge  of 
these  matters  or  not. 

Senator  Borah — Would  it  be  proper  for  me  to  ask  if 
Great  Britain  and  France  insisted  upon  maintaining  these 
secret  treaties  at  the  Peace  Conference  as  they  were  made  ? 

The  President — I  think  it  is  proper  for  me  to  answer  that 

302 


APPENDICES  303 

question,  sir.  I  will  put  it  in  this  way :  They  felt  that  they 
could  not  recede  from  them,  that  is  to  say  that  they  were 
bound  by  them,  but  when  they  involved  general  interests 
such  as  they  realized  were  involved,  they  were  quite  willing, 
and  indeed  I  think  desirous,  that  they  should  be  reconsid- 
ered with  the  consent  of  the  other  parties.  I  mean  with  the 
consent  so  far  as  they  were  concerned  of  the  other  parties. 

Senator  Swanson — Can  you  tell  us,  or  would  it  be  proper 
to  do  so,  of  your  understanding  with  Japan  as  to  the  return 
of  Shantung — a  question  which  has  been  very  much  dis- 
cussed ? 

The  President — I  have  published  the  wording  of  the 
understanding,  Senator.  I  cannot  be  confident  that  I  quote 
it  literally,  but  I  know  that  I  quote  it  in  substance.  It  was 
that  Japan  should  return  to  China  in  full  sovereignty  the 
old  province  of  Shantung  so  far  as  Germany  had  had  any 
claims  upon  it,  preserving  to  herself  the  right  to  establish 
a  residential  district  at  Tsingtao,  which  is  the  town  of 
Kiaochow  Bay ;  that  with  regard  to  the  railways  and  mines 
she  should  retain  only  the  rights  of  an  economic  concession 
there,  with  the  right,  however,  to  maintain  a  special  body 
of  police  on  the  railway,  the  personnel  of  which  should  be 
Chinese  under  Japanese  instructors  nominated  by  the  man- 
agers of  the  company  and  appointed  by  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment.   I  think  that  is  the  whole  of  it. 

Senator  Borah — Was  that  understanding  oral? 

The  President — Senator  Borah  asked  whether  this  under- 
standing was  oral  or  otherwise.  I  do  not  like  to  describe 
the  operation  exactly  if  it  is  not  perfectly  discreet,  but  as 
a  matter  of  fact  this  was  technically  oral,  but  literally  writ- 
ten and  formulated,  and  the  formulation  agreed  upon.  .  .  . 

Senator  Pomerene — Mr.  President,  if  I  may,  I  should 
like  to  ask  a  question  or  two  along  that  same  line.  If  this 
treaty  should  fail  of  ratification  then  could  not  the  oppor- 


304  APPENDICES 

tunity  be  opened  to  Japan  to  treat  the  Shantung  question 
just  as  she  has  treated  the  Manchurian  situation? 

The  President — I  think  so;  yes. 

Senator  Pomerene — So  that  if  the  treaty  should  fail  of 
ratification  China,  so  far  as  Shantung  is  concerned,  would 
be  practically  at  the  mercy  of  Japan,  whereas  if  the  treaty 
is  ratified  then  at  least  she  will  have  the  benefit  of  the  moral 
assistance  of  all  the  other  signatory  Powers  to  the  treaty 
to  aid  in  the  protection  of  Chinese  rights. 

The  President — Senator,  I  conceive  one  of  the  chief  bene- 
fits of  the  whole  arrangement  that  centres  in  the  League  of 
Nations  to  be  just  what  you  have  indicated ;  that  it  would 
bring  to  bear  the  opinion  of  the  world  and  the  controlling 
action  of  the  world  on  all  relationships  of  that  hazardous 
sort,  particularly  those  relationships  which  involve  the 
rights  of  the  weaker  nations.  After  all,  the  wars  that  are 
likely  to  come  are  most  likely  to  come  by  aggression  against 
the  weaker  nations.  Without  the  League  of  Nations  they 
have  no  buttress  or  protection.  With  it,  they  have  the 
united  protection  of  the  world,  and  inasmuch  as  it  is  the 
universal  opinion  that  the  great  tragedy  through  which  we 
have  just  passed  never  would  have  occurred  if  the  Central 
Powers  had  dreamed  that  a  number  of  nations  would  be 
combined  against  them,  so  have  I  the  utmost  confidence  that 
this  notice  beforehand  that  the  strong  nations  of  the  world 
will  in  every  case  be  united  will  make  war  extremely  un- 
likely. 

Senator  Johnson — Mr.  President,  I  am  quite  hesitant 
about  asking  certain  questions  which  I  wish  to  ask.  I  apol- 
ogize in  advance  for  asking  them  and  I  trust  you  will  stop 
me  at  once  if  they  are  questions  which  you  deem  inappro- 
priate or  that  ought  not  to  be  asked. 

The  President — Thank  you. 

Senator  Johnson — I  think  the  question  I  am  about  to  ask 
you  answered  to  Senator  Borah,  so  pardon  me  if  it  is  re- 


APPENDICES  305 

petitive.  The  question  is,  Was  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment officially  informed  at  any  time  between  the  rupture  of 
diplomatic  relations  with  Germany  and  the  signing  of  the 
armistice  of  agreements  made  by  the  Allied  Governments 
in  regard  to  the  settlement  of  the  war? 

The  President — No;  not  so  far  as  I  know. 

Senator  McCumber — Senator  Johnson,  may  I  ask  the 
President  right  here  whether  or  not  any  treaties  were  made 
after  we  entered  into  the  war  between  any  of  our  co-bellig- 
erents that  were  not  given  to  us? 

The  President — No,  sir.    I  do  not  know  of  any. 

Senator  Johnson — ^When  our  Government,  through  you, 
Mr.  President,  in  January,  1918,  made  the  fourteen  points 
as  the  basis  for  peace,  were  those  points  made  with  the 
knowledge  of  the  existence  of  the  secret  agreements  ? 

The  President — No;  oh,  no. 

Senator  Johnson — It  was  not  intended,  then,  by  the  ex- 
pression of  those  fourteen  points,  to  supplant  the  aims 
contained  in  the  secret  treaties? 

The  President — Since  I  knew  nothing  of  them,  necessar- 
ily not.    .    .    . 

Senator  Johnson — ^You  would  have  preferred,  as  I  think 
most  of  us  would,  that  there  had  been  a  different  conclusion 
of  the  Shantung  provision,  or  the  Shantung  difficulty  or 
controversy,  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference? 

The  President — Yes;  I  frankly  intimated  that. 

Senator  Johnson — Did  it  require  the  unanimous  consent 
of  the  members  of  the  Peace  Conference  to  reach  a  decision 
like  the  Shantung  decision? 

The  President — Every  decision,  yes,  sir.    .    .    . 

Senator  Johnson — May  I  ask  one  or  two  more  questions 
concerning  Shantung  which  I  omitted  or  forgot? 

The  President — Certainly,  Senator. 

Senator  Johnson — First:  Did  Japan  decline  to  sign  the 
award  as  made  or  provided  in  the  peace  treaty? 


306  APPENDICES 

The  President — Her  representatives  informed  us,  Sena- 
tor, that  they  were  instructed  not  to  sign  in  that  event 
(the  refusal  to  award  Shantung  to  Japan). 

Senator  Johnson — Was  the  decision  reached,  if  you  will 
pardon  the  perfectly  blunt  question,  because  Japan  de- 
clined to  sign  unless  that  decision  was  reached  in  that 
way? 

The  President — No,  I  do  not  think  it  would  be  true  to 
say  "Yes"  to  that  question.  It  was  reached  because  we 
thought  it  was  the  best  that  could  be  got,  in  view  of  the 
definite  engagements  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  and  the 
necessity  of  a  unanimous  decision,  which  we  held  to  be 
necessary  in  every  case  we  have  decided. 

Senator  Johnson — Great  Britain  and  France  adhered  to 
their  original  engagements,  did  they  not? 

The  President — They  said  that  they  did  not  feel  at  liberty 
to  disregard  them. 

Senator  Johnson — Do  you  mind  stating,  or  would  you 
prefer  not,  what  it  was  that  caused  you  ultimately  to  accede 
to  the  decision  that  was  demanded  by  Japan  ? 

The  President — Only  the  conclusion  that  I  thought  it  was 
the  best  that  could  be  got  under  the  circumstances. 

Senator  Brandegee — May  I  interpolate  there  without  dis- 
turbing you,  Senator  Johnson. 

Senator  Johnson — Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Brandegee — In  Part  VI  of  the  hearings  before 
our  committee  on  page  182,  Senator  Johnson  of  California 
asked  Secretary  Lansing:  (Reading.) 

Was  the  Shantung  decision  made  in  order  to  have  the  Japanese 
signatories  to  the  League  of  Nations? 

Secretary  Lansing — That  I  cannot  say. 

Senator  Johnson — In  your  opinion  was  it  ? 

Secretary  Lansing — I  would  not  want  to  say  that,  because  I 
really  have  not  the  facts  on  which  to  form  an  opinion  along  that 
line. 


APPENDICES  307 

Senator  Johnson — Would  the  Japanese  signature  to  the  League 
of  Nations  have  been  obtained  if  you  had  not  made  the  Shantung 
agreement  ? 

Secretary  Lansing — I  think  so. 

Senator  Johnson — You  do? 

Secretary  Lansing — I  think  so. 

Senator  Johnson — So  that  even  though  Shantung  had  not  been 
delivered  to  Japan,  the  League  of  Nations  would  not  have  been 
injured. 

Secretary  Lansing — I  do  not  think  so. 

Senator  Johnson — ^And  you  would  have  had  the  same  sig- 
natories that  you  have  now  ? 

Secretary  Lansing — Yes,  one  more — China. 

Senator  Johnson — One  more — China.  So  that  the  result  of  the 
Shantung  decision  was  simply  to  lose  China's  signature  rather 
than  to  gain  Japan's? 

Secretary  Lansing — No,  that  is  my  personal  view,  but  I  may 
be  wrong  about  it. 

Senator  Johnson — Why  did  you  yield  on  a  question  on  which 
you  thought  you  ought  not  to  yield  and  that  you  thought  was  a 
principle  ? 

Secretary  Lansing — Because  naturally  we  were  subject  to  the 
direction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

Senator  Johnson — And  it  was  solely  because  you  felt  that  you 
were  subject  to  the  decision  of  the  President  of  the  United  States 
that  you  yielded? 

Secretary  Lansing — Yes. 

Senator  Johnson — The  decision  is  his? 

Secretary  Lansing — Necessarily. 

Now  I  v?ondered  whether  Secretary  Lansing  was  well  in- 
formed about  this  question  or  not? 

The  President — ^Well,  my  conclusion  is  different  from 
his,  sir. 

Senator  Brandegee — You  could  not  have  got  the  signa- 
ture of  Japan  if  you  had  not  given  Japan  Shantung. 

The  President — That  is  my  judgment. 


308  APPENDICES 

Senator  Brandegee — ^You  say  you  were  notified  to  that 
effect. 

The  President — Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Swanson — As  I  understand,  you  were  notified 
that  they  had  instructions  not  to  sign  unless  this  was  in- 
cluded. 

The  President — ^Yes. 

Senator  Borah — And  was  it  your  judgment  that  after 
the  treaty  had  been  ratified,  China's  rights  would  be  pro- 
tected and  Japan  would  surrender  to  China  what  she  said 
she  would? 

The  President — ^Yes. 

Senator  Swanson — As  I  understand  it  you  considered 
this  verbal  agreement  effective  as  relating  to  Shantung,  and 
you  understood  that  this  conveyance  would  be  followed  by 
a  conveyance  to  China. 

The  President — Not  to  supersede  it,  but  the  action  by 
Japan  is  to  follow. 

Senator  Johnson — ^Yes.  But,  Mr.  President,  you  would 
have  much  preferred  to  have  a  different  disposition  not- 
withstanding the  promise  of  Japan  in  the  treaty,  would 
you  not  ? 

The  President — ^Yes,  sir. 


Appendix  VI 

china's   attitude  to   the  ANGLO- JAPANESE   ALLIANCE 

Peking,  June  6,  1920. — The  Foreign  Office  has  handed  to 
Renter's  Agency  the  following  statement  of  the  position 
China  has  taken  up  in  matters  arising  out  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance: 

Three  months  ago  the  attention  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment was  drawn  to  statements  appearing  in  the  world's 
press  regarding  the  renewal  or  termination  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance. 

Inasmuch  as  an  important  element  in  the  text  of  both 
of  the  1905  and  1911  Agreements  was  Section  B  of  the 
Preamble  which  treated  of  matters  affecting  China's  inter- 
national standing  and  international  relations  without  the 
prior  assent  of  China  having  been  obtained,  and  inasmuch 
as  public  opinion  throughout  the  Eepublic  had  long  shown 
deep  resentment  at  this  condition  of  affairs,  the  Govern- 
ment decided  that  the  time  has  arrived  to  address  repre- 
sentations to  the  British  Government. 

Instructions  were  consequently  sent  to  the  Chinese  Min- 
ister in  London  to  make  formal  inquiries  regarding  the 
reports  appearing  in  the  press  and  to  point  out  that  while 
obviously  the  international  arrangements  of  other  Powers 
did  not  in  the  ordinary  course  of  events  concern  others  than 
the  High  Contracting  Parties,  the  treatment  of  China 
merely  as  a  territorial  entity  in  the  written  text  of  any  such 
agreements  would  no  longer  be  tolerated  by  the  public  opin- 
ion of  the  country  and  would  indeed  be  viewed  by  all  as  an 
unfriendly  act. 

To   these  first  inquiries  China  received   the   following 

309 


310  APPENDICES 

verbal  reply :  First  that  the  question  of  the  renewal  or  ter- 
mination of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  had  not  yet  come 
up  for  consideration;  secondly,  that  inasmuch  as  the  suc- 
cessive Agreements  had  been  couched  in  the  same  language, 
it  would  naturally  follow  that  if  the  Alliance  were  renewed 
it  must  follow  the  same  lines. 

In  consequence  of  this  reply  a  memorandum  was  pre- 
pared analysing  the  three  successive  Alliance  instruments 
and  establishing  clearly:  (a)  that  the  original  instrument  of 
1902  was  radically  different  from  the  1905  Agreement  in 
that  the  independence  of  Korea  was  specifically  guaranteed 
in  the  first ;  (b)  that  the  second  Agreement  of  1905  far  from 
being  identical  included  India  for  the  first  time  within  its 
scope,  whilst  Korea  was  relegated  to  a  subordinate  position 
and  clearly  earmarked  for  annexation;  (c)  that  the  third 
Agreement  introduced  into  the  Preamble  the  definite  state- 
ment having  in  view  the  important  changes  which  have 
taken  place  in  the  situation,  etc.,  and  then  definitely 
dropped  all  reference  in  the  numbered  articles  to  either 
Korea  or  the  Indian  frontier,  because  the  act  to  which  Rus- 
sia's assent  had  been  obtained  had  made  mutual  pledge 
regarding  these  matters  superfluous. 

In  view,  then,  of  the  fact  that  beneath  the  framework 
of  what  is  on  the  surface  a  self-denying  ordinance,  vital 
and  far-reaching  changes  have  acquired  the  sanction  of  the 
High  Contracting  Parties,  Chinese  opinion  is  not  unnatu- 
rally distrustful  of  any  renewal  of  this  agreement,  all  men 
holding  that  China  has  suffered  enough  from  its  operation 
during  the  World  War  in  the  matter  of  Shantung. 

Furthermore,  as  the  formal  ratification  of  the  Austrian 
Treaty  has  made  China  a  member  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
which  she  assumes  was  created  in  good  faith,  she  is  advised 
that  a  contract  regarding  her  affairs  between  other  mem- 
bers of  the  League  cannot  be  entered  into  without  her  prior 


APPENDICES  311 

consent  has  been  obtained,  Article  10  being  a  sufficient 
guarantee  that  her  territorial  integrity  will  be  respected. 

So  far  China  has  not  received  from  Britain  a  reply  to 
her  memorandum.  She  is  anxious  for  that  reply  so  that 
she  may  address  an  identical  note  to  Japan  and  establish 
definitely  the  national  attitude  on  a  question  vital  to  the 
peace  and  prosperity  of  her  people. 


INDEX 


Abrogation  of  treaties:  claimed 
by  China  and  resisted  by 
Japan,  177-179. 

Ackerman,  Carl  W. :  interview 
with  China's  President,  221. 

Adler,  Felix:  criticizes  League 
of  Nations,  205. 

Advisors,  foreign,  in  China: 
sought  by  Japan  in  Man- 
churia, 76;  by  Japan  in  Mon- 
golia, 76;  by  Japan  in  all 
China  postponed  for  future  ne- 
gotiations, 79. 

Aggrandizement,  territorial : 

should  cease,  228. 

Agreements:  see  Treaties. 

Alliance:  Anglo-Japanese,  44-46, 
49,  218,  283,  Appendix  VI. 

Allies:  author's  feeling  about, 
Pref.,  36;  Japan  and  Britain 
as  allies,  43-48,  78;  silent  as 
America  brought  war  issue 
into  China,  98;  China  not  to 
join  Allies  in  war  on  Germany, 
109,  110;  Allied  Ministers 
hold  different  theory  from 
President  Feng,  110,  111;  in- 
trigue with  Japan  unknown  to 
China  or  U.  S.  A.,  112-117; 
helped  autocracy  and  not  de- 
mocracy in  China,  129-131, 
263,  264;  all  eight  in  Peking 
make  twelve  complaints  of 
China's  negligence,  136-141 ; 
arrayed  against  China  at 
Peace  Table,  179;  handicapped 
in  China,  244;  attitude  to 
principle  as  compared  with 
Central  Powers,  269,  270. 

America,  Americans,  U.  S.  A.: 
in  the  war,  Pref.;  generous  to 
China,  2,  251 ;  aid  in  neutral- 
ity sought  by  China,  38;  criti- 
cize Japan,  65,  223,  225; 
checkmated  by  Japan  in  Fu- 


kien,  78;  protests  the  1915 
Si  no- Japanese  agreements,  82, 
83;  tied  up  with  intrigue,  84; 
part  played  in  bringing  China 
into  the  war,  84-111;  leader 
of  neutral  nations  and  then 
changed,  89,  90;  alliance  with 
China  against  Japan,  92,  93; 
responsibility  with  others  in 
leading  China  into  war,  96,  97, 
104;  note  to  China  declaring 
China's  enrtry  into  war  second- 
ary, 104,  105;  restricted  when 
neutral  by  the  British,  148, 
254 ;  how  help  was  given  to 
Britain  in  destroying  German 
trade,  150,  153;  policy  about 
enemy  property  changeable, 
153;  better  treated  by  Ger- 
mans than  by  Japanese,  175; 
looked  up  to  by  China  at 
Paris,  171,  180;  help  to  China 
a  delusion,  70,  178,  180,  200, 
201,  206,  207;  to  be  blamed  at 
Paris  along  with  Japan,  201, 
224;  join  English  in  dislike  of 
Japan,  215;  tr^da-.in  opium, 
237 ;  future  influence  in  China, 
250-256;  reputation  as  China's 
friend,  251,  253;  hampered 
by  Entente  and  Japan,  254- 
256. 

American  Minister  in  Peking: 
see  Reinsch. 

Anderson,  F.:  on  Germans  and 
Japanese  compared,  175. 

Anderson,  Roy  S.:  help  to  Dr. 
Reinsch  on  war  issue,  91. 

Appeal:  of  Britain  to  Japan,  46- 
48. 

Ariga,  Dr.:  advises  China  on 
war  zone,  56. 

Arthur,  Port:  given  up  by 
Japan,  4;  acquired  by  Russia, 
7 ;  in  Japanese  hands,  75. 


813 


314 


INDEX 


Asahi,  Osaki:  sees  no  good  to 
China  for  entry  into  war,  122. 

Asia:  affected  badly  by  the  war, 
36,  38. 

Associated  Press:  agent  in  Pe- 
king, helping  war  campaign, 
91. 

Astronomical  instruments  at  Pe- 
king: taken  by  Germany  to  be 
returned,  193. 

Austria-Hungary:  China  declares 
war  against,  106;  Minister  in 
Peking  sends  humorous  note 
to  China,  111;  its  dismember- 
ment, 263. 

Autocracy:  takes  place  of  de- 
mocracy in  China  through  war 
issue,  84,  101;  its  ascendency 
in  China,  129,  130;  to  be  over- 
thrown everywhere,  263,  264. 

Balfour,  Arthur:  keeps  hid  se- 
cret treaties,  115,  116. 

Barnardiston,  Gen.:  at  Tsingtao, 
54. 

Belgium:  neutrality  compared 
with  China's,  56,  Appendix  I; 
losses  compared  with  those  of 
China,  73. 

Bland,  J.  0.  P.:  on  Britain's 
commercial  aims,  2;  on  Brit- 
ish, railway  concessions,  11; 
on  Japan's  ideas  of  treaties, 
13;  on  Japan's  growing  power, 
15;  critic  of  Japan,  223. 

Bliss,  Dr.  W.  D.  P.:  on  Bolshe- 
vism in  Asia,  144. 

Blythe,  Samuel  G.:  quoted  as  to 
"  Flying  Wedge,"  in  Saturday 
Evening  Post,  89-94;  helps  Dr.. 
Reinsch  on  war  issue,  91. 

Board  of  Trade  in  London:  its 
plans  for  extending  trade,  247. 

Bolshevism:  possibility  of  spread- 
ing to  China,  143-145. 

Borah,  Senator:  quotes  Balfour 
versus  Wilson  and  Lansing  as 
to  secret  treaties,  115,   116. 

Boxer  uprising:  why  begun,  11; 
indemnity  for,  to  be  given  up 
by  Germans,  92,  192,  193;  as 
viewed  by  John  Hay,  141. 


Boycott  of  Japanese  goods:  by 
Chinese,  228,  239,  243. 

Briand,  M.:  demands  on  Japan 
in  action  against  Germany, 
115,  150. 

Britain,  Great,  British,  English: 
first  attack  on  China,  1 ;  trade 
in  China,  2,  147-149,  247-250; 
leases  Weihaiwei,  7;  France  a 
rival,  8,  9,  10;  sphere  of  in- 
terest, 9;  dispute  with  Russia, 
6,  9,  10;  dispute  with  Ger- 
many, 9,  10;  has  railway  con- 
cessions, 11;  with  Germany 
one  group,  13;  both  Japan  and 
Germany  as  rivals,  15;  must 
not  be  partial  against,  36; 
changes  European  war  into 
World  War,  37,  45;  culpabil- 
ity with  Japan  compared,  43- 
62;  dubious  of  Japan,  65,  77, 
78,  246;  secret  agreement  with 
Japan  as  to  Germany  and 
China,  112,  113;  demands  on 
China  about  Tibet,  124-126; 
plan  to  uproot  German  trade 
in  China,  147-149;  seizes  Ger- 
man property  at  Chinese 
treaty-ports,  157,  158,  162; 
complaint  against  Japan,  215, 
216;  alliance  with  Japan,  218, 
283,  Appendix  VI;  trade  in 
opium,  236;  her  future  in 
China  as  compared  with  Japan 
and  America,  246,  247,  250; 
checking  American  railway 
concession,  254;  conduct  in 
China  after  armistice.  265-268; 
as  land  of  freedom,  271. 

Brothels    in   China:    started    hy- 
Japanese,   234;    under  British 
rule  in  Shanghai,  235. 

Brotherhood,  universal:  still  a 
true  principle,  276. 

Brown,  Arthur  J.:  on  Britain 
and  Japan  conferring  about 
Tsingtao,  44;  on  secret  diplo- 
macy, 117;  doubts  benefit  to 
China  from  the  war,  121;  tells 
of  weary  road  for  China's  Re- 
public, 130;  receives  letter 
from  Prof.  Richter  on  German 


INDEX 


315 


Missions,  164;  on  Germans 
and  Japanese  compared,  187; 
on  increase  of  Japanese  in 
Shantung,  190;  fair  critic, 
223;  on  Japan's  ambitions, 
226;  on  Japan's  business  meth- 
ods, 230;  on  Japanese  vices  in 
China,  234;  on  nationalizing 
Christian  Missions,  Appendix 
IV. 

Bryan,  William  Jennings:  sends 
identic  note  to  Japan  and 
China,  82. 

Burton,  Theodore  E. :  objects  to 
protectorate  for  China,  142; 
on  Germans  and  Japanese  com- 
pared, 174. 

Cables  touching  China:  pass  to 
Japan  in  Peace  Treaty,  188, 
189. 

Castis  "belli:  by  China  more 
against  Japan  than  Germany, 
88. 

Central  Powers:  no  request  of 
China  to  side  with  them  in 
war,  123;  compared  with  Big 
Three,  244,  269. 

Chamber  of  Commerce:  of  China, 
opposed  to  entry  into  war, 
106;  British,  on  open  door, 
142;  in  Shanghai,  advise  ne- 
gotiating with  Japan,  216; 
American,  on  Japan's  restric- 
tions, 256. 

Chang  Hsun,  Gen.:  called  by 
President  Li  to  mediate,  102; 
demands  a  mandate  to  dissolve 
Parliament,  102;  declared  res- 
toration of  Manchu  Emperor, 
103;  defeated  by  Tuan  Chi-jui, 
103. 

Chang  Tsung-hsiang:  of  pro- 
Japan  group,  99. 

Chen  Chin-tao :  helps  Reinsch  on 
war  issue,  91. 

Chen,  Eugene:  helps  bring  China 
into  war,  91;  praises  Chinese 
note  to  Germany,  95,  96. 

China,  Chinese:  pro-Chinese, 
Pref. ;  conflict  with  Japan,  1, 
49,    168,    169;    encroachments 


on,  see  Encroachments;  loses 
Hongkong,  1 ;  loses  Amur,  2 ; 
loses  Tongking,  2;  loses  Ko- 
rea, 4;  loses  Formosa,  4;  loses 
Burma,  9;  ignored  in  her  own 
afifairs,  13,  129,  275;  agree- 
ments made  with  Germany,  19- 
32,  176,  177;  kept  in  turmoil 
by  Japan,  14,  213;  trying  to 
maintain  neutrality,  38,  39, 
66,  61 ;  injured  by  the  war, 
42,  52,  55,  69-83,  100-103,  168; 
neutrality  violated  by  Japan, 
54-62,  Appendix  I;  weakened 
by  Japan's  Demands,  63-83, 
178;  has  always  hope  of  future 
help,  71,  180,  199-202;  did  not 
complain  about  Shantung  in 
1915  negotiations,  73,  80; 
Sino-Japanese  agreements  and 
Versailles  treaty  compared,  70, 
72,  73,  80,  179;  injured  by  in- 
trigues leading  her  into  war, 
84-118;  reasons  of,  for  enter- 
ing the  war,  88,  106,  107;  at 
first  opposed  to  entering  the 
war,  90;  proposal  of  alliance 
with  U.  S.  A.  against  Japan, 
92;  note  of  rebuke  and  threat 
to  German  Minister,  95;  three 
groups  on  war  issue,  99;  be- 
comes land  of  upheaval  and 
strife  over  war  issue,  101,  102, 
105,  109;  receives  American 
Note  counselling  internal  peace 
before  entry  into  war,  104, 
105;  declares  war  against  Cen- 
tral Powers  without  Parlia- 
mentary sanction,  106;  reasons 
against  entering  the  war,  107, 
108;  waging  war  independent- 
ly, 109,  110,  Appendix  II;  de- 
ceived by  intrigues  in  Tokio, 
112-118,  179;  receives  promises 
on  entry  into  war,  118-120; 
benefit  from  entry  into  war 
doubted,  121,  122;  has  trou- 
bles after  entry  into  war,  121- 
146;  gets  demands  from  Brit- 
ain about  Tibet,  124,  125;  ob- 
jects to  Lansing-Ishii  agree- 
ment, 126-129;  in  thraldom  to 


8ie 


INDEX 


Japan,  132-136;  gets  com- 
plaint from  eight  Legations, 
137,  138;  forced  after  armis- 
tice to  issue  mandates  for 
repatriation  and  liquidation  of 
Germans,  141;  threatened  by 
foreign  protectorate,  141,  142; 
aflfected  by  commercial  rival- 
ries, 147-162;  opposed  to  liqui- 
dating German  property,  150, 
151 ;  inclined  to  treat  Germans 
justly,  150,  162,  166;  delega- 
tion at  Peace  Conference,  168- 
170,  197-201;  aligns  with 
America  at  Paris,  170,  171; 
decision  against,  made  by  Big 
Three,  171;  her  past  treaties 
not  abrogated,  177,  178;  how 
deluded,  70,  71,  178,  180,  200, 
201,  206,  207;  the  losses  in 
Versailles  treaty,  182-197; 
badly  treated  at  Paris,  200, 
201,  277;  future  prospects  and 
duty,  206-222 ;  reconciliation 
with  Japan  needed,  214-218, 
239,  240;  affected  by  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance,  218,  283, 
Appendix  VI;  chance  for  self- 
development,  273,  274;  ad- 
vised by  author  to  get  ready 
in  war,  294;  war  declaration 
as  viewed  by  author  when 
editor  in  Peking,  292-294. 

China  Merchants  Steamship  Co.: 
suggested  expansion,  221,  222. 

Chinda,  Viscount:  delegate  at 
Paris,  170. 

Christianity:  as  shown  in  diplo- 
macy, 63;  forgotten  in  restric- 
tions on  German  missions, 
163-167;  only  hope  for  Chi- 
nese, 207;  badly  shown  to 
Chinese  after  armistice,  265- 
268. 

Chronicle,  Japan:  quoted  on 
folly  of  deporting  Germans, 
152;  on  trade  in  morphia,  237. 

Civilization:  European  as  shown 
in  China,  63,  266-268;  Chinese, 
1;  bad,  of  the  West  in  Japan, 
240. 

Claims:     Gkrmans    can    present 


none  against  Allies,  158,  194; 
Allies  can  present  against 
Germans,  159;  made  by  Japan 
at  Peace  Table,  why  agreed  to, 
196,  197;  of  Chinese  at  Peace 
Table  rejected,  197,   198. 

Cleraenceau,  M. :  decides  against 
China  at  Paris,  171. 

Colonies,  German :  Wilson's  point 
bearing  thereon,  171. 

Commerce:  German,  to  be  de- 
stroyed, an  early  secret  com- 
pact, 115;  rivalries  therein 
brought  trouble  to  China,  147- 
162;  of  Chinese,  222;  of 
Japan  in  Eastern  Asia,  228- 
230;  of  British  in  China,  11, 
247-250;  of  French  in  Chin.,, 
245;  of  Americans  in  China, 
11,  251-255. 

Commercial  aims:  of  British  in 
Great  War,  45,  46,  113,  149. 

Competition:  of  British  and 
others  in  China,  147-149,  243- 
260. 

Compromise:  followed  at  Peace 
Table,  199,  205. 

Compton,  Major  T.  E.:  on  Ja- 
pan's feeling  to  Germany,  45. 

Concession  at  Chinese  ports:  ac- 
quired for  sole  control,  7,  16; 
by  Germany  at  Tsingtao,  21 ; 
at  treaty-ports,  how  different 
from  Tsingtao,  etc.,  21 ;  de- 
manded by  Japan  at  Tsingtao, 
70,  71,  183;  international,  at 
Tsingtao,  71,  183,  275;  German 
at  Tientsin  and  Hankow  al- 
lotted China,  194;  in  Shang- 
hai no  voice  by  Chinese,  275. 

Concessions  in  railways  and 
coal:  battle  of,  10,  11;  also 
sought  by  Americans,  10; 
Britain  gets  most,  11;  by 
groups  in  China,  13,  14;  Grer- 
man,  in  Shantung,  14,  27-33; 
those  of  Germany  seized  by 
Japan,  59-61 ;  those  of  Ger- 
many allotted  Japan,  185-188. 

Conciliatory  spirit:  adopted  by 
Germans,  14,  173-175,  188; 
may  be  adopted  by  Japanese, 


INDEX 


317 


188;  of  all  nations  after 
Boxer  cataclysm,  260;  needed 
in  all  the  world,  265,  268. 

Confucianism:  opposed  to  meth- 
ods of  foreign  diplomacy,  63. 

Consortium  in  China:  its  pros 
and  cons,  220,  221,  251,  275. 

Conquest,  right  of:  claimed  by 
Japan,  60,  61,  64;  confirmed 
in  treaties,  72,  73,  189. 

Conty,  M. :  congratulates  China 
on  declaring  war,  110. 

Conventions:  see  Treaties. 

Co-operation:  of  Germans  and 
Chinese,  24,  27,  28,  173,  258; 
of  Chinese  and  Japanese,  75, 
77,  228. 

Coimcil  of  the  League:  Japan 
sure  member,  169;  China  mem- 
ber for  one  year,  169. 

Council,  Supreme,  at  Paris:  see 
Supreme. 

Craddock,  Admiral:  defeated  by 
German  Admiral,  41. 

Culpability;  of  Germany  in 
1898  same  as  that  of  others, 
6,  16,  33-35;  of  Japan  and 
Britain  in  bringing  war  into 
China,  43-54;  of  all  in  bring- 
ing China  into  war,  84-86,  96- 
98,  103,  106,  110,  112,  117, 
224;  of  all  in  settlement  at 
Peace  Table,  201,  208,  224; 
in  immoralities,  all  the  same, 
235-238. 

Custodian  of  Alien  Property:  in 
America,  153,  154 ;  in  the 
Philippines,  154;  in  Hongkong, 
154,  157;  as  to  China  Com- 
panies registered  in  Hongkong, 
157,  158. 

Delegation  at  Peace  Conference: 
Chinese,  169,  170,  183,  184, 
191,  192,  196,  197,  200,  202, 
206;  Japanese,  169,  171,  184, 
192;  Chinese,  concerning  Wil- 
son, 203,  206;  Chinese  on 
Right  over  Might,  211. 

Delusions  and  vain  hopes  for 
China:  70,  71,  108,  178-180, 
199-204,  206,  252. 


Demands  on  China:  twenty-one 
by  Japan,  original,  revised 
and  accepted,  62-83,  178,  206; 
twelve  by  Britain  about  Ti- 
bet,  124-126. 

Democracy:  abandoned  by  China 
for  autocracy,  84,  106,  129- 
131,  263,  264;  Li  Yuan-hung, 
exponent  of,  88,  130,  145;  out- 
look for,  in  China  bright,  89; 
not  encouraged  by  democratic 
countries,  143,  144;  outlook 
in  Japan,  239;  how  far  an 
object  in  the  world,  263,  264. 

Dewey,  John:  in  praise  of  Ger- 
mans in  China,  173,  174;  on 
Chinese  militarism,  211;  on 
friendship  between  Chinese 
and  Germans,  219;  on  Amer- 
ican influence  in  China,  252. 

Diplomacy:  has  fine  phrases,  20; 
Japanese,  63,  64,  171;  old  kind 
and  new,  88;  played  by  Amer- 
icans in  Peking,  89,  94;  as 
pursued  by  Entente  in  Tokio, 
117;  of  good-feeling,  220. 

Diplomatic  relations:  severed  by 
China  with  Germany  as  U.  S. 
A.  had  done,  85-100,  123. 

Donald,  W.  H. :  an  Australian 
helping  Dr.  Reinsch  in  war 
agitation,  91. 

Duress:  in  making  treaties,  see 
Force  majeure;  before  and 
after  war,  34;  as  seen  at 
Peace  Table,  183. 

Elimination  of  Germany  from 
China:  a  bad  policv,  43,  65, 
74,  172-176,  235;  the  Allied 
aim,  49,  113;  ends  in  Japan's 
supremacy,  243. 

Embroiling  China  in  the  war: 
through  Intrigue  in  Peking, 
84-112;  through  intrigue  in 
Tokio,  112-118. 

Empress  Dowager:  coup  d'etat 
of,  8;  not  punished  as  head  of 
Boxer  war  in  1900,  11. 

Encroachments  on  China:  for- 
eign, 1-15;  by  European  war, 
36-62;  by  Japan  in    the  war. 


318 


INDEX 


52-62;  by  Japan  through 
Twenty-one  Demands,  63-83. 

Entanglements:  of  China  with 
European  Powers  and  Japan 
prior  to  Great  War,  1-15;  of 
Germany,  6,  7,  16,  17;  of 
China  with  Britain  and  Japan 
on  entrance  of  war,  36-62;  of 
China  with  Japan  in  Twenty- 
one  Demands,  63-83;  of  China 
with  America,  Entente  and 
Japan,  84-118;  of  China  with 
Britain  about  Tibet,  124-126; 
of  China  with  America  and 
Japan  in  Lansing-Ishii  Agree- 
ment, 126-129;  of  China  with 
Japan  during  the  war,  132- 
136;  of  China  with  Allied  and 
Associated  Nations,  136-143; 
of  China  with  Bolsheviki 
movement,  143-145;  of  China 
bv  commercial  rivalries,  147- 
162;  of  China  at  Peace  Table, 
168-205;  of  China  with  Japan 
in  the  future,  223-242;  of 
China  with  Britain,  America 
and  Germany  in  the  future, 
243-260;  to  be  avoided  by  U. 
S.  A.  and  China,  278,  279. 

Equal  opportunities:  in  China, 
see  Open  Door;  stipulated  by 
Japan  and  others,  13;  sought 
by  Germany,  21 ;  should  still 
prevail,  142,  143. 

Equality,  racial  and  national :  re- 
jected at  Paris,  195,  196. 

Expansion :  Japanese,  5,  43,  45, 
66,  67,  225-227. 

Exploitation:  in  foreign  groups, 
14;  the  principle  recognized  in 
Peace  Treaty,  187,  188;  see 
Encroachment. 

Extra-territoriality  in  China:  to 
be  given  up  some  time,  22, 
274 ;  removal  of,  a  Chinese  aim 
at  Peace  Table,  198. 


Facts:  should  be  knbwn,  vi,  270; 
shaping  principles,  261. 

Fairness:  the  basis  of  discus- 
sion, V,  16,  43,  223;  deserved 


by  Japan,  43,  223-227;  world- 
wide, 158,  269,  274. 

Fait  accompli:  a  theory  in 
Japan,   64;    binds   China,  207. 

Far  East:  China  aiming  to  pre- 
serve neutrality  of,  38;  peace 
of,  not  through  war,  42,  50; 
Gibbons  on  failure  of  perma- 
nent peace  therein,  244. 

Fatalism:  of  Chinese  in  meeting 
trouble,  121,  207. 

Feng  Kuo-chang:  becomes  Presi- 
dent, 103;  declares  war,  106; 
conversation  with  author  on 
declaring  war  independently, 
109;  speech  against  siding 
with  Entente,  110;  in  conver- 
sation with  author  expresses 
no  hope  for  China,  122;  an  op- 
portunist, 132;  gets  warning 
concerning  foreign  dictation, 
136;  proclamation  on  going  to 
war  against  Central  Powers, 
Appendix  II ;  congratulated 
by  the  author,  while  editor, 
292-294. 

Ferguson,  Dr.  John  C. :  helps 
Reinsch  on  war  issue,  91. 

Finances:  influence  of,  in  China's 
declaration  of  war,  106,  107; 
of  China  in  Japan's  hands,  134, 
135. 

Fiume:  Wilson's  words  to  be  ap- 
plied to  Shantung,  203,  204. 

Force  majeure:  of  Boxer  Proto- 
col, 11;  of  German  1898  treaty, 
6,  17,  18,  34;  of  Sino-Japa- 
nese  agreements  of  1915,  34, 
68,  79;  at  Peace  Table,  183. 

Formosa:  acquired  by  Japan,  4, 
9. 

France,  French:  in  opening 
China,  1;  in  Opium  War,  2; 
protector  of  Catholic  Mis- 
sions, 2,  18;  hostilities  of 
1883,  2;  menace  to  China,  3; 
aiding  Russia,  4;  leases 
Kuang-chow-wan,  8 ;  checked 
by  Britain,  8,  9,  10;  sphere  of 
interest,  8;  builds  railway  into 
Yunnan,  11;  with  Russia,  one 
group,    13;    at   Lao-shi-kai    a 


INDEX 


319 


grievance,  88 ;  Minister's 
speech  in  Peking,  110;  secret 
agreement  with  Japan  as  to 
Germany  and  China,  112-115; 
seizes  German  school  in 
Shanghai,  150;  future  influ- 
ence in  China,  245;  checking 
American  railway  concession, 
254 ;  unfavourable  to  Christian 
Missions  of  other  nationals, 
Appendix  IV. 

Franco-German  Association : 

against  war  and  hate,  268. 

Fraser,  David:  doubts  value  of 
Japan's  special  position  in 
Shantung,  105;  shows  harm 
from  Japan,  191. 

Freedom  of  the  seas:  given  up, 
if  there  are  to  be  no  neutral 
nations  in  war,  85. 

Friends,  Society  of:  protests 
against  excluding  German  mis- 
sionaries, 163,  164. 

Friendship:  of  Americans  to 
China,  2,  16,  251,  253;  of  Ger- 
many to  China,  25,  31-33;  by 
China  to  all  nations  prior  to 
American  pressure,  86;  still 
needed  by  China  with  all  na- 
tions, 220;  needed  between 
China  and  Japan,  214,  217, 
218;  of  Chinese  for  Germans, 
219. 

Fukien  province:  as  Japan's 
sphere  of  interest,  9;  has 
growing  influence  of  Japan,  78. 

Gains  of  Japan:  by  the  war,  43, 
69-79,  116,  168,  227,  242,  243; 
by  the  Peace  Conference,  171, 
180-192,   195,  201. 

George,  Lloyd:  receives  warning 
from  Dr.  Sun  on  China's  entry 
into  war,  108;  countenances 
restriction  of  German  mis- 
sions, 163;  decides  against 
China  at  Paris,  171. 

Germany,  Germans:  friend  of,  a 
pro-German,  vi,  123,  158,  269; 
people  to  be  treated  as  friends, 
vi,  269;  aiding  Russia,  4;  first 
move  in  China  in  1898,  6;  am- 


bitions later  than  others',  6, 
16;  murder  of  missionaries  in 
1897,  6,  17,  18;  check  on 
others  as  China's  gain,  6,  7; 
treaty  of  1898,  7,  19-34; 
sphere  of  interest,  9;  clash 
with  Britain  avoided,  9,  10; 
rights  in  Shantung  acknowl- 
edged by  Britain,  10;  railway 
of,  in  Shantung,  11,  27,  28, 
186;  with  Britain,  one  group 
in  China,  13;  adopts  concilia- 
tory policy  in  China,  14,  173- 
176,  219;  terms  of  Tientsin- 
Pukou  Railway,  14,  31 ;  rival 
of  Britain,  15,  147-149,  246; 
called  a  menace  to  China,  6, 
16-18,  25,  65,  191;  rights  in 
Shantung,  19,  66.  69,  171-178; 
should  have  equal  chance  with 
others,  21,  22,  29;  culpability 
like  that  of  others,  16,  17,  22, 
33,  35;  rule  in  Kiaochow  to  be 
praised,  26,  27,  30-33,  174-176; 
does  not  obstruct  China's  neu- 
trality in  World  War,  38; 
anxious  to  keep  war  away 
from  Tsingtao,  38;  proposed 
direct  transfer  of  Tsingtao  to 
China,  39;  proposes  plan  of 
neutrality  to  Japan,  40;  Pa- 
cific Squadron  kept  away  from 
Tsingtao,  41,  42,  44;  receives 
ultimatum,  50;  defence  of 
Tsingtao,  53,  54,  57,  58;  elimi- 
nation from  China,  bad  policy, 
43,  65,  74,  172-176,  235; 
rights  in  Shantung  pass  to 
Japan  by  conquest  and  treaty, 
19,  69-74.  180-189;  ready  to 
consult  China,  70;  rebuked 
and  threatened  by  note  from 
China,  94,  95 ;  receives  China's 
severance  of  relations,  98-100; 
China  declares  war  against, 
106,  Appendix  II;  all  rights 
in  Shantung  and  North  Pacific 
guaranteed  to  Japan  by  secret 
compact,  113-115;  repatriation 
of,  agreed  upon  by  Entente  and 
Japan,  115,  150;  destruction 
of   trade   of,   planned   for   by 


320 


INDEX 


Entente,  113-115,  137,  139,  147- 
153,  158-162,  257,  258;  defeat 
did  not  end  imperialistic 
schemes  in  others,  says  Wilson, 
145;  Germans  as  Germans  to 
suffer,  152,  268;  no  chance  to 
present  claims,  158;  German 
Government  allowed  to  reim- 
burse losses  of  nationals,  161 ; 
German  Missions  attacked  in 
treaty,  163,  164;  work  of  Ger- 
man missionaries,  165,  166; 
may  expect  just  treatment 
from  Chinese,  157,  166;  forced 
in  Versailles  treaty  to  break 
treaties  with  China  and  re- 
nounce all  rights  in  China  in 
favor  of  Japan,  171-189;  pol- 
icy and  conduct  compared  with 
others',  244,  269,  270,  274 ;  can 
co-operate  with  Americans, 
254;  future  chances  and  influ- 
ence in  China,  256-260;  its 
militarism,  should  be  de- 
stroyed, but  not  its  trade  and 
industry,  210,  211,  257,  258, 
262;  will  renew  friendship 
with  Chinese,  219,  258;  link- 
ing hands  with  Japan,  45,  58, 
259;  must  have  trade  in  Rus- 
sia, 259,  260;  hatred  to  Ger- 
mans in  China  a  disgrace, 
268;  violation  of  international 
law  given  as  the  cause  of  war 
by  CWna,  Appendix  II. 

Gibbons,  Herbert  Adams:  on 
blaming  Germans  alone,  33 ;  in 
praise  of  German  conduct  in 
Shantung,  175;  on  Japan's 
priority  in  Asia,  226;  on  fail- 
ure of  Peace  Conference,  244. 

Globe,  N.  Y. :  on  private  prop- 
erty inviolable,  160. 

Goodnow,  Frank  J.:  quoted  as 
to  Japan's  designs,  118. 

Gore,  Bishop:  counsels  moral 
ideals  in  war,  166;  on  mili- 
tarism among  ourselves,  262. 

Goto,  Baron:  says  agreements 
must  be  secret,  136. 

Grey,  Earl  of:  dying  message 
one  of  love,  167. 


Grey,  Sir  Edward:  tried  to  cir- 
cumscribe the  war,  37. 

Griffith,  Major  Sanford :  on  Brit- 
ish trade  with  Germany,  250. 

Gulick,  Sidney  L. :  on  Twenty- 
one  Demands,  67;  on  China 
getting  fair-play,  274. 


Hague  Conventions:  broken  in 
Shantung,  59,  284,  285; 
against  confiscating  private 
property,  156;  should  have 
been  given  natural  develop- 
ment after  Great  War,  279. 

Hall's  "International  Law": 
quoted  on  duties  of  neutrality, 
61;  against  confiscating  pri- 
vate enemy  property,  155. 

Hamilton,  Alexander:  on  private 
property  as  inviolable,  156. 

Hanyehping  Company:  growing 
control  of,  by  Japan,  77. 

Hara,  Premier:  for  Japanese  in- 
fluence in  China,  135. 

Hart,  Sir  Robert:  as  Inspector- 
General  of  Chinese  Customs 
arranges  about  Tsingtao,  24. 

Hate:  in  war  and  after,  un- 
christian, 265-268. 

Hay,  John:  his  open  door  policy, 
11;  saved  China,  141. 

Hegemony  of  Far  East:  Japan's 
aim,  64. 

Hill,  David  Jayne:  criticizes 
League  of  Nations,  280. 

Hintze,  von:  ready  to  consult 
China,  70;  commends  himself 
to  the  Chinese,  100;  leaves 
Peking,  100. 

Hioki,  Mr.:  presents  Twenty-one 
Demands,  65 ;  negotiates  agree- 
ments with  China,  68. 

Hitchcock,  Senator:  argues  that 
only  by  ratifying  Versailles 
treaty  is  liquidation  of  Ger- 
man property  made  legal,  160, 
161. 

Hobson,  J.  A.:  criticizes  League 
of  Nations,  278. 

Hodges,  Charles:  on  Japanese 
hampering  Americans,  256. 


INDEX 


321 


Hopes,  China's:  many,  in  future, 
69,  199,  201. 

Hornbeck,  S.  K. :  on  Germans  In 
Tsingtao,  26;  on  Germans  In 
Shantung,  31-33;  on  peril 
from  Japan's  position  in 
China,  74;  on  reason  of  Ja- 
pan's ultimatum  to  China,  81. 

Hsu  En-yuan:  on  failure  of 
Americans  in  trade  in  China, 
253. 

Hsii  Shih-chang:  sends  Chinese 
delegation  to  Paris  conference, 
168;  on  internationalizing 
China's  railways,  221;  on 
League  of  Nations,  277. 

Hyndman,  H.  M.:  on  Japanese 
unpopularity,  241. 

Ichihashi:  on  Japan's  duty  to- 
wards China,  242. 

Ijuin,  Ambassador:  delegate  at 
Paris,  170. 

Immoral  deeds  of  Japan  in 
China:  seen  in  sale  of  opiiun, 
morphine  and  brothels,  176, 
233-237. 

Indemnity:  Boxer,  to  be  partly 
cancelled,  92,   192,   193. 

Independence:  of  Korea  recog- 
nized, 4;  of  Korea,  taken 
away,  12;  of  China,  guaran- 
teed, 13;  Military  Governors 
declare  for,  as  against  Presi- 
dent Li,  102;  from  foreign  con- 
trol needed  in  China,  222,  274. 

Independently,  waging  war : 
President  Feng's  idea,  109, 
110. 

Independent,  N.  Y.:  on  great  in- 
crease of  British  Empire,  249, 

Influence  in  China:  of  Japan, 
223-242;  of  Western  nations, 
243-260. 

Influence,  spheres  of:  see 
Spheres. 

Inspector-General  of  Chinese 
Customs:  a  Britisher,  5; 
makes  arrangement  with  Ger- 
many, 24;  acts  against  Ger- 
mans, 151. 

interests,  special:  see  Special. 


Interest,  spheres  of:  see  Spheres. 

International  Law:  violated  in 
bringing  war  into  China,  54- 
60,  281-289;  violated  in  seizure 
of  private  property,  61,  153- 
162;  violations  of,  by  Japan 
condoned  in  Peace  Treaty, 
183;  violation  of,  by  Germany 
led  to  China's  declaration  of 
war.  Appendix  II. 

Internationalizing,  plans  of : 
China's  railways,  220,  221; 
should  include  all,  and  China, 
274,  275. 

Intrigue:  American  and  Allied, 
in  Peking,  84-111;  abhorred  by 
President  Li,  100;  Allied  in 
Tokio,  112-118. 

Ishii,  Viscount:  keeps  hid  secret 
compacts  of  Tokio,  115;  see 
also  Lansing-Ishii  agreement; 
speaks  of  moral  awakening  of 
China  as  a  danger,  263. 

Italy:  her  future  in  China,  245; 
Wilson's  ideas  concerning,  ap- 
plied to  China,  203,  204. 

Ito,  Count:  peace  negotiator,  4; 
Resident-General  in  Korea,  12. 

lyenaga.  Dr.:  on  Japan's  prior 
position  in  Far  East,  227;  on 
Japan's  political  influence  in 
China,  231. 

Japan,  Japanese:  an  American 
as  pro  or  not,  vi;  conflict  with 
China,  1,  3;  compared  with 
Western  nations,  1,  33,  113, 
224,  225;  ambitions  for  ex- 
pansion, 5,  45,  64,  66,  225-228 ; 
war  by  decades,  3;  sphere  of 
interest  in  China,  9,  12,  225; 
gains  from  Russo-Japanese 
war,  12;  as  leader  in  conven- 
tions about  China,  13;  helping 
to  keep  China  in  turmoil,  14, 
213;  growing  rival  of  Britain, 
15,  243,  246;  no  right  to 
Kiaochow,  22,  34,  183;  exclud- 
ing Chinese  from  railway  in 
Shantung,  30;  spurns  China's 
request  on  neutrality,  38;  ig- 
nores German  neutral  scheme, 


322 


INDEX 


40;  gains  through  Great  War, 
43,  69-82,  112,  113;  culpabil- 
ity with  Britain  compared,  43- 
49;  friendly  to  Germans,  45, 
58;  ultimatum  to  Grermany, 
50-53;  violates  China's  neu- 
trality, 54,  59,  61,  Appendix 
I;  in  battle  at  Tsingtao,  54- 
58;  promises  restoration  of 
Kiaochow,  52,  71,  179,  239, 
303,  308;  twenty-one  demands 
on  China  and  forced  agree- 
ment, 63-83,  178;  wins  in 
China  by  Might,  60,  64,  81, 
185;  diplomacy,  60,  64,  171; 
at  first  opposed  to  China's  en- 
trance into  the  war,  87,  98; 
finds  U.  S.  A.  and  China  com- 
bined against  her,  92,  98;  per- 
suasive voice  in  getting  China 
to  declare  war,  97,  98,  106; 
oflfended  by  American  intru- 
sion, 105;  scheme  as  to  China 
in  war  to  detach  her  from 
America,  111;  intrigues  with 
Entente  as  against  China,  and 
U.  S.  A.,  as  well  as  Germany, 
112-118,  302,  305;  gets  quid 
pro  quo,  113;  gets  from 
America  recognition  of  spe- 
cial interests  in  China,  126- 
128 ;  increased  power  in  China, 
66,  79,  132-135,  189,  190,  227; 
tactics  at  Peace  Table,  168, 
169,  171,  195,  196;  delegation 
at  Paris,  169;  conduct  com- 
pared with  Germans,  173-176, 
187,  191;  immoral  influence, 
176,  233-237;  as  to  abroga- 
tion of  treaty  with  China, 
177-179;  claims  met  in  Ver- 
sailles treaty,  180-190;  Japan 
not    solely    blamable,    33,    35, 

43,  171,  201,  209,  224;  possible 
withdrawal  from  Paris  Con- 
ference, 197,  305-308;  should 
be  reconciled  to  China,  214- 
218,  228,  238,  240;  blamed  by 
British  and  Americans,  215, 
216;    Alliance    with    Britain, 

44,  45,  49,  218,  Appendix  VI; 
future  prospects  and  duty  in 


China,  223-242;  hard  to  get 
commendation,  43,  223;  possi- 
ble relations  with  Germans,  45, 
58,  259;  attitude  to  Christian 
Missions,  299,  300. 

Jay  treaty:  teaches  private 
property  inviolable,  156. 

Jenks,  Jeremiah  W.:  on  North 
and  South  factions  in  China, 
213;  critic  of  Japan,  223; 
quotes  Viscount  Ishii,  263. 

Jones,  Jefferson:  on  Britain 
seeking  Japan's  aid,  47 ;  on  re- 
storing Kiaochow  to  China, 
52;  quotes  Chinese  Note  on 
war  zone  in  Shantung,  57;  on 
fall  of  Tsingtao,  58;  on  Japa- 
nese occupation,  58,  59. 

Jordan,  Sir  John:  dealing  with 
Yuan  Shih-kai  about  China's 
joining  the  war,  86 ;  as  doyen, 
136;  confers  about  open  door, 
142. 

Justice:  in  passing  judgment,  v, 
16,  43,  223-227;  lacking  in 
Japan's  refusal  to  indemnify 
China,  73;  none  in  seizing 
private  property,  158,  161; 
none  in  restricting  missions 
of  Germans,  163;  lacking  in 
dealing  with  German  rights, 
176;  a  loser  in  Versailles 
treaty,  180,  198,  200,  205;  a 
world-wide  need,  as  voiced  by 
Wilson,  269,  274. 

Kaiser,  the:  orders  not  to  sur- 
render Tsingtao,  54;  after- 
wards allows  surrender,  58. 

Kamio,  Gen.:  at  Tsingtao,  54; 
reported  treatment  of  Ger- 
mans, 58. 

Kang  Yiu-wei:  noted  reformer, 
opposed  to  China's  entry  into 
war,  106. 

Kato,  Baron:  on  Britain  asking 
for  aid,  46;  on  Japan's  aid 
sought  by  Britain,  47;  dis- 
claims promise  to  restore 
Kiaochow,  53. 

Kawakami,  K.  K. :  on  Britain 
seeking   Japan's   aid,   47,   48; 


INDEX 


323 


on  China's  reason  for  joining 
the  Allies,  86,  87;  on  Sino- 
Japanese  agreement  of  1918, 
187;  on  new  railways  to  be 
built  by  Japan,  188;  on 
China's  criticisms,  225;  on 
Japan's  rights  equal  with 
others,  226;  on  Japan's  com- 
mercial needs,  228;  on  domi- 
nation of  China,  231. 

Kiaochow  and  Tsingtao:  aimed 
at  by  Russia,  6;  contracted 
for  by  Germany,  7;  Britain 
advised  to  get,  6;  Germany's 
treaty  concerning,  20-27;  not 
to  be  sublet,  22;  administra- 
tion by  Germany  beneficial,  26, 
27;  China's  proposal  to  neu- 
tralize in  time  of  war,  38; 
transfer  to  China  proposed  by 
Germany,  39;  captured  by  Ja- 
pan in  battle,  54,  57,  58;  res- 
toration of,  promised  to  China, 
52,  71,  179,  239,  303,  308;  how 
disposed  of,  by  1915  treaty,  70, 
71,  178,  179;  how  disposed  of, 
in  Versailles  treaty,  183,  184. 

Koo,  Dr.  Wellington:  in  League 
Council,  169;  delegate  to 
Paris,  170;  on  committee  to 
draft  League  Covenant,  170. 

Korea:  centre  of  dispute,  3; 
cause  of  China- Japan  war,  3; 
independence  recognized  by 
China,  4;  under  predominance 
of  Japan,  12;  absorbed  by  Ja- 
pan, 12;  an  example  of  Ja- 
pan's ambition  in  Shantung, 
65. 

Kung,  Prince :  classed  opium  and 
missionaries  together,  2. 

Kuo  Tai-chi:  tells  of  generous 
offer  of  Japan,  191,  192. 

La  Motte,  Miss :  on  lofty  tone  of 
China's  note  to  Germany,  96; 
on  Britain's  demands  on 
China,  125;  on  Japan  in 
China,  232. 

Lansing,  Secretary:  as  partly  re- 
sponsible for  China's  joining 
the  war,  84,  90;   ignorant  of 


secret  compacts  made  in  To- 
kio,  115,  116;  see  also  Lansing- 
Ishii  agreement;  on  Japan's 
threatened  withdrawal  from 
Peace  Conference,  197,  306, 
307. 

Lansing-Ishii  Agreement :  two 
sides,  open  door  and  Japan's 
special  interests,  126-128;  ob- 
jected to  by  China,  129;  failed 
in  not  recognizing  China's  spe- 
cial interests,  275. 

Lapradelle,  A.  G.  de:  article 
quoted,  281-289. 

Lawrence,  T.  J.:  disapproves  di- 
vision of  sovereign  powers,  24. 

League  of  Nations:  endorses  the- 
ory of  a  potential  world-war 
with  no  neutral  nations,  85; 
on  regional  understandings  as 
affecting  China,  195;  as 
China's  hope,  200,  206,  304, 
307;  criticized  by  Felix  Adler, 
205;  far  short  of  Wilson's 
ideals,  277;  why  a  failure, 
279. 

Lease  of  Chinese  ports:  begun 
in  1898,  6,  7,  16;  of  Kiao- 
chow, to  end  by  agreement 
with  Japan,  70,  71,  72;  of  two 
kinds,  treaty,  and  under  ex- 
clusive control  of  one  nation, 
21. 

Lease  of  land  away  from  Chinese 
ports:  right  to  Japan  in  Man- 
churia, 75. 

Li  Hung-chang:  peace  envoy,  4; 
as  diplomat,  4,  7. 

Li  Yuan-hung:  successor  to 
Yuan  Shih-kai  as  President 
and  representative  of  Democ- 
racy, 80,  100;  ready  to  follow 
Wilson  in  neutrality,  89;  op- 
posed to  China's  leaving  neu- 
trality, 91,  100;  did  not  favor 
war,  100,  102,  106;  in  conflict 
with  war  party,  100-102;  .is- 
sues mandate  dissolving  Par- 
liament, 102;  chagrined,  he  re- 
signs as  President,  103;  gave, 
real  chance  for  a  Republic," 
100,    130;    remaining   at    the 


324 


INDEX 


head  of  China  could  have 
saved  her  from  Bolshevism, 
145. 

Liang  Chi-chiao:  was  of  pro- 
Ally  group  on  war  question, 
99. 

Liaotung:  see  Manchuria. 

Liberty:  as  upheld  or  not  by 
English  and  Americans,  158, 
271;  too  often  only  a  profes- 
sion, 162;  versus  slavery,  272; 
the  goal  for  all  peoples,  271, 
276. 

Liquidation  of  German  property: 
planned  for  by  Entente,  113, 
115;  demanded  by  eight  Lega- 
tions, 137,  139,  151;  China's 
mandate  concerning,  after 
armistice,  141,  149,  151;  op- 
posed and  then  helped  by 
America,  149,  153,  154;  con- 
trary to  American-Prussian 
treaties,  153;  contrary  to  in- 
ternational law,  155,  156; 
contrary  to  Chinese  ideas,  157 ; 
contrary  to  morality,  257. 

Loans  to  China:  first  made  by 
British,  French,  Germans,  5; 
made  by  Japan  in  war  time, 
134,  135;  chance  for  Ameri- 
cans, 251. 

London  Times:  on  utilizing  the 
war  for  commerce,  45;  on 
England  appealing  to  Japan, 
47;  on  British  area  of  fight- 
ing at  Tsingtao,  56. 

Losses  of  China :  by  the  war  and 
its  complications,  43,  52,  69- 
82,  101,  103,  107-109,  115,  116, 
124-145,  168;  in  Versailles 
treaty,  180-191,  194,  195,  199- 
201,  205,  206. 

Lou  Tseng-tsiang:  negotiates  on 
Twenty-one  Demands,  68,  179; 
was  of  pro-Ally  or  pro-French 
group,  99;  chief  delegate  at 
Paris,  170;  laments  the  Peace 
Treaty,  206. 

Lowell,  James  Russell:  sings  of 
true  freemen,  272. 

Loyalty:  how  wrongly  gauged  in 
war  time,  262, 


Lu  Tsung-yu:  of  pro- Japan 
group,  99. 

Lungkow:  Chinese  port  where 
Japanese  landed  to  attack 
Tsingtao,  54,  283,  286. 

McCarthy,  Justin :  criticizes 
Opivun  War,  1. 

McDonald,  Sir  Claude:  supports 
German  action  in  1897-8,  17, 
18. 

McMaster,  John  B.:  on  Presi- 
dent's promise  not  to  seize 
German  property,  153. 

Makino,  Baron:  delegate  at 
Paris,  169. 

Manchu  House:  overthrown,  14; 
temporary  restoration,  103. 

Manchuria:  Russia  in,  5,  7,  9; 
has  Liaotung  controversy,  4, 
5,  9;  has  railway  built  by 
Russia,  11;  seat  of  Russo- 
Japanese  war,  12;  finds  Japan 
taking  Russia's  place,  75-77. 

Marcosson,  Isaac  F.:  on  British 
preparedness  for  trade  war, 
247. 

Marine,  merchant:  needed  in 
China,  221,  222. 

Marshall,  Chief  Justice:  on  deal- 
ing with  enemy  property,  154. 

Massingham,  H.  W. :  on  wrong 
done  to  Germany,  257. 

Matsui,  Ambassador:  delegate  at 
Paris,  169. 

Menace  to  China:  French,  3; 
Russian,  2;  German,  6,  16-18, 
25,  65,  191 ;  Japanese,  65,  173- 
176. 

Meyer- Waldeck,  Gov.-Gen. :  hoists 
white  flag  at  Tsingtao,  58. 

Might,  rule  of:  that  of  Japan, 
60,  64,  81,  186;  in  seizing 
enemy  property,  158;  shown 
in  Great  War  and  at  Paris, 
210,  211. 

Militarism:  Japanese,  60,  64, 
210;  strengthened  in  China,  on 
entry  into  war,  102,  103,  129, 
130;  Prussian  and  other  kinds, 
210,  257,  258,  262;  bad  for 
China,  212,  264. 


INDEX 


325 


Militaristic  faction  in  China:  in 
the  saddle,  102,  103,  168,  169, 
214;  declare  for  independence, 
102;  in  control,  says  Dewey, 
214. 

Military  Convention :  between 
China  and  Japan,  133,  134. 

Military  Governors :  support 
Premier  in  calling  for  war, 
102;  retire  to  Tientsin  and  de- 
clare independence,  102;  sup- 
ported by  democratic  nations, 
264. 

Military  necessity:  claimed  by 
Japan  in  violating  China,  61, 
286,  288;  in  Belgium  and 
Shantung  compared,  42. 

Military  railway :  built  by  Japan 
in  China  and  asked  removed,  74. 

Military  strength  of  Japan:  rec- 
ognized at  Paris,  169. 

Millard,  Thomas  F.:  on  bringing 
war  into  China  as  a  pawn,  42; 
on  Japan  taking  initiative,  45; 
on  restoring  Kiaochow  to 
China,  52,  53;  on  Japanese 
army  in  Shantung,  55;  on 
seizing  enemy  property  in  neu- 
tral country,  61;  on  Japan's 
high-handedness,  68 ;  on  Yuan's 
wise  course,  69 ;  on  China's 
early  proposal  to  enter  the 
war,  86;  on  China  and  U.  S. 
A.  joining  in  alliance,  93;  on 
Japan's  scheme  to  detach 
China  from  U.  S.  A.,  Ill;  on 
proposals  of  Chinese  delega- 
tion, 184;  critic  of  Japan,  223. 

Mines:  in  Shantung,  as  conces- 
sion to  Germans,  28,  31 ;  in 
South  Manchuria,  given  to  Ja- 
pan, 76;  in  Hanyehping  Com- 
pany, held  by  Japan,  77;  in 
Shantung,  pass  to  Japan  by 
Peace  Treaty,  185,  186. 

Ministers  in  Peking,  foreign: 
urge  on  China  close  associa- 
tion with  Allies,  110;  send 
Note  to  China  on  her  entry 
into  war,  giving  assurances, 
118;  action  of,  as  viewed  by 
author,  119,  120. 


Missions,  missionaries:  Catholic 
and  France,  2;  as  viewed  by 
Prince  Kung,  2;  German, 
killed,  6;  riots  against,  17,  18; 
under  German  protectorate, 
18;  Allied  Ministers  on 
China's  sending  delegate  to  the 
Pope,  137,  139;  of  Germans, 
prohibited  in  treaty  and  this 
a  wrong,  163-166,  Appendix 
III  and  IV;  as  treated  by 
Germans  and  Japanese,  176; 
nationalizing  missions  a  dan- 
gerous policy,  see  Appendix 
IV;  good  work  of  British  in 
China,  247;  good  work  of 
Americans  in  China,  255. 

Mixed  Court  procedure:  adopted 
in  Manchuria,  75. 

Mongolia:  position  there  gained 
by  Japan,  76,  77. 

Monroe  Doctrine:  applied  to  Ja- 
pan, 195. 

Moral  influence:  of  Japan  in 
China,  233-238. 

Moral  reform:  needed  in  China, 
208-210;  needed  in  Japan,  238. 

Morphine,  trade  in:  by  Japan, 
233-237 ;  by  British  and  Amer- 
icans, 236,  237. 

Morrison,  Dr.  George  E. :  China's 
official  advisor,  but  helps 
American  Minister  on  war 
question,  91 ;  gives  financial 
reason  for  China's  entering  the 
war,  107. 

Morse,  H.  B.:  on  Li  Hung- 
chang's  finesse,  4;  on  Britain 
as  being  against  break-up  of 
China,  9;  on  Chinese  sov- 
ereignty in  Kiaochow,  24;  on 
Tsingtao  as  free-port,  24. 

Motono,  Viscount:  Note  to 
French  and  Russian  Embassies 
as  to  German  rights  to  pass 
to  Japan,  114;  about  Military 
Convention,  133. 


Nationalizing:  of  Christian  Mis- 
sions as  viewed  by  English. 
Friends,  164,  Appendix  IV. 


326 


INDEX 


Naval  base:  as  referred  to 
Tsingtao,  25,  40,  41,  44. 

Negotiation,  mutual:  disallowed 
at  Paris  Conference,  279. 

Neutrality:  of  China,  infringed 
in  Russo-Japanese  war,  12; 
China's  efforts  at,  fail  in 
World  War,  38-40;  of  China, 
violated  by  Japan,  56,  59,  61, 
Appendix  I;  China  urged  to 
give  up,  85,  86,  89,  93,  100; 
Wilson's  plan  to  eliminate,  85 ; 
neutral  Americans,  how  treated 
by  British  in  China,  148,  149. 

North  and  South:  as  divided  in 
China  an  evil,  212-214. 

North  China  Herald:  quoted  on 
liquidating  enemy  property, 
152;  quoted  on  morphine  trade 
in  China,  236. 


Occupation,  forceful:  by  Japan 
of  Shantung,  59,  288. 

Okuma,  Count:  on  Japan's  op- 
portunity, 43 ;  consulting  about 
Britain's  request  for  aid,  48; 
professes  well,  52. 

Open  covenants:  as  professed  but 
as  absent  from  part  played  in 
China,  115,  117,  118. 

Open  door:  policy  favoured  by 
Lord  Salisbury,  9;  Hay's  pol- 
icy, guaranteed  by  Japan  and 
others,  11;  violation  of,  by 
Japan  receives  American  pro- 
test, 82;  modified  by  Lansing- 
Ishii  agreement,  126-129;  still 
needed,  142,  143. 

Opium:  curse  to  China,  1;  trade 
in,  by  Japanese,  British  and 
Americans,  235-238. 

Oppenheim :  teaches  non-appro- 
priation of  private  enemy 
property,  155;  says  League  of 
Nations  should  start  in  Hague 
Conferences,  279. 

Outlook,  The :  on  Japan's  control 
in  China,  232;  on  Japan's  true 
course,  240. 

Overlack,  T.  W. :  on  spheres  of 
interest,  8. 


Pacifism:  in  China,  212. 

Palmer,  A.  Mitchell:  as  Cus- 
todian of  Alien  Property,  153; 
on  right  to  ruin  (Jerman  busi- 
ness, 154. 

Parliament,  Chinese:  restored  by 
President  Li,  89 ;  acts  on  ques- 
tion of  severing  relations  with 
Germany,  100;  began  to  oppose 
war  proposals,  101 ;  refuses  to 
be  coerced  on  war  question, 
102;  dissolved,  102,  103;  re- 
starts in  Canton  "  Constitu- 
tional Government,"  103; 
gives  no  sanction  to  China's 
declaration  of  war,  106;  new 
election  needed,  214. 

Passive-ism :  in  Taoism  of  China, 
212. 

Peace:  of  Far  East  upset  by 
war,  38,  50;  China  urged  to 
forsake,  84;  Wilson's  teaching 
concerning,  a  mistake,  85 ;  best 
for  China,  211,  212;  how  to  be 
lasting,  260;  world-wide,  as 
once  taught  by  Wilson,  261  j 
in  the  spirit,  265. 

Peace  Conference,  Paris:  China's 
desire  to  attend,  87,  91,  99, 
191;  receives  Memorial  from 
Society  of  Friends,  163;  bound 
by    previous     compacts,     171, 

179,  306;   wrongs  China,   176, 

180,  199,  200,  201;  Sino- 
Japanese  questions  outside 
purview  of,  190;  displeases 
China,  205,  206;  camouflaged 
by  Shanghai  Conference.  213; 
its  bad  impression  on  Chinese, 
244,  252. 

Peace  conference  in  Shanghai: 
its  purpose  and  work,  213. 

Peace  Table  at  Paris:  see  Peace 
Conference. 

Peace  Treaty:  of  China  in  1842, 
1;  of  China- Japan,  4,  5;  at 
Portsmouth  between  Japan 
and  Russia,  12;  of  Versailles, 
see  Versailles. 

Peking:  as  centre  of  intrigue  in 
war,  85-112. 

People:  German,  as  friends,  vi; 


INDEX 


327 


British,  different  from  govern- 
ment, 40,  49;  Japanese,  differ- 
ent from  government,  40,  63. 

Phelan,  Senator:  on  Japan's  ex- 
pansion in  Asia,  225. 

Philippines:  Chinese  trade  in, 
222. 

Political  influence  in  China:  how 
far  right  for  Japan,  230-233. 

Ports,  Chinese:  leased  to  foreign 
nations,  6,  7,  16,  21;  of  Kiao- 
chow,  7,  20-27;  of  Tsingtao  as 
free-port,  24,  26;  of  two  kinds, 
treaty  and  under  exclusive 
control  of  one  nation,  21 ; 
called  commercial,  in  interior 
of  China,  76. 

Portsmouth  treaty:  its  gains  to 
Japan,  12. 

Preconceptions :  as  to  war  in  Eu- 
rope wrongly  applied  to  con- 
ditions in  China,  268. 

Predominance:  of  Japan  in 
China,  66,  81,  135,  189,  226- 
228,  232,  233,  245;  of  Japan 
and  Great  Britain  as  rivals, 
15,  243,  246,  247. 

Preferential  rights  to  foreign  na- 
tions in  China:  to  France  in 
South  China,  8;  to  Germany 
in  Shantung,  29;  to  Japan  in 
Shantung,  72;  to  Japan  in 
Manchuria,  71;  to  Japan  in 
Fukien,  78. 

Principles,  much  needed:  to  be 
applied  on  all  questions,  261- 
280;  as  taught  by  Wilson,  261. 

Pro-Ally:  as  a  party  in  China, 
acting  on  the  war  question,  99. 

Pro-Chinese :  versus  pro- Japa- 
nese by  the  author,  v,  vi. 

Pro-German:  as  to  events  in 
China  author  more  so  than 
pro-Ally,  vi;  accused  as  being, 
when  one  argues  that  China 
should  take  no  sides  in  the 
war,  123;  accused  as  being, 
when  one  criticizes  seizure  of 
private  enemy  property,  158; 
suspicion  of  being  a  bugaboo, 
269. 

Pro- Japan:   party  in  China  fa- 


voured close  relations  with  Ja- 
pan, 99,  100,  169. 

Propaganda:  of  all  kinds  equally 
bad,  273. 

Property,  private  enemy:  seized 
in  a  neutral  country,  60,  61; 
to  be  sequestrated,  115;  liqui- 
dation of,  demanded  by  eight 
Legations  in  Peking,  137,  139, 
141,  151;  mandate  for  liqui- 
dation of,  issued  by  China, 
after  Armistice,  137,  139,  141, 
151 ;  forced  sale  of,  contrary 
to  Chinese  ideas,  150;  seizure 
of,  opposed  and  then  helped 
by  Americans,  150,  154,  161; 
safe  under  American-Prussian 
treaties,  153,  160;  liquidation 
of,  contrary  to  international 
law,  155,  156 

Property,  German  State :  at  Kiao- 
chow  allotted  Japan,  189;  in 
German  concessions  of  Chinese 
ports  allotted  China,  193. 

Protectorate:  of  Catholic  mis- 
sions in  China,  2,  18,  139;  by 
Japan  in  China  suggested,  141, 
142;  by  joint  foreign  control, 
proposed  for  China,  141-143. 

Protest:  none  made  by  Britain 
on  Japanese  action  in  Shan- 
tung, 59;  none  by  China  over 
Japanese  demands  about  Shan- 
tung, 73,  178;  made  by  Ameri- 
can Government  over  Sino- 
Japanese  agreements,  82 ;  made 
by  China  over  Lansing-Ishii 
agreement,  128. 

Railways:  by  Russians  in  Man- 
churia, 11;  by  French,  11;  by 
Germans  in  Shantung,  11,  27, 
28,  186;  by  British,  11;  by 
Americans,  10;  Tientsin-Pukou 
line,  14,  31,  60;  in  Shantung, 
seized  by  Japan,  59,  60,  61 ; 
those  to  be  built  in  Shantung 
give  preference  to  Japan,  72, 
187,  188;  extended  rights  to 
Japan  in  Southern  Manchuria, 
75;  Shantung  Railway  passes 
to  Japan  in  Peace  Treaty,  185; 


328 


INDEX 


under  Japanese  control,  a  dan- 
ger to  China,  188,  191 ;  should 
be  under  Chinese  control,  220, 
221 ;  concessions  for,  to  Japan 
and  to  others  compared,  191, 
226. 

Rape  of  Shantung:  a  wrong 
phrase,  33,  34. 

Rapprochement:  needed  between 
China  and  Japan,  218. 

Reconciliation:  needed  between 
China  and  Japan,  218,  240, 
242;  needed  by  China  with 
Germany,  218,  219;  needed 
among  all  belligerents,  260, 
265,  266,  268. 

Reforms  in  China:  begun  in 
1889,  8;  of  moral  kind  needed, 
209,  210. 

Reinsch,  Paul  S. :  American 
Minister,  partly  responsible 
for  China's  entrance  into  the 
war,  84,  89,  90,  96-98;  advises 
China  to  join  Allies  while 
America  was  neutral,  86;  agi- 
tates in  turning  China  against 
Germany,  90-94;  doubt  as  to 
his  responsibility  in  China's 
declaring  war,  103,  104;  on 
June  9,  1917,  has  to  send  a 
note  to  China  declaring  entry 
into  war  only  secondary  mat- 
ter, 104;  interprets  Lansing- 
Ishii  agreement  different  from 
Japanese  view,  127;  how  he 
helped  autocracy  in  China, 
130;  on  Japan's  trump  card, 
239;  sued  author,  when  editor 
Peking  Post,  for  libel,  252. 

Repatriation  of  Germans:  from 
China,  secretly  agreed  upon 
by  Japan  and  Entente,  113, 
115;-  mandate  for,  issued  by 
China  after  Armistice,  141 ;  as 
carried  out,  151,  152,  266,  267. 

Republic,  Chinese:  a  chance  un- 
der President  Li,  100,  130; 
through  war  agitation,  ceases 
to  be.  103. 

Requisition  of  Grerman  property: 
secretly  agreed  upon  for  China, 
113,   115;   demanded  by  eight 


Legations,  137,  139;  by  Chi- 
nese mandate,  141,  151 ;  as  re- 
lated to  law  and  right,  152-162. 

Reservations  to  Peace  Treaty:  as 
proposed  in  the  Senate,  202. 

Restoration  of  Kiaochow:  in 
promise  made  to  Germany,  52; 
agreed  upon  with  China,  70, 
80;  ought  to  be  carried  out, 
239,  303. 

Restricting  area  of  war:  in  lan- 
guage of  Earl  Grey,  37;  as 
seen  in  German  and  English 
purpose,  42,  45. 

Reunion:  essential  to  China, 
212-214. 

Revolution  in  China:  of  1911 
and  after,  14;  the  fourth,  131. 

Richter,  Prof.  Julius:  on  Ger- 
man Missions,  164. 

Righteousness  and  Right:  mixed 
up  with  intrigue,  117;  pro- 
fessed at  Peace  Table,  199, 
200;  how  far  it  has  ruled  or 
failed,  153,  180,  204,  263,  265. 

Rights:  German,  how  acquired, 
19,  171,  172,  176-178;  Chinese, 
trampled  upon,  19,  178;  Rus- 
sian, ceded  to  Japan,  12;  Ger- 
man, claimed  by  Japan,  66, 
69;  of  Germany,  allotted  Ja- 
pan at  Peace  Conference,  171, 
177,  179,  182,  185,  188,  189. 

Riots:  in  1897  in  China,  17. 

Rivalries,  commercial:  in  China, 
10,  13,  15,  147-162,  243,  245, 
246,  247,  250,  254,  255. 

Robertson,  J.  W.:  on  Japan  as 
hope  of  Asia,  241. 

Rockhill,  W.  W.:  on  Britain 
seeking  Japan's  aid,  47. 

Rosthorn,  Dr.  von:  Austrian 
Minister,  China's  friend,  and 
his  note  to  China,  111. 

Russia,  Russians :  encroaching 
on  China,  2;  understanding 
witli  Li  Hung-chang,  4;  push- 
ing into  Manchuria,  5,  6;  rail- 
way in  Manchuria,  6,  11;  aims 
at  Kiaochow,  6;  leases  Port 
Arthur,  7;  sphere  of  interest, 
9;  dispute  with  Britain  over 


INDEX 


329 


Manchuria,  9,  10;  certain 
rights  ceded  to  Japan,  12 
with  France,  one  group,  13 
itg  Bolshevist  menace,  143-145 
future  influence  in  China,  245 
will  have  relations  with  Ger 
mans,  259. 


Saionji,  Marquis:  delegate  at 
Paris,  169. 

Salisbury,  Lord:  about  Kiao- 
chow,  6;  in  clash  with  Russia, 
9;  in  clash  with  Germany,  9; 
hears  about  German  action  of 
1897-8,  17. 

Schools  in  China:  German  in 
Shanghai,  seized  by  the 
French,  150;  German  in 
Shanghai  allotted  French  and 
Chinese  together,  194. 

Secret  diplomacy:  insisted  on  in 
Twenty-one  Demands  of  Ja- 
pan, 65;  in  schemes  of  Entente 
and  Japan  to  China's  injury, 
112-117,  179,  302,  303,  305; 
called  a  dubious  way  by  Dr. 
Arthur  J.  Brown,  117. 

Selden,  Charles  A.:  gives  out  in 
N.  Y.  Times  secret  agree- 
ments in  Tokio,  foot-note,  114, 
115. 

Self-determination :  applied  to 
Kiaochow,  171,  172;  needed  in 
China,  222,  274. 

Self-development :  granted  to 
China,  274. 

Senate,  United  States:  reserva- 
tion on  Shantung  Articles  in 
treaty,  202. 

Sequestration :  see  Liquidation 
or  Requisition. 

Settlements,  foreign:  see  Conces- 
sions. 

Severance  of  diplomatic  relations 
with  Germany:  China  urged 
to  follow  America  and  then 
complies  in  so  doing,  85-100, 
123. 

Shantung,  province  of:  under  in- 
fluence of  Germany  and  Brit- 
ain,   7;    occupied    by    Japan, 


59,  64;  suffers  from  Japan's 
demands  for  German  rights, 
68,  69;  forms  separate  Head 
in  Versailles  Treaty,  180-190; 
subject  to  two  misconceptions, 
184,  185. 

Shepherd,  William  G.:  on  Ger- 
man plans  to  renew  trade,  258. 

Siam:  unfriendly  attitude  to 
Christian  Missions  because  of 
Peace  Treaty,  300. 

Sisson,  Francis  H. :  on  England's 
trade  schemes,  248. 

Smith,  Charles  Stevenson:  helps 
Dr.  Reinsch  in  war  issue,  91. 

Snow,  A.  H. :  on  German  action 
in  China  in  1897-8,  foot-note 
17,  18;  on  German  conduct  in 
China,  173;  against  Japan's 
claim,  177. 

South  and  North:  division  in 
China,  213,  214. 

Sovereignty:  Chinese,  still  held 
in  Kiaochow,  23;  held  by 
China  in  Shantung,  32,  185; 
of  Shantung,  Manchuria  and 
Mongolia  threatened  by  Ja- 
pan, 77. 

Spargo,  John:  on  Bolshevism  in 
Asia,  144. 

Special  interests  and  position  in 
China:  sought  by  Japan,  77, 
225;  recognized  as  Japan's  in 
Lansing-Ishii  agreement,  126- 
128;  not  accorded  China,  273, 
275. 

Spee,  Admiral  von:  head  of  Ger- 
man Pacific  Squadron,  41;  de- 
feated, 41. 

Spencer-Cooper,  Commander:  on 
aims  of  German  squadron  in 
Pacific,  when  war  opened,  41. 

Spheres  of  interest  or  influence 
in  China:  begun  by  France,  8; 
by  Russia,  9;  by  Germany,  9, 
27,  29;  by  Britain,  9;  by  Ja- 
pan, 9,  78;  Japan's,  grows 
after  war  with  Russia,  12; 
British,  threatened  by  Japan, 
77. 

Spies,  foreign:  to  be  warned 
against,  273. 


330 


INDEX 


Spiritual  factor :  must  be  first  in 
China,  208. 

Steps  taken  to  bring  China  into 
the  war:  were  three,  85. 

Sturdee,  Admiral:  defeats  Ger- 
man Admiral,  41. 

Sun-Yat-sen:  in  first  revolution, 
14;  opposed  to  China's  entry 
into  war,  106,  109;  warns 
Lloyd  George  on  entangling 
China,  108;  of  constitutional 
party,  264. 

Supreme  Council  in  Peace  Con- 
ference: Japan  a  member,  169; 
decides  China's  fate,  171,  180, 
200,  224;  spurns  China's  re- 
quests, 200,  201. 

Suspicion:  by  Chinese  of  Japan, 
74. 

Tang  Shao-yi :  opposed  to  China's 
entry  into  war,  106;  of  con- 
stitutional party,  264. 

Taylor,  Alonzo  E.:  on  no  repara- 
tion without  German  trade, 
259. 

Terauchi,  Premier :  favours  Japa- 
nese influence  in  China,  135. 

Territory,  acquisition  of :  by  Ger- 
mans in  China,  19;  by  Britain 
in  Hongkong  and  Burma,  1, 
9;  by  French  in  Annam,  2;  by 
Japan  in  Korea,  12;  ought  to 
cease  in  China,  22,  276;  a  bad 
policy  pursued  by  Japan,  230, 
233. 

Tibet:  subject  of  Britain's  de- 
mands on  China,  124-126. 

Times,  New  York:  prints  secret 
agreements  of  Tokio,  114,  115. 

Tokio:  as  centre  of  intrigue  in 
the  war,  112-117. 

Tong,  Hollington  K. :  on  direct 
negotiation  with  Japan,  217. 

Tong  King-Sing:  unselfish  Chi- 
nese merchant,  222. 

Trade:  see  Commerce. 

Treaty:  see  Peace  Treaty;  of 
1898,  by  China  with  Britain, 
France,  Germany  and  Russia, 
7;  between  China  and  Ger- 
many,  19-31;   by  Japan  with 


others  about  China,  13;  con- 
ception of,  by  Japan,  13,  179; 
signed  at  Versailles,  see  Ver- 
sailles; when  made  under 
duress,  17,  34,  68,  69,  183; 
Sino-Japanese,  of  1915,  69-79; 
about  abrogating,  177-179;  of 
1918  between  China  and  Ja- 
pan, 133-135,  188. 

Tribune,  New  York:  warns  of 
danger  of  China  joining  En- 
tente with  Japan  as  leader  in- 
stead of  joining  America,  101. 

Tsai  Ting-kan:  helps  bring 
China  into  war,  91. 

Tsai  Yun-pei:  of  pro- Ally  group 
on  war  question,  99. 

Tsao  Yu-lin :  of  pro- Japan  group, 
99. 

Tsinan-fu:  railway  to,  from 
Tsingtao,  27 ;  entered  by  Japa- 
nese troops,  59,  60. 

Tsingtao:  see  Kiaochow. 

Tuan  Chi-jui:  as  premier,  89; 
at  first  opposed  to  war  pro- 
posals, 91 ;  came  under  Japan's 
influence,  99;  took  lead  in  ar- 
guing for  war,  101 ;  gets  aid 
of  Military  Governors  in  de- 
manding war,  102;  dismissed 
from  office,  102;  defeats  Chang 
Hsun,  103;  again  becomes 
Premier,  103;  head  of  mili- 
tarists, 132,  168;  makes  agree- 
ments with  Japan,  133,  134, 
168;  a  military  Premier,  264. 

Ultimatum:  by  Japan  to  Ger- 
many, 50.  51;  by  Japan  to 
China,  68,  81. 

United  States:  see  America. 

Unity,  national:  needed  in 
China,  212-214. 

Universal  brotherhood:  see 
Brotherhood. 

Van  Dyke,  Dr.  Henry:  favours 
an  Anglo-American-Japanese 
Alliance,  218. 

Versailles  Peace  Treaty:  uses 
phrase,  "  German  rights,"  19, 
176;    compared    unfavourably 


INDEX 


331 


'  with  1915  Sino-Japanese  agree- 
ments, 70,  71,  72,  79,  80,  178, 
179,  188;  stipulates  right  to 
confiscate  private  property  and 
companies,  156,  158,  159;  on 
restricting  German  Missions, 
163,  165,  Appendix  III  and 
IV;  confirms  wrongs  already 
done  to  China,  168,  183;  be- 
low professed  ideals,  168; 
forces  Germany  to  renounce 
her  treaty  rights  in  China, 
176-178;  makes  disposition  un- 
der head  "  Shantung,"  180-190; 
also,  under  head  "  China,"  192- 
194;  brings  wrong  into  Cove- 
nant, 195;  not  signed  by 
China,  200,  206 ;  first-fruits  of 
League,  199;  reservations  to, 
by  U.  S.  Senate,  202;  puts  re- 
straint on  German  opportuni- 
ties in  China,  256;  more  to  be 
criticized  than  League  of  Na- 
tions, 277;  its  weakest  link  is 
"  Shantung,"  277 ;  should  have 
been  based  on  Wilson's  princi- 
ples, 279;  not  satisfactory  to 
Wilson,  305,  308;  agreed  to 
from  fear  of  Japan,  307,  308. 

Viviani,  M.:  keeps  secret  trea- 
ties of  Tokio  hid  from  Ameri- 
cans, 115. 

Wang,  C.  T.:  delegate  at  Paris, 
170;  eloquent  in  English,  170; 
speaks  of  Japan's  hold  on  Pe- 
king like  pincers,  191. 

War:  the  "Opium,"  1;  the 
Great  War,  see  World  War; 
with  France  in  1883,  2;  by 
China  with  Japan,  3,  4; 
Russo-Japanese,  12;  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  treaties,  34;  first 
European  and  then  World 
War,  36-43;  the  war  spirit 
still  alive,  262. 

Washington's  Farewell  Address: 
quoted,  278. 

^\eak  nations:  like  China,  to  be 
helped,  275,  276. 

Weale,  Putnam:  on  Germans  in 
Tsingtao,  27;  on  Britain's  ap- 


peal to  Japan,  43;  on  Twenty- 
one  Demands,  65;  on  Japan 
as  sword  of  Damocles,  79;  on 
Foreign  Debt  Bureau,  221; 
critic  of  Japan,  223. 

Westlake,  J.:  on  lease  of  terri- 
tory as  alienation,  23. 

Wheeler,  W.  Reginald:  on 
Reinsch  as  factor  in  inducing 
China  to  join  the  Allies,  103. 

White  peoples:  fighting  each 
other  in  presence  of  yellow 
races,  57. 

Williams,  E.  T. :  thought  Japan 
might  leave  Peace  Conference, 
197. 

Wilson  and  Tucker's  "  Interna- 
tional Law  " :  against  molest- 
ing private  enemy  property, 
155. 

Wilson  Administration :  policy 
of,  in  China,  vi;  concerned  in 
China's  entrance  into  war,  84; 
as  related  to  consortium,  251, 
252. 

Wilson,  Woodrow:  on  German 
people,  vi;  only  partly  re- 
sponsible for  China's  joining 
the  war,  84,  85,  89,  90,  96,  97 ; 
asks  China  to  break  with  Ger- 
many, 85,  90;  new  theory  of 
making  war  a  potential  world 
war,  85;  followed  by  Presi- 
dent Li  as  a  neutral,  89;  dis- 
claims that  help  was  promised 
China,  97,  98;  ignorant  of  se- 
cret compacts  made  in  Tokio, 
113,  116,  171,  302,  305;  per- 
haps suggested  to  President  of 
China  idea  of  warring  not  as 
an  ally,  110;  speaks  of  com- 
mercial war,  147;  speaks  of 
danger  still  from  imperialistic 
schemes,  145;  promised  not  to 
seize  German  property,  153; 
later  seemed  to  sanction  such 
liquidation,  153,  161;  exhorts 
observance  of  right  with  proud 
punctilio,  161 ;  countenances  re- 
striction of  German  Missions, 
163;  followed  at  Paris  by 
Chinese  delegates,  171 ;  decides 


332 


INDEX 


China  issue  at  Paris,  171;  on 
colonial  claims,  172;  hard  task 
in  helping  China  at  Paris,  179, 
303 ;  has  a  misconception  as  to 
transfer  of  Shantung,  184; 
wished  to  insert  in  treaty 
clause  on  religious  liberty, 
196;  feared  Japan  might  re- 
tire from  Peace  Conference, 
197,  307,  308;  speaks  of  in- 
justice to  China  and  explains 
his  action,  198,  199;  discusses 
Fiume,  203,  204;  should  apply 
to  China,  204;  was  trusted  too 
much  at  Paris,  says  Chinese 
delegate,  206 ;  disappointed  the 
Chinese,  252;  announced  great 
principles  on  war  and  peace, 
261 ;  quoted  on  a  conquest  by 
"  friendly  helpfulness,"  265 ; 
on  "  impartial  justice,"  269 ; 
on  "  airs  of  an  older  day " 
stirring  again,  270;  on  serv- 
ing liberty  everywhere,  272; 
on  each  nation  living  its  own 
life,  274;  on  "interest  of  the 
weakest,"  a  sacred  task,  275; 
on  "  common  devotion  to 
right,"  276;  approved  by 
China's  President,  277;  on  a 
"  general  alliance "  of  "  com- 
mon rights,"  278;  should  have 
made  his  principles  Preamble 
to  treaty,  279;  conversation 
with  U.  S.  Senators  on  Peace 
Treaty  and  China,  Appendix 
V. 

World,  N.  Y.:  on  Versailles 
Treaty  worse  than  League  of 
Nations,   277. 

World  War:  succeeds  European 
War,  36 ;  no  business  in  China, 
36-43 ;  brought  havoc  to  China, 
168;  should  have  been  a  war 
for  principle,  262;  should  have 
overthrown  autocracy,  263 ; 
ended  on  basis  of  Wilson's 
principles,  279. 


Wu,  C.  C:  helps  bring  China 
into  war,  91;  supposed  to 
draft  letter  to  German  Min- 
ister, 94;  favoured  imion  with 
America  on  war  question,  99; 
quoted  concerning  Britain's 
demands  about  Tibet,  126. 

Wu  Ting- fang:  Minister  Foreign 
AflFairs,  91;  favoured  aligning 
with  America  on  war  question, 
99;  wanted  China  at  Peace 
Table,  99;  becomes  acting 
Premier,  102;  refuses  to  coun- 
tersign mandate  to  dissolve 
Parliament,  103;  quoted  on 
democracy  versus  militarism, 
131 ;  of  constitutional  party, 
264. 

Wyllie,  W.  L.:  on  Grerman  Pacific 
Squadron,  41. 


Young  China:  appealed  to,  on 
China's  entering  the  war,  91 ; 
captivated  by  sweeping  away 
the  "  archaic,"  92 ;  favoured 
aligning  with  America,  99; 
turned  away  from  Premier's 
leadership  on  war  question, 
101;  democratic  ideas  of,  not 
backed  by  democratic  nations, 
264. 

Yuan  Shih-kai:  in  Korea,  3;  in 
coup  of  1898,  8;  becomes  Presi- 
dent, 14;  not  liked  by  Japa- 
nese, 3,  14,  39,  65;  improves 
arrangement  with  Germans, 
29;  asks  author  to  work  for 
China's  neutrality,  38;  accepts 
Japanese  advice  as  to  war 
zone,  56;  receives  Twenty -one 
Demands,  65;  has  plan  to  save 
face,  67;  prevented  revolt,  68; 
able  to  lessen  Japan's  demands, 
69;  makes  tentative  overture 
on  joining  the  var,  86,  87 ;  as 
compared  with  Li  Yuan-hung, 
88. 


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